Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
It shouldn't.

Armies that expect real wars - not petty expeditions - have to expect that even entire battalions get crushed in a matter of hours. Squads certainly have to expect multiple casualties per fight.

An army with such expectations HAS TO have way more leaders than its TO&E requires. Squad leader need to be able to assume command of a platoon, senior enlisted need to be able to assume command of a squad.

An infantry squad - no matter 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13 men - has to have several men capable of assuming command of a squad on the spot - even do it on their own initiative seconds after squad leader became incapable.

The difference should be marginal between a 5 and a 13 men squad, simply because platoon leaders might in the hours after a fight transfer more promising replacement leaders from one squad to another anyway.


In the best peacetime case, you approach the personnel-constrained Reichswehr or Napoleon's Old Guard; both were essentially replacing enlisted men with NCO-capable men both in selection and qualification.
As time passes I really do believe that armies need to be flexible with regard to organisational structure and weapons and equipment. More applicable (I appreciate) for armies that pick fights overseas than those who defend only their homeland.

Take (Vietnam and Afghanistan) two examples for comparison where give the different enemy and the different terrain certain changes from the standard "Cold War" organisational structure of those times would have been beneficial in the particular theater.

It seems that despite all the talk of flexibility and of adapting to local conditions no significant changes seem to get made. Is this because commanders believe in the "one size fits all" approach where current organisations are forced to fit current operational circumstances or they have neither the interest nor the ability to make the necessary changes?

Watching a repeat of the series the Scots at War on the History Channel I note (from the parts on Afghanistan) that apart from a water overload, the insanity of lugging Javelin anti-tank missiles (at 40lbs for missile and CLU) and the obvious absurd weight of radio equipment for 2-3 km patrol much stays the same in terms of structure, weapons and equipment.

I would have thought that by now we would have seen some (structural/weapons/equipment) innovations (probably initiated by special forces) filter their way through to the line infantry?

... and as I have mentioned before that most of the (mine protecting) vehicle mods could have been carried out in a local "factory" in Kabul (or suitable local place).

Seems modern soldiers not only carry too much weight but also labour under the burden of the inflexible military procurement bureaucratic nightmare that straight-jackets modern armies.

Is there really an ideal squad size or equipment scale? Surely you go to a new place and look, listen and learn and adapt before you have to put too many troopies in body-bags?