I could swear that some months ago you argued when I criticised this very thing in Helmand. What's changed?Originally Posted by William F. Owen
I could swear that some months ago you argued when I criticised this very thing in Helmand. What's changed?
The "little forts" in Helmand are FOBs. - Patrol Bases. I was referring to the conduct of defence in combat operations. Two entirely different conditions.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
How come siting and defending a base in Afghanistan is not governed by standard defensive principles?
...and what standard defensive principle would those be?
A FOB is a facility from which to mount operations, and the location itself may provide operational advantages, such as surveillance of a route or an area. The Surveillance Towers in South Armagh, were sited to give the most efficient coverage of the boarder. Had a Soviet MRR been coming north from the Republic, they would not have been where they were.
A FOB in A'Stan is in a very, very low threat environment. Siting is in no way critical. Taking on a proficient mobile enemy with AFVs is a different game altogether.
Having said that, the base at Wanat was clearly badly sited and there for all the wrong reasons. The SF Base at Lang-Vei, over run during Tet, was never constructed with Tanks (PT-76's) in mind. Compare and contrast, the SF Base at Kontum, which straddled the main road.
The differentiation is really all down to your core functions analysis. A FOB in A'Stan is "Found." If you were an Armoured Coy in Germany facing the Soviets, and you got "found" you were probably going to be dead before the fight began.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
May I suggest that you access and read the following without delay:
Army Field Manual (AFM)
Volume One - Combined Arms Operations
Part 10 - Counter Insurgency Operations
ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 8
FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASES
All will be revealed.
OK so getting found is the problem. So in the defence you have have resources that will find the enemy forming up/gathering/grouping then you have the ability to break up their attack before it begins, yes?
(See:
ARMY FIELD MANUAL
VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATION
PART 1 - FORMATION TACTIC
PART 2 – THE CONDUCT OF FORMATION LEVEL OPERATIONS
SECTION 4 — OFFENSIVE SUPPORT
712. General
a. (1) Engaging the enemy early to disrupt the cohesion of his attack, reduce his information gathering capability and his ability to mass combat power.)
OK, so that said you also need to make urgent reference to the following:
ARMY FIELD MANUAL
VOLUME 1 - COMBINED ARMS OPERATION
PART 2 - BATTLEGROUP TACTICS
PART B - TACTICS AT THE BATTLEGROUP LEVEL
CHAPTER 7 - DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
SECTION 1 - THE FUNDAMENTALS
Trust me its all there...
The problem in Afghanistan is that "young" and inexperienced Brigadiers, Lt Cols and majors have been allowed to make it up as they go along.
...sadly the Brits have never been able to learn from their own mistakes. I'm told by those who know that it is due to the levels of arrogance which rise in step with officer promotions. That is why it is widely accepted that apart from a rare few, British officers are mainly followed out of curiosity.
Last edited by JMA; 01-27-2011 at 08:08 PM.
Don't need to read it. I spend a lot of time pointing out why what in the manual is complete rubbish. Most of what is wrong today is because of what is written in the manual.
Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy. IF the AFM you cite, does not make that clear, then it is just wrong. - like a great deal of British AFMs.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf, that you have strong opinions on certain matters does not necessarily make you correct (I assume you realise this).
I'm not sure what your military service and counter insurgency credentials are but I suggest that you may be making to bold a use of the red pen.
The Brits normally place the following in the Preface:
So where does the problem lie? With the doctrine or the military judgement of commanders on the ground?"The subject matter contained within this publication is authoritative. However, its application is a matter of military judgement."
The use of fortified bases in low-intensity conflicts such as in Afghanistan or Iraq isn't the same thing as trying to use them to defend against a corps of German Panzer and Panzer-Grenadier divisions during World War II. This goes back to the many different permutations of tactical and operational situations that come under the all-encompassing category of "Full-Spectrum Operations."
Pete, I would have thought it was obvious that the enemy capabilities would be taken into account when such a based is sited.
Neither you nor Wilf seem able to explain that if the Principles of Defence are not used to guide the siting and development of an FOB then what basis is used.
Frankly, in most places, the capabilities of the Taliban and other associated militants (HIG, Haqqani network, etc.) against a well-established fixed-site defense are negligible. Witness exactly ZERO coalition outposts overrun in the last 9 plus years, and only one fully set outpost even seriously threatened, AFAIK.
Sometimes, you have to fight where you need to be for operational and/or strategic reasons (population centers, etc), instead of getting to choose to fight from the best tactical position. It sucks, but that's the way it is.
The principles are used.
However, they are often (too often, I and some say...) modified to adapt to one to three other factors; in no particular order as that order will vary depending upon location, from time to time and from unit to unit, those are:
- Desires (presumed or real) of the next higher commander or (more scarily) one of his staff weenies. This includes those cases where a Grid reference was given, arrival on site showed it to be a poor choice but the base was established where directed anyway rather than a simple call back saying "It's not a good location, I'm moving 850m north..."
- Desired or directed (by someone who likely has not been on the ground but relied upon a map or aerial recon) proximity to a Village or feature.
- Equipment and labor available. That needs a bit explanation to anyone with Commonwealth (or similar) service. Unlike the British and many other Armies, US Troops do not defend well. They never have. Nor do they dig well. We are too lazy. We'd rather build sandbag castles to be RPG targets and hope that doesn't happen. There are many reasons, most a bit flaky in the eyes of some but in sum they mean that the US Army has never done well at defense. It may be noteworthy that most British battles of renown are defensive while almost all US battles of significance are offensive. One would think the US would adapt to that and make USE of known strengths while avoiding known weaknesses. One would think...
That explains most or at least some poor location selections by the US. Can't speak for the UK or others.
Added: Slow typing strikes again, 82redleg beat me with a more concise and good answer. His point on zero successful attack / overuns is important as it contributes to the "It's not worth a whole lot of effort" attitude. His final comment is also correct -- as it always is, in every Army...
P.S.
To the impersonator of 82redleg below: He, the real 82redleg, is smarter than that -- he noted ol' Ken couldn't even spell 'use' correctly...
Last edited by Ken White; 01-31-2011 at 02:26 AM. Reason: Addendum. + P.S. + Dumba$% typo.
Anytime I get an "attaboy" from Ken, it makes me feel good
That I suppose should read "The Principles of the Defense should be being used."
Yes, partially. There are obviously poor location selections and then there are poor defensive sitings of the positions on the locations themselves.However, they are often (too often, I and some say...) modified to adapt to one to three other factors; in no particular order as that order will vary depending upon location, from time to time and from unit to unit, those are:
- Desires (presumed or real) of the next higher commander or (more scarily) one of his staff weenies. This includes those cases where a Grid reference was given, arrival on site showed it to be a poor choice but the base was established where directed anyway rather than a simple call back saying "It's not a good location, I'm moving 850m north..."
- Desired or directed (by someone who likely has not been on the ground but relied upon a map or aerial recon) proximity to a Village or feature.
- Equipment and labor available. That needs a bit explanation to anyone with Commonwealth (or similar) service. Unlike the British and many other Armies, US Troops do not defend well. They never have. Nor do they dig well. We are too lazy. We'd rather build sandbag castles to be RPG targets and hope that doesn't happen. There are many reasons, most a bit flaky in the eyes of some but in sum they mean that the US Army has never done well at defense. It may be noteworthy that most British battles of renown are defensive while almost all US battles of significance are offensive. One would think the US would adapt to that and make USE of known strengths while avoiding known weaknesses. One would think...
That explains most or at least some poor location selections by the US. Can't speak for the UK or others.
My sole point was in contrast with what Wilf appeared to suggest and that was that the standard Principles of Defence are indeed always important in siting a defensive or base location whether at formation level or down to even platoon outposts and temporary bases. I maintain quite simply that the Principles of Defense are universal. I asked if the Principles of Defence don't apply, what does.
Yes it is generally understood that "the US Army has never done well at defense" and that this has not been taken into account in US military planning remains a mystery.
Not sure that all the blame can be moved upwards for what happens on the ground.
But Ken his answer is not relevant in the context of what was being discussed. Where does the measure of a base/outpost being overrun become the yardstick by which it is assessed whether the Principles of the Defence have been adhered to on the construction and development of a base or outpost?Added: Slow typing strikes again, 82redleg beat me with a more concise and good answer. His point on zero successful attack / overuns is important as it contributes to the "It's not worth a whole lot of effort" attitude. His final comment is also correct -- as it always is, in every Army...
Months ago I raised the issue of the futile construction and occupation of Beau Geste Forts supposedly as a platform from which to launch offensive action against the Taliban (and in so doing deny them freedom of movement).
The history shows that the Taliban through the widespread use of IEDs and small arms harassment turned what was envisaged as platform from which to launch offensive action into nothing more than an isolated (from the community) fort from which ISAF soldiers ventured out at the their peril (from IEDs and ambushes).
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