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Thread: The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

  1. #321
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Not my place to criticise the USA or USMC, but I can tell you that Platoon Manoeuvre is widely mis-understood and mostly very poorly trained for. I've watched many UK platoons do "bunker busting" drills at the platoon level an they have them down pat. Highly skilled, highly aggressive, and mostly effective. Done it myself and last observed it being done at the NCO school in 2006.
    Problem is that template drills do not test Platoon and Section commanders as to their understanding of how a platoon gets forward. Thus in the UK, you have the bones of an excellent system, that mostly people have no idea as to why they are doing what they do. They just do it.
    Same thing screwed up the platoon and section tactics training in 1941.
    You're on to something, and that is at the root of my frustration with what we do...very few understand the WHY, and far fewer can apply it smoothly when the parameters change.

    That in turn results, IMO, with unecessary employment of supporting arms disproportionate to the threat, wildly inaccurate small-arms fires which run counter to our need to protect the populace in small wars, and unecessary casualties. Our men have the capacity to do it, but we fail them when it comes to applying time, resources, and mentorship to the training.

  2. #322
    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    Default As far as grenade launchers

    ...there is this behemoth. I have not personally ever used this thing nor do I know anyone who has but I don't like what I see. I'm not sure what niche this thing fills. It seems like it's too big to carry along with an M4 but I wouldn't want to arm someone with just this thing.



    This strikes me as more of a solution in search of a problem.

    SFC W

  3. #323
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Uboat509 View Post
    ...there is this behemoth. I have not personally ever used this thing nor do I know anyone who has but I don't like what I see. I'm not sure what niche this thing fills. It seems like it's too big to carry along with an M4 but I wouldn't want to arm someone with just this thing.



    This strikes me as more of a solution in search of a problem.

    SFC W
    I have not heard of any example, anecdotal or otherwise, where those things have been employed in the fight-breaker role we purchased them for. Not sure if we will either, but with the resurgence of offensive action in Afghanistan, maybe data will surface.

  4. #324
    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    Default Speaking of Knock Out a Bunker drills

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Not my place to criticise the USA or USMC, but I can tell you that Platoon Manoeuvre is widely mis-understood and mostly very poorly trained for. I've watched many UK platoons do "bunker busting" drills at the platoon level an they have them down pat. Highly skilled, highly aggressive, and mostly effective. Done it myself and last observed it being done at the NCO school in 2006.
    Problem is that template drills do not test Platoon and Section commanders as to their understanding of how a platoon gets forward. Thus in the UK, you have the bones of an excellent system, that mostly people have no idea as to why they are doing what they do. They just do it.
    Same thing screwed up the platoon and section tactics training in 1941.
    I can't speak to how the Marines have done this drill but this does illustrate a problem we developed in the infantry in the Army. When I first came into the infantry in '95 the drill went something like this. The SAW gunner and one man would provide suppressive fire on the aperture(s) of the bunker that was to be taken out. They would continue suppressive fire on that bunker while the man designated to destroy the bunker crept into position, identified which aperture he was going to throw the grenade in and prepped his grenade, all while the SAW gunner was putting rounds into a target a foot away from him. The shift fire signal was when the man at the bunker had finished prepping the grenade he would raise it up to indicate that he was ready. The SAW gunner would shift fire at which point the man with the grenade would release the spoon, count to two thousand, punch the grenade into the aperture and role away. Once the grenade detonated he would get up and fire into the bunker to ensure that everyone was dead and then try to visually verify that the bunker was clear. Some time after that, however, I'm not sure when, somebody realized that there was some risk to that and the drill changed. Due to safety concerns we were not allowed to fire within fifteen degrees of another soldier. Depending on how far away the SBF position was that could equate to a sizable distance. Of course it was always preached that this was just for training safety, in the real thing we would do it the old way. I want to meet the guy who, in war, consistently does things the way they should be done rather than the way he has been training.

    SFC W

  5. #325
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    I have not heard of any example, anecdotal or otherwise, where those things have been employed in the fight-breaker role we purchased them for. Not sure if we will either, but with the resurgence of offensive action in Afghanistan, maybe data will surface.
    Guys I've talked to, (UK-SF, USMC and Colombian SF) swear by them. With the new medium velocity ammunition, they're probably a better bet than a SAW-Minimi.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  6. #326
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default LAR or GPMG?

    May interest some folks here, but I’ve recently been crunching some numbers for an article and I thought I’d share them here.

    An FN MAG-58/GPMG with 500 rounds weighs a total of 25.5kg. Distributed between two men this is 13.79kg and 11.76kg

    An FN-LAR HB or modified HK-417 (heavy barrel, + bipod) with 500 rounds weighs about 21kg. This breaks down as a two man load of 10kg and 11kg.

    Yes, magazines weight more than link, but the weight associated with belt fed weapons, tends to cancel this out, across realistic operational loads.

    Now I have my own data sets, but I’d be grateful if someone wants to check those figures.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Kiwigrunt's Avatar
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    I don’t think I like where you’re going with this but here goes.
    Most of my data is from 1999/2000 Jane’s Infantry Weapons except the weight of a 100 belt of 7.62 which I have at 2.7 kg, and the Minimi.


    MAG 58 (11.65 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 25.15 kg
    FN LAR (6 kg, Argy version 6.45 kg) with 25 x 20 rnd mag (0.715 kg) = 23.88 kg
    SS77 (9.6 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 23.1 kg
    7.62 Minimi (don’t slap me guys)(8.2 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 21.7 kg
    L4A4 (8.68 kg) with 17 x 30 rnd mag (1.085 kg) = 27.13 kg

    For L4 mag weight I used that of the 30 rnd mag for SG542 as I don’t have L4’s data.
    Looks like the good old Bren is worst off. And SS77 is slightly lighter than LAR.
    This does of course only work with 500 rnds. More is better for beltfeds, less is better for LAR, unless carried loose for reloading mags.
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  8. #328
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Kiwigrunt View Post
    I don’t think I like where you’re going with this but here goes.
    Don't worry. You will!
    L4A4 (8.68 kg) with 17 x 30 rnd mag (1.085 kg) = 27.13 kg
    Nearly spot on. I have all the figures for the L4 and it's 27.59!
    This does of course only work with 500 rnds. More is better for beltfeds, less is better for LAR, unless carried loose for reloading mags.
    Exactly, and that's the bit that needs clarification, and understanding. If you are adding weapons to fire teams, and not platoons, this might be important.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  9. #329
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    You're on to something, and that is at the root of my frustration with what we do...very few understand the WHY, and far fewer can apply it smoothly when the parameters change.

    That in turn results, IMO, with unecessary employment of supporting arms disproportionate to the threat, wildly inaccurate small-arms fires which run counter to our need to protect the populace in small wars, and unecessary casualties. Our men have the capacity to do it, but we fail them when it comes to applying time, resources, and mentorship to the training.
    I observed a rather disappointing intelligence of NCOs on many occasions.
    Many took what they learned as gospel and weren't the slightest bit capable of discussing it.

    It may be a personnel quality/availability problem. Maybe the previous education and the early training is simply not well-suited to make the average NCO understand what he does on a theoretical level.

    They can be very competent in what training and experience told them and they can be quite creative if they encounter new problems - but they're rarely able to explain the advantages and disadvantages of different solutions to a problem.
    In fact, I've listened more often to 'street language' about me supposedly having a wet pu**y than an intelligent answer in such cases.

    Maybe it's the right approach to tell most leaders only what they need to know - and to reserve a more in-depth training and education for those who can grasp it.
    Some tactical courses that focus on the development of tactics (developing them on their own) might be a good idea. Military history is rich (and unknown) enough to offer enough scenarios for tactical consideration (even back in ancient times).


    Quote Originally Posted by Uboat509 View Post
    I can't speak to how the Marines have done this drill but this does illustrate a problem we developed in the infantry in the Army. When I first came into the infantry in '95 the drill went something like this. The SAW gunner and one man would provide suppressive fire on the aperture(s) of the bunker that was to be taken out. They would continue suppressive fire on that bunker while the man designated to destroy the bunker crept into position, identified which aperture he was going to throw the grenade in and prepped his grenade, all while the SAW gunner was putting rounds into a target a foot away from him. The shift fire signal was when the man at the bunker had finished prepping the grenade he would raise it up to indicate that he was ready. The SAW gunner would shift fire at which point the man with the grenade would release the spoon, count to two thousand, punch the grenade into the aperture and role away. Once the grenade detonated he would get up and fire into the bunker to ensure that everyone was dead and then try to visually verify that the bunker was clear.
    Where's the smoke? Bunkers can be blinded quite easily.

    What did you do if the aperture was properly protected by a mesh wire shield and camouflage netting?
    First one defensive hand grenade to remove it?

    What did you do when the bunker wasn't isolated, but part of a network and in fact covered by two others (as was the 'right' thing to do with fortifications since at least Vauban).

    I thought the modern (post-50's) and internationally preferred method was rather to use AT weapons on bunkers from a relatively long distance (200-2000 m).

    Bunker busting is in my opinion actually one of the infantry activities with the greatest change since WW2, and your drill of '95 sounds a lot like an awfully incomplete drill from the 30's.

  10. #330
    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Where's the smoke? Bunkers can be blinded quite easily.

    What did you do if the aperture was properly protected by a mesh wire shield and camouflage netting?
    First one defensive hand grenade to remove it?

    What did you do when the bunker wasn't isolated, but part of a network and in fact covered by two others (as was the 'right' thing to do with fortifications since at least Vauban).

    I thought the modern (post-50's) and internationally preferred method was rather to use AT weapons on bunkers from a relatively long distance (200-2000 m).

    Bunker busting is in my opinion actually one of the infantry activities with the greatest change since WW2, and your drill of '95 sounds a lot like an awfully incomplete drill from the 30's.
    My intent was not to describe our entire TTP for assaulting a bunker system. I was simply using this particular drill to demonstrate how safety concerns had changed how we train. Of course we use smoke when it is available and appropriate. Of course we use stand-off weapons when available. The point was that drills like the one I described developed trust and confidence among team members. There is, in my opinion, a world of difference between rounds from the SBF impacting a foot away from you and when they are impacting twenty-five meters away from you.

    SFC W

  11. #331
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Perhaps...

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    It may be a personnel quality/availability problem. Maybe the previous education and the early training is simply not well-suited to make the average NCO understand what he does on a theoretical level.

    In fact, I've listened more often to 'street language' about me supposedly having a wet pu**y than an intelligent answer in such cases.
    In both cases that's a result of the way they were treated...
    Maybe it's the right approach to tell most leaders only what they need to know - and to reserve a more in-depth training and education for those who can grasp it.
    As exemplified by that attitude. Most people can and will accept knowledge that is properly imparted, learn to think constructively and apply judgment and that knowledge to problem solutions. OTOH, if they are conditioned to do what they're told and never question their 'betters' you'll have the reactions you cite.
    Where's the smoke? Bunkers can be blinded quite easily.
    Use it quickly -- as more thermal viewers proliferate around the world, that will no longer work (and yes I know of thermal obscurants. I also know of supply and resupply failures among other things).
    I thought the modern (post-50's) and internationally preferred method was rather to use AT weapons on bunkers from a relatively long distance (200-2000 m).
    Great plan -- if you have them. If not due to lack of resupply or for other reasons, what do you do? A satchel charge or a pole charge is better than a hand grenade but UBoat's point was that even mediocre training is ruined by excessive concern for safety and costs -- and that truth is why they were using a grenade instead of a pole charge and why they were not using a rocket or missile. They were doing a direct infantry attack for training because every thing in war doesn't always work the way it's supposed to and somebody has to do the hard practical stuff to keep things going. His broader point that people will do in war what they do in training is true.

    That training is poor is an indictment of the training regimen in most democracies where the armed forces cannot train adequately due to politically correct concern for safety, an irony for a trade where safety is not really a viable option. It's also constrained due to cost constraints -- we cannot spend some money to save some lives. Fascinating logic.

    That it is poor is also an indictment of all armed forces that treat their NCOs in such a manner as to breed the attitudes and reactions you mentioned. People tend to react as they are expected to -- don't like the way some react?

    Change the expectation.
    Bunker busting is in my opinion actually one of the infantry activities with the greatest change since WW2, and your drill of '95 sounds a lot like an awfully incomplete drill from the 30's.
    Not really -- change that is. The preferred method in the late 30s was to blast the bunker with anti tank guns; attacking with charges or grenades was a last resort effort. Training to do that let people know they could do it if they had no better option. They had to do that during WW II, so that worked out okay. Still being done today. That hasn't changed. Only difference now is missiles or rockets instead of guns -- and now, as then, that desirable standoff weapon may not always be available.

    Can't train totally for the best case in war, you have to train for the worst case. If you can operate effectively then life is better when things work out and you can go the best case route...

    The well educated theoreticians often miss little things like that...

  12. #332
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    You missed an essential part of what I wrote

    preferred method
    I would call the use of an assault gun as an artillery tactic (although German infantry guns were under control of infantry regiments) and ignored it this time.
    A bunker that can be successfully engaged with an infantry gun was a dumb idea in the first place anyway.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Nope, didn't miss it, I specifically commented about the times one did not have

    better options.
    A bunker that can be successfully engaged with an infantry gun was a dumb idea in the first place anyway.
    Agreed and there are a lot smart people who know that, thus taking it out the hard way becomes a nasty but necessary chore.

    We used flamethrowers, don't guess one could do that nowadays..

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    Council Member Kiwigrunt's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    We used flamethrowers, don't guess one could do that nowadays..
    How about thermobaric rifle grenades or 40mm? Sssssst, don't tell anyone
    Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)

    All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
    (Arthur Schopenhauer)

    ONWARD

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Nearly as I can tell you can use them but not napalm.

    Go figure...

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    Council Member Kiwigrunt's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Kiwigrunt View Post
    MAG 58 (11.65 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 25.15 kg
    FN LAR (6 kg, Argy version 6.45 kg) with 25 x 20 rnd mag (0.715 kg) = 23.88 kg
    SS77 (9.6 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 23.1 kg
    7.62 Minimi (don’t slap me guys)(8.2 kg) with 5 x 2.7 kg = 21.7 kg
    L4A4 (8.68 kg) with 17 x 30 rnd mag (1.085 kg) = 27.13 kg
    Add around 0.8 kg per 100 rnd canvas belt pouch for the Minimi (didn't think they'd be that heavy) and probably similar for MAG58 equivalent.
    Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)

    All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
    (Arthur Schopenhauer)

    ONWARD

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    Council Member Kiwigrunt's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Go figure...
    As long as they're not hollow-point, because they really hurt and that just not fair. So bullet-through grenades are out, cause they're hollow-point.
    Okay, enough of that nonsense, time for my flu-nap.
    Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)

    All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
    (Arthur Schopenhauer)

    ONWARD

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    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    When making the numbers crunch, don't forget that it's not all about raw weight. An item with a heavier gross weight might have a lighter "feel" if it can be carried easily and with little bulk. That's the predominant reason why I like the 100-rd "nutsacks" for the SAW. Yeah, they are lighter, but the distribute fairly well.
    Last edited by jcustis; 07-07-2009 at 05:59 AM.

  19. #339
    Council Member Kiwigrunt's Avatar
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    Came across an article here that analyses marksmanship and rounds fired per kill by the Anzac’s in Vietnam. Article is ‘Bang on target’ on page 139.
    Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)

    All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
    (Arthur Schopenhauer)

    ONWARD

  20. #340
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Kiwigrunt View Post
    Came across an article here that analyses marksmanship and rounds fired per kill by the Anzac’s in Vietnam. Article is ‘Bang on target’ on page 139.
    Gold mine mate! Good job. Very interesting and confirming some things I had thought for a while now. Excellent find!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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