The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Fuchs]

Fire support did not help the U.S. platoon because there wasn't much it could have done in the few minutes. Calls for artillery fire are slow and calls for company mortar fire not really effective against an assault gun and dispersed infantry.

No opponent would always "know" that the line of defence is reverse/counter slope, for there are usually several slopes and the first one could be largely a decoy. German defence doctrine advocated a deep defence which had a zone for skirmishing and delaying in front of the real deal. There were often even two fully prepared defensive positions plus if possible decoy positions. The secondary defensive position was a necessity against Soviet offensive preparatory shelling, and the Soviets rarely kept both positions under simultaneous fire.

You do not increase the uncertainty for the opponent by presenting your troops in the showcase.

Besides; forward slope defensive positions are easily detected, thus never an advantage from a detectability point of view. A defensive position that's well done does not tell to an aerial photo interpreter what's decoy and what not.
Reverse slope defences on the other hand cannot be observed permanently like forward slope defences and allow thus for much less reconnaissance by the enemy.


JMA; the key is -as so often- that I wrote about capable opponents. Some dinosaur calls it METT-T. The "E" stands for "enemy". Forward slopes defences ARE suicidal against capable enemies. I doubt that the Rhodesian army cared much about capable enemies. It didn't fight one for a generation in the 70's.
The WW2 booklet in question was about a war between first and second-rate powers. A forward slope defence was suicidal in that war. Even Romanian infantry regiments of '44 and Italian Bersaglieri of '42 were capable enough to rip forward slope defences apart, even the ones set up by the Argentinians in '82.


I know many gimmick and have added some gimmicks* to counterslope, reverse slope and ridge defence positions. The forward slope on the other hand is simply hopeless.

*: One gimmick is for example to set up an additional concealing screen (a fence of netting, for example) a metre ahead of the ridge in order to increase the survivability of the ridge defenders and observers. Gaps created by shelling can be plugged with the concealing "umbrella frame" trick of snipers, even in the midst of a fight.
This gimmick solves a problem which occurs on very straight ridges; the problematic silhouettes of the defenders.

[JMA]

Fire support did not help the U.S. platoon because there wasn't much it could have done in the few minutes. Calls for artillery fire are slow and calls for company mortar fire not really effective against an assault gun and dispersed infantry.

No opponent would always "know" that the line of defence is reverse/counter slope, for there are usually several slopes and the first one could be largely a decoy. German defence doctrine advocated a deep defence which had a zone for skirmishing and delaying in front of the real deal. There were often even two fully prepared defensive positions plus if possible decoy positions. The secondary defensive position was a necessity against Soviet offensive preparatory shelling, and the Soviets rarely kept both positions under simultaneous fire.

You do not increase the uncertainty for the opponent by presenting your troops in the showcase.

Besides; forward slope defensive positions are easily detected, thus never an advantage from a detectability point of view. A defensive position that's well done does not tell to an aerial photo interpreter what's decoy and what not.
Reverse slope defences on the other hand cannot be observed permanently like forward slope defences and allow thus for much less reconnaissance by the enemy.


JMA; the key is -as so often- that I wrote about capable opponents. Some dinosaur calls it METT-T. The "E" stands for "enemy". Forward slopes defences ARE suicidal against capable enemies. I doubt that the Rhodesian army cared much about capable enemies. It didn't fight one for a generation in the 70's.
The WW2 booklet in question was about a war between first and second-rate powers. A forward slope defence was suicidal in that war. Even Romanian infantry regiments of '44 and Italian Bersaglieri of '42 were capable enough to rip forward slope defences apart, even the ones set up by the Argentinians in '82.


I know many gimmick and have added some gimmicks* to counterslope, reverse slope and ridge defence positions. The forward slope on the other hand is simply hopeless.

*: One gimmick is for example to set up an additional concealing screen (a fence of netting, for example) a metre ahead of the ridge in order to increase the survivability of the ridge defenders and observers. Gaps created by shelling can be plugged with the concealing "umbrella frame" trick of snipers, even in the midst of a fight.
This gimmick solves a problem which occurs on very straight ridges; the problematic silhouettes of the defenders.

I agree with most of what you say and will add that trying to hold ground in the traditional sense is pointless against a mobile (mechanised) enemy capable of rapid maneuver and bypass. As to a reverse slope defensive position modern observation through satellite and drone make it just about as vulnerable as a forward slope.

Yes competence together with the necessary weapons and equipment make for a tough opponent but take away most of the supporting weapons and Air Effort available to modern armies and the playing field is leveled pretty soon.

I quote again from the Brits: "Although in each case the choice of a forward or reverse slope position should be decided on its merits, reverse slopes almost invariably provide the best position for defence."

Your reference to Rhodesia needs to be addressed.

Yes the enemy (being the guerrilla forces - ZANLA and ZIPRA) were pathetic against even the most basic standard. We had few troops so had to work out how best to take then on with what we had. So we were able to take them on on ratios of (not 3:1 but) 1:30 (Op Dingo) or more if we used what little air we had to maximum effect and achieved the element of surprise. ZANLA (Mugabe) kept pushing ill trained cannon fodder over the border which we culled in turkey shoot after turkey shoot so in reality the numbers of so-called insurgents was not as significant as some latter day observers would like to make out. ZIPRA (Nkomo) had Russian advisors who prepared them for a mechanised invasion from Zambia down one of two routes (or both), Victoria Falls-Bulawayo and Kariba-Salisbury. Too many bridges on those routes which we could cut and the advance would grind to a halt. (What were the Russians thinking). So what you are capable of, what your enemy is capable of and the terrain you will be fighting on is important - METT-TC - if you like.

As the man said..."If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles." - Sun Tzu

So true.

[William F. Owen]

I agree with most of what you say and will add that trying to hold ground in the traditional sense is pointless against a mobile (mechanised) enemy capable of rapid maneuver and bypass. As to a reverse slope defensive position modern observation through satellite and drone make it just about as vulnerable as a forward slope.

Just some rather obvious things to consider.

a.) Reverse slope is only relative to one direction of enemy threat.
b.) What reverse slope actually means is not positioning your defensive position were it can be reduced by stand-off direct fires or from observed fires, outside the range where your weapons and TA systems can destroy/detect the enemy before they engage.

c.) The best general advice I am aware of, and have tested to my satisfaction, is to locate defensive positions in terrain that ensure the greatest freedom of action. In other words, defensive positions should be viewed as assembly areas or start lines. Not little forts to fight and die from.

d.) and again, core functions. FIND, FIX, STRIKE, EXPLOIT. Do them, while not having them done to you.

[JMA]

Not little forts to fight and die from.

I could swear that some months ago you argued when I criticised this very thing in Helmand. What's changed?

[William F. Owen]

I could swear that some months ago you argued when I criticised this very thing in Helmand. What's changed?

The "little forts" in Helmand are FOBs. - Patrol Bases. I was referring to the conduct of defence in combat operations. Two entirely different conditions.

[JMA]

The "little forts" in Helmand are FOBs. - Patrol Bases. I was referring to the conduct of defence in combat operations. Two entirely different conditions.

How come siting and defending a base in Afghanistan is not governed by standard defensive principles?

[William F. Owen]

How come siting and defending a base in Afghanistan is not governed by standard defensive principles?

...and what standard defensive principle would those be?

A FOB is a facility from which to mount operations, and the location itself may provide operational advantages, such as surveillance of a route or an area. The Surveillance Towers in South Armagh, were sited to give the most efficient coverage of the boarder. Had a Soviet MRR been coming north from the Republic, they would not have been where they were.

A FOB in A'Stan is in a very, very low threat environment. Siting is in no way critical. Taking on a proficient mobile enemy with AFVs is a different game altogether.

Having said that, the base at Wanat was clearly badly sited and there for all the wrong reasons. The SF Base at Lang-Vei, over run during Tet, was never constructed with Tanks (PT-76's) in mind. Compare and contrast, the SF Base at Kontum, which straddled the main road.

The differentiation is really all down to your core functions analysis. A FOB in A'Stan is "Found." If you were an Armoured Coy in Germany facing the Soviets, and you got "found" you were probably going to be dead before the fight began.

[Pete]

How come siting and defending a base in Afghanistan is not governed by standard defensive principles?

The use of fortified bases in low-intensity conflicts such as in Afghanistan or Iraq isn't the same thing as trying to use them to defend against a corps of German Panzer and Panzer-Grenadier divisions during World War II. This goes back to the many different permutations of tactical and operational situations that come under the all-encompassing category of "Full-Spectrum Operations."

[Firn]

No opponent would always "know" that the line of defence is reverse/counter slope, for there are usually several slopes and the first one could be largely a decoy. German defence doctrine advocated a deep defence which had a zone for skirmishing and delaying in front of the real deal. There were often even two fully prepared defensive positions plus if possible decoy positions. The secondary defensive position was a necessity against Soviet offensive preparatory shelling, and the Soviets rarely kept both positions under simultaneous fire.

Actually the need to deny the forward zone to the enemy of the MLR was already present in WWI, if in more static form. Through heavy patrolling, scouting, trench raids and strictly limited attacks the Allies tried often to gnaw this screening zone away. The Soviets put a great deal of effort in many directions to gather as many information as possible about the composition of the enemy defenses and operational intent. Heavy night attacks were at least once used to pull more German troops into the front zones.

You do not increase the uncertainty for the opponent by presenting your troops in the showcase.

Besides; forward slope defensive positions are easily detected, thus never an advantage from a detectability point of view. A defensive position that's well done does not tell to an aerial photo interpreter what's decoy and what not.
Reverse slope defences on the other hand cannot be observed permanently like forward slope defences and allow thus for much less reconnaissance by the enemy.

If we consider the fact that the construction, supply and relieve of relatively exposed defensive positions and outposts were in WWII usually done under the screen of darkness the advances of modern sensors and optics certainly don't help the forward slope defense, especially in relative open terrain and static situations and a highly capable "E". Factors of the METT-TC like Urban areas, dense vegetation, available and useable firepower and so on will ever influence this debate.

...............

To come back to the topic. Is it just me or isn't it striking that despite all the words and ink spread about the need to lighten the load at least two key weapons systems tested by US Army, the Mk 48 or the XM25? will be heavier then the ones they replace?