The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[William F. Owen]

That is the first time I think I have seen my small unit fire support concept validated. I prefer the 25mm "payload" rifle for versatility but old Carl or a Foglore with updated fire control would be a close second. I do feel infantry has a role past 300m however, just not the fire teams.
Reed

Going back as far as we do Reed, I think we've always agreed on the merit of something more than bullets. I'm really not worried which weapon it is, as long as 3-5 can effectively carry and employ it. You may want to look at the ALCOTAN-100

Mix of a AT-4 LAW type weapons with a Fire Control System. Goes to 600m. M-32 with MV 40mm with go to 800m. Do you care?

[jcustis]

What target are we going afterwith a support weapon that big, heavy, and slow to get into action? I certainly hope we aren't talking about troops in the open, even if at a range of 300m and beyond.

[reed11b]

What target are we going afterwith a support weapon that big, heavy, and slow to get into action? I certainly hope we aren't talking about troops in the open, even if at a range of 300m and beyond.

25mm payload rifle and MK-32 can get into play pretty darn quick, at least as quick as a 240B if not quicker.
Reed

[jcustis]

25mm payload rifle and MK-32 can get into play pretty darn quick, at least as quick as a 240B if not quicker.
Reed

I buy where you are going with those types. above 40mm and I start to wince.

[AlexTX ret]

Going back as far as we do Reed, I think we've always agreed on the merit of something more than bullets. I'm really not worried which weapon it is, as long as 3-5 can effectively carry and employ it. You may want to look at the ALCOTAN-100

Mix of a AT-4 LAW type weapons with a Fire Control System. Goes to 600m. M-32 with MV 40mm with go to 800m. Do you care?

Wilf, I finally found out our major sticking point. Recognized policy for most counties small unit tactics reduce (maybe to almost nothing) the value of the individual rifleman except to keep the enemy from disrupting the crew served weapon. This comes straight from WW2. The Germans kept rebuilding the 10 man squad with its embedded M34/m40 LMG. It proved its effectiveness over and over. The American squad with its BAR wasn't the killer it was supposed to be. I won't go into the supply problems that a normal squad/platoon went through because of all the cartridge types that the squad/platoon had. The M1 rifle was effective but the BAR proved less than spectaclar. It was too light and fragile to be used as an effective LMG. The platoon's M1919 30 cal MMGs were effective but there weren't enough of them in a platoon.

So today, it matters little what the cartridge or rifle is as long as it can keep the bad guys at bay. The real killing will be done by crew served weapons.

In this case, you're right in your convictions. It fits the prevalent operational mission of the squad/platoon. The SAW is sort of a aberation. All the minimum parameters of the inefficent rifle round and all the requirements of a crew served weapons. No wonder so many feel that it is a pile of sh*t.

I on the other hand work with nonstandard requirements and getting the best bang for the buck. Most of my clients are knowledgeable about the effect of crew served weapons but they feel the need to put them under the control of more experienced (and politically correct) officers and ncos. So I have a reason to try and get the most out of thier riflemen and see a need for a family of weapons that has a greater effective range, reliable, semi and controllable auto fire and needs less training. They have to take up the slack of the fewer crew served weapons and those that they have are usually older and proven reilable. For the most part if they'e using the American system (High overal cost is a disadvantage) this means the "pig" (M60) and there is really no answer to the RPG7v2-3 unless they fall back on a recoiless rifle of some sort. Most American weapons are expensive, cumbersome and need a lot of expesive training.

I sort of see it as a view of the future. We are going through cost cuts and restructuring of our military to fit a smaller profile. maybe it's time to look at all our assumptions and see if changes need to be made.

Actually I will take it one step further. While foot powered units show weaknesses, there are more than a few countires that are seeing a tendency of using less tanks (expensive and too big to ship easily) and instead of going to a more and more effective IFVs caring a section of Infantry. In Russia, this means the new BMP 4 with its 100mm gun and (hopefully) fanatical soldiers, that can be shipped easily to the point of conflict. The Contract Soldier program has been a failure for it is no more effective than their present conscript program. So there go the "fanatical" soldiers. But the creation of more intense squad weapon assets on the IFV show a need for more simple riflemen, IAR and SDM (SVD rifle) specialists.

The Americans tried this and is failing. The Bradley was effective for a while but now there are a larger and more powerful weapons packages out there. Also, the Bradley was never that easy to pack up and ship anywhere. Also it didn't fit our squad profile of 9 men easily. Under such conditions, it is cramped and in the case of long rides/confinment, it is very taxing.

I have studied the Israeli system and while it is more effective in most areas, it show a certain weakness in urban environments. ESP. in anti-terrorist insurgency missions. I have my masters in the international relationships though my specialty was in insurgency and non traditional forms of government. So I'm a bit sensitive to the effects of world wide political opinion on the actions of the individual state.

[Ken White]

The M1 rifle was effective but the BAR proved less than spectaclar. It was too light and fragile to be used as an effective LMG. The platoon's M1919 30 cal MMGs were effective but there weren't enough of them in a platoon.

That's a statement that is questionable. The BAR did what it was supposed to and did it well. There were better weapons available-- the Johnson for one example; the Bren and Type 99 for a couple of more -- but the BAR , like the M4 tank or the M16 series was adequate. It was light, it was not fragile.

The issue raised is whether the US / British squad was not as effective as the German squad due to weapons selection -- or training level.

So today, it matters little what the cartridge or rifle is as long as it can keep the bad guys at bay. The real killing will be done by crew served weapons.

Not against a well trained enemy they won't...

I see a need for a family of weapons that has a greater effective range, reliable, semi and controllable auto fire and needs less training.

The 'need' for automatic fire is vastly overstated and is a compensation for marginal training.

[AlexTX ret]

That's a statement that is questionable. The BAR did what it was supposed to and did it well. There were better weapons available-- the Johnson for one example; the Bren and Type 99 for a couple of more -- but the BAR , like the M4 tank or the M16 series was adequate. It was light, it was not fragile.

The issue raised is whether the US / British squad was not as effective as the German squad due to weapons selection -- or training level.Not against a well trained enemy they won't...The 'need' for automatic fire is vastly overstated and is a compensation for marginal training.

The BAR was an old concept and an old weapon by the time I was ready to play with it. I lugged it for a while. There were problems with it that couldn't be fixed. It would over heat easily esp. in extended fire fights. Its rate of fire was to0 slow for my tastes. Finally the mags had a distinct problem of the mouth of the magazine deforming. I trained the troops I was with to fight a M60. All teams finally did the same at one point or another. Yes, Ken, ammunition was a bitch but it was worth the hassle. Then, suprisingly, all problems were magically whisked away.

Wilf, maybe it took one man to fight it but it took the whole squad to support it. For one thing, it took everyone in the unit to carry a mag or two for the gunner (me) couldn't carry all the ammo that we would need for a mission.

Problem with adquate is that it is almost a mathematical proposition. The Panther or Tiger tank could be overcome by 5:1 or 10:1 ratio of Shermans to either German tank. But we would comeout victorious in the end. Yeah! But what happen to those other 4 or more American tanks that were lost trying to stop the German tank.? At 5 men per Tank, how many casualties were there? I see a problem there.

The American Rifleman with his M1 rifle and sufficent ammunition was the best equipped on the field. His moral had a tendency to break but then squads/platoons would quickly reform (with or without the leader being present) and go back into fight. I think the Japanese reliance on "fighting spirit" was over rated but in anycase, it was the American soldier that showed who had fighting spirit. That overcame the need for auto fire.

However, I'm torn. If your training is excellent and your group has Espirt de Corps, no, auto fire can be more trouble that its worth. But today's operational policies being what they are. I don't have that faith. A barely adquate weapon with quick and dirty training bring what to the small unit. Ken, as you said before armies seem to reduce training costs but are willing to spend so much more in action cost in material if not casualties.

Not sure of your point here. Yes, some weapons are disproportionately effective in breaking the enemies will. Obviously how you sustain, manoeuvre and apply those weapons within your tactical doctrine, is extremely important.
The German Squad of 1940 was 13 men, not 10. Treat with extreme caution what folks say about German infantry organisation. By mid 1944 almost all German infantry units task organised and threw the TOE in the bin.

First of all, yes, the original German squad was 13 men and a M34 LMG. I learned to look at it as a 10 man team and one LMG section. However, losses reduced it to a 10 men total, of which 2 would fight the M34/M42.

Yes, your tactical doctrine is formost in its importance. However, The Germans refused to add new technology or change its Small Unit Tactics until casualties force them to change their policies. That's your task orientated units. They didn't have the manpower to keep creating "old" squad TO&Es. The was the driving force behind the Sturmgewehr 44. SMGs were too short ranged to be affective and the full power round took too much training to be put to best use. So they relooked at their tactics and decided the STG 44 was the perfect compromise.

[Ken White]

The BAR ... problems with it that couldn't be fixed. It would over heat easily esp. in extended fire fights. Its rate of fire was to0 slow for my tastes. Finally the mags had a distinct problem of the mouth of the magazine deforming.

I saw with the BAR. First thing one should do is dump that clunky bipod and useless carrying handle, then take out and discard the actuator, actuator spring, sear release and buffer key -- that cuts the weight down to about 17 plus pounds and converts your officially dual auto fire weapon to an illegal (regulation-wise) but practical one that fires semi-auto and full auto at about 600rpm cyclic, 200rpm effective -- slightly faster than an M-60 but not quite as fast as an M-240. Got in a fight or two here and there, never had an overheat problem if the weapon was used as it should have been. Anyone who tried to use it as a LMG probably would have problems.

Magazine lips were easily disturbed, no question. Simple solution was operator training which was effective. Not a difficult fix. Though one did have to occasionally throw a steel helmet at a Troop to insure he paid attention and didn't just drop or fling his BAR Belt...

The key a fire fight is accurate suppressive fire, not volume of fire -- the BAR, Bren and Type 99 (arguably one of the best LMG/AR designs ever) are about 3x as accurate as any MG that was available before the M-60 / MAG 58 / M-240 / PKM / SS-77 and the BAR is twice as accurate as those. It was adequate for the task at the time.

[AlexTX ret]

I saw with the BAR. First thing one should do is dump that clunky bipod and useless carrying handle, then take out and discard the actuator, actuator spring, sear release and buffer key -- that cuts the weight down to about 17 plus pounds and converts your officially dual auto fire weapon to an illegal (regulation-wise) but practical one that fires semi-auto and full auto at about 600rpm cyclic, 200rpm effective -- slightly faster than an M-60 but not quite as fast as an M-240. Got in a fight or two here and there, never had an overheat problem if the weapon was used as it should have been. Anyone who tried to use it as a LMG probably would have problems.

Problem was that there just wasn't enough fire power in the mix of troops with me. Also training wasn't as good as it could of been. But I've made my comments obout ARVN policies and how we reacted to them.

Wish I had thought about that before I went in the bush. It would of solved a lot of my problems though when we got the pig a lot of my problems dried up. And when I got through training the troops with me, even more problems solved themselves.

Magazine lips were easily disturbed, no question. Simple solution was operator training which was effective. Not a difficult fix. Though one did have to occasionally throw a steel helmet at a Troop to insure he paid attention and didn't just drop or fling his BAR Belt...

You had a busy helmet...

The problem was that I had to distibute my extra magazines among the troops and how they were taken care of was out of my hands, though not out of my thoughts.

The key a fire fight is accurate suppressive fire, not volume of fire -- the BAR, Bren and Type 99 (arguably one of the best LMG/AR designs ever) are about 3x as accurate as any MG that was available before the M-60 / MAG 58 / M-240 / PKM / SS-77 and the BAR is twice as accurate as those. It was adequate for the task at the time.

Yep, right up untill you found youself in a place that Charlie really didn't want you there. Then it was like trying to mother a group of brownies. Just keeping them from running like scared rabbits at first was my job one. They got much better as time got on but then in the genius of the Army, they were all taken away.

I thiink there is a definate place for a IAR. It has advantages across the board. After the SAW, things can't get much worse.

[Ken White]

My good fortune perhaps was that my combat BAR experience was in the Marines and having three of the monsters with 13 (or more often, 10 ) men made a difference -- particularly when all the others knew to pick up the BAR and belt (carefully) if necessary and keep moving.

Yes, Helmet was busy, would've used a 2x4 but there were never any around; Helmet worked fine. My fearless leaders, Marine and Army, could never figure out why my hats always had so many dents...

Learned the trick from an old Gunnery Sergeant who'd been a Corporal in Nicaragua. He also taught me that I could see at night -- and told me not to write stuff down because if I lost the paper I wouldn't know what I was s'posed to do. That last was really beneficial -- I cheerfully drove a number of meeting holders nuts for over 40 years by not taking notes.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, I finally found out our major sticking point. Recognized policy for most counties small unit tactics reduce (maybe to almost nothing) the value of the individual rifleman except to keep the enemy from disrupting the crew served weapon. This comes straight from WW2. The Germans kept rebuilding the 10 man squad with its embedded M34/m40 LMG. It proved its effectiveness over and over.

Not sure of your point here. Yes, some weapons are disproportionately effective in breaking the enemies will. Obviously how you sustain, manoeuvre and apply those weapons within your tactical doctrine, is extremely important.
The German Squad of 1940 was 13 men, not 10. Treat with extreme caution what folks say about German infantry organisation. By mid 1944 almost all German infantry units task organised and threw the TOE in the bin.

The M1 rifle was effective but the BAR proved less than spectaclar. It was too light and fragile to be used as an effective LMG. The platoon's M1919 30 cal MMGs were effective but there weren't enough of them in a platoon.

Like Ken, I'd dispute the BAR as fragile.
The M1 and BAR fired the same cartridge from the same barrel length. The BAR had a bi-pod, was fully automatic and useable by 1 man (the MG-42 was not) - so the BAR was an enhanced M1. It was a true Light Automatic Rifle, and it was a very good idea in 1919. Not so great by 1940, but in terms of what it was designed for, more than adequate.

So today, it matters little what the cartridge or rifle is as long as it can keep the bad guys at bay. The real killing will be done by crew served weapons.

That's too simplistic, but yes you need a combination of weapons in the platoon. Heavier weapons will have heavier effect.

In this case, you're right in your convictions. It fits the prevalent operational mission of the squad/platoon. The SAW is sort of a aberation. All the minimum parameters of the inefficent rifle round and all the requirements of a crew served weapons. No wonder so many feel that it is a pile of sh*t.

Thanks, and that is essentially mine, Ken's, Reed's and many others case. Convictions and a body of empirical evidence are not the same thing.

• Actually I will take it one step further. While foot powered units show weaknesses, there are more than a few countires that are seeing a tendency of using less tanks (expensive and too big to ship easily) and instead of going to a more and more effective IFVs caring a section of Infantry.
• The Americans tried this and is failing. The Bradley was effective for a while but now there are a larger and more powerful weapons packages out there. Also, the Bradley was never that easy to pack up and ship anywhere. Also it didn't fit our squad profile of 9 men easily. Under such conditions, it is cramped and in the case of long rides/confinment, it is very taxing.

Well that's another can of worms, and it comes down to what you actually want the infantry to do. I think IFVs are not good for infantry. APCs are however essential.

I have studied the Israeli system and while it is more effective in most areas, it show a certain weakness in urban environments. ESP. in anti-terrorist insurgency missions.

What system? Almost everything the IDF does makes extremely good sense, if you see the problem in the way they do. This is very hard for modern Brits and Americans because few if any have ever fought a war within 100km of where you were born.

So I'm a bit sensitive to the effects of world wide political opinion on the actions of the individual state.

Individual states like the US or smaller non-Christian individual states?

[AlexTX ret]

The funny thing is that I'm in a similar argument on another forum and I think they're mostly staff types without any real combat experience. So they are able to quote me chapter and verse but not explain why. It's kin of sad.

That is not the problem here...

Not sure of your point here. Yes, some weapons are disproportionately effective in breaking the enemies will. Obviously how you sustain, manoeuvre and apply those weapons within your tactical doctrine, is extremely important.

Yes, but does these superior weapons that do more damage slow down the small unit to a point that it can't maneuver effectively. This is where I go back to the individual rifleman. In WW2 and for the most part, Korea, our rifleman was the best in the field. It took Chinese massive body of troops to overwhelm us and then we regrouped and struck back time after time.

We have barely adquate rifle but that is not as big a thing that it could be, for everybody uses something similar. So crew served weapons gain a preeminence on the field of battle. Except for room sweeping and such very confining extremely short range stuff, I read tactical theory that shows more men are killed by artillery than anything else. However, the crew served weapon comes a close second.

However, all countries are looking into bring the fight back to the very manueverable small unit. From what I read there is still much debate on the effectiveness of the Ind. Rifleman and should it be increased. Is training important enough to increase spending for it. In the British Regimental System where soldiers would sign up for enlistmants as long as 20 years. There could be an overwhelming need to increase training and spend the money on a soldier that would be there for the long haul. However, in most countries the average enlistment is for 3-4 years. Is it worth the expense to better train a soldier that will be up and out when his first enlistment is up.

Crew served weapons would be the resoncibility of the troops that would stay more than one term. Extra training would be worth the training there. So there are factors other than tactical doctrine that are being researched by many countries.

Like Ken, I'd dispute the BAR as fragile.
The M1 and BAR fired the same cartridge from the same barrel length. The BAR had a bi-pod, was fully automatic and useable by 1 man (the MG-42 was not) - so the BAR was an enhanced M1. It was a true Light Automatic Rifle, and it was a very good idea in 1919. Not so great by 1940, but in terms of what it was designed for, more than adequate.

The Russians took that concept and made a better IAR in the RPK system. It is more than adequate and is quite effective. Its much more than a heavy barreled AKM. Of course there have been a few technolgical changes since 1919.

Thanks, and that is essentially mine, Ken's, Reed's and many others case. Convictions and a body of empirical evidence are not the same thing.

Yes, but the SAW fails in both reguards.

Well that's another can of worms, and it comes down to what you actually want the infantry to do. I think IFVs are not good for infantry. APCs are however essential.

I think that IFVs make more sense if you can afford them for they carry sufficent weapons to become the tactical support for your section of dismounted troops.

However, this quickly falls into an argument if IFVs are worth the added expense and usefulness over the ability of the "Battle Taxi" to carry your soldiers comfortably and ready for combat if not better protected armor wise.

Nevertheless, Is the Styker system any better. People have used wheeled vehicles for combat carriers and I still provide them upon request. But are they the answer for wheeled carriers have a distinct disadvantage as they are force to stay on level terrain or just have a tendency to do so. So is the wheeled IFV worth anything at all?

What system? Almost everything the IDF does makes extremely good sense, if you see the problem in the way they do. This is very hard for modern Brits and Americans because few if any have ever fought a war within 100km of where you were born.

I don't find it hard to understand. I was confused when Israel traded land for peace with people who have distinct problems with Isreal existing at all. Except for Eygpt which keeps its own counsel, all other countires are at best concerned about their populations rising up in a religous jihad if they don't show proper disrespect for Isreal. But it isn't my call...

Individual states like the US or smaller non-Christian individual states?

Hmmm. This is a discussion best served over a few beers.

[William F. Owen]

I read tactical theory that shows more men are killed by artillery than anything else. However, the crew served weapon comes a close second.

It's not theory, it's fact, based on the RAMC collated causality figures from WW1, WW2 and Korea.

However, all countries are looking into bring the fight back to the very manueverable small unit. From what I read there is still much debate on the effectiveness of the Ind. Rifleman and should it be increased. Is training important enough to increase spending for it.

I don't see this at all. I see no interest in developing the Platoon in the US, the UK except via hanging computers off them. Training is everything, and it's not that expensive. I have a personal opinion that we don't do it very well, because we don't seem to see a relationship between what training costs and what performance increase it actually creates.

If you can't train operationally effective infantrymen in under 6-8 months, you are doing something wrong.

The Russians took that concept and made a better IAR in the RPK system. It is more than adequate and is quite effective. Its much more than a heavy barreled AKM. Of course there have been a few technolgical changes since 1919.

Well prior to the RPK the Russians had the RPD. They replaced the RPD with the RPK. Why? I have a few theories.
Almost every rifle built since 1945 has seen an LAR version -

[jcustis]

Wilf wrote: I don't see this at all. I see no interest in developing the Platoon in the US, the UK except via hanging computers off them. Training is everything, and it's not that expensive. I have a personal opinion that we don't do it very well, because we don't seem to see a relationship between what training costs and what performance increase it actually creates.

If you can't train operationally effective infantrymen in under 6-8 months, you are doing something wrong.

Often, it isn't that we are doing something wrong, but rather that we cannot control outside influences (base-level working parties anyone?) or constraints.

A lot of things influence training, and certainly basic precepts of safety worry us the majority of the time to a degree that I think is dangeriously exaggerated. Ask a platoon commander to take his platoon from a cold start and conduct a non-illuminated night attack, and I doubt many could do it without extensive rehearsals beyond what we execute for reasonable safety considerations as a dry run. Why can't he do that you ask, when he is certainly trained in its execution? We tend to get too busy doing a lot of other things that are deemed necessary by folks outside our immediate sphere.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
.....my combat BAR experience was in the Marines and having three of the monsters with 13 (or more often, 10 ) men made a difference.....

Rifleman wrote: This seems important to me. My understanding is that the traditional 13-man USMC rifle squad (and the fire team concept as we know it) was built in 1944 to maximize the BAR's strengths. The BAR is what the USMC had to work with and they made the most of it by having three BARs per squad and three Garand riflemen manuvering around and supporting each BAR. I think the USMC squad had one (or two?) more BARs than Army squads of the same era did.

But could it not be said that the smaller German squad during the same era made best use of what they had to work with: the MG42? My understanding is that the German SOP was to get the gun into action; the Mauser riflemen screened and packed ammo to the gun.

So might not the AR v. LMG argument hedge on squad size and organization? It just seems to me that larger TOE squads can make best use of the AR and fire teams, but that smaller TOE (plus often being understrength) squads built around an LMG, a grenadier, and a handful of riflemen (and too small for internal fire teams) have been just as successful. Of course that type of squad requires fire and manuever to begin at platoon and not squad level. A smaller squad can usually fire or manuever but usually not both without being reinforced.

I know I've stated this idea before but it seems worth repeating - especially considering the recent posts. But my experience is peacetime light infantry, not combat, so someone tell me if their combat experience says that I'm way off base here.

I think you are on to something with this. Considering the derision with which our own infantry seem to view the SAW (just look at how it gets issued to "the boot" when the TO/E calls for the next senior man after the TL), I don't think the Corps will get its head around just how the AR/LMG fits into our tactics because we are for the most part very immature about the concept of employment in the first place. It just seems as though very few officers and senior enlisted have though about the issue in the least.

We definitely do not organize ourselves to support the SAW-man. He predominantly humps his own ammo, while other team and squad-mates get the burden's share of 60mm ammo and AT-4 rounds, as well as batteries, specialized kits for tacital site exploitation, etc. Heck, it may just be that we simply do not have a large enough loadout of ammo for the SAW-men to make them effective for any duration, thus the heavier reliance on the combined arms concepts of M203 and direct fire employment.

The SAW is also integral to the movement of the team as a whole, since we preach fire and maneuver down to the squad level, more than we preach establishing a base of fire where the riflemen support the SAWs (we do bases of fire, but just not with the SAWs so prominently figured.

I have not seen it first-hand, but I know that there is a degradation of lightfighter skills occuring, since nowadays just about every rifleman also has to have an incidental HMMWV license, be qualified in escaping from it while hanging inverted, and has to have (sometimes to the extreme) familiarity with CSWs because we have killed more troops through NDs that we have killed bad guys it seems.

I started out as a light infantryman and am now in the light armored recce community, where we transport scouts in what could be considered hybrids (certainly considering how we fight them). Our recce/cav doctrine should very clearly delineate who supports whom, when, and where, but in practical application we have some difficulties deciding just what to do.

[Ken White]

Considering the derision with which our own infantry seem to view the SAW (just look at how it gets issued to "the boot" when the TO/E calls for the next senior man after the TL)...

Peacetime foolishness (both the TOE design and the boot getting the weapon) and the Squad Leader (and the Platoon Sergeant. Not the PL) is at fault for allowing it, it'll change in a real war when it will go to the guy who can use it best.

We definitely do not organize ourselves to support the SAW-man. He predominantly humps his own ammo, while other team and squad-mates get the burden's share of 60mm ammo and AT-4 rounds, as well as batteries, specialized kits for tacital site exploitation, etc. Heck, it may just be that we simply do not have a large enough loadout of ammo for the SAW-men to make them effective for any duration, thus the heavier reliance on the combined arms concepts of M203 and direct fire employment.

FWIW, I think the emphasis is right. HE stuff is better than 5.56 rounds

(we do bases of fire, but just not with the SAWs so prominently figured.

That's right IMO, the SAW is just one weapon and is not as likely to keep heads down as accurate fire from the rifles or HE from the 203. Plus, the automatic weapon always draws attention; they should be fired less than they usually are...

[William F. Owen]

I don't think the Corps will get its head around just how the AR/LMG fits into our tactics because we are for the most part very immature about the concept of employment in the first place. It just seems as though very few officers and senior enlisted have though about the issue in the least.

If this is true, and I am not doubting you, it would strongly suggest that the USMC has no clear idea as the relative effects and benefits of the weapons in the platoon. The UK certainly has the same problem, because it has focussed on loading up 3 sections, with identical fire teams, and wants to treat the "section as a platform."

This problem will persist as long as we train folks "how do things" and not "why to do things."

[reed11b]

Well that's another can of worms, and it comes down to what you actually want the infantry to do. I think IFVs are not good for infantry. APCs are however essential.

Disagree in a way... IFV's manned by Infantry as an intregal part of the infantry platoon is bad from infantry becouse it creates a huge tax on infantry skills and manpower. IFV's manned by dedicated IFV crewmen, i.e. 19Whatevers, in a dedicated IFV platoon, could be a valuable battlefield support. Still chewing on Ken's dragoon concept as an alternative to my infantry is infantry is infantry theory.
Reed

[William F. Owen]

Disagree in a way... IFV's manned by Infantry as an intregal part of the infantry platoon is bad from infantry becouse it creates a huge tax on infantry skills and manpower. IFV's manned by dedicated IFV crewmen, i.e. 19Whatevers, in a dedicated IFV platoon, could be a valuable battlefield support. Still chewing on Ken's dragoon concept as an alternative to my infantry is infantry is infantry theory.
Reed

Can't disagree with your logic Reed! In fact I agree!

Problem here is the very fine line between IFV and APC. What gives me grief is a vehicle that is essentially a light tank or reconnaissance vehicle, being used to transport infantry.

I am inclined to the view that there are Tanks, and there are APCs. I am worried about "hybrids" not able to do either job very well.

....and I've seen an M2 Bradely "they" took the turret off, fitted another 4 men inside, and used the spare weight to add more armour.

[AlexTX ret]

Disagree in a way... IFV's manned by Infantry as an intregal part of the infantry platoon is bad from infantry becouse it creates a huge tax on infantry skills and manpower. IFV's manned by dedicated IFV crewmen, i.e. 19Whatevers, in a dedicated IFV platoon, could be a valuable battlefield support. Still chewing on Ken's dragoon concept as an alternative to my infantry is infantry is infantry theory.
Reed

Is your IFV a minitank that carries a section of infantry on the side?

Is it a battle taxi with support weapons added to it as an upgrade ie. M113A3 ACCV?

Is it supposed to take the place of larger, greater weapons load and more expensive MBT or is it an addtional asset? Can it be used in the anti-tank Role? Is it easily transportable with a possible reduction in armor?

Is it meant to operate on its own (or with others of its kind) or must it operate in a mixed weapons force? Is it part of a greater weapons system that does as many of the battlefield tasks as possible ie Stryker with a 90mm gun?

I'm not asking these as b*llsh*t questions for in many (those that can afford them) countries this is a raging fire storm. The loss of the IFV/APC if loaded is 3 crewman and a section of infantry in one strike. If it's an IFV unloaded, there is the loss of small unit assets. In both cases, if unloaded, there is the psychological loss of all the section's personal assets such as extra clothing and possibly extra ammunition as well.

The US answered the question with the Stryker which came out of our Iraq experience. But will it work in a bigger more intense battlefield?

One final question. Where do the vehicle crewmen fit in the command structure? Are they part of the squad/platoon or are they part of the company's assets?

What is your take in all this?

[jcustis]

The US answered the question with the Stryker which came out of our Iraq experience. But will it work in a bigger more intense battlefield?

Which expoerience was that...OIF, or Op Desert Storm?

RSTA squadron doctrine was already being published (with Strykers symbolized in the print vice Brads) as late as 2002.