The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Ken White]

I get that with regards to making a hitting lighter bullet totally ineffective. That still doesn't make a missing heavier bullet any more effective though. (apart from maybe a suppressive effect)

Suppression is mostly misunderstood -- trained troops will not be deterred by any volume of misses; they will be deterred by accurate fire. The key is simply to minimize the number of misses -- regardless of caliber.

Would the accuracy potential not be increased with a semi mode to allow for following through on the trigger pull, as opposed to having to concentrate on a careful short and sharp trigger pull? Or am I being pedantic now?

Perhaps a slight increase; you still have with many automatic weapons the problem of the recoiling mass moving forward regardless of single shot cape or trigger manipulation. The Brownings escape that problem by firing from a closed bolt, as did the FG 42 and the Johnsons in WW II on semi auto (while switching to an open bolt for full auto). So does this LINK little gem. If that new one works out, it'll be a while before they appear in large numbers and there a a LOT of MAG 57 / GPMG / M240 variants around. There are also too many Minimis but that's another thread...

[William F. Owen]

Suppression: An effect of action that causes the enemy to fail to act, through fear of harm.

Note: Suppression can be delivered by sensors as well as weapons, if the enemy believes that being detected will lead to his being harmed.

....so we use small arms fire to suppress the enemy, to fix him, so he will not move, and to prevent him firing back at us, so as we can deliver increasing effective harm against him.

Roger so far?

[Ken White]

and other HE or standoff weapons (among other things) aside from small arms and sensors. Then this

Suppression: An effect of action that causes the enemy to fail to act, through fear of harm.

is okay.

So far...

[Rifleman]

.....'they' have never been in a major fire fight with lots of people milling about. Or had to deal with opponents in heavy winter clothing.....

A position (conviction?) formed from observing the effects of the .30 Carbine on the Chinese?

[kaur]

Just one table to illustrate Ken White's last page post about external ballistics.

http://web.archive.org/web/200712011...ballistics.pdf

[jcustis]

I think suppression can absolutely come from the one guy who was milling about, and then went down, even though merely wounded, from a lone round. Everyone else scatters and begins looking around frantically.

With the 203, what is actually the biggest issue? Is it familiarization with the weapon itself, is it the sighting systems, or is it skills regards judging distances? If it is the latter, than can that be overcome with training more specific to solving that issue, not requiring so much use of ammo?
On the NZ 203’s we have pretty basic (nay, crappy) sights but the Oz 203’s seem to have far better ones, with what looks like a red dot, similar to the ‘piggy back’ that you see on some Acog’s. see picture.

In the case of what I have seen within the USMC, we do not hav enough ammunition in the quantities required to build up the skill at utilizing the crude sights. The picture you posted looks like out quadrant sight, with a miniature red dot instead of a screw-in post and ghost ring that flip out. The PSQ-18 sight was a nice try at improving accuracy, but it is so bulky and heavy that no one uses them...at least in the battalion I am in. The rudimentary front sight, good to 250 meters, is decent enough I suppose, but I personally never liked the awkward firing position you had to assume, nor the means of manipulating the trigger.

I don't know what the standard number of rounds required is, off the top of my head, for by-the-book qualification and sustainment training. I do know that when Gunner Eby was establishing pre-deployment training and qualification standards for 203 gunners going back to Iraq in 2004 with RCT-7, the number 27 comes to mind. 18 for training and 9 for a qual run. Nowadays and then, we're lucky to get 27 for all four 203 gunners in a platoon.

I like the idea of rifle grenades solely because you don't have to have the 203 mounted to be able to employ a fight-breaker. We don't even follow good practices by training grenadiers...it gets assigned as a collateral duty to the team and squad leader. If I were top dog, I'd enforce the proper MTO&E with a grenadier working truly in that role.

I had those two longer posts where I had a lot more to say, but I've been celebrating the 4th pretty heavily today guys, and the pitchers of sangria are doing me in. More to follow tomorrow.

And on the note of the 4th, you guys inspire me to do what I do, at here and abroad, and to try to be a better warrior. Hats off to you all who are working to make the modern warrior of the free world more lethal and efficient when he needs to be.

[William F. Owen]

Just one table to illustrate Ken White's last page post about external ballistics.

http://web.archive.org/web/200712011...ballistics.pdf

Yes, that looks impressive and is actually pretty good data.
Especially interesting the range at which the round drops below supersonic, as there is some evidence that the "crack" caused, increases the suppressive effect.
The point of carried weight though needs to be considered as a "whole" of the weapons effects the man can provide. As I said in one of my articles, the weight of a 5.56mm weapon plus 100 rounds, and 2 rifle grenades, does not exceed the weight of some 7.62mm weapons, plus the same number of rounds. Assuming an 4-man fire team engagement at 300m, 8 rifle grenades, may provide effects beyond that which larger calibre's can provide. Obviously this is not an absolute condition.

[Kiwigrunt]

.
In the case of what I have seen within the USMC, we do not hav enough ammunition in the quantities required to build up the skill at utilizing the crude sights. The picture you posted looks like out quadrant sight, with a miniature red dot instead of a screw-in post and ghost ring that flip out. The PSQ-18 sight was a nice try at improving accuracy, but it is so bulky and heavy that no one uses them...at least in the battalion I am in. The rudimentary front sight, good to 250 meters, is decent enough I suppose, but I personally never liked the awkward firing position you had to assume, nor the means of manipulating the trigger.

That would suggest that better sights should make a difference. Here are some pics of another sight that may have some potential.
And what about issuing a small range finder like this one. These civvie ones are probably not very soldier proof but conceptually it may work. It weighs less than a 40mm round.

I'm just trying to think of ways to (at least partially) overcome the shortage in training ammo (live and chalk) as it doesn't look like that will ever change.
Maybe some sort of electronic simulator, no idea what that would look like though.
On chalk, in my experience chalk rounds are not particularly consistent and not ballistically matched with live. That doesn't help things.

Nowadays and then, we're lucky to get 27 for all four 203 gunners in a platoon.

I assume you mean nine grenadiers? Must have been that last beer you had...cheers.

We don't even follow good practices by training grenadiers...it gets assigned as a collateral duty to the team and squad leader. If I were top dog, I'd enforce the proper MTO&E with a grenadier working truly in that role.

Concur. It is essentially a support weapon and as such deserves the grenadiers undivided attention. As much as the team deserves the leaders undivided attention, well, at least with regards to not multi-tasking him by giving him a support weapon.

And on the note of the 4th, you guys inspire me to do what I do, at here and abroad, and to try to be a better warrior. Hats off to you all who are working to make the modern warrior of the free world more lethal and efficient when he needs to be.

Hey, my pleasure (for as far as I can claim credit, which is not far). I do it for fun and out of genuine interest, but from my comfortable lounge. You guys are out there doing it! So let me take a huge big fat hat of to you.

[Ken White]

A position (conviction?) formed from observing the effects of the .30 Carbine on the Chinese?

Also applied to even .30-06 and .45 though obviously to a far lesser extent. The milling mob applied to Viet Nam and elsewhere and to various calibers. As an aside, 9mm x 19 is worthless as a combat cartridge, only thing it offers is low recoil enabling a good shooter to achieve better accuracy with less noise in certain conditions.

Problem in a heavy firefight is that targets are fleeting thus 'good' hits are hard to obtain; that the sheer numbers occasionally preclude hits on person X because person Y suddenly gets in the way and absorbs or deflects the bullet. Add to that the difficulty of getting some folks to fire slowly and accurately when they are receiving fire, deflection of bullets by various things, even leaves, in or on an untidy battle space and the need to punch through some minor elements of cover -- you arrive at a desire for superior penetration and knock down power.

My son carried an M-14 on his second trip to Afghanistan, recoil / weight not withstanding. I would've also...

[Jones_RE]

Ken White,

You talked about training shooters to hit targets at 500m. How much ammunition did that require? What methodology did the trainers use?

[jcustis]

I'm curious about a similar question Ken...

What was the typical (if that term can be applied) combat load for the M1 and M14? I know it was probably easy enough to toss a bandolier of clips over the shoulder, but on the standard webbing, were the ten clip pouches typically loaded with a 8-rd Garand clip or 2x 5-rd stipper clips?

And when the M14 came into use, were the M-1956 universal ammunition cases really used? The wikipedia description of them say they were designed to be general purpose since weapons were in transition, but they don't seem to be all that functional.

When an M4-toting guy pauses to think of a stripped-down loadout of 80 (M1) or 120 (M14) rounds, I wonder whether the smaller round count wasn't a worry because the bad guys had comparable loadouts.

[Ken White]

the major difference being that it was far easier to get a hit at 600 yards with an M1 than it is at 500 with an M16.

LINK.

Back then it was 3rds to confirm zero (daily), 10rds 0ffhand / 200 yds, 10rds kneeling / 200 yds, 10rds Sitting / 300 yds, 10rds prone / 300 yds, 10rds prone / 600yds for a total of 53rds a day times five days = 265 rds per man plus for the 105 requiring makeups, another two or three days, say an average of about 290-300 rds per per man on the known distance range. Add Field Firing on pop-up and obscured targets at ranges from 25 yds to 600 yrds (it was 600 yds then with the M1, now reduced to 500 for the M16 [and that's optimism if I ever saw it]), three days of it at 80 rds per run including five for zero confirmation, thus 240 rounds per man + 290 = ~ 530 rds per man. Repeat annually and add in unit training live fire exercises and you get an annual requirement of about 1,000 rds per man for Infantry units. Minimum requirement, that. More would be better, upo to about 2,000 rds per man (allowing for the slop of people on leave, special duty, in hospital, etc. giving those present slightly more).

With todays weapons, ammunition and training enhancements, it could almost certainly be done with slightly fewer rounds -- and there are some people who should not qualify annually simply because they'll never likely fir a round in anger. Shooting is like riding a bike, if your initial training is really good, sustainment isn't all that necessary; just a refresher before you might have to use it. That does not apply to the Infantry who need to shoot more, not less but a lot of folks are shooting every year who do not need to do so.

Units other than Infantry would require much less, half that 1K rounds or even fewer. Figuring Infantry at about 25% of a modern force, you'd get a realistic ammo requirement of about 550-600 rds per man for each 100K persons in the force (100K x .25 x 1K = 25M rds + [75K x 500 rds = 37.5M rds] = 62.5M x .9 {because almost never will everyone fire every year} = 56,250 rds / 100K = 562 rds). At about .30 per rd, that's $180.00 per man in ammo and about $20. in targets and ancillaries; total of around $200.00 per man -- less than his working / combat uniform and boots.

Well less than the cost of a Kevlar vest and probably more beneficial...

[Ken White]

What was the typical (if that term can be applied) combat load for the M1 and M14? I know it was probably easy enough to toss a bandolier of clips over the shoulder, but on the standard webbing, were the ten clip pouches typically loaded with a 8-rd Garand clip or 2x 5-rd stipper clips?

Basic load for the M1 was 184 rounds for most infantry; 10 clips of 8 in the belt (Airborne Infantry was less, 168 rds, 8 clips in 4 pouches on a pistol belt) = 80 (64 Abn) + 2 bandoleers of 6 x 8 = 96 == 176 (152 Abn) + one clip in the weapon = 184 (168 Abn). In practice, the bandoleers were sometimes taken, sometimes not and latitude was allowed the troops most of the time to determine their own ammo load. Most guys initially carried too much ammo and as they learned, rarely took the bandoleers; some frequently took the clips out of a bandoleer and put them in a pocket (bad idea, the ammo invariably got jamming dirty and / or displaced forward in the clip) but most didn't bother. Joe's pretty good at reading the real METT. So, you're right, 80 rounds plus 8 in the weapon for most the majority of the time...

Little stuff needs to be trained. The M1 functioned better when dirty -- and all combat rifles get dirty -- if the clip was inserted with the uppermost round to the right, so the old guys put their clips in the ammo belt so that each clip would be properly oriented in they had to reload in the dark or rapidly without looking at the placement. Just as all your old guys load their mags into the pouches properly oriented for a rapid reload without looking.

Five round stripper clips in .30 were rare and were never used with the M1; occasionally, the BAR guys would get some instead of cartons. BAR men carried 13 mags, 12 on the belt, 1 in the weapon (only issued 12 but they always had an extra; some had several extras they carried in their packs. Somehow, the extra belt issued for the Assistant AR man always seemed to get lost...

And when the M14 came into use, were the M-1956 universal ammunition cases really used?

Yep, each pouch would hold two 20 rd mags for the M14, perfect fit. Five mags were issued per wpn, thus most guys carried 100 rds. Bandoleers with 12 5 rd stripper clips were available but were almost never carried; easier to scuff some extra mags and load ;'em, carry them in the Ruck. Basic load was 220 rounds, five mags plus two bandoleers. As with the M1, bandoleers were rarely carried and new guys quickly learned they were carrying too much ammo. Recall though, that the M14 was issued to most as semi-auto only.

The M 1956 pouches each would carry two 20 rd M16 mags comfortably, three with a tight fit & that's where the jerk string on mags came from; still around even though no longer needed I usually carried my survival kit in one pouch, three mags in the other, one mag in my Jungle trousers left pocket which had an inner pocket for that purpose and one in the weapon plus three or four cartons of 20 in my ruck (never used); 100 rounds in mags, never got down to my last mag.

When an M4-toting guy pauses to think of a stripped-down loadout of 80 (M1) or 120 (M14) rounds, I wonder whether the smaller round count wasn't a worry because the bad guys had comparable loadouts.

Nope, not a worry. Why would it be? If I can shoot more accurately and can use my ammo wisely, I'll have some left when he's out even if he started with twice as much as I did. Even if he's as good and well trained as I am, we're nominally even -- I can handle that. I don't get your logic on that one...

The only reason that 300 plus rounds are being carried by many today is simply due to the fact they can waste ammo with no penalty. Try that on the beach after the Shore Party gets clobbered and the ASP gets hit with ten mortar rounds -- and there will be no more Ammo until tomorrow...

It's just like your canteens or camelback -- you can drink it all real quick or you can pace your usage. The ability to fire on full auto will be used -- and misused -- unless it is trained properly. Our fire discipline is pathetic. I've seen recent videos of people responding to mortar and rocket attacks with automatic weapons fire at night.

I never fired my M16 on full auto and wouldn't allow people that worked for me to do so. Lotta firefights in my Platoon Sergeant days including a couple of big, multi-battalion fights and all the Troops were still alive when I left, carrying seven or eight 20 round mags -- or less...

[jcustis]

Thanks for the detailed reply Ken.

On the issue of round count, your confidence in ability to outshoot opponents speaks to just what I was thinking. Knowing you could carry more didn't translate into a need to do so.

Your point about fire discipline makes me think on the matter of the Corps' current combat marksmanship training program. Lot's of emphasis on controlled and hammer pairs because so many of the table iterations are fired from 10-50m, but not a single point ever made by an instructor (in my four runnings of the courses of fire) that deliberate, well-aimed single shots remain appropriate for threats engaged at distance.

[Ken White]

...Lot's of emphasis on controlled and hammer pairs because so many of the table iterations are fired from 10-50m...

However, so does this:

...deliberate, well-aimed single shots remain appropriate for threats engaged at distance.

We need to avoid excessive concentration on one range / technique -- and to training actions that become too firmly embedded to the exclusion of thinking and alternative methods and thus become, to our opponents, very predictable.

That will get a lot of our people killed unnecessarily.

The total spectrum of combat must be taught and trained constantly. The Troops can handle it; problem is that's a LOT of work for the Commanders, leaders and trainers. Therefor...

ADDED: Off the wall question, Jon. Do they teach the kids to count rounds fired? You can generally tell a good pro from even a talented amateur -- the pro will always know how many rounds he has left in the mag and in total...

[jcustis]

ADDED: Off the wall question, Jon. Do they teach the kids to count rounds fired? You can generally tell a good pro from even a talented amateur -- the pro will always know how many rounds he has left in the mag and in total...

No, that is neither taught, nor stressed, unless it comes down from a passionate small-unit leader. Heck, there are Marines (probably a majority) who can't recognize the sound and feel of a bolt carrier group locking back on an empty magazine. And actually, there's very little need to do so if you have one of these thing-a-ma-jigs (don't laugh, it is a very good magazine and I own many):

We need to avoid excessive concentration on one range / technique -- and to training actions that become too firmly embedded to the exclusion of thinking and alternative methods and thus become, to our opponents, very predictable.

I've got specific thoughts on this part, and was drafting a long rant about the matter of fire and movement techniques, when IE started crashing on the other computer. I want to put a placeholder here because I have some honey-do things to accomplish, but need to come back to what I was writing yesterday.

[Uboat509]

...On a few of the topics here.

M203

I have carried both the M203 and the M79 and I have to say that I absolutely prefer the M79. I can understand the convenience and speed factors for having the grenade launcher mounted under the weapon but everyone I know who has fired both has always been much more accurate with the M79. Plus, it's nice not to have extra weight and bulk on the end of the gun or to limited to a minimum barrel length by the M203, particularly when it comes to CQC. It's a shame that the M79 is no longer available.

Having the teamleaders carry the M203 was something we started doing in my company when I was a squad leader in 2000. The rational was partly a manpower issue, the rifle man was already carrying things like the AT-4 or the claymore, and partly an issue of giving the teamleader an additional signaling device. In any case, the teamleader leads from the front so giving him the M203 doesn't really distract him from his job much.

M14 v. M4

I love the M14. It is definitely a Superior weapon in terms of knock-down power and long distance accuracy. You can't argue that. The M4 is superior in terms of the weight of the weapon and the weight of rounds carried, although that never mattered as much to me as the knock-down power and distance accuracy. The problem comes in the CQC environment. Even the SOCOM version of the M14 is still a long weapon. I do not relish the idea of trying the maneuver that beast around in a house. The M4, with the right ammunition, is definitely a better weapon in that environment and we do spend a lot of time in that environment.

SFC W

[William F. Owen]

...On a few of the topics here.

M203

It's a shame that the M79 is no longer available.

There are modern M-79 equivalents. I've only ever fired the HK69A1 and it seemed pretty good.

Having the teamleaders carry the M203 was something we started doing in my company when I was a squad leader in 2000.

Having the team leader with the M203 is SOP in many IDF battalions.

The M4, with the right ammunition, is definitely a better weapon in that environment and we do spend a lot of time in that environment.

I suggest that support the Platoon level mix of weapons approach. 12 men = 9 x M4 + 3 x M14 perhaps, - which is most probably what you guys do anyway.

[jcustis]

I think that one of our larger failings in the Marine Corps comes from being terribly inconsistent in our doctrine. MCWP 3-11.2 of 2002 vintage is merely a re-labelling of FMFM 6-5 Marine Rifle Squad from 1991.

To let our small unit doctrine lie fallow for 18 years is pretty sad, considering the advances in so much technology, understanding of human factors in comabt, and the like.

The description of techniques of assault fire in the attack, found on page 2-32, is indicative of what irks me with our dated drivel:

(a) Riflemen and Assistant Automatic Riflemen. Both fire welldirected
shots from the pointing position. They should fire the weapon
using three-round bursts or they should pull the trigger each time the
left foot strikes the ground. They fire at known or suspected enemy
locations on the portion of the objective that corresponds with their
position in the assault formation. (See fig. 2-17.)

The insert photo shows a rifleman advancing with his rifle in an underarm firing position, as if he were participating in that classic "GET ON LINE!!!" technique which we abandoned so long ago. It's a good thing Marines are basically just rough and tumble SOBs.

Being tough isn't the sole answer though, and a newly-minted squad leader can't find a reference for controlling his fires in the attack that are rational and make sense. The USA may have such a pub, but we sure don't, and I've witnessed the slop as squads rush downrange, firing wildly and with little to no apparent focus. SAW gunners rushing forward as soon as the rifleman have barely dropped to a new firing position...Riflemen resuming their rushes just because the SAW gunner droped to his bipods...

The greater shortfall is that I have watched instructors at our formal schools critique these abortions using totally skewed criteria, such as solely how well the teams employed talking guns, or maintained speed and momentum (which was for some reason decoupled from how many tgts were successfully engaged during the run). We think we have it down pat, but are really far from cutting to thebeing as efficient as we could be.

[William F. Owen]

The greater shortfall is that I have watched instructors at our formal schools critique these abortions using totally skewed criteria, such as solely how well the teams employed talking guns, or maintained speed and momentum (which was for some reason decoupled from how many tgts were successfully engaged during the run). We think we have it down pat, but are really far from cutting to thebeing as efficient as we could be.

Not my place to criticise the USA or USMC, but I can tell you that Platoon Manoeuvre is widely mis-understood and mostly very poorly trained for. I've watched many UK platoons do "bunker busting" drills at the platoon level an they have them down pat. Highly skilled, highly aggressive, and mostly effective. Done it myself and last observed it being done at the NCO school in 2006.
Problem is that template drills do not test Platoon and Section commanders as to their understanding of how a platoon gets forward. Thus in the UK, you have the bones of an excellent system, that mostly people have no idea as to why they are doing what they do. They just do it.
Same thing screwed up the platoon and section tactics training in 1941.