The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Ken White]

That is a great article. The Journal, as always, has great material...

Couple of things leaped out of the article:

Numerous reasons for the ‘poor’ state of infantry marksmanship were given. They included the lack of suitable ranges near unit barracks leading to insufficient shooting practice, poor fire control by NCOs and junior officers, soldiers deliberately aiming off because training with blank ammunition encouraged them to do so, carriage of excessive amounts of ammunition encouraging profligacy, failure of instructors to instil the desire to shoot to kill, and other reasons. Few of the
complainants mentioned the difficulties of acquiring a target in the combat conditions that prevailed in Vietnam.

I know you two know this but a point or two on that bears voicing; The training complaints are almost certainly valid but the specific conditions in Viet Nam are more valid -- and the fact that the poor training prior was not rapidly adapted to the specific combat arena is troublesome. Not slamming Oz -- witness US performance in Viet Nam and today.

The problem is the bureaucracy cannot or will not shift gears with rapidity and a part of that problem is that the 'Trainers' (and Doctrine writers) are working in air conditioned comfort and tend to adapt what they write and do to cause minimum disruption to what is currently being done at home.

The solution of course is for Theater experienced people 9not short term visitors or observers) to do a trainup on units previously well schooled in the basics with local adaptations to a broad -- NOT specific -- doctrine. As an example from the article, the GPMG to the high ground rule is indicative.

Or an indictment...

If caught in an ambush or a patrol encounter the enemy usually sought to break contact quickly and escape into the jungle. They were very skilled at doing this and—using high volumes of fire and fragmentation effect from AK47s, RPD light machine-guns and RPGs—often broke contact before the 1ATF patrol could organise effective indirect fire support. Artillery responding to an infantry call for fire support usually took about 10 minutes to get effective fire onto a target. Air support could take even longer. But Table 3 shows that in more than 60 per cent of cases, the enemy had already broken contact and escaped in less than10 minutes.

The western reliance on massive HE fire support to win small contacts is counterproductive. That time factor is ALWAYS problematic and numerous patrol actions have fizzled to naught due to the technique.

The 1ATF in Viet Nam was good, the only unit I worked with, 3 RAR, was better than most US units at most everything. Still, the number of VC / NVA initiated contacts they had was very similar to US experience.

If the other guy is initiating most contacts, you're doing something wrong.

Lastly, they wrote one very scary thing in that article. Last paragraph:

Perhaps a future family of small arms will assist this process by capturing electronically the date, time, location, number
of rounds fired and sight picture every time the trigger is squeezed. Once analysed, this data might inform subsequent training and tactics leading to improved combat performance.

Metrics are great. Metrics lend weight to arguments Metrics such as those lend weight to weapons. Not a good plan.

It is a good article but contains no surprises. From it, Wilf will probably derive different lessons but mine are:

- Doctrine must be broad and generic; excess specificity in an attempt to cover all eventualities and directed rigid adherence turn it into dogma and will get people killed unnecessarily.

- Doctrine MUST adapt to the enemy and all the METT-TC factors of the moment. If it does not, it is wrong and must be discarded.

- Training must be thorough and well grounded in the basics of the trade and must allow for theater or enemy, area and time specific modification. Rigid adherence to one model or 'system' of processes is wrong.

- Theater specific training should be rapidly implemented and be ongoing in theater. All too often, we do not do the latter to avoid 'hassling the troops.' Training isn't hassling, it's life assurance.

- A Volume of fire is no substitute for adequate accurate fire.

- Western reliance -- dependence even -- on supporting fires and lots of HE is rarely applicable in Small Wars and training that emphasizes its use is damaging to not only unit initiative and aggressiveness but also to actual prosecution of contacts and even the war.

- Weapons must be selected with broadest possible usage in mind if funds are limited. If adequate funds are available, theater specific weapons should be procured and used.

- Units must be trained with broadest possible usage in mind if funds are limited. Adequate funds must be made available for theater specific weapons and training prior to commitment if possible and absolutely for follow on forces.

There is no one size fits all...

Sommygun. Training and METT-TC. Amazing.

[William F. Owen]

It is a good article but contains no surprises. From it, Wilf will probably derive different lessons but mine are:

Wilf is actually always pretty happy to use other people's useful insight and be freed from the effort of creating his own!! Worked for Vauban!

...but joking aside. I was amazed that this level of data had been captured. Point being, it seems not to have informed UK thinking in any significant way. As of 1980, I was still being subjected to the then new fangled "Training the battle shot," that seemed not to work well even on the range!!

Fast forward 8 years later when I was running the CQB range on Cyprus, found that my platoon's 3F system "Fire till the F**ker Falls" worked pretty dam well!

[Ken White]

Fast forward 8 years later when I was running the CQB range on Cyprus, found that my platoon's 3F system "Fire till the F**ker Falls" worked pretty dam well!

been true for eons...

No matter how well you train 'em, everyone will not be a good aimed shot person; fewer will be good snap shooters. All you have to do is get it ON the target and fate will handle the rest.

Problem is that 'on the target' is translated by many as volume of fire. T'ain't so, most automatic fire is frequently so far off target as to be value negative. Automatic fire should be limited to people that are well trained enough and who have a weapon adequately heavy and accurate to put most of their rounds in the target zone.

I'm a little dubious of the apparent accuracy and finite numbers in their study but I do strongly believe that their overall 800 rounds of small arms per enemy casualty is about right; IIRC, we came up with about the same thing there and in Korea and that tracks with my anecdotal evidence and deteriorating memory...

Really hope that many today note that a 10 minute lag was enough time for the bad guys to slip away -- some things don't change much with respect to METT-TC anywhere, anytime...

[Kiwigrunt]

What I got from this article was a bit of confusion. Many of us on this forum appear to agree that (relatively) accurate semi auto fire suppresses better (more effectively and more efficiently) than wild full auto. That is supported by some articles we’ve discussed here lately.

However, this article indicates (to me anyway) the need for ‘wild’ automatic fire at these very short ranges where the enemy simply cannot be seen. In these situations, how do you make your fire more accurate? And because the range is that short, even a relatively wide dispersion of rounds is not really going to be that far off as to be totally useless for suppression, I think.
Heaven forbid, it looks like a situation where you could almost justify giving everyone a Minimi-type weapon. By the time everyone has gone through their first 200 rnd belt, the job will be over, one way or the other.

So I felt the need to re-read the concept of Drake-shooting.
See here at thread SWC, pdf on SWJ and selousscouts site.

It appears to me that the bush in Rhodesia may not have been as thick as the jungles in Nam and that the range, although still short, would have been a bit longer on average in Rhodesia than in Nam. So I am not sure that the concept of Drake-shooting could have been successfully applied in Nam.

Drake-shooting, as described here, does seem to rely heavily on a larger calibre round to penetrate cover.

And by gum, to apply this concept surgically at such a short range, you’d have to have a pair of hand-grenades for testicles (just don’t pull the pin…..there was actually no pun intended but hey…).

[Ken White]

...this article indicates (to me anyway) the need for ‘wild’ automatic fire at these very short ranges where the enemy simply cannot be seen. In these situations, how do you make your fire more accurate? And because the range is that short, even a relatively wide dispersion of rounds is not really going to be that far off as to be totally useless for suppression, I think

I don't think so. Wild automatic fire puts a lot of rounds out but in heavy jungle, most of those round will go high, may be deflected and generally will not give the proposed recipient the impression he's being fired upon. Better technique is not too rapid semi automatic, aimed low because those deflections and ricochets will go at an angle off thicker trunks and will let the target area know it is just that. Note I said aimed, it has to be aimed. As the article says, that aiming will sometimes be at shadows, fleeting movement or sounds -- and that okay, it will let them know you know they're there -- provide you hold all your shots below waist level.

That's in secondary growth or rain forest with triple canopy. In more open bush (like most of Rhodesia and southern Africa but not much of Central Africa, SE Asia or most of the Amazon area), same techniques as temperate woodland will work and the ranges will be slightly greater.

Heaven forbid, it looks like a situation where you could almost justify giving everyone a Minimi-type weapon. By the time everyone has gone through their first 200 rnd belt, the job will be over, one way or the other.

Not at all. Belt fed weapons are more problematical in heavy bush than they are ordinarily (which is mostly bad enough) because bugs (really) and sticks clutter up up the belts. The moisture doesn't help. Seen pictures of people in the jungle with exposed belts? You've seen pictures of people who were guaranteed misfires due to that clutter and to rounds being knocked out of alignment in the belt. There's a place for belt feds but a patrol is not it.

The actions of the opponent can vary, he may try to disappear; he may try to attack and that's driven by many factors. Every engagement, no matter how small, is different. The key is to spot him before he spots you. Regardless of the opponent, that can be difficult but is never impossible -- it takes solid and hard training and it takes knowing people so leaders know who to place where.

No matter; the key to jungle engagements is aimed (relatively speaking) semi automatic fire and the knowledge that the other guys automatics are likely to be sending three out of four rounds into the trees.

Drake-shooting, as described here, does seem to rely heavily on a larger calibre round to penetrate cover.

That helps -- and the 7.62X39 is a better bush round than is the 5.56 -- but the 7.62X51 is better yet.

[Jones_RE]

Let me see if I'm following what you're saying, Ken.

The shooter should apply the fundamentals of marksmanship even in situations where the enemy cannot be directly seen. You may be aiming at shadows, moving branches or just where you think the sound is coming from but you are aiming at a specific point in space. You can't physically see an enemy occupying that point, but you aim anyway. Correct?

From reading the article it sounds like both the volume and aimed fire schools were missing this point. I wonder what would happen if you tried the different techniques on a target range simulating those conditions, i.e. brush so heavy that you can't physically see the targets but you get indicators like gunfire sounds and movement.

[William F. Owen]

To me it's all pretty clear... which may mean I am completely wrong.... but..

a.) In heavy forest/jungle you can't see the target but you still have to suppress them, so high volumes of fire across broad arcs is merited. The physics of dispersion means this will only work at pretty close range.

b.) At longer ranges, your fire has to be directed either at the enemy that can be seen, or at his suspected position, so more deliberate aimed semi-automatic fire would seem useful. This would also apply in the urban terrain.

Translating that into training may require some thought.

[Ken White]

Jones R.E.

...You may be aiming at shadows, moving branches or just where you think the sound is coming from but you are aiming at a specific point in space. You can't physically see an enemy occupying that point, but you aim anyway.

Some times you see a few but not all, some times you see none, depends on many things; essentially if they're firing at you, you have targets, if vague and shadowy. The key is to fire low generally aimed shots; if your bullets go high, they won't impress anyone and they won't hit anything.

...on a target range simulating those conditions, i.e. brush so heavy that you can't physically see the targets but you get indicators like gunfire sounds and movement.

Been done and was done at the olf Jungle Warfare School in Panama on a routine basis. What happens is that you get a few hits, IIRC the average was about 20-30%+, target placement dependent and enough to deter most opponents -- problem is that targets generally don't move so it's artificial. It works better against people because they have a fifty fifty chance of moving into as well as out of fire cones.

Wilf

a.) In heavy forest/jungle you can't see the target but you still have to suppress them, so high volumes of fire across broad arcs is merited. The physics of dispersion means this will only work at pretty close range.

Agree except for the broad arcs; control in Jungle is very difficult and people do get out of line, ahead others or fall behind totally misoriented, etc. -- best solution with moderately well trained troops is to use a clock system. Fire is directed by a clock number and people restrain their fire to fifteen degrees on either side of that. As each clock number spans 30 degrees, that's easy -- if the word is enemy at 2 O'clock (or it's obvious that's were they are...), then everyone except the point and trail (men or parties) fire at from one to three o'clock. Point and trail get 270 degree arcs for obvious reasons. Most people in the good units in Viet Nam told their troops to flank into an ambush, fire one mag on full auto in short burst obver their arc and then switch to semi-auto. I'm genetically or geriatrically indisposed toward full auto so I always insisted on strictly semi-auto. I know, I know, we don't have to reload after each shot anymore; still...

NOTE; there are many variations, the above is a simple generic meeting engagement or ambush response. Train the basics thoroughly, apply METT-TC...

Whatever; the key is to make sure they aim below waist level and compensate for any slope -- some are amazed at what slope does to firing. Its effects are too often ignored; you can't do that.

At longer ranges...This would also apply in the urban terrain.

True. Takes a lot of Ammo but not hard to train provided you can replicate the vegetation differences to a general level locally. Lacking real greenery, I've taken old shot-up E Silhouette targets and chopped them up a bit. Have also used camouflage nets which I then exchanged for new ones to the S4s distress and my satisfaction. We used BB guns to teach snap shooting in dense vegetation meeting engagements -- before there was Simunition and Paint Ball.

[William F. Owen]

I'm genetically or geriatrically indisposed toward full auto so I always insisted on strictly semi-auto. I know, I know, we don't have to reload after each shot anymore; still...

So fire as quickly as you can "re-charge your fire piece?" , but yes, well trained semi-auto is superior to full auto in many circumstances.

[Fuchs]

Unobserved fire can very well be aimed fire.

Think of the Drake shooting drill, for example.
It was a rather orderly triple-tapping of suspected positions, if possible with assigned fields of fire.

You still need the sights to do it right or you could still miss a couching opponent behind a small concealing object, even with three shots.

[Chris jM]

a.) In heavy forest/jungle you can't see the target but you still have to suppress them, so high volumes of fire across broad arcs is merited. The physics of dispersion means this will only work at pretty close range.

b.) At longer ranges, your fire has to be directed either at the enemy that can be seen, or at his suspected position, so more deliberate aimed semi-automatic fire would seem useful. This would also apply in the urban terrain.

Translating that into training may require some thought.

From my perspective, it's less a training problem and more a tactical problem.

I remember reading Sydney Jary's '18 Platoon' (accounts of a WW2 British rifle platoon commander) and he placed great weight on the commander being able to 'read the battle'.

Taking the example of close country, winning the firefight may often necessitate the rapid rate of fire to gain the initiative but then - in my opinion, anything goes. Maintaining the rapid rate and fire-and-manoeuvring forward - hey, it works. Being more aggressive, going watch-and-shoot and then assaulting so the soldiers only shoot at targets they id on the advance? Risky, aggressive, but it has a time and place.

I see the section/ squad commander being someone who should have the 'bag of tricks' up his sleeve and be able to pull them out as he 'reads the battle'. Controlling the wight of fire and method of movement comes down to training and drills, but templating how you shoot in what example, beyond the initial IA of returning fire, is to me unnecessary.

I did some training with a Canadian recce sect a year ago and their NCOs told me that they (whether this was the Canadian Army, their Bn or simply their recon pl I don't know) had given up on the concept of double-tapping in favour of a slower rate of single, well aimed shots.

Ken One thing I beg to differ in is calibres. My experience is completely limited to that of training, but I don't really see the need for a 7.62 round instead of a 5.56 in close country/ jungle. Your either shooting to kill the enemy or shooting to suppress him, and I don't really see 7.62 penetration doing much in punching through cover to justify the extra weight.

My opinion (and I have yet to find someone who shares it, which is probably saying something!) is that the rifle section is suited to a 5.56 LSW in all environments as the standard support wpn.

[Ken White]

...whether this was the Canadian Army, their Bn or simply their recon pl ... had given up on the concept of double-tapping in favour of a slower rate of single, well aimed shots.

Yes they were...

From my perspective, it's less a training problem and more a tactical problem.

You cannot separate the two; the one leads to the other and it has to be a continuous loop.

I see the section/ squad commander being someone who should have the 'bag of tricks' up his sleeve and be able to pull them out as he 'reads the battle'. Controlling the wight of fire and method of movement comes down to training and drills, but templating how you shoot in what example, beyond the initial IA of returning fire, is to me unnecessary.

Control in the jungle is quite different than control in rolling terrain with some vegetation. Control in training is different than control in a fire fight. Combine the two and you are confronted with the FACT that ability to "read the battle" may be somewhat limited; ability to exercise control may be severely limited; the Leader may be a casualty and half dozen other things -- thus everyone has to know what to do. That occurs with good or even just decent training.

One thing I beg to differ in is calibres. My experience is completely limited to that of training, but I don't really see the need for a 7.62 round instead of a 5.56 in close country/ jungle. Your either shooting to kill the enemy or shooting to suppress him, and I don't really see 7.62 penetration doing much in punching through cover to justify the extra weight.

First, an aside. Always shoot to kill, if you do that, it will 'suppress' the bad guys; shooting to suppress them will likely not suppress them or even impress them...

We can disagree on the caliber issue, not a problem. However, the 7.62 punching through cover is not the issue. The 5.56 being deflected by leaves is the issue.

I understand 10 mags is the norm for 5.56 carrying folks nowadays (way too much ammo and weight IMO) so you're looking at about 10 x 494g= 4.94 kg; a more sensible load seven mags of 7.62x39 would run about 7 x 750g or 5.25 kg kg. An adequate load of 100 rds of 7.62x51 would be 5 x 698g = 3.5 kg.

Thus I'm not sure I agree on the weight issue even if you add in another kg or two for the weapon. If one is more comfortable with additional ammo, add another 120 rounds, two Bandoleers of stripper clips and you only get another 3.5 kg = 7 kg. Small price to pay for more likely hits, IMO. YMMV.

All weapons are compromises, there is no perfect fit for all the variations possible in METT-TC.

[Chris jM]

Ken, I've read your reply a few times now and I agree with pretty much everything your getting at. Not much that I can/ could add to what you have said.

Cheers.

[RJ]

First, an aside. Always shoot to kill, if you do that, it will 'suppress' the bad guys; shooting to suppress them will likely not suppress them or even impress them... Ken White

Best quote of the week!

One of the best examples is way back in the annals of WWI. Well aimed, bolt action rifle fire in the hands of expert riflemen devastated parts of three German units that were trying to reinforce hard pressed entrenched German troops in a battle that marked the high water mark of the German Army in its attempt to capture Paris in WWI.

The weapons were Springfield 1903, 5 shot, .30 caliber rifles in the hands of US Marines in their first fight as battalions and regiments in a land war.

After the victory Marines of the 5th and 6th Regiments, were recognized by a grateful French Government with the highest unit decoration France gives to foreign units that fight in the defense of France. The French Frourragere. In addition the French renamed the battle area the Wood of the Marine Brigade.

The Marines took high casualties attacking German machinegun nests that had interlocking fire in the tough terrain of heavy growth that was Belleau Wood. One of their battalion commanders said that there was a shortage of hand grenades and his men took the machinegun strong points with aimed rifle fire and bayonets. The Battle lasted 20 days. Supporting artillery was used sparingly, due to the closeness of battle lines. The Marines had a Machine Gun Battalion attached, but they were used to defend the town of the town of Chateau-Thierry on the River Marne.

The German units were from German Army Group Crown Prince - In Belleau Wood - the 461st Regiment of the German 237th Division; At Bouresches - elements of the 10th Division; Later reinforcements included elements of the 197th, 87th and 28th German Divisions.

Aimed fire and bayonet work was the reason the Marines were able to over come veteran German Divisions in this first fight of American Forces in WWI.

And if my memory serves me, US Army's Sgt. York with his bolt action, Springfield Rifle had a movie made about his capture of a German Battalion.

Never underestimate the power of a well aimed single shot.

[Bob's World]

A bit off topic, but my oldest son just assumed leadership of a team in the weapon's squad of his rifle company in Iraq. Pretty proud of him.

[Ken White]

Thank him for me and all my kinfolks...

[Bob's World]

Wilco!

[Rifleman]

Never underestimate the power of a well aimed single shot.

On that note: http://www.worldwar1.com/dbc/woodfill.htm

I think I posted that somewhere before but I think it's worth posting again.

The actions of Sgt. York in the Argonne and the Marines in Belleau Wood are well known and deserve to be. Sam Woodfill's actions are less well known but just as impressive.

[jcustis]

a.) In heavy forest/jungle you can't see the target but you still have to suppress them, so high volumes of fire across broad arcs is merited. The physics of dispersion means this will only work at pretty close range.

I haven't fought in the jungle, but I've been in some very tight patches of veg in Thailand, so I understand the dynamics of old and juvenile growth in the bush...

Why do we presume that we can't see the target? Didn't the enemy sight their target before opening fire?

[William F. Owen]

Why do we presume that we can't see the target? Didn't the enemy sight their target before opening fire?

I suggest that enemy saw someone and fired. My own FTX experience and that I have garnered from others, is that in forest or jungle, often only one or two folks in each opposing group sight each other, and that is where the initial exchange takes place.
That leaves everyone else trying to contribute to the fire fight, while having no target picture, unless they can get forward to the point of contact - which is a valid drill.