The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Ken White]

My understanding is that it is very much a Commander / AO - METT-TC thing and that some units are more Patrol friendly than others (and obviously. location can have a bearing.). I hear a few units are less risk averse than most but that generally, Cav Platoons and Scout Platoons are converted to palace guard or personal protection (which should be a Court Martial Offense for he or she who directs that ) and the use of LRS patrols is 'not robust.'

The OpSec issue bothered me in making my post above and this one -- but the risk aversion is IMO more worrisome. It fascinates - and worries -- me that I had more latitude as a Squad Leader in Korea and as an acting Platoon Leader in Viet Nam than most Company Commanders appear to have today. We should be better trained, more trusting of a professional force and they should have more freedom of action. Sadly, none of those things appear to be true.

[Pete]

I remember in 2003 shortly after the fall of Baghdad when Jake Garner and and his military government crew were said to have been holed up in their compound because there were no force protection escorts to accompany them out the gate. These force protection policies seem to originate at high levels with the intention of preventing little detachments and groups from being picked off by the bad guys. When taken to extremes though it makes one wonder why we bother sending people overseas if we're going to lock them down in FOBs.

[Infanteer]

I routinely deployed 4-6 man patrols for layback, OPs and ambushes. These weren't LRRPs, but I was sending small teams out.

[Ken White]

I routinely deployed 4-6 man patrols for layback, OPs and ambushes. These weren't LRRPs, but I was sending small teams out.

Many do that and for more than a day or two as well but one unit that did not do so would be too many IMO. I hear there's more than one.

The LRS guys should be out for a week or two at a time. There are a lot of reasons why that isn't routinely being done, some good, some not so much...

[BushrangerCZ]

I routinely deployed 4-6 man patrols for layback, OPs and ambushes. These weren't LRRPs, but I was sending small teams out.

Really? You deployed 4-6 man team away from the FB/FOB/COP, where it acted independently for more than couple of hours? I am not talking about cut off/security elements or OPs who are part of the bigger element, I am talking about sending out independent recon/combat patrol, just by itself. LRS units train like that, and organize like that, but never get deployed just like that (current organization of LRS team can be found on their official site in free-to-download presentation). At the end, they drive around stuck in body armor in humwees as whole detachments, not teams (who are supposed and trained to operate by themselves if needed- and I think it´s needed, you can´t hide whole detachment anywhere in that place). I PM´d you the rest od the story.

[BushrangerCZ]

I don't think I qualify as a senior field grade, but it doesn't make sense to me. I know a couple of people that had LRS-D or Pathfinder commands in OEF- I'll have to ask them their thoughts on operations.

Just read the rules for ISAF and OEF operations, you will find out.

[Infanteer]

Really? You deployed 4-6 man team away from the FB/FOB/COP, where it acted independently for more than couple of hours?

Yes.

[BushrangerCZ]

Thanks for the info Infanteer, I will try to find out exactly where was stated what I PM´d you, to this point I was sure it was for the whole operation - maybe not.

[Ken White]

Just read the rules for ISAF and OEF operations, you will find out.

I agree with the thrust of your question that started this sub-thread and it is as I said an embarrassing question -- or should be -- but while you address the norm, there have been and are exceptions.

Remember that rules change over time and what is the rule for one tour in country may differ from earlier or later tours (the US does not have 10 years experience in Afghanistan, it has ten one year tours experience there... ). Recall also that what is written is not always followed. I know of units that did send out patrols for days at a whack and LRS elements that did get to do their job -- however, and unfortunately, also know or heard of more that did not. So rules change and all units are not the same. The Country and the coalition force is too big and varied to make a lot of generalizations very accurately.

[BushrangerCZ]

I agree with the thrust of your question that started this sub-thread and it is as I said an embarrassing question -- or should be -- but while you address the norm, there have been and are exceptions.

Remember that rules change over time and what is the rule for one tour in country may differ from earlier or later tours (the US does not have 10 years experience in Afghanistan, it has ten one year tours experience there... ). Recall also that what is written is not always followed. I know of units that did send out patrols for days at a whack and LRS elements that did get to do their job -- however, and unfortunately, also know or heard of more that did not. So rules change and all units are not the same. The Country and the coalition force is too big and varied to make a lot of generalizations very accurately.

Fortunately, you are right... thanks for accurating my statement guys, I like to see that things were better somewhere. However, as you said, it´s more an exception rather than norm. Still, I think we all have the same experience with body armour - it was, is and probably will be mandatory everytime outside the wire, no matter what GFC thinks, and it effectively prevents LRS type of operations (reasons are obvious). Even if you use quads, you can´t move in many parts of the mountains, plus tracks are very distinctive, and you are limited with suitable hides for them. But there probably is "body armour" thread already somewhere on this forum, so I will not move off-topic. Thanks all for good brainstorming.

[82redleg]

Just read the rules for ISAF and OEF operations, you will find out.

I know what the rules say, or at least what they said during a couple of different rotations.

I was answering Ken, as a field grade (albeit not a senior one).

Training units one way, and employing them another doesn't make sense to me, and neither does the restriction of decision-making. Ken said it better than I can, based on his experiences. I don't understand why we allow a CO CDR to take $$ and rank, but not spend $$ (or not very much $$) and make decisions about force protection, etc.

Maybe I'll never get it, maybe I'm still here because I haven't completed the lobotomization process yet.

[P-Hustle]

As a LRS guy myself, currently deployed to Afghanistan, this a point of major frustration for me. While not currently serving in a LRS unit (a long and sordid chain of events brought that on), I am still in a unit whose primary mission (when not deployed) is dismounted reconnaissance. Yet, we spend a majority of our time bundled up in body armor and MRAPS, driving around like idiots and not influencing the battlespace in any long term manner. Our influence extends as far as our LOS from the trucks, and disappears as soon as we drive past.

Yet the leadership still uses terms like "surprise" and "ambush", as if 4 diesel fume excreting MRAPS will get the jump on 5 guys on foot with no heavy equipment and an AK apiece. Coming from a LRS background, this kills me daily. And when I repeatedly bring up the idea of dispatching small teams for several days to operate quietly within the battlespace, commanders who should know better look at me as if I have horns.

Amusingly, or depressingly, this complete misunderstanding of how to utilize R&S units has led to all of our dismounted operations consisting of at most 8-10 men, as the command simply imposed a conventional unit structure on an R&S unit with much smaller numbers. So now to run the trucks and foot patrols, we are understrength in both areas.

Keep in mind, those 8 man patrols are not reconnaissance patrols where stealth and speed are used, but very basic conventional presence patrols.

As a caveat to all of this, I do not know of one R&S unit currently in country who is actually operating as they train. My other LRS brethren are tasked as either mounted units, or in one case basic trainers to the ANA. All of this is very, very sad IMHO.

Someone may hit me on OPSEC issues, but frankly all of this is easily observable and I think that ignoring the issue is more detrimental than admitting it exists and discussing it. What would be an OPSEC violation would be advertising that we have numerous small elements operating all over the battlefield gathering intelligence and planning interdiction operations. Sadly....

[BushrangerCZ]

Thanks much for the input P-Hustle... this is exactly what I have meant. Imagine one fictional FOB in, let´s say, south-eastern Afghanistan, which gets shelled by 107mm rockets almost every week. It´s widely known from what approximate distance this munition can be fired using primitive and effective methods which are used in that area, and direction is easy to figure out many former impacts. Due to hard and limited terrain, it´s possible, by ordinary common sense, to determine couple of areas, which are most commonly used for priming the rockets. Classical FOB reaction is, after the indirect fire attack, to start mortaring the place and call CAS. What´s the result?? Next week the attack goes on again. I can clearly see the job for covert, fast moving recce patrol here, with good observation devices and attached sniper, waiting fot their prey in those NAIs. I guess they would freak the insurgents out much more than predictable (and thus avoidable) current reaction. Yes, it could mean that weak recce unit will get into the contact with stronger enemy element and sustain casualties, but this risk still sounds better to me than be like a sitting duck, waiting for a hit, just showing it´s harmlessness.
PS: Sorry for my grammar

[jcustis]

P-Hustle, welcome aboard brother.

[Firn]

.. but the risk aversion is IMO more worrisome. It fascinates - and worries -- me that I had more latitude as a Squad Leader in Korea and as an acting Platoon Leader in Viet Nam than most Company Commanders appear to have today. We should be better trained, more trusting of a professional force and they should have more freedom of action. Sadly, none of those things appear to be true.

Indeed and this is far from only true for the US forces, the standard Italian units are subjected possibly to an even tighter leash. From what I have heard first hand a lot of the scouting, infiltration and patrolling which would have done in past wars by simple conscripts with only some if any additional training has been SFed or greatly reduced for the professionals....

The key problem seems to be that the standing of a commander might get harmed far more by a potential disaster then bolstered by the potential success. At least after the political upheaval which followed the last Italian KIA the smart guys should know that they should play it safe and work-to-rule which might even be work-to-the true political intent.

[Pete]

Welcome, BushrangerCZ. In May 1945 my late Dad was in the outskirts of Pilsen with the 97th U.S. Infantry Division when World War II ended. Later when he was in Prague in the 1970s a Communist Party official asked him whether he'd ever been to Czechoslovakia before and he said yes, near Pilsen in May 1945. The official said no, that can't be true, we were liberated by the great Red Army!

[BushrangerCZ]

Welcome, BushrangerCZ. In May 1945 my late Dad was in the outskirts of Pilsen with the 97th U.S. Infantry Division when World War II ended. Later when he was in Prague in the 1970s a Communist Party official asked him whether he'd ever been to Czechoslovakia before and he said yes, near Pilsen in May 1945. The official said no, that can't be true, we were liberated by the great Red Army!

Pete, if I only could, I would buy your father whole crate of Pilsen Urquell. Commies really tried to persuade everybody that US soldiers in Pilsen were in fact soviet soldiers dressed up like Americans. Most people knew the true, but it was not good to talk about it. My grandfather handed some german POWs to US troops in my own hometown, so it is obvious that most people could not be blamed, but for example history teachers who taught about this facts could loose the job. Commies ruined the whole country, and now we are trying to catch up.

[BushrangerCZ]

Thanks much for the input P-Hustle... this is exactly what I have meant. Imagine one fictional FOB in, let´s say, south-eastern Afghanistan, which gets shelled by 107mm rockets almost every week. It´s widely known from what approximate distance this munition can be fired using primitive and effective methods which are used in that area, and direction is easy to figure out many former impacts. Due to hard and limited terrain, it´s possible, by ordinary common sense, to determine couple of areas, which are most commonly used for priming the rockets. Classical FOB reaction is, after the indirect fire attack, to start mortaring the place and call CAS. What´s the result?? Next week the attack goes on again. I can clearly see the job for covert, fast moving recce patrol here, with good observation devices and attached sniper, waiting fot their prey in those NAIs. I guess they would freak the insurgents out much more than predictable (and thus avoidable) current reaction. Yes, it could mean that weak recce unit will get into the contact with stronger enemy element and sustain casualties, but this risk still sounds better to me than be like a sitting duck, waiting for a hit, just showing it´s harmlessness.
PS: Sorry for my grammar

sorry for my mistakes, I wanted to write: "recce unit could get into the contact with stronger enemy element", not "will", I need to read my posts more than once after myself

[BushrangerCZ]

And to not to only complain, I´m going to post something positive:
Last month I was lucky enough to fire couple hundred rounds from both .223 and .308 SCAR rifle, plus some grenades from grenade launcher, and I am very impressed. So far the best rifle I ever fired from.

[Pete]

Pete, if I only could, I would buy your father whole crate of Pilsen Urquell.

The day before Pilsen was officially liberated by the U.S. Army Dad's division G-2 intelligence officer had Dad drive him in a jeep into downtown Pilsen, where they found no Germans. They went back to division headquarters, which requested permission to occupy the city immediately. Corps and/or Third Army replied that they should stick to the original plan, and accordingly the next day the 16th Armored Division, a unit which had previously seen no combat, entered the city. The 2nd Infantry Division was then on the southern flank of Dad's 97th Infantry -- in fact the 97th ID had occupied positions of the 2nd ID a couple of days earlier so the 2nd ID could shift further south.