The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Tukhachevskii]

... the Lightweight Medium Machine Gun in a whopping .338 calibre!

[castellanoc1]

For squad level organization, I support the USMC model. For weaponry, particularly direct fire, I would argue for a baseline of squad level weapons being chambered in 300 Blackout, while granting the squad better access to 7.62x51 weapons based on the mission and environment.

As state-on-state conflict continues to lose utility, training and equipping for the small wars has a greater value than ever. Embodying past, present, and projected future trends, what capabilities should the infantryman’s primary weapon have? Former SEAL and tactical firearms trainer Kyle Defoor advocates that the modern fighting carbine should “be able to shoot effectively at CQB distance, take positive head shots at 100, and engage at the max distance for 5.56 - IMO 400 yds on the body.” By many accounts, practical combat accuracy out to approximately 300-400 yards seems to be the common understanding for the capabilities of an infantryman and his rifle.

Some have taken a look at the relatively new 300 Blackout (7.62x35) as a more ideal caliber due to its better terminal ballistics from shorter barrels, better intermediate barrier performance, acceptable external ballistics for the ranges considered, and better integration with suppressors. It is designed to operate reliably suppressed or unsuppressed, using supersonic or subsonic ammunition. Pairing this extremely versatile cartridge with the extreme versatility of the AR-15 platform is a natural match to arm the infantryman with a more effective weapon. At the squad level, this could materialize as a 7.62x35 service rifles, multiple auto-rifles for volumetric fire, and a squad designated marksman rifle for precision fire. By adding some improvements such as lightweight customizable free-float rail systems, improved triggers, and good optics/lights/lasers, you earn an improved AR-15 family of squad-level weapons ready to dominate at common combat ranges.

What do we give up in terms of capabilities compared to 5.56 chambered service rifles and squad support weapons? In the case of the US Army where current M4 training/qualifications are limited to 300 yards, there is no real change in hit-probability. However, the 400-600 yard ranges where auto-rifles/SAWs and designated marksmen rifles have the capability to reach out is generally outside the envelope of capabilities for 7.62x35. Nevertheless, even with 5.56 support weapons, what we see in Afghanistan is an increasing squad level reliance on 7.62x51 based precision semi-automatic rifles, lightweight variants of the medium machine guns, and essentially heavyweight variants of light machineguns chambered in 7.62x51. To mitigate the shortfalls when compared to 5.56, the theoretical 7.62x35 armed squads would benefit from even better access to 7.62x51 weapons in order to achieve true well-rounded effectiveness from CQB distances to ranges up to 800 yards and beyond. In this sense, the squad designated marksman would be proficient at both 7.62x35 and 7.62x51 chambered precision platforms, and have both available based on the nature of the operating environment and mission at hand. Squad auto-riflemen would enjoy a similar proficiency with 7.62x35 and 7.62x51 chambered fully automatic weapons. Having 2-3 M240s available for use if needed in each squad may sound excessive at first. However, when you consider the mobile patrols in the Iraq War where each HMMWV or MRAP had a crew-served weapon mounted, it seems not so excessive.

Basic breakdown of the two variations:

-Squad Leader

-TL: 7.62x35 carbine
-Auto-rifleman: 7.62x35 auto-rifle OR 7.62x51 medium machine gun
-Squad DM: 7.62x35 carbine OR 7.62x51 DM Rifle
-Grenadier: 7.62x35 carbine +assorted HE weapons

-TL: 7.62x35 carbine
-Auto-rifleman: 7.62x35 auto-rifle OR 7.62x51 medium machine gun
-Rifleman: 7.62x35 carbine
-Grenadier: 7.62x35 carbine +assorted HE weapons

-TL: 7.62x35 carbine
-Auto-rifleman: 7.62x35 auto-rifle OR 7.62x51 medium machine gun
-Rifleman: 7.62x35 carbine
-Grenadier: 7.62x35 carbine +assorted HE weapons

While I think this approach could make for some highly versatile and lethal squads, realistically it will likely be a little while before the US and NATO considers replacing 5.56 with another intermediate cartridge.

[Compost]

Some considering has apparently been already done and has lead to the US Army’s CLAWS (Combat Lightweight Automatic Weapon System) and LDAM (Lightweight Dismounted Automatic Machinegun) project(s).
http://www.janes.com/article/.../us-...alibers‎
So it is possible that within say ten years two new conventional – brass, steel or aluminium cased - cartridges could be in widespread NATO/US use as successors for the 5.56x45 and 7.62x51.

The rationale for dumping the 5.56 can be summarised almost on a thumbnail. The 5.56 is over-powered for close-quarter use and less handy than SMGs firing pistol-power ammunition. A lightweight 5.56 projectile also looses velocity and hitting power rapidly: the energy of the heaviest 77-grain sharpshooter projectile falls by more than 10 percent within each 100m from muzzle to 600m. Effective range in a carbine or para-MG is 200-250m and in long barrel weapons 350-450m. The 5.56 is generally unsuitable for echelon deployment, suppression and harassing, and as the basis of a tracer round.

Calibre of any successor would be greater than 5.56, less than 7.62; mass of projectile greater than 5.56x45 less than 7.62x51 and of 7.62x35. When fired from an individual weapon in automatic mode such a successor round would be less controllable than 5.56 and also 7.62x35. However, automatic mode is most likely during assault, ambush and counter-ambush when rate of fire guided by adrenaline has more utility than precise accuracy.

A successor to the 5.56 round could readily exceed its hitting power, and at longer range also that of the standard 7.62x51. For example a 123 grain 6.5mm projectile started at 2,600fps has more energy beyond 600m than does NATO’s 147 grain 7.62 projectile started at 2,700fps. Assuming development of a companion LMG there would be little benefit in alternatively deploying a 7.62 MG such as the Mark 48 or M240 down to squad level. The 7.62x35 Blackout developed for hitting power out to about 400m is not a suitable round for a longer-ranged LMG, or a DM rifle.

In the same general timeframe as the 5.56 successor, the 7.62x51 round could be succeeded by another more powerful cartridge that can defeat body armour at longer range. Such a 7.62 successor might be a 7.62 magnum, 7.82 magnum or even an 8.59 cartridge with a projectile of 200-plus to about 300 grains. Much lighter and less demanding than the 700 grain 12.7x99 which also requires a HMG platform that is too bulky and heavy for ready use by footmobile infantry.

The detail on CLAWS and LDAM is brief and dates from November 2013. Have found nothing more recent. It will be interesting to see what – if anything – emerges.

[Fuchs]

Compost, the U.S.Army runs small arms development programs.
It's not in the business of actually buying any small arms developed in these programs.


This is the same as with combat and recce AFVs and helicopters. They're just not in the business of doing the step from R&D to in-service employment any more.

Forget their small arms and AFV progams. They're all PR stunts of no relevance.

[jcustis]

Gotta agree with the Fuchster.

The US will never go away from its combo of 5.56 and 7.62, besides in maybe the smallest samplings at the highest tiers.

It just comes down to a money and logistics issue. Paying for an ammo plant's retooling is not going to happen, and we are not going to shoot down stocks of 5.56/7.62 while the ammo supply points are stocked with 6.5, 6.8, or Blackout. Never in a million years.

Seeing this thread revived makes me realize Ken White had been off the board a very long time. I miss him.

[Compost]

Compost, the U.S.Army runs small arms development programs.
It's not in the business of actually buying any small arms developed in these programs.

This is the same as with combat and recce AFVs and helicopters. They're just not in the business of doing the step from R&D to in-service employment any more.

Forget their small arms and AFV progams. They're all PR stunts of no relevance.

US Army may be playing games but USAF sparked interest in 5.56x45 and M16 to succeed 7.62x33 and M1 carbine back in the 1960s. This time the USMC might force the issue or otherwise contrive introduction of successors. Also SF have a lot of pull. Others in NATO may just have to hope.

[Fuchs]

US Army may be playing games but USAF sparked interest in 5.56x45 and M16 to succeed 7.62x33 and M1 carbine back in the 1960s. This time the USMC might force the issue or otherwise contrive introduction of successors. Also SF have a lot of pull. Others in NATO may just have to hope.

The USMC ran the IAR program; it was apparently an attempt to get a reliable assault rifle under the disguise of a very light machinegun. So far they succeeded to buy at a few, but at least they now have a new type standardised and in service, so they may be able to get enough of them to replace their M16s.
But look at what they got; a thoroughly unspectacular design that was already MOTS if not COTS and merely modified somewhat with accessories. Basically the same weapon had been in service in Europe for three years previously AND the weapon is internally an early 1990's G36 with VISMOD outside.

The U.S. forces are still using the M240, an overweight 1950's design. Even the gold-plated (partially titanium) L version weighs 10.1 kg, while the Soviets/Russians have been running around with their equivalent (PKM) of 7.5 kg since 1969. Meanwhile, GI carried the 12.3 kg M240 for decades.
(The German Heer stuck with the almost entirely optics-incompatible and heavy MG3 for too long as well - it should have made use of HK21E in dismounted roles for decades). The Russians now have a 8.7 kg Pecheneg machine gun as PKM successor in service (and has so for more than a decade); it needs no spare barrels, so it's effectively even more lightweight than the PKM.

[Kiwigrunt]

It is interesting to see that HK's brand new 7.62 MG5 Universal (GPMG/MMG) weighs a whopping 11.6 kg. The LMG Infantry version (with pencil barrel and lacking a bipod) still weighs about 10.5 kg. I'm all for saving weight, but to shave a relatively measly one kg off a solid machine gun by severely compromising two of the most important aspects of a machine gun – the barrel and the support – seems ridiculous to me.

FN's 7.62 Minimi weighs about 8 kg (depending on config). The NZ army now uses that in lieu of the retired 5.56 Mimini. I had a chat to a NZ army officer recently, who is of the opinion that they should have gone back to the L7 / Mag58 at section level. He thinks the Minimi is too fragile and rattly.

The Danes are currently introducing the latest pencil barrel iteration of the M60 for use at section level.

Indeed Fuchs, if the Russian 'full weight' 7.5 kg PKM is as durable as the West's traditional GPMGs, than what are we missing?
The Pecheneg is interesting. I've not been able to find any user feedback on it. The bipod at the muzzle is said to improve accuracy. I wonder for how long, after the barrel heats up. As Fuchs alluded to, the Pecheneg LMG is actually heavier than the PKM GPMG. The weight saving and user simplification of the Pecheneg is in the lack of a spare barrel, which at section level is not a bad thing.

This conversation keeps going round and round in circles. I wonder if, rather than defining the role of the MG, it has become more about this week's accepted compromise. Durability and robustness vs. weight. We tweak the role-narrative to suit this week's compromise or fashion.

We all know what Ken would have said about all of this. I too miss him.

jcustis, at the risk of seeing the whole IAR debate regurgitated (let's not), do you have any feedback on experiences with it now that it has been used for a bit in Afghanistan? Are the marines happy with the IAR in its intended role, or do they miss the SAW? I imagine there would have been plenty of 240s around to mitigate the lack of the SAW.

[jcustis]

The USMC ran the IAR program; it was apparently an attempt to get a reliable assault rifle under the disguise of a very light machinegun. So far they succeeded to buy at a few, but at least they now have a new type standardised and in service, so they may be able to get enough of them to replace their M16s.
But look at what they got; a thoroughly unspectacular design that was already MOTS if not COTS and merely modified somewhat with accessories. Basically the same weapon had been in service in Europe for three years previously AND the weapon is internally an early 1990's G36 with VISMOD outside.

That bit about the Corps going after the HK416 in an attempt to get leverage to replace M4s/M16A4s has been passed around the internet so much that people asssume it is true. We went after the HK rifle to gain a true Automatic Rifle to, and the acquisitions folks actually did a half decent job for once.

We are not trying to disguise it as a LMG. Everyone driving the employment and doctrine for the IAR is very clear what it is, and isn't. The gun rags and fanboy sites typically get the information wrong.