By strategy an enemy is out-manoeuvred; that is, he is placed in a bad position from which to hit out. First it should be remembered that the purpose of tactics is similar to that of strategy, namely to carry out the intention of the commander- his plan. The instrument is not only the troops but the
organization of the troops. Organization
must be maintained. Further movement
must be maintained, or at least the power to move must exist when the commander desires to move. We here get as our battle problem the maintenance of a moving
organized body of men. This body must be able to move, and it must remain organized. The enemy is attempting to stop this movement, not only by killing and wounding our men, but
by destroying their organization. We must, therefore, protect our men and their organization, and we do so to a great extent through offensive action.
By hitting we reduce the chances of being hit.
Tactical action may, therefore, be defined as: protected
organized movement through offensive action. To accomplish this we require three orders of troops. Troops which will protect the attackers, troops which can attack, and troops which can pursue. These three orders remain fundamental, and to pull their full weight they must co-operate-that is, work together to attain a common object. In a present-day army these orders are represented by artillery, infantry, and cavalry; and the reason why in the last great war a decision was so long delayed was due to:
(i.) The immobility of artillery.
(ii.) The defensive strength of infantry.
(iii.) The offensive weakness of cavalry.
The number of guns employed and the enormous supply of ammunition required tied artillery down to definite areas, and as intensity of fire had to be maintained, and guns cannot fire when in movement, the result was that when they had to move the attack virtually had to be suspended. The defensive power of infantry and the lack of ability on the part of cavalry to pursue needs no accentuation. What we have got to do now is to think in the terms of the elements of war and make good the above deficiencies. Thus, artillery must be endowed with a higher power of movement. Infantry must be endowed with higher offensive power, and cavalry must be more highly protected. I have laid down three orders of troops from the major point of view, now I will examine them from the minor-the tactical organization and co-operation of the attackers themselves.
According to the accepted theory of war, the true attackers are the infantry. They attack from the base supplied them by the protective troops-the gunners-and on defeating the enemy’s infantry, theoretically, they form a base for cavalry action. If, from the major point of view, three orders of troops are necessary, so also are they necessary from the minor. Consequently an infantry platoon should be a threefold organization, and it virtually is one. To prove this I will first divide the platoon into two equal parts, a forward body and a reserve-the left and right fists of a boxer. Both consist of two weapons-
a protective weapon, the Lewis gun, and an offensive weapon, the rifle. The object of the forward division is to deprive the enemy of power to move, so that the reserve division may move forward and destroy him. The reserve may assist the forward body by protective fire, but, in any case, the Lewis-gun section of the forward body should protect the advance of the rifle section. Thus we find, in miniature, the tactics of an army repeating themselves in the platoon. The forward
Lewis gun is the field artillery, the forward rifle section the infantry, and the reserves the cavalry and horse artillery. But, whilst theoretically the cavalry in pursuit can move faster than infantry in flight, in the platoon battle the reserve cannot do so. Consequently, whilst in the main battle the object of the infantry is to disorganize the enemy's infantry so that the cavalry can pursue, in the platoon battle the object of the forward division is to fix or hold its antagonist until the reserve division can move forward and disorganize him. Each time such a disorganization is effected the enemy's battle-body sustains a scratch. In the infantry attack as conceived to-day an antagonist is scratched to pieces. The diagram (No. 13) shows what I mean [
see image attached below]. D is the enemy; A is the forward Lewis-gun section; and B the forward rifle section; C is the reserve. Under the protective fire of A, B manoeuvres, and through offensive action fixes D. When once D is fixed, C makes the fullest use of movement to manoeuvre into a position from which D can be annihilated or compelled to surrender.
Even in so small an action as this we see the close interplay between the three physical elements of war, and, through them, back to the three elements of force.
Stability, activity, and co-operation (mobility) demand three types of weapons; these demand three types of soldiers; and these soldiers express their combined action in a threefold order of tactics, namely to protect, to fix, and to destroy or paralyse. Again we get a close relationship between strategy and tactics. The position occupied by A is first of all tactical-that is, offensive; secondly it is strategical-to cover the movement of B. B's movement is strategically, then tactical; and so also is C's. If strategy and tactics cannot be separated in the platoon, neither can they be separated in an army. Even if our force comprises three men, one should act protectively, one offensively, and the third in a mobile manner; even if only one man, he should protect himself with one fist, hit out with the other, and move by leg-power; and one man is our ultimate model, for one man is our military molecule. (my emphasis underlined, pp.170-173)
The mere addition of new weapons and means of movement and protection must not delude us into supposing that an army is guided by progress, for the " test " of progress is
tactical idea. How are they being used ? This is the question. The answer is to be sought in the training manuals and on the manoeuvre grounds. Here we can learn how they are being used, and then, possessed with this information, we should turn to the weapons and means and ascertain their powers and limitations. Does tactical theory express them? If it does, then we learn that an army is thinking scientifically;
if not, then that its command is composed of alchemists. This is a tremendous and decisive discovery to make.
Next we should examine the military structure of organization. Does it admit the true tactical values of the means being expressed, and does it permit of a co-ordination of tactical structure and maintenance, and is it easily controllable ? To be controllable and maintainable it must be simple. Is it simple or complex ? Is it growing like the body of a man, or like an amorphous polypus :
that is, is each new means accentuating the power of the elements of war by correlation, or by mere addition? If by addition, then we are faced by a monster, and monsters are seldom to be feared. As the power of each weapon is limited, so also is the force of an organization limited. What are its limitations, and how can they be overcome. (p.174, Fuller’s emphasis in italics; mine underlined)
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