The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Kiwigrunt]

We used flamethrowers, don't guess one could do that nowadays..

How about thermobaric rifle grenades or 40mm? Sssssst, don't tell anyone

[Ken White]

Go figure...

[Kiwigrunt]

Go figure...

As long as they're not hollow-point, because they really hurt and that just not fair. So bullet-through grenades are out, cause they're hollow-point.
Okay, enough of that nonsense, time for my flu-nap.

[jcustis]

When making the numbers crunch, don't forget that it's not all about raw weight. An item with a heavier gross weight might have a lighter "feel" if it can be carried easily and with little bulk. That's the predominant reason why I like the 100-rd "nutsacks" for the SAW. Yeah, they are lighter, but the distribute fairly well.

[Kiwigrunt]

Came across an article here that analyses marksmanship and rounds fired per kill by the Anzac’s in Vietnam. Article is ‘Bang on target’ on page 139.

[William F. Owen]

Came across an article here that analyses marksmanship and rounds fired per kill by the Anzac’s in Vietnam. Article is ‘Bang on target’ on page 139.

Gold mine mate! Good job. Very interesting and confirming some things I had thought for a while now. Excellent find!

[Ken White]

That is a great article. The Journal, as always, has great material...

Couple of things leaped out of the article:

Numerous reasons for the ‘poor’ state of infantry marksmanship were given. They included the lack of suitable ranges near unit barracks leading to insufficient shooting practice, poor fire control by NCOs and junior officers, soldiers deliberately aiming off because training with blank ammunition encouraged them to do so, carriage of excessive amounts of ammunition encouraging profligacy, failure of instructors to instil the desire to shoot to kill, and other reasons. Few of the
complainants mentioned the difficulties of acquiring a target in the combat conditions that prevailed in Vietnam.

I know you two know this but a point or two on that bears voicing; The training complaints are almost certainly valid but the specific conditions in Viet Nam are more valid -- and the fact that the poor training prior was not rapidly adapted to the specific combat arena is troublesome. Not slamming Oz -- witness US performance in Viet Nam and today.

The problem is the bureaucracy cannot or will not shift gears with rapidity and a part of that problem is that the 'Trainers' (and Doctrine writers) are working in air conditioned comfort and tend to adapt what they write and do to cause minimum disruption to what is currently being done at home.

The solution of course is for Theater experienced people 9not short term visitors or observers) to do a trainup on units previously well schooled in the basics with local adaptations to a broad -- NOT specific -- doctrine. As an example from the article, the GPMG to the high ground rule is indicative.

Or an indictment...

If caught in an ambush or a patrol encounter the enemy usually sought to break contact quickly and escape into the jungle. They were very skilled at doing this and—using high volumes of fire and fragmentation effect from AK47s, RPD light machine-guns and RPGs—often broke contact before the 1ATF patrol could organise effective indirect fire support. Artillery responding to an infantry call for fire support usually took about 10 minutes to get effective fire onto a target. Air support could take even longer. But Table 3 shows that in more than 60 per cent of cases, the enemy had already broken contact and escaped in less than10 minutes.

The western reliance on massive HE fire support to win small contacts is counterproductive. That time factor is ALWAYS problematic and numerous patrol actions have fizzled to naught due to the technique.

The 1ATF in Viet Nam was good, the only unit I worked with, 3 RAR, was better than most US units at most everything. Still, the number of VC / NVA initiated contacts they had was very similar to US experience.

If the other guy is initiating most contacts, you're doing something wrong.

Lastly, they wrote one very scary thing in that article. Last paragraph:

Perhaps a future family of small arms will assist this process by capturing electronically the date, time, location, number
of rounds fired and sight picture every time the trigger is squeezed. Once analysed, this data might inform subsequent training and tactics leading to improved combat performance.

Metrics are great. Metrics lend weight to arguments Metrics such as those lend weight to weapons. Not a good plan.

It is a good article but contains no surprises. From it, Wilf will probably derive different lessons but mine are:

- Doctrine must be broad and generic; excess specificity in an attempt to cover all eventualities and directed rigid adherence turn it into dogma and will get people killed unnecessarily.

- Doctrine MUST adapt to the enemy and all the METT-TC factors of the moment. If it does not, it is wrong and must be discarded.

- Training must be thorough and well grounded in the basics of the trade and must allow for theater or enemy, area and time specific modification. Rigid adherence to one model or 'system' of processes is wrong.

- Theater specific training should be rapidly implemented and be ongoing in theater. All too often, we do not do the latter to avoid 'hassling the troops.' Training isn't hassling, it's life assurance.

- A Volume of fire is no substitute for adequate accurate fire.

- Western reliance -- dependence even -- on supporting fires and lots of HE is rarely applicable in Small Wars and training that emphasizes its use is damaging to not only unit initiative and aggressiveness but also to actual prosecution of contacts and even the war.

- Weapons must be selected with broadest possible usage in mind if funds are limited. If adequate funds are available, theater specific weapons should be procured and used.

- Units must be trained with broadest possible usage in mind if funds are limited. Adequate funds must be made available for theater specific weapons and training prior to commitment if possible and absolutely for follow on forces.

There is no one size fits all...

Sommygun. Training and METT-TC. Amazing.