The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Rifleman]

Kiwigrunt,

Good post. Some thoughts:

The SAW, even though it was introduced as an AR, is clearly an LMG.

Agreed.

Therefore it kind of deserves to be manoeuvred around and sited by the rest of the team.

Agreed again, but is that a bad doctrine? Isn't that more or less what the Germans did with the MG42 and their nine man gruppe?

The extent to which that is sensible at fire team level is another matter.

Agreed. Three men may be too few to effectively work around and support an LMG the way eight German riflemen worked around and supported the MG42. Take one or two casualties in a fire team and that doctrine breaks down. This gets to what Paul Melody was advocating in his dissertation on the Army rifle squad as it is currently organized; essentially, Melody believes that an LMG is needed by squads but that one LMG per squad is enough and that more LMGs can't be effectively employed at squad level, thus the extra "firepower " really doesn't translate into more effective suppression.

The IAR however is not an MG. Eby is also very clear on that. I believe that there is so little real difference between assault rifles and AR’s that a strong doctrinal differentiation is not justified and may lead to disappointment with the weapon. (see the Brit LSW again?)

Then is it really needed? Or is the USMC too fixated on a modern BAR replacement because the BAR is what the fire team that they've had since 1945 was built around?

I think we make a mistake to compare today’s AR’s with the BAR. First of all, the BAR was first introduced alongside the 1903 bolt action. There’s a big difference, to the point that within the realm of that comparison, the BAR was almost an MG. (Like the Bren versus the SMLE).

I understand, but what else can we compare it to? Isn't it meant to fill a role that has been unfilled (as originally envisioned) since the demise of the BAR?

So I wonder if we should look at changes in doctrine not so much from a perspective of differences between the BAR and modern AR’s, but more from a perspective of the increased ability of rifles to take on the role of the AR (read for instance James Webb on squads).

I've read that article and Webb makes some interesting points. But if there isn't that much difference between modern assault rifles and ARs is a modern AR really needed? Or is the USMC too fixated on a modern AR because the squad and fire team organization that they've had since 1945 was designed around AR employment?

[jcustis]

I've read that article and Webb makes some interesting points. But if there isn't that much difference between modern assault rifles and ARs is a modern AR really needed? Or is the USMC too fixated on a modern AR because the squad and fire team organization that they've had since 1945 was designed around AR employment?

You could be onto something. We are often victims of the history that we strive to honor and understand, and the Marine squad organization has indeed been a long-standing organization that honestly has not been fiddled with much.

[Kiwigrunt]

Jcustis:

Hmmm, so if the SAW was never really an AR because it deserved to be maneuvered like a MG, but the IAR is realistically not that much different from the other weapons of the team and therefore there might not be lessons to be derived from the BAR, where can we look?

I wouldn’t necessarily say that no lessons can be learned from it (although I can't think of them), just to be careful not to make one on one comparisons, like Wilf says:

History here is not helpful, because form got confused with function very early on. The BREN was not an LSW (MG crewed by 3), but the BAR was sometimes (when crewed by 1).

Wilf pretty much hits the nail on the head again:

Basically they are a rifle, with a better chance of hitting at longer ranges. Use them that way.

If you have a fire team, of 4 men with rifles, you can make it more effective, for very little increase in weight/penalty by adding an LSW.

And of course some increase in ability to deliver auto-fire in a more sustained manner.
I think the key here is not to over-rate the weapon and base a doctrine on it that makes it the nucleus/pivot point of the team. It’s just a good tool that is handy at times, like the DMR, or 40 mm, or hand grenades, or Claymores.


Rifleman:

Agreed again, but is that a bad doctrine? Isn't that more or less what the Germans did with the MG42 and their nine man gruppe?

Well, that is indeed the question. But one separate to the AR conversation. And this is where I agree with Wilf again with regards to confusing form and function. For as far as I understand it, Melody talks explicitly about MGs, not ARs

Three men may be too few to effectively work around and support an LMG the way eight German riflemen worked around and supported the MG42. Take one or two casualties in a fire team and that doctrine breaks down.

And that is probably why it is not a good idea to have a ‘true’ (and heavy) support weapon at fireteam level under the assumption that the fireteam is there to support the weapon. I think that kind of defeats the purpose of the fireteam. That is why we used to have the gungroup/riflegroup combination. If every riflegroup (fireteam) becomes a gungroup, who’s gonna play riflegroup?
An LSW (or whatever we may call it) probably just wants to be a one-man weapon that is capable of giving some internal support to the team, but not one that becomes the reason for the team’s existence, like with a gun-group.

Then is it really needed? Or is the USMC too fixated on a modern BAR replacement because the BAR is what the fire team that they've had since 1945 was built around?

Exactly. That is pretty much my point. I don’t think it is really needed. Doesn’t mean it wouldn’t be handy though….

I understand, but what else can we compare it to? Isn't it meant to fill a role that has been unfilled (as originally envisioned) since the demise of the BAR?
…if there isn't that much difference between modern assault rifles and ARs is a modern AR really needed?

And again, that is my point. I can no longer see a need for that exact role. I think the very close gap between assault rifles and their AR versions make that need redundant.

Or is the USMC too fixated on a modern AR because the squad and fire team organization that they've had since 1945 was designed around AR employment?

That’s a good question. They may be…unless we are not seeing something. Maybe they are not envisaging a modern day mirror image of the BAR but indeed just an assault rifle with slightly improved support capabilities. Remember, they are not fully replacing the SAW, just adding to it and shifting some furniture within the platoons.

[Fuchs]

Considering that the IAR will simply be an assault rifle with fore grip and bipod, I assume that the USMC simply used this as work-around to replace the M-16.

By 2012 someone might claim that the USMC loves the IAR and will replace all ARs with IARs. Someone will publish a nice ppt to show that this is a revolution in firepower and they'll finally get rid of the M-16.

[Kiwigrunt]

Well, you could be right Fuchs.


Please bear with me guys as I sprout some more random thoughts and considerations. I’m just trying to:

[Write] to more clarify my own thoughts, rather than preach to other folks (Wilf)

And to add food for thought….or confusion….or obsession.


Let’s make some comparisons:
1.) Commonwealth section of the 70’s. Some 10 men with 7.62 rifles and a 7.62 GPMG in a gungroup. If you remove the gun, will you notice a difference? Most certainly.
2.) A similar size section with 8 M4’s and 2 HK416’s (I am of course picking the most extreme examples). If you remove the HK’s, will you notice a difference? Hardly, if at all.

When we used to establish a section night harbour we would dig a gunpit and take turns on the gun. Would we, in the second example, do that with the HK416? Might almost look a bit comical.


I’ve mentioned this before in an earlier post. When NZ first changed from 7.62 to 5.56, we maintained the original structure with one Minimi (which by the way is our LSW, so don’t confuse the concept of LSW with IAR) in a gungroup. Here the Minimi is the reason for the existence of the gungroup within the section. In the same way that the M240 is the reason for the existence of fire support sections at platoon and company level in US forces.
We then adopted the fireteam structure and added a Minimi, adding some substantial fire power. However, what shifted?
• Has the Minimi become a one-man weapon, like a support IW on steroids?
• Has the fireteam, consciously or subconsciously, become a default gungroup?
• Is the body-team the (default) gungroup or is it just the gunner and a rifleman?

The idea was of course to have balanced teams that can give each other mutual support. And that’s great. But (with LMGs at least) that almost leans towards having gungroupisch sort of teams that are reasonable well equipped for the support role. As the USMC have established, it is not so great for the ‘riflegroup’ role that the same teams need to be able to fulfil. The potential loss of flexibility and agility, and our habitual tendency to use the LMG as a true machinegun in the way that we used to, makes it harder for the fireteam to be anything other than a gun/support group.

So there does seem to be a shift from agility to weight and noise, which, as we know, goes beyond weapons carried. But maybe that’s just what the doctor ordered. Dunno. An example is some UK units when they first took Basra (is there an ‘h’ in there somewhere?). Apart from using the Warriors for awesome fire support, they were also mobile ammo dumps for the dismount sections that carried as many MGs as they could get there hands on. And that seemed to work. But then, we’re not talking light infantry here. Adding additional MG and other tools for specific tasks can of course always be done.

I’m starting to think that maybe we have two separate issues here. One is the physical constraints on the fireteam with regards to weight carried, versus their agility. The other is more psychological, with regard to truly understanding the roles (form and function) of the tools and the teams.

I’ll stop…..well, pause anyway….rambling and get my backside to work.

[Fuchs]

I worked on an infantry theory for defensive, low force density activities. It was about observing terrain and ambushing infiltrators.

The platoons were made up of four different types of teams in one stage of development:

"observation/sniping" and "soft ambush"
"observation/sniping" and "tank ambush"
"leader team"
"mortar team"

The first two were meant to switch roles from sniper team(2)+rear security element (3) to ambush teams. The change would happen by exchanging equipment (vests & weapons) in a hideout.
Very small infiltrations would be handled by sniping & mortar fire, with possible use of the security element's LMG against runners.

This quick change approach could help to minimise the weight carried in general.

[Firn]

I worked on an infantry theory for defensive, low force density activities. It was about observing terrain and ambushing infiltrators.

The platoons were made up of four different types of teams in one stage of development:

"observation/sniping" and "soft ambush"
"observation/sniping" and "tank ambush"
"leader team"
"mortar team"

The first two were meant to switch roles from sniper team(2)+rear security element (3) to ambush teams. The change would happen by exchanging equipment (vests & weapons) in a hideout.
Very small infiltrations would be handled by sniping & mortar fire, with possible use of the security element's LMG against runners.

This quick change approach could help to minimise the weight carried in general.

Rather interesting.

I actually wrote up some notes after viewing the video of the French operation and came up with the following for a platoon. Not that this are more rough ideas of functions than a clear presentation.

a) Mortar element - a mortar team which might cooperate with/also function as a UAV team. Frankly I have little idea how well that light UAV ability would work in practice. (Could give the mortar position away) It would only be advisable for mechanized infantry (weight!)

b) Observation team - tries to stay as hidden as possible, best if in depth and observe (identify, target acquisition). A sniping/sharpshooting capability can be added.

c) Heavy fire support group - Has at least one MG and maybe a supported, possibly specialised GL capability (ammunition shared, mulit-shot GL with good optics). Once again the exact composition depends alot on the METT-TC

d) Rifle element A - a small squad - when a decent AT is needed it will be split with one part going to B

e) Rifle element B - a small squad (could form a large squad with element A)

f) Leader element B


This was only a bit of personal thinking. I will try to make up my mind about the IAR and some other posts. Every element should have the chance to use a periscope. Some other than the observation element could put a spotting scope (or other optics) to good use. Depends a lot on the usual METT-TC.


Firn

[jcustis]

Considering that the IAR will simply be an assault rifle with fore grip and bipod, I assume that the USMC simply used this as work-around to replace the M-16.

By 2012 someone might claim that the USMC loves the IAR and will replace all ARs with IARs. Someone will publish a nice ppt to show that this is a revolution in firepower and they'll finally get rid of the M-16.

We have been experimenting too long on this to indicate that the USMC is looking to simply replace the M16. That's pretty far from reality, IMO. Just look at the history of the experimentation alone.

[Rifleman]

2.) A similar size section with 8 M4’s and 2 HK416’s (I am of course picking the most extreme examples). If you remove the HK’s, will you notice a difference? Hardly, if at all.

I think the USMC should ask themselves that question. In WWII and Korea, if they removed the BARs from the fireteams and just had four M1 Garands would they have noticed the difference? Most certainly. Now, with assault rifles, if they remove IARs from the fireteams will they notice the difference? Not sure, but likely not nearly so much as in the first example.

• Has the Minimi become a one-man weapon, like a support IW on steroids?

In US Army light infantry? Yes.

• Has the fireteam, consciously or subconsciously, become a default gungroup?

In US Army light infantry? Yes. How can anyone say otherwise when the SAWs will always be manned in an understrength fireteam? At least that used to be true. Maybe not today?

The idea was of course to have balanced teams that can give each other mutual support.

In the US Army that probably comes from an obsession of SLA Marshall's that squads have to be able to fire and manuever v. fire or manuever. That, plus Marshall's obsession with the idea that riflemen didn't shoot enough.

And that’s great.

Indeed it is, but it also strikes me as a watered down version of having balanced squads that can give each other mutual support.

But (with LMGs at least) that almost leans towards having gungroupisch sort of teams that are reasonable well equipped for the support role.

That, or gungroupish sort of squads that are equipped for the support role (with one LMG) but still have enought riflemen to clear a bunker or trench. Back to Paul Melody and the Germans again. Were they on to something? The more I read Melody's squad study and the German squad in combat paper the more sense they make to me. At least if you are limited to smallish squads employing the LMG at squad level.

That might not hold true for the big USMC squad, especilly if they drop the SAW from the fireteam. I don't know.

As the USMC have established, it is not so great for the ‘riflegroup’ role that the same teams need to be able to fulfil.

Then aren't you back to needing a basic element with only one LMG for suppression and enough riflemen for close combat? Yep, I'm gonna say it again, that may mean something close to a smallish squad that has to fire or manuever instead of fire and manuever.

I’ll stop…..well, pause anyway….rambling and get my backside to work.

Not me, I'm off today.

[Fuchs]

We have been experimenting too long on this to indicate that the USMC is looking to simply replace the M16. That's pretty far from reality, IMO. Just look at the history of the experimentation alone.

The really powerful people sometimes play with their pawns and allow them to move around a lot as long as they end up in the right place.

We Germans call that phenomenon "nützlicher Idiot" (useful idiot) - someone who is doing something wrong (edit: or something dirty), but is nevertheless useful to another one.

Also keep in mind we're talking about Generals. They were educated and trained for decades in tactics and strategy. I'm rarely impressed by high rank military competence, but I still think that they may be using deception tactics for a hidden strategy.
The frontal attack tactic has failed often enough against the AR-15.

[jcustis]

Also keep in mind we're talking about Generals. They were educated and trained for decades in tactics and strategy. I'm rarely impressed by high rank military competence, but I still think that they may be using deception tactics for a hidden strategy.

You give them way too much credit.

[jcustis]

Although the requirement for a larger box magazine may be withering away for the IAR (it's hard to tell based off the various news snippets), I understand that development of a 100-150 rd setup may be in the works.

Let's say a 100-rd magazine can be made to work with that long magazine well. Does that change the calculus of how much an IAR matters if it is taken away from a team? Even a 50-75 round curved magazine means something, but I don't suspect industry is going to try to crack that nut. Going bigger makes more sense.

One thing that leaves me scratching my head a bit is the barrel length of the HK416, as mentioned in articles so far. At 16", it is shorter than the M16A4 barrel, and a bit over the M4 barrel. I'm sure testing has demonstrated effects out to the desired distance, but it does make one ask...why not simply slap a full-auto feature on an A4?

[Fuchs]

...why not simply slap a full-auto feature on an A4?

There was a M-16A1 based AR in the 70's and early 80's, at least in the USMC. It was apparently disappointing.

[Rifleman]

There was a M-16A1 based AR in the 70's and early 80's, at least in the USMC. It was apparently disappointing.

It was simply a matter of designating one man in each fire team as the automatic rifleman. He had a bipod on his M16A1 and was supposed to fire in automatic bursts. I don't believe there was ever some kind of HBAR in service.

It seems the USMC is returning to the same thing, or nearly so. This 416 doesn't appear to be a modern BAR to me. Just an M16 with an operating rod.

[slapout9]

There was a M-16A1 based AR in the 70's and early 80's, at least in the USMC. It was apparently disappointing.

I was in from 72-75, all M16's were capable of full automatic. No problems once you learned the proper way to shoot full auto, but you will go through a lot of Ammo. It even had a lightweight bi-pod that could be attached but never saw it used much. A whole squad opening up on full auto at a designated target is some fierce fire power.

[slapout9]

It was simply a matter of designating one man in each fire team as the automatic rifleman. He had a bipod on his M16A1 and was supposed to fire in automatic bursts. I don't believe there was ever some kind of HBAR in service.

Rifleman, that is exactly right. You could not tell the difference between the AR man and a regular rifleman except he was designated as the AR man per squad organization SOP. Worked well IMO. The only complaint I ever heard was when they took the M-79 grenade launcher away and replaced it with the M-203.

[Kiwigrunt]

The only complaint I ever heard was when they took the M-79 grenade launcher away and replaced it with the M-203.

It's funny how people perceive things differently. I did my basic with the M-79 and couldn't hit the side of a barn with it. Well, I only ever fired a few shots with it. I had to drag it around a bit though and hated it.
On the 203 PI however, I was a bit of a sniper.....well....you know...
And soooo much easier to drag around with you.

[Kiwigrunt]

Rifleman:
That, or gungroupish sort of squads that are equipped for the support role (with one LMG) but still have enought riflemen to clear a bunker or trench. Back to Paul Melody and the Germans again. Were they on to something? The more I read Melody's squad study and the German squad in combat paper the more sense they make to me. At least if you are limited to smallish squads employing the LMG at squad level.

That might not hold true for the big USMC squad, especilly if they drop the SAW from the fireteam. I don't know.

Well, maybe the USMC are now on to the same thing. They haven’t yet defined how they are going to rearrange the furniture within their squads. It may actually work quite well for them as they could (and I believe that was one of the suggested options) have 2 SAWs in a support (heavy) fireteam and keep the other 2 teams light (ok, with their IAR). And when needed the 2 SAWs can split and attach to a team each, giving 2 x 6 man teams with a SAW each.

I am starting to think along the same lines as you, Rifleman. When the balanced fireteam setup with an LMG each first came out I thought it was ####-hot. I’m not so sure anymore.
Anyway, back to IARs.

Jcustis:
Let's say a 100-rd magazine can be made to work with that long magazine well. Does that change the calculus of how much an IAR matters if it is taken away from a team?

I doubt it will make all that much difference. First of all, if you were to use a full-auto A4 instead of an IAR, you can put that high-cap mag on there too. In fact, you can slap one on an M4. But either way, and depending on the particular IAR we’re looking at, at some point the weapon will over-heat. An A4 will of course do that a bit sooner than an IAR. A high-cap mag may invite for this to happen quicker. I think to justify a high-cap mag you need a pretty heavy barrelled IAR with open bolt, so almost a mag-fed LMG. And then you start to get to the point where you may as well stick with the SAW.

Jcustis:
One thing that leaves me scratching my head a bit is the barrel length of the HK416, as mentioned in articles so far. At 16", it is shorter than the M16A4 barrel, and a bit over the M4 barrel. I'm sure testing has demonstrated effects out to the desired distance, but it does make one ask...

Yes, that barrel length wouldn’t allow it to reach out very far, but then, standard 5.56 has it’s limitations anyway. So the emphasis appears to be on the full-auto capability rather than range. Then again, look at the barrel length of the now so popular Para-Minimi. That’s even shorter that the M4. Used to be a time when the heavier weapons, certainly MG’s, were the long-range weapons of the section.

… why not simply slap a full-auto feature on an A4?

And a bipod.
I’d say you would hardly notice the difference…..until it over-heats. And that is of course the main reason for an IAR. But the HK 416 does not seem to have a heavy barrel anyway.

I’ve searched the net (in vane) to see if I could find anything on the Dutch Marine’s Diemaco LSW (see picture, and these two links for latest Colt version) It fires from an open bolt and has a fairly low rate of fire so sustained fire should be quite reasonable. The Danes have the same weapon but theirs fires from a closed bolt which may be part of the reason why it doesn’t work for them.

From Wiki:
The LSW used to be issued to "support gunners" in infantry squads. However in the future the Royal Danish Army will only use 7.62mm belt-fed machine guns for the support role. Most of the LSW's will be transferred to the Danish Home Guard since the weapon is perfectly suited for guard duty.
The main problem with the LSW, is that it's a new type of weapon looking for a role. For starters, it's not well suited to be a sniper type rifle. The 5.56 round in itself isn't accurate enough for longer ranges with a standard deviation of around 17mm at 100m. At least not when using a standard Nato round with steel penetrator core.
Secondly, in common with all light support weapons derived from rifles, the LSW is not a true fire-support weapon either. At least not when measured by the standards of a belt-fed machine gun like the MG3 (M/62), that is used by the Royal Danish Army. Without a quick-change barrel as found on true machine guns, the rate of fire is very limited as the barrel will overheat with any attempt at sustained fire. The Danish version of the LSW fires from a closed bolt and is prone to "cook-offs" (spontaneous firing of the weapon when a round is left in the chamber of a hot weapon) in the fire-support role. The drum magazines are prone to jamming and every fifth round must be lubricated when loading. (A solution to this feeding-problem is said to be underway however, according to the "Danish equipment service", but it remains to be seen as of June 2009).

The best use of the LSW seems to be from fixed positions or vehicles using standard magazines (see above) and where you would otherwise use the C7A1. It's heftier barrel ensures that the weapon still shoots true after prolonged single-shot firing. (Single shot firing mode is unique to the danish variant). With the C7A1 you need to compensate for a lower impact point after around 90 rounds fired according to Afghanistan veterans.

The plain vanilla Diemaco LSW does weigh 5.8 kg, which is (only?) 1 kg lighter than the original plain vanilla Minimi with full barrel. For some reason the Minimi keeps getting heavier, even with only half a barrel.

[Fuchs]

That design (Diemaco LSW, your attached image) is a poor one.
There's not always a need for automatic fire, and a smart design (open bolt operation in full auto, closed bolt operation in semi auto - that was already done in FG42 and earlier weapons) allows for a weapon that's both accurate AND capable of a high practical rate of fire.

That weapon wastes the accuracy potential of bipod and sight by mounting the bipod directly on the barrel. This disturbs the barrel's vibrations (not free-floating a all) and leads to terrible inconsistencies. Those inconsistencies may be intentional for auto fire at about 100 m, but it's otherwise just poor. (addition: The replacement barrel also has an additional bipod, same as with M60 - unnecessary weight!)


There may be a strong theoretical argument for a more even equipment with automatic weapons.
We agree that the BAR has lost its "special" status because its difference to a M1903 was much greater than to an M14.

We do most likely also agree that the suppression of only one or two true machine guns of your squad may be a problem (especially if things turn ugly in general).

We do most likely also agree that in some situations you want few very accurate shots while in others you prefer a high RoF, inside of covers even full auto fire.

It IS possible to mate that all in one design, and it IS affordable (assertion of mine based on imo enough background).

It could look like this
- intermediate calibre
- bipod
- free-floating barrel and other measures for 1.5 MOA dispersion @ 200 m
- 30-40 rds curved magazine
- closed bolt operation in semi auto, open bolt operation in full auto
- expensive 1.1-4x scope (or a cheaper combination of 4x scope and a 45° side iron sights fixed on 100 m)
- heavy modern metallurgy barrel that tolerates 300 rds in full auto without cooling break (or if compatible to dispersion requirement a quick-change barrel with grip*)
- A hand guard that protects the scope's field of view against hot air rising from the barrel (and helps to conceal the thermal signature of the barrel).

Such an "everyone's precision AR" assault rifle replacement might make real MGs as well as designated marksman rifles unnecessary and undesirable in the rifle squad. Heavier support weapons (real sniper rifle, real tripod machine gun) could be kept in a "base of fire" squad.

The rifle squad would be well-equipped for suppressive fires, precision fires with very low ammunition consumption and assault.


In short: A significant technical design step forward (or backward, if you think of the FG42) might provide what's needed to come to really nice compromises in infantry small arms problems.
Rifle squads could move without any small arms heavier than 6 kg loaded (without night sight) and would have unparalleled versatility and redundancy in regard to aimed /high volume fires.

*: It should be possible; an analogy are the modern rails that allow scopes to keep their zero after repeated removal and re-attachment.

[B.Smitty]

I don't know if everyone has seen these two articles, but they relate to the AR discussion.

Both are from Marine Corps Gazette,

Automatic Rifle Concept: Part I—History and Empirical Testing
by CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby

Automatic Rifle Concept: Part II—Reorganizing the Infantry Squad
by CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby

Here's a link to a repost of both articles on strategypage.com.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htw...529/page2.aspx