Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I'm sorry I didn't know about it -- there's a LOT of well stated wisdom in that booklet. Many things I had to learn the hard way -- and yet, it was out six years before I followed the Recruiter home...
Base on what I see and hear today from both theaters, Benning should make this required reading...
I'm about to print the part about leadership and hang it up at work...
Wow, you're slipping Wilf...you never saw that publication before, or the link to the archive?
I read it long ago and don't remember unusual stuff in it. What's so special about it?
and more combat and reality focused than most of it's western contemporaneous documents -- and vastly superior to most of today's.
While I don't particularly agree with the then Squad organization, the combat actions and degree of detail are impressive -- no wonder the WW II German force was such a tough opponent.
As an aside, your earlier comment on the German troops 'talking it up' in combat also applies to others. Good units know when to talk it up and when to be silent -- and what to say when talking where. Dare I say METT-TC yet again...
It's also inaccurate.
Let's look at Fig.8. It makes no sense whatsoever.
MG1 in prepared position, riflemen in the open? Nonsense.
MG1 without MG2? Nonsense.
Riflemen separated like that from MG? I have never, ever seen, read or heard anything like that. It makes no sense anyway, other than extending the hand grenade range.
Figure 10:
Again nonsense; the defensive positions are depicted on the front slope!
Different barrage areas for different types of support weapons are also highly questionable (and I've never seen anything that confirms the assertion).
the practice of pre-planned barrage positions has afaik never been weapons-type specific. The infantry mortars were preferably used against point targets because of the limited supply of ammunition.
A main line of resistance without forward observation and listening posts was totally contrary to doctrine. Very few tactics that weren't and didn't become doctrine were universally applied.
Figure 13.: Again forward slope defence...
...
Wartime publications about opfor tactics were often outrageously inaccurate. I've seen this in many, many publications. Authors were either mislead or described what individual units had done in the assumption that it was representative.
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