The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Ken White]

All that is disclosed about new nine men squad is that it consist of 3 teams of 3 soldiers.
Educated quesses have been that squad will have "command team", rifle team and MG team and not three identical teams.

That would work, though I tend to think fewer but larger squads are better for sustained combat than more smaller squads. The trade off is in leaders trained, though...

The US Marines briefly had a ten man squad, three teams of three plus a Squad Leader; each team had an Automatic Rifle / LMG. Combat experience quickly led to the team size being increased to four men for a 13 man Squad.

I have (maybe silly) question. Does land mines belong to standard equipment of infantry squads in armed forces of other countries?
I am asking this because here in Finland part of infatry squads standard equipment are 10-12 anti-tank mines.

For the US, that was true in Europe World War II and it was true in the early days in Korea. In the Pacific Theater in WW II and later in Korea and in most of our wars since, we've gotten out of the habit due to lack of need. It's a METT-TC thing...

Finnish defense concerns make it perfectly understandable on that basis.

[Fuchs]

That would work, though I tend to think fewer but larger squads are better for sustained combat than more smaller squads. The trade off is in leaders trained, though...

It shouldn't.

Armies that expect real wars - not petty expeditions - have to expect that even entire battalions get crushed in a matter of hours. Squads certainly have to expect multiple casualties per fight.

An army with such expectations HAS TO have way more leaders than its TO&E requires. Squad leader need to be able to assume command of a platoon, senior enlisted need to be able to assume command of a squad.

An infantry squad - no matter 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13 men - has to have several men capable of assuming command of a squad on the spot - even do it on their own initiative seconds after squad leader became incapable.

The difference should be marginal between a 5 and a 13 men squad, simply because platoon leaders might in the hours after a fight transfer more promising replacement leaders from one squad to another anyway.


In the best peacetime case, you approach the personnel-constrained Reichswehr or Napoleon's Old Guard; both were essentially replacing enlisted men with NCO-capable men both in selection and qualification.

[Ken White]

Agree with all you wrote. From the NCO leader standpoint, the size of the Squad makes little difference. The absolute number of them is only marginally an issue.

My too cryptic comment was aimed not at training NCOs, that's easy and even democracies can and do get that done in short time periods with few problems -- the issue is training Officers. Simply put, smaller Squads mean more Platoons, and thus more Companies and so more Battalions -- the latter two critical training and development positions for Officers in war or peace.

Training new Lieutenants is easy and we did it in '90 days' in WW II, seemed to work fairly well. However, at higher echelons, developing good commanders takes time and experience; more smaller units simply equals more opportunities to develop such experience in and for larger units.

Democracies will always have to sacrifice some efficiency and effectiveness for politically prescribed concerns and thus cannot undertake optimum training regimens -- particularly in peacetime...

So while I totally agree and have long advocated a Reichswehr - like approach for the US Army and Marines (i.e. raise the standard for entry and in training considerably among other things), the probability of seeing that happen is not good.

[Fuchs]

Demand for officers is less a problem than a solution in the medium term.

Kill 2/3 of staff positions, assign the officers to line units in new command jobs.

They'll be happier and you solve the staff madness.

[Ken White]

They'll be happier and you solve the staff madness.

wish...

[JMA]

It shouldn't.

Armies that expect real wars - not petty expeditions - have to expect that even entire battalions get crushed in a matter of hours. Squads certainly have to expect multiple casualties per fight.

An army with such expectations HAS TO have way more leaders than its TO&E requires. Squad leader need to be able to assume command of a platoon, senior enlisted need to be able to assume command of a squad.

An infantry squad - no matter 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13 men - has to have several men capable of assuming command of a squad on the spot - even do it on their own initiative seconds after squad leader became incapable.

The difference should be marginal between a 5 and a 13 men squad, simply because platoon leaders might in the hours after a fight transfer more promising replacement leaders from one squad to another anyway.


In the best peacetime case, you approach the personnel-constrained Reichswehr or Napoleon's Old Guard; both were essentially replacing enlisted men with NCO-capable men both in selection and qualification.

As time passes I really do believe that armies need to be flexible with regard to organisational structure and weapons and equipment. More applicable (I appreciate) for armies that pick fights overseas than those who defend only their homeland.

Take (Vietnam and Afghanistan) two examples for comparison where give the different enemy and the different terrain certain changes from the standard "Cold War" organisational structure of those times would have been beneficial in the particular theater.

It seems that despite all the talk of flexibility and of adapting to local conditions no significant changes seem to get made. Is this because commanders believe in the "one size fits all" approach where current organisations are forced to fit current operational circumstances or they have neither the interest nor the ability to make the necessary changes?

Watching a repeat of the series the Scots at War on the History Channel I note (from the parts on Afghanistan) that apart from a water overload, the insanity of lugging Javelin anti-tank missiles (at 40lbs for missile and CLU) and the obvious absurd weight of radio equipment for 2-3 km patrol much stays the same in terms of structure, weapons and equipment.

I would have thought that by now we would have seen some (structural/weapons/equipment) innovations (probably initiated by special forces) filter their way through to the line infantry?

... and as I have mentioned before that most of the (mine protecting) vehicle mods could have been carried out in a local "factory" in Kabul (or suitable local place).

Seems modern soldiers not only carry too much weight but also labour under the burden of the inflexible military procurement bureaucratic nightmare that straight-jackets modern armies.

Is there really an ideal squad size or equipment scale? Surely you go to a new place and look, listen and learn and adapt before you have to put too many troopies in body-bags?

[Ken White]

As time passes I really do believe that armies need to be flexible with regard to organisational structure and weapons and equipment...
...
Seems modern soldiers not only carry too much weight but also labour under the burden of the inflexible military procurement bureaucratic nightmare that straight-jackets modern armies.

Is there really an ideal squad size or equipment scale? Surely you go to a new place and look, listen and learn and adapt before you have to put too many troopies in body-bags?

One would think...

Apparently it was not meant to be...

Several feelers out on the article. One negative back, others working.

[Rifleman]

I would have thought that by now we would have seen some (structural/weapons/equipment) innovations (probably initiated by special forces) filter their way through to the line infantry?.....

.....Is there really an ideal squad size or equipment scale? Surely you go to a new place and look, listen and learn and adapt before you have to put too many troopies in body-bags?

It's been suggested. That was one of Wilf Owen's big things: a platoon of 30 or so divided into big fire teams without a permanent squad organization. His idea was that you could mix and match the fire teams in various ways. METT-TC as always.

SEALs and DELTA do it now: their 16-man troop can be employed 4x4, 2x8, 1x8 plus 2x4, etc.

But to do it with line infantry and keep the company end numbers the same you would have to add a platoon or two to the company. Maybe that's why it doesn't catch on: it messes up the idea that a rifle company is three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon because.....well, because it's three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon, of course.

[Pete]

The TO&E is an admin-log thing, done to simplify the manning and equipping of a lot of units in a hurry, such as in the U.S. during 1942-45. At the time of Pearl Harbor the U.S. Army had Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment, which in the early days required a lot of cross-referencing back and forth between the two. Then around '42 or '43 someone at DA got smart and decided to combine the two together into the TO&E.

Those standard templates of organization should not drive tactics. Just because you're in a triangular straight-leg Infantry division or in an Armored division with three combat commands, it doesn't mean the organizational structure dictates tactics. Same for Pentogonal, ROAD, and whatever it is we have these days.

[Rifleman]

The TO&E is an admin-log thing, done to simplify the manning and equipping of a lot of units in a hurry, such as in the U.S. during 1942-45. At the time of Pearl Harbor the U.S. Army had Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment, which in the early days required a lot of cross-referencing back and forth between the two. Then around '42 or '43 someone at DA got smart and decided to combine the two together into the TO&E.

Those standard templates of organization should not drive tactics. Just because you're in a triangular straight-leg Infantry division or in an Armored division with three combat commands, it doesn't mean the organizational structure dictates tactics. Same for Pentogonal, ROAD, and whatever it is we have these days.

Pete,

I understand how we got there and I agree it should not drive tactics but it often does, doesn't it?

One example is a Bradley platoon. With four Brads in a platoon each able to hold up to six dismounts it seems sensible to me to deploy as four big fire teams under the PL for dismounted ops. Yet, the last FM I saw called for them trying to form standard squads after un-assing the Brad. Done to stay consistent with light infantry doctrine for their dismounted ops, I suppose.

Is that still doctrine for dismounts in the mech community?

[Pete]

The experience of World War II led the U.S. Army to become more of a massive administrative and logistical apparatus rather than a professional fighting force. It has to do with combining guys of the right MOSs with LIN numbers of equipment. In part it dates from organizing an Army in a hurry during War I. So we put together guys who graduated from shake-and-bake school training with industrial output, weapons and vehicles, and voila, we have divisions. We report on whether they're combat-ready on DA Form 2715 every month, mainly in terms of the personnel and equipment they have assigned to them.

Much of what I've read about on SWJ/SWC has been about taking this business of forming organizations with personnel and equipment to a higher level of proficiency -- leader developent, soldier development, and tactics, tactics, tactics ...