What is the issue then?...but the problem isn't the one-for-one comparing of accuracy, with other types of 5.56mm LARs. As I said, this is where I differ with Eby on his approach to testing.
Thanks for postingOriginally Posted by jcustis
...but the problem isn't the one-for-one comparing of accuracy, with other types of 5.56mm LARs. As I said, this is where I differ with Eby on his approach to testing.Despite the small margin of accuracy between the replacement candidates and the SAW that would otherwise mean a replacement is not necessary, the SAW still does not provide the requisite mobility and ability to fire in a semi-automatic mode.
The testing also identified that optics, and often a spotter of some sorts, matter.
Optics are critical. There is a pretty huge body of evidence to support this, from the UK if nowhere else.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
What is the issue then?...but the problem isn't the one-for-one comparing of accuracy, with other types of 5.56mm LARs. As I said, this is where I differ with Eby on his approach to testing.
Ah! Sorry, thought I had dealt with this else where.
Basically the problem was framed as "Replace the SAW for X-reasons." This lead to comparative testing against replacements.
I would have suggested trying to measure
- How effective the Fire team was, with and without the SAW? - so how effective is the SAW, kilogram for kilogram?
- Can the M32 replace the SAW?
- Do you actually need a SAW, if all the M4's or M16A4s have good optics and a bipod?
If the testing is limited to punching holes in targets, then the usefulness of the results are going to limited as a result.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I think those are good points Wilf. (And we have of course discussed this else where).
That’s where a weapon like LWRC IAR is IMO interesting because it weighs hardly any more than ‘its’ standard carbine/rifle version. Replace all M4’s, M16’s, Minimi’s, IW’s, LSW’s, SAW’s, LMG’s, AR’s, carbines etc. etc. with it and call it a……uhhmmmm….rifle. Next weapon up is a 7.62 beltfed at section/squad level (or platoon level for Wilf, or company level for Ken). (fit sniper rifles and DMR’s in there somewhere.) And that will IMO make it much easier to add other weapons like M32 or anything shoulder launched to any fireteam/squad/whatever, since the emphasis is no longer on manoeuvring the fireteam around the (overweight) SAW.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Sweet looking AR there. Yeah, this is pretty much the way it think it is useful to progress. The variety in sighting systems enabled by the MIL-STD 1913 rail can gain far more capability for existing weapons than adding new ones.
I've just been looking at <1kg laser range finding sniper scope with an automatic ballistic range reticule. It accounts for temperature and wind.
- Put dot on target.
- Press "range" button.
- Dot moves.
- Put dot back on target.
- Squeeze trigger
Could take a 7.62mm rifle out to 1,200-1,300m for a first round hit. Now you have to have pretty steady hands for that, so skill is still required.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Kiwigrunt,
When you say that other systems can be integrated b/c an AR would mean a change to maneuver around the SAW, are you thinking more that the team has to slow its movement down to the speed that the SAW gunner can move, or that the team is built around the SAW, and supports it (in militaries that use it)?
Jcustis, I’m thinking more the latter. In the NZ army the Minimi replaced the GPMG on a one to one basis for the first decade or so and was therefore the section machinegun, just like the gimpy used to be. Then we adopted the fireteam structure and added a Minimi and pretty much started using it as the fireteam machinegun (which it is of course), so a fireteam almost became a mini-section with its own baby-machinegun. Problem is, the section of old had enough bods to fill other roles like rifleman, radio op, scout and cover-scout, anti tank etc., and that way the gunner could totally concentrate on his gun and get maximum effect out of it. The fireteam is so small that, especially after some minor redundancy, the gunner has no option but to be one of the ‘bods’. And that than still goes back to your first point anyway, regarding weight, by the time they carry the additional stores.
And then things started getting silly. The Minimi was so cool (and I have to say, I really do like it myself) and 'light', and superior to any rifle, that for instance six man CMA teams in East Timor typically carried three of them. Now that to me is not using a MG in its intended role as a group support weapon, where its weight is justified against its effect, but as a supercharged SMG on steroids. (And that’s not to say that it can’t do that job quite nicely, but that would be a choice; maybe more suitable to SF than to line-infantry)
And I suppose that is where the USMC IAR concept comes in. The issue I see with it is that the tactics applied still revolve around the AR as being pivotal, with the rest of the team manoeuvring around it. It appears to me that the weapon is so close to being a standard assault rifle that the differentiation becomes silly. So the whole concept of the team being formed around this weapon could IMO be dropped completely (provided of course that a weapon like the LWRC can prove itself). If everyone has this rifle, then anyone can fulfil the role of AR as and when required, or all if the situation is desperate enough to require it (I can hear your teeth grinding Ken). And they could do it without even stepping into that role, since that role would not exist as such. It would just be a matter of switching to full auto when needed.
A shift in mindset that may create whole new possibilities???
I suppose the question I have is, are we trying to fill this spot of gunner or AR because we are so used to having it (there almost appears to be some kind of mystique about it) and we’d feel naked without it? Or do we really need that extra firepower at those low levels, even if only 5.56? I think the answers to those questions can only be found by you trigger-pullers, as long as emotions can be set aside and a clear differentiation can be made between a perception of power on the part of the gunner (the hard-on factor), and the real on-target effects. I always felt that when I carried the C9 on exercises (and even with blanks), those figure 11 targets were just sh#t out of luck!
By the way, Wilf, you may be able to answer this. Did the Israelis not try to do this with the Galil, with its bipod and 35 and 50 round magazines? What happened there?
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
That was feasible (and done) -except the weight cap- 20 years ago.
Even a comparably simple red dot+LRF sight is an overkill at typical ranges, though.
Snipers operate in teams and need neither integral LRF nor a red dot. Long range shots require a lot of skill besides calm hands anyway (altitude difference, wind, optical distortions, lead aiming).
A designated marksman could use such a toy, but they're so numerous that the toy's price becomes a factor - and designated marksmen need sights for very short range. This favours variable sights with minimum 1-1.5x and maximum 3.4-6x - unsuitable for 1,200m shots.
An alternative is the use of two sights, of course.
Any general infantry weapon that's meant to hit at more than 400-600m is suspicious to me.
That's fine for snipers, but infantry would merely force the enemy to become less sloppy (invisible) by shooting+hitting at extreme distances.
That also gives away the own presence (if not location).
I'd say reserve anything between 300 and 500m for the designated marksmen (and designated marksman rifles+automatic carbines should probably succeed 'assault rifles' in general), snipers and indirect fires.
Reserve anything 500m+ for snipers and indirect fires.
Sometimes you should simply hide and observe, provoke carelessness and maybe prepare an ambush instead of shooting.
Infantry wouldn't achieve many 1,200m hits anyway. First week maybe - then it'll simply have an empty battlefield and be frustrated because it lacks 'situational awareness'.
Being pretty familiar with the technical and operational aspects of long range prescsion engagement (sniping) I would agree.
This sight was developed for sniper type applications, not marksmen. Cost wise, it is less than a TI sight and a lot of armies, are looking to equip each fire team with a TI sight.A designated marksman could use such a toy, but they're so numerous that the toy's price becomes a factor - and designated marksmen need sights for very short range. This favours variable sights with minimum 1-1.5x and maximum 3.4-6x - unsuitable for 1,200m shots.
An alternative is the use of two sights, of course.
The 1,200m statement is an example of technical capability, not an example of operational need. Yes, I'm pretty sceptical of it, but I am making no assumptions about the things you state, until I've seen it working.
I'd agree.Any general infantry weapon that's meant to hit at more than 400-600m is suspicious to me.
Well all that assumes a direct cause and effect between actions and reactions, which is not what activity on current operations shows. What "First Week?"That's fine for snipers, but infantry would merely force the enemy to become less sloppy (invisible) by shooting+hitting at extreme distances.
That also gives away the own presence (if not location).
I'd say reserve anything between 300 and 500m for the designated marksmen (and designated marksman rifles+automatic carbines should probably succeed 'assault rifles' in general), snipers and indirect fires.
Reserve anything 500m+ for snipers and indirect fires.
Sometimes you should simply hide and observe, provoke carelessness and maybe prepare an ambush instead of shooting.
Infantry wouldn't achieve many 1,200m hits anyway. First week maybe - then it'll simply have an empty battlefield and be frustrated because it lacks 'situational awareness'.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
One comment to Kiwigrunt's question:
Galil ARM (AR with bipod) is not as accurate as AR. ARM's bipod is connected to the barrel in this way that after every shot rifle jumps. It is not even connected to the hand guard. I don't know who made this serious mistake. Logic says that bipod should make you more accurate, but in this case it is opposite. This enhances ammo consumtion and soldier's load weight etc.By the way, Wilf, you may be able to answer this. Did the Israelis not try to do this with the Galil, with its bipod and 35 and 50 round magazines? What happened there?
Fuchs said:
It seems that SEAL's don't belive youInfantry wouldn't achieve many 1,200m hits anyway. First week maybe - then it'll simply have an empty battlefield and be frustrated because it lacks 'situational awareness'
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2009infantr...sionxi8503.pdf
"Well all that assumes a direct cause and effect between actions and reactions, which is not what activity on current operations shows."
I don't really care about ongoing operations because the hostiles are extremely far away from a competent/well-equipped/well-supplied profile that I use for my theoretical work that's 90% related to actual national defence.
"First Week" = time till the enemy adapts to the long range threat.
TI: thermal sights are expensive and bulky. I see no need for more than two such sights per squad plus maybe one spare sight at platoon level.
Thermals should be regarded as special equipment to detect camouflaged hostiles and hostiles concealed by smoke or fog as long as thermal sensors aren't cheap (and energy efficient) enough for general use.
This is the smallest infantry TI known to me:
http://www.trijicon.com/user/parts/p...?categoryID=16
@kaur: SEALs are no general infantry. SF with their uncommon toys are almost irrelevant in the wars that I'm interested in.
OK, that's valid, but my point was that operational history does not show new or improving infantry equipment capabilities as becoming irrelevant based on enemy behaviour. Equipment that does not work, gets ditched. I fully accept that, but equipment than gains a required capability, or increase in existing performance, nearly always endures. The Sniper sight referred to can be programmed with any ballistic algorithm you want, so you can clip it to an AT-4 and hit an object at 1,000m
So one per fire team?I see no need for more than two such sights per squad plus maybe one spare sight at platoon level.
I would define detecting camouflaged enemy as general use, especially in the highly dispersed conditions you allude to. I am strongly of the opinion that a 1kg TIWS is a better use of carried weight than the additional weight associated with a SAW.Thermals should be regarded as special equipment to detect camouflaged hostiles and hostiles concealed by smoke or fog as long as thermal sensors aren't cheap (and energy efficient) enough for general use.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
One per squad as minimum, the second as insurance against Murphy's law and for the use in a 2nd observation post. It's not about fire teams at all.
TIs are expensive and require much energy - it would be nice to have one (especially if mated with LL sights) for every one, but that won't happen for a while because resources are scarce in reality and need to be allocated wisely.
The problem is that it's difficult to decide who should have one.
The leader? Could make good use of it ('situational awareness'), but wouldn't use it much of the time - wasteful.
The designated marksmen? They could use the sight as well, but primarily during a firefight on their rifle. That rifle tends to be longer and heavier than a carbine or assault rifle - so it would be very tiresome to scan the area as needed with the sight on the rifle.
Same (just worse) applies to machine gunners.
Finally grenadiers and other specialists (demolitions, AT, radio) - they could use the sight on their carbine, but that would be a waste during a firefight.
I say; keep the rails standardized and let the leaders figure out who's most reliable at detecting hostiles with TI.
The zeroing is likely the greatest problem for TI swapping in a team.
It's most easy with sniper teams; the observer should have the TI, he's the primary spotter.
Well that's where we differ in our ideas about Platoon organisation. My guess is that our respective platoons would have 5-6 TI sights
Agreed. Flexibility seems to a capability in and of itself, providing that flexibility is defined.
- The problem is that it's difficult to decide who should have one.
- The leader? Could make good use of it ('situational awareness'), but wouldn't use it much of the time - wasteful.
- I say; keep the rails standardized and let the leaders figure out who's most reliable at detecting hostiles with TI.
- The zeroing is likely the greatest problem for TI swapping in a team.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Interesting article but from both documentaries on TV/internet and posts on other forums (specifically ARRSE) it would seem at least some rifle sections in Afghanistan are actually operating with 1xGPMG and 1xLMG (Minimi) per section i.e. 1 fire-team with GPMG and 1 with Minimi. Sorry have to go, more later.
Why the "but." That's precisely my point!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf, thanks for your new article. I found there also this article.
The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets..._Summer_09.pdf
Dr Jim Storr said:
I have to admit that my English is not very good, but does this mean that you have to send metal pieces towards opponent that make him find cover. This makes him slow and your faster guys just catch the slower one. Caliber doesn't matter? This reminds me that Wilf pushed somewhere also HK new small ammo. Wilf any comment, please?To conclude, small arms fire kills and incapacitates very few
people in a typical infantry battle. The location and identity
of those individuals is critical to the outcome. However, the
effect of small arms fire in suppressing the enemy is probably
more important. Suppression fixes the enemy to enable
movement, or for elimination by other weapons. Suppression
is critically important, but also generally very poorly done.
Essentially you are correct. Suppression cannot win in and of itself and suppression only very rarely breaks the will to fight, but Jim Storr and I basically agree, based on the evidence, that small arms fire "fixes", while projected HE, and/or close range direct fire "strikes."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I agreed with your article, Wilf
and thanks for posting it. I did not comment on it simply because it made sense and I had nothing to add. I do wish that, like Kaur, I'd explored and pulled up the Colonel Dr. Storr article. I agree with Storr's conclusion -- but I get there by a slightly different route.
Thanks for doing that and posting it, Kaur.
Storr says:I have not seen those studies but my experience corroborates the thrust of that paragraph. I think the factors he cites range from reasonably accurate for green troops to terribly high for experienced troops. In short, experience can better performance. No surprise there but I also strongly believe that better, more intense and more realistic training can significantly better the performance of new troops.A few studies are quite insightful. It appears that a soldier’s ability to hit a given target is typically reduced by a factor of ten or so when he is moved from a static rifle range to a field firing area where he has to select cover, move, shoot and so on. It is reduced by a further factor of ten or so if there is an enemy firing back at him. It is reduced by another factor of ten if the enemy has machine guns, or if he has tanks; and by a hundred if he has both.
The issue then becomes one of cost. Marginal performance can be obtained as we now train weapons use; to improve that will take a lot of rounds and will cost a bit more. IMO, the money should be expended as doing less is morally suspect to say the least...
An added cost factor is the possibility of a slight increase in training casualties. Sensible practice can minimize that but the realism required will create the potential.
Then this:Exactly -- calling for better, more imaginative and realistic tactical training for junior leaders and potential Company / Battalion commanders (and better operational and strategic training for senior people but that's another thread).Another study reveals entirely different phenomena. It highlights that achieving surprise, or inflicting shock on the enemy are hugely effective. These are more effective than any likely force ratio, or the use of other weapon systems, and so on. Put very simply, if the attacker can find the enemy’s flanks and rear and attack him from there, or apply sudden concentrated violence to him and then exploit it, the enemy will typically give up quite quickly.
With respect to suppression, he says:I very much agree with that and believe the vast majority of such fire is totally wasted and the wasters don't even realize it...Get some fire down!’ is the wrong approach.
‘Suppress the enemy!’ is a better approach.
‘Suppress the enemy, to enable the platoon to attack him
from his rear’ is a better approach still.
Suppressive fire without purpose is just that: purposeless
As you and I have agreed previously, 'suppressive fire' as it is generally practiced is not at all effective against well trained and experienced troops -- accurate fire OTOH will stop or slow them.
He also added:Confirming my long held position that belt fed weapons do NOT belong in the Rifle Platoon other than in the defense (which should be avoided but that too is another thread...).The L110 (Minimi) Light Machine Gun (LMG) performs far worse in such trials. At best, only the first shot of a short burst passes close enough to suppress. However, subsequent shots in that burst go anything up to 6m wide of the mark at battlefield ranges. Since perhaps 3 to 5 rounds in 3 to 5 seconds are required to suppress, a typical LMG gunner will rarely achieve suppression. He would have to fire 3 to 5 bursts in as many seconds to do so. Furthermore, since only the first round typically passes near enough, he would have to fire a burst every 3 seconds or so to keep the target suppressed.
I agree that suppressive fire is needed but contend it must be reasonably accurate and that aimed fire is far more effective than are rounds in the general direction. I also agree that in many situations, HE is the killer but do believe that far better small arms training than is now the norm in desirable, achievable and that improvements can significantly improve the kill ratio of small arms versus HE effects.
Last edited by Ken White; 06-29-2009 at 06:25 PM.
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