The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Pete]

An U.S. army platoon dug in in a defensive position overnight sometime in 1944. It was on a forward slope ... when morning fog had cleared, a camouflaged assault gun began opening fire on the forward slope position, decimating the platoon.

At the risk of being another old f*rt who repeats himself, the following is from Paul Gorman in The Secret of Future Victories.

DePuy was at odds with both propensities, being convinced that field fortifications should primarily provide cover from frontal fire, and should be wholly concealed from the enemy. In 1973, in explaining to the Commandant of the Infantry School and the Combat Arms Training Board what he expected them to do, and why, he told of an incident toward the end of the Battle of the Bulge, in early February 1945, when his battalion had pushed forward toward the Belgian-German border against stiffening German resistance. One company had dug in one evening along the military crest of a high, open snow-covered ridge, the soldiers' exertions with their entrenching tools ringing each foxhole with "dark doughnuts in the snow." After dawn the next day, from a ridge facing them, the Germans opened fire with high velocity, pinpoint-accurate cannon, probably from Jagdpanzer. "It was murder":17

I do not believe that infantry can survive on the modem battlefield against a modem enemy if our positions can be seen by their side. The issue ... is field of fire, cover and concealment. The reason that I feel [so strongly] is because I just happened to see German tanks kill a lot of my soldiers.... (My battalion) dug in where they could be seen, and a couple of tanks on a hill opposite just picked them off one by one. They couldn't get out and run, couldn't get away. [The enemy] just walked his tank cannon right down that one company--C Company--[I had] a pretty awful, hopeless, and helpless feeling. They were dug in wrong. They could be seen ... the lesson I hoisted aboard back in World War II is still valid for today and the future.

DePuy taught his troops to employ rear slope defenses when they could, and to dig cover and concealment when they could not. His ideas did not always agree with concepts of contemporaries.18 DePuy tells of a clash with Army Training Test umpires when he was commanding 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, in Germany in 1953. Because of his World War II experiences, DePuy had trained his battalion to dig defensive positions in such a way that they were wholly invisible from the front. Typically, a 2/8 Inf soldier would dig his foxhole directly behind a tree or a rock, or in the midst of a bush, with his field of fire across the front of adjacent holes similarly sited. Spoil was concealed, and great pains taken to maintain the "natural appearance" of the position as seen from the enemy perspective. Emplacements with extensive frontal views were reserved for indirect fire observers, or for accompanying tanks. Many of the Army Training Test umpires were veterans of Korea, and most were graduates of the Infantry School. They held that the 2/8 Infantry positions little resembled a proper defense. DePuy knew why:19

[In Korea] they built big forts. When you got out in front, you could see everything.... The umpires who came to test [2/8 Inf] thought I was crazy. They didn't understand why I hadn't built Korean pillboxes on the military crest or at the bottom of the hill. Instead I had my guys behind rocks, trees and bushes. I wouldn't let them disturb the bushes, so you couldn't see a thing from the front.... All the company and platoon umpires ran back to the battalion umpire and said, "This battalion is totally unsatisfactory. They don't know how to dig in." They were also sceptical about the overwatch and bounding [in the atack]....

(Fortuitously, it turned out the the Chief Umpire was a Colonel who had served in the 5th RTC in Korea, and who readily agreed with DePuy; the 2/8 Infantry passed its test.)

DePuy's field fortification techniques received a rigorous test in Vietnam. There his troops in the 1st Infantry Division were taught to erect a frontal parapet of earth constructed of spoil from the foxhole, camouflaged with vegetation, with partial overhead cover as well. In 1967, shortly after DePuy's departure from command of the Big Red One, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, dug in after that fashion, defeated an all-out attack by a regiment, with an enemy-to-friendly mortality ratio of 198 to 1.20.

[Fuchs]

I also recall from my basic training an episode that fits here:
I was in the Luftwaffe and had my very first 36 hr exercise in an old IHAWK SAM battery. These things have artificial ridges, about 5 m high.

I was told to build a shallow defensive position on such a ridge; for two persons, with sandbag cover and camouflage. I declared it ready after a while, but the trainer disagreed and I had to add another layer of sandbags.

I looked at it from the OPFOR direction and it stood out very much. The camo was a joke, no matter how much vegetation I applied.

Later that night, I simply left the position (which was easily visible even in quarter moonlight!) and prepared under the cover of darkness a very, very shallow fighting position 10m next to it (an OPFOR NCO, our original platoon leader, had been allowed to inspect our positions in daylight).
That night OPFOR tried to break through 50m to my right side and attempted to suppress/destroy my position. They did merely hit the empty, easily visible sandbag castle. I would have been declared dead in the first second of the attack if I hadn't left it earlier in the night.
I never, ever used a ridgeline or forward slope position again. I even relocated some bushes behind my other positions to avoid a helmet-shaped silhouette in later exercises.


If I - as a 18 y.o. private - was able to figure this out on in advance of my first try, why are there still proponents of main defences on forward slopes and ridgelines?

[JMA]

If I - as a 18 y.o. private - was able to figure this out on in advance of my first try, why are there still proponents of main defences on forward slopes and ridgelines?

It seems universal that 18 year olds have always had all the answers

We can go and on with this for ever but...

[Fuchs]

It seems universal that 18 year olds have always had all the answers

We can go and on with this for ever but...

Tragic fact is that humans lose intelligence after their 15th year. We become dumber and dumber and need to compensate for this with education, training and experience.
That's why your age is relevant for IQ test; the IQ is a measure relative to your age group only. An IQ 120 person at 70 years answers much less questions correctly in such a test than an IQ 120 person at 20 years.

Young people are also less encrusted with cognitive dissonance issues yet.

[Rifleman]

Tragic fact is that humans lose intelligence after their 15th year. We become dumber and dumber and need to compensate for this with education, training and experience.
That's why your age is relevant for IQ test; the IQ is a measure relative to your age group only. An IQ 120 person at 70 years answers much less questions correctly in such a test than an IQ 120 person at 20 years.

Young people are also less encrusted with cognitive dissonance issues yet.

That's it, Ken. "Cognitive dissonance issues." You're done.

[Ken White]

That's it, Ken. "Cognitive dissonance issues." You're done.

Especially in my case. I not only have cognitive dissonance issues, I have plain old cognitive issues.

Lessee. IQ 120 at 20 + 58 years = ((120-58)² - (20+58)² ) / 78 =~29. Seems about right...

My Wife also says I have dissonance issues but she just doesn't appreciate good singing...