The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[William F. Owen]

So lets talk optics and red-dots and all that stuff. Obviously did not help the Queens Royal Lancers one little bit.

I spend a lot of time playing with weapons optics. To discuss it seriously you need to talk specifics. "Red-dots" for example may have no magnification power what so ever.

What you have from the QLR is a snap shot opinion. Not operational analysis. If you talk to audiences composed entirely of infantrymen recently returned from operations, then they have a very different perspective about optics and sensors.

So I wonder what the teaching is on how to suppress/kill the enemy if you know roughly where they are but can't see them?

Go online and read this.

Hope that helps.

[JMA]

I spend a lot of time playing with weapons optics. To discuss it seriously you need to talk specifics. "Red-dots" for example may have no magnification power what so ever.

Is there a need for short range stuff for troops in Afghanistan (other than special forces)?

And what impact has the general issue of optics to Brit soldiers on the kill rate per contact and the ability to lay down good old fashioned suppressive fire to win the fire-fight? Has it been positive by any stretch of the imagination?

What you have from the QLR is a snap shot opinion. Not operational analysis.

If that's the spin you want to apply then... OK

Given the six months of operations the QRL experienced in Helmand that particular troop of the squadron experienced just that. Lets take the report on its merits. 100 exchanges of fire, actually saw the TB twice.

Maybe it indicates the folly of deploying armour in a dismounted infantry role? No value in the optics? Lack of training? You tell me...

If you talk to audiences composed entirely of infantrymen recently returned from operations, then they have a very different perspective about optics and sensors.

We have been through this before Wilf. Everyone has an opinion but if you want to learn what really happened you need to know who to talk to... and not in an audience... but rather man-to-man over a cup of tea (no booze).

Go online and read this.

Hope that helps.

Yes it helps... that is the best motivation of the Rhodesian style Fire Force tactic I have ever read. I need to put your man Storr in contact with Group Captain (Rtd) Petter-Bowyer who is retired in the UK. The next RLI book (to be published July/August) will also have a section on the Fire Force.

Did you note the comment on the benefit of experienced soldiers being able to conserve ammo? You don't find experienced soldiers amongst a group of six month wonders. Been through this before as well.

As far as the shock of HE is concerned again the Rhodesian Air Force knew about that (speak to Petter-Bowyer) as that allowed us to go to Chimoio with 184 SAS/RLI to take on 5,000 plus.

I would make one further comment. Storr says "... ‘finding’ obviously involves movement..." Well yes and no. In the case where you employ small highly professional OPs to locate the enemy it is their movement that allows them to be found.

We have discussed this before. I maintained that high frequency patrolling (movement) by Brits plays into the Taleban hands through giving away location and being IED bait. What is the idea? To separate the Taleban from the villagers... surely? And there are many ways to skin that cat.