The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Kiwigrunt]

But I still the see the need for IW with at least an effective range of 300m+ and just wondered if a true IAR would be better along the lines suggested by webb.

I think it depends very much on what we really want to use that IAR for, and how it is classified and structured within the organisation.
I would be inclined to agree with you if the IAR is no or little heavier than an IW, like the HK416 or the LWRC. But in that case (and indeed along the lines of Webb) why call it an IAR? It would then really just be an improved assault rifle. That would make sense to me.


It is interesting how opinions differ so widely, even among people with ample experience on the two way firing lane (not yours truly). Regarding beltfeds we have Ken as one ‘extreme’ who doesn’t like to see them below coy level and JMA at the other end who much appreciated the MAG at fireteam level and even at a rate of one per two pers. 2 Para claimed to like two per section in the Falklands (yes Wilf, no proof of effect compared to having only one) and in the sandbox they keep working their way down to the lowest level, as GI Zhou alluded to. Attempts at replacing their ‘firepower’ potential (without going in to what that means) with lighter weapons has been tried with the likes of IARs and LMGs (Minimi) and appears partly successful, at times, but just doesn’t seem to do the trick (what trick?).

And I think that’s the danger of the IAR as a concept, as a class of weapon, rather than with the weapon itself. Treating the weapon as ‘the’ firepower of the team, and having the team manoeuvring around it so to speak, I think creates expectations beyond what the weapon can ever be capable of delivering. And that is why the gimpy keeps coming back down. That is why Brit patrols in A-stan now carry a bit of everything, IW, LSW, LMG, GPMG and sniper rifles (ignoring HE for now).

And that is what I can foresee happening with the USMC as well, once the IAR gets introduced.
(And as an opposing extreme the NZ army is currently testing the 7.62 MINIMI as a possible replacement for the 5.56.)
There appears to be much confusion indeed regarding what constitutes fire power and what is required for effect (at the receiving end) versus a perception of said firepower that possibly does more to boost our own morale than to reduce that of the enemy. That is of course still important but a clearer understanding (training and education) may help to keep the carried weight down a bit and also that confusing plethora of weapons, types and classes.

So I do think that a simplification here would make a lot of sense. Have ‘improved assault rifles’ that can be used on full auto when required and 7.62 beltfeds, anywhere between 7.62 Minimi and MAG 58. Then decide where those beltfeds need to be, and perhaps that should remain more flexible and situation dependant.
That of course negates Ken’s:

My observation has been that MGs at Platoon level are misused and overused -- generally not because they're needed or in many cases even make tactical sense but simply because they're available.

That is more likely to happen with IARs across the board as ‘improved assault rifles’. Yet it may still waste less ammo then the current situation with a bit of everything, or in fact so much of everything else that IWs are hardly carried anymore (slight exaggeration there).

[Ken White]

OK, (1) you mention the old "train separate, fight together" issue. It can find application in everything from infantry to armor/mech infantry battalion training up to the question why the AF is usually separate of the army.

True. The only thing that matters is the quality and capability of the Trainers. Separating some things lessens the requirement for super qualified trainers. Like many things, there are a number of ways to approach the issue. I merely posited one that I saw work very well and have yet to see any of the others systems I've seen work as well. Make no mistake, most all will work, I've seen a number do just that -- I cite and recommend the one I've seen work best in varying conditions, war and peace.

(2) You seem to assume that tactics (one of the METT-TC "T"'s., after all) permit such a shifting of machine guns from the Coy Cmdr's pool to the Plt in need.

I don't assume it, I've seen it work very well a number of places to include Korea and Viet Nam. The US Marine Corps in WW II and in Korea and long after had a Machine Gun Platoon in each Rifle Company. That later changed to a Weapons Company and the MG Plat lost some ammo bearers and became a Section. That Weapons Platoon has an Assault section (Sappers of a sort -- or they may be an AT section by now), a Mortar Section and a MG Section with Section Leader and three Squads, each with a Squad Leader and 2 three man MG Teams of Gunner, Asst Gunner and Ammo Bearer (each team in Korea had two Ammo Bearers). The Guns are normally employed in pairs allowing sustained automatic fire from stable positions, tripod or bipod (a single gun has to reload and clear jams -- frequently -- the other gun increase its rate of fire until both guns can alternate firing). The Guns can be assigned, one Squad (two guns) to a Rifle Platoon and the same squad always goes to the same Platoon IF dispersed operation is necessary. Used to be a no-no to split the Squad, don't know about today -- a lot of hard won WW II lessons are gone...

You may end up with another recurring phenomenon:
Specialists pooled at HQ, but in the field de facto permanently attached to subordinate units.

That can and has happened. Mostly in my experience it was avoided. The bit of having a Squad with two guns available for each Rifle Platoon gives you the flexibility to easily give gour or all six guns to a maneuver base of fire or two guns to each platoon. It's flexible -- and the Gunners are good...

The only reliable way to avoid this from happening is afaik to pool less support than subordinate units in the formation/unit. Like 2 machine guns for a Coy of 3 Plt.

Either that method -- or better training...

[William F. Owen]

It is interesting how opinions differ so widely, even among people with ample experience on the two way firing lane (not yours truly).

Concur, which is why the specific context and thinking behind the opinion has to be considered. Different Armies, cultures, etc etc...

Regarding beltfeds we have Ken as one ‘extreme’ who doesn’t like to see them below coy level and JMA at the other end who much appreciated the MAG at fireteam level and even at a rate of one per two pers. 2 Para claimed to like two per section in the Falklands (yes Wilf, no proof of effect compared to having only one) and in the sandbox they keep working their way down to the lowest level, as GI Zhou alluded to.

Not "claimed" - 2 Para DID have 2 GPMG per rifle section = 6 per platoon, before, during and after the Falklands. It's an issue still causing very heated debate to this day!

What I take from it is the need to be able to group guns where needed, as and when. Personally, I could have a specialist section within the platoon, and I'd ditch the need to do indirect fire, which massively reduces the training needed for the Sustained Fire role.

[Rifleman]

Once you have section or squads of 2-3 equally equipped fire teams, this type of "gun manoeuvre" becomes impossible, - which is a pity because it works really well.

That caught my attention.

I'm not disagreeing but I want to know why moving the gun becomes impossible in a squad of 2-3 balanced fire teams.

I thought that was how the current USMC squad developed in WWII. The BAR was the heart of the fireteam and three riflemen supported it. Is that not accurate?

[William F. Owen]

That caught my attention.

I'm not disagreeing but I want to know why moving the gun becomes impossible in a squad of 2-3 balanced fire teams.

It's not impossible to move guns, it's just the type of manoeuvre that becomes impossible, when all fire teams have the same weapons.

What the UK Battle Craft idea progressed was that while the 3 man "Gun group"(3 man Fireteam?) was suppressing the enemy (hopefully) the the 5-man "Rifle Group"(5-man Fireteam?) moved forward or to the flanks, to find a better position for the gun. They would then signal the gun to move to the new position, and provide some covering fire.

This all stemmed from the idea of an attack being movement from fire position to fire position, until you got within grenade/"bayonet" range, by which time the enemy had hopefully jacked.

Doing it by 3 x 8-man sections, required considerable co-ordination, which is why Wigram Grouping was more sensible. Both ideas together create a very robust and simple system.

[JMA]

It is interesting how opinions differ so widely, even among people with ample experience on the two way firing lane (not yours truly). Regarding beltfeds we have Ken as one ‘extreme’ who doesn’t like to see them below coy level and JMA at the other end who much appreciated the MAG at fireteam level and even at a rate of one per two pers. 2 Para claimed to like two per section in the Falklands (yes Wilf, no proof of effect compared to having only one) and in the sandbox they keep working their way down to the lowest level, as GI Zhou alluded to. Attempts at replacing their ‘firepower’ potential (without going in to what that means) with lighter weapons has been tried with the likes of IARs and LMGs (Minimi) and appears partly successful, at times, but just doesn’t seem to do the trick (what trick?).

Perhaps the differentiator will be the type of war being fought. In a type of warfare where you encounter the enemy in pockets (as we mainly did in Rhodesia) rather than in depth then it is the initial exchange of fire on making contact that makes the difference and allows small groups (sections, fire teams or sticks) to rapidly close with and kill the enemy without having to seek additional support from behind.

When we took on dug in and prepared positions in Zambia and Mozambique there were always preliminaries in the form of air strikes to soften up the enemy. But suffice it to say that in taking out bunkers and trenches the idea of launching a 9 man section attack did not make sense purely from the space point of view. In that only one man with a buddy behind him could deal with the type of bunkers we faced while the other two (including the MAG) covered them. The next stick also 4 men would be better employed to prevent enemy in other positions from interfering. Always we wanted the MAG right up there where we needed a high rate of direct fire.

In house clearing type situations (FIBUA) the MAG was needed but not right up front as everyone had to be prepared to enter doorways. We trained for this but never got anywhere near a Fullujah situation so you would need to ask those boys where they wanted their machine guns.

If the enemy is contacted where they are situated in depth (say in a defensive position) of say battalion strength your leading troops must pull back quickly before DF and other tasks come raining down on their heads. The MAG could be helpful in helping to disengage as well as using the other ideas mentioned such as smoke etc.

I genuinely believe that if there are those who believe that machine guns should be pooled at platoon and company level then is it not better to create an additional machine gun section or platoon as applicable? Are there still true believers in the effectiveness of indirect machine gun fire out there?

[kaur]

About IAR.

G3Kurz (person close to HK USA) says in hkpro.com forum:

There is no requirement in the contract for the IAR to be built in the US. As the timeline is pretty tight, the guns will have to be built at HK GmbH as the US production is far from ready to build a MIL SPEC rifle. Would be a bad decision to make the gun at any other HK facility than HK GmbH. Their record for QA and lot testing is well established - they are the true experts on HK's, especially the 416. Why risk it?

This is a very good thing for the Marines and every other service/country that is watching this. This is the US Marine Corps! Remember that the Marines were expected to consider seriously what SOCOM decided on SCAR. A full fielding decision on SCAR is expected this month. It is anyones guess what will happen at Tampa. This confirms the wisdom of the selection of the HK416 by Tier 1 SOF units for which they have taken a bunch of crap over the years and begs the question why not just upgrade or replace the SOCOM M4's with COTS HK416's? Mother Army is looking to upgrade the M4 and conduct a new carbine competition. This "award" (downselect actually) raises the state of the science for 5.56mm rifles by a long margin, and just in time maybe.

Nice to see the troops getting the very best for a change. The Marines conducted the first "Field Experiment" on IAR back in the late 1990's wherein HK competed with the MG36 at that time and did well - pre HK416. The HK416 provides a substanially improved sustained rate of fire, improved accuracy, higher cook off rate, improved service life and decreased life cycle costs and likely it was not the most expensive candidate. What is amazing is that the Plain Jane standard production HK416 (okay a bayonet stud was added) as submittted (the lightest candidate also!) beat out the heavier and purpose built candiate from FN and Colt. Guess this sheds some light on the rumor control that said the HK416 was dead and it was having many problems with US users. Wrong. Hard to beat HK made hammer forged barrels and the op rod gas system. Now they just need a good reliable 75-90 round drum magazine like the G8 mag.

The first 5.56mm SOST ammo gets fielded in the Corps soon as well. If the reported performance of the 7.62mm SOST in Afghanistan is any indicator Marines armed with HK416 IAR's firing SOST ammo will gain a new found respect from our enemies there. Lighter. More manuverable. More "lethal" and at greater ranges and against protected targets? What's not to like about that?!

Things are looking up (finally). Congratulations to the folks at Quantico and to HK.

http://hkpro.com/forum/showthread.ph...wins-IAR/page5

it appears SOCOM will not field the SCAR in any great numbers other than maybe some SCAR H's for use in Afghanistan and for a small component of SOCOM. They are a good company with mostly top notch product but they are not alone in the fight for business. In the end the HK416 IAR will be proven to be THE BEST conventional rifle on the market today. The ongoiing tests thus far are proving that to be true. All just in time for the upcoming M4 Upgrade program and new Army Individual Carbine effort. Let the best gun win.

http://hkpro.com/forum/showthread.ph...es-IAR-article

[Tukhachevskii]

It's not impossible to move guns, it's just the type of manoeuvre that becomes impossible, when all fire teams have the same weapons.

What the UK Battle Craft idea progressed was that while the 3 man "Gun group"(3 man Fireteam?) was suppressing the enemy (hopefully) the the 5-man "Rifle Group"(5-man Fireteam?) moved forward or to the flanks, to find a better position for the gun. They would then signal the gun to move to the new position, and provide some covering fire.

This all stemmed from the idea of an attack being movement from fire position to fire position, until you got within grenade/"bayonet" range, by which time the enemy had hopefully jacked.

Doing it by 3 x 8-man sections, required considerable co-ordination, which is why Wigram Grouping was more sensible. Both ideas together create a very robust and simple system.

This intrugues me. So am I right in understanding that once the gun group displaces fom its position the rifle group supports it with suppressive fire, presumably on the same target that the gun group had been engageing (or a different target within their arc of fire)? I find it intriguing that for however long the gun group was "out of action" because they were displacving to a new position they were expected to be covered by a rifle group without a LMG? Surely they would thereby be at a disadvantage compared to a section organised into two balanced fireteams each of comparable "suppresive" capabilties. It sounds like getting Tyson to disengage from a fight while Barry McGuigan covers him

[Tukhachevskii]

There appears to be much confusion indeed regarding what constitutes fire power and what is required for effect (at the receiving end) versus a perception of said firepower that possibly does more to boost our own morale than to reduce that of the enemy. .

This is precisely what I was getting at; its not what the GPMG/LMG/SAW can do but rather "what desired effects on target do we require?" that should determine weapon choice. I can't see 500rnds of 7.62mm link making much of a differance in a firefight given the numbers of rounds expended for any given number of kills (of which I am admittedly ignorant). I am aware that British units are arming themselves with all and sundry in Afghanistan but is that because they like those BOS or because they have nothing better with which to tilt the scales in the battle for fire superiority? I read a AAR recently which described a plt contact in Afghanistan where all IW and Saws were being fired without hitting the Taliban opposition until the plt cdr deployed his 51 and one smoke (target marking) and four HE later the Taliban were meeting their maker (actually, they were dead on the first round of HE while the others were insurance.

[JMA]

This is precisely what I was getting at; its not what the GPMG/LMG/SAW can do but rather "what desired effects on target do we require?" that should determine weapon choice. I can't see 500rnds of 7.62mm link making much of a differance in a firefight given the numbers of rounds expended for any given number of kills (of which I am admittedly ignorant). I am aware that British units are arming themselves with all and sundry in Afghanistan but is that because they like those BOS or because they have nothing better with which to tilt the scales in the battle for fire superiority? I read a AAR recently which described a plt contact in Afghanistan where all IW and Saws were being fired without hitting the Taliban opposition until the plt cdr deployed his 51 and one smoke (target marking) and four HE later the Taliban were meeting their maker (actually, they were dead on the first round of HE while the others were insurance.

I would love to read this contact report. Especially as they knew where the TB were in order to engage then with mortar fire but were unable to direct any of the others weapons onto the target.

[William F. Owen]

I find it intriguing that for however long the gun group was "out of action" because they were displacving to a new position they were expected to be covered by a rifle group without a LMG? Surely they would thereby be at a disadvantage compared to a section organised into two balanced fireteams each of comparable "suppresive" capabilties. It sounds like getting Tyson to disengage from a fight while Barry McGuigan covers him

That is why "section F&M" is flawed, and better done as a platoon under tight control, with guns moving incrementally.

The "balanced" fire teams means neither can really do anything well.

[William F. Owen]

Especially as they knew where the TB were in order to engage then with mortar fire but were unable to direct any of the others weapons onto the target.

Behind a wall or far side of a raised road would be my guess. The 51mm goes to 800m, so I'm not surprised that an HE round caused casualties when weapons fire did not.

[Tukhachevskii]

Behind a wall or far side of a raised road would be my guess. The 51mm goes to 800m, so I'm not surprised that an HE round caused casualties when weapons fire did not.

Wilf has intuited the matter correctly. I'll get a full quote and paste it with a link to the book (not an AAR, my mistake) tommorow (and write up a fuller review for the "What are you reading" thread later, along with some other recently published British works). The platoon was under fire in some very uneven terrain (agricultural land, furrows, berms, reeds, etc) with the TB having occupied rather robust terrain features and the 51 negates all that by taking the path of least resisstance!!

[Tukhachevskii]

That is why "section F&M" is flawed, and better done as a platoon under tight control, with guns moving incrementally.

The "balanced" fire teams means neither can really do anything well.

Right. I'm with you now. That brings the pre-WWII plt with two Gun sections and two rifles sections into greater clarity. Did the gun section contain a single LMG (in which case having a security/close protection rifle team makes more sense given the plt focus)? Were they split two by two (ie, 1 gun and 1 rifle section) as manouvre/fire elements or was their employment entirely METT-T (or whatever their equivalent mnemonic was, and just what was that exactly?) dependant.

[William F. Owen]

Right. I'm with you now. That brings the pre-WWII plt with two Gun sections and two rifles sections into greater clarity. Did the gun section contain a single LMG (in which case having a security/close protection rifle team makes more sense given the plt focus)?

The 1918 Platoon was 4 x 7 man sections. 2 Gun Sections had 1 x Lewis gun each, and the other sections had Rifles and Rifle grenades. It grew out of what worked in WW1.

The scheme of manoeuvre was formally laid out in the 1919 "Soft Spots" manual. basically, no one moves unless there are 3 sections giving covering fire, and the aim is always to get the gun-sections closer to the enemy.

[Tukhachevskii]

The scheme of manoeuvre was formally laid out in the 1919 "Soft Spots" manual. .

Is this avalibale in the open source media? (obviously "Soft Spots" isn't its true title, right?)

[Ken White]

Perhaps the differentiator will be the type of war being fought.

Each one is different and different equipment, organizations and techniques are required and developed and what works is employed. Then comes peace and / or the budget people who cannot stand chaos (which is what war mostly happens to be...) and they attempt to impose order by defining a limited and limiting TOE. Those are usually designed for the last war and generally are biased toward cheap as opposed to effective.

I genuinely believe that if there are those who believe that machine guns should be pooled at platoon and company level then is it not better to create an additional machine gun section or platoon as applicable? Are there still true believers in the effectiveness of indirect machine gun fire out there?

I'd vote for the Platoon, separate section at a minimum IF -- big if -- a decent LMG (which the Minimi / M249 is not), preferably magazine fed were available for the rifle platoons. As there are none out there in common use today, the GPMG has logically become the preferred substitute. They work, they're just too heavy and require too much maintenance. Lighter belt feds like the Minimi and Mk 46 or 48 will work for in and out SOF like ops but aren't rugged enough to be beat up in line infantry combat for weeks on end.

The PKM is probably the best one out there right now with the Vektor VS 77 and the 5.56 version being a close second. The MAG is one of the more reliable jobs out there but the price for that reliability is excessive weight. All belt feds suffer from a weak link (pun intended), the belt and misaligned ammo plus twigs and leaves. That plus maintenance and weight. That and mostly weight...

As for indirect fire; almost never needed or useful in the offense or for any kind of assault. No one in the west other than Argentina has had to consistently defend fixed positions (not necessarily a defensive line, just any static defended position) since Korea. After we do that again and we will someday, somewhere, then the utility of indirect fire with MGs -- a lost art due to that lack of need to defend -- may become apparent to those who have not applied it...

[Ken White]

The "balanced" fire teams means neither can really do anything well.

They're designed by such people. Easier to design, diagram, fill with equipment and people and so forth.

The key is to not hire those with that bureaucratic mindset as combat leaders. Flexibility is in ones head, not in the design or documentation.

A Marine Rifle Squad in Korea was designed with SL, 3 x 4 man Fire Teams, each with a Corporal leader, Rifleman / Scout, an Automatic Rifleman (then BAR, today a SAW M249) and Assistant AR man (who was a rifleman but theoretically carrying an extra BAR belt with Ammo. They were heavy and thus almost always got 'lost' ). At various times, I operated with:

Aslt Team - 1 Leader, 4 Rifles; Base of fire - Me plus everyone else including 2 ARs.

Point Team - 1 Leader, 2 Rifles; Hook / Develop Team - 1 Leader (Me), 1 AR, 5 Rifles; Base of fire - 1 Leader, 2 ARs.

LP Team - 1 Leader, 2 rifles; Line Team 1 - 1 Leader, 1 AR, 1 Rifle; Line Team 2 (Hot Spot) 1 Leader, 2 ARs, 2 Rifles; CP Team - Me, 1 Rifle / Runner.

Plus half dozen other variations including all the BARs in support and all the Rifles but 1 Fire Team Leader attacking. That big Marine Squad has beaucoup flexibility and can absorb a lot of casualties.

[William F. Owen]

Is this avalibale in the open source media? (obviously "Soft Spots" isn't its true title, right?)

IRRC it was called SS-148. I only know of one copy and it's in the Liddell-Hart archive at Kings Collage.

[William F. Owen]

As for indirect fire; almost never needed or useful in the offense or for any kind of assault. No one in the west other than Argentina has had to consistently defend fixed positions (not necessarily a defensive line, just any static defended position) since Korea. After we do that again and we will someday, somewhere, then the utility of indirect fire with MGs -- a lost art due to that lack of need to defend -- may become apparent to those who have not applied it...

Thought a lot about it. I trained to do it. Spent many happy hours firing through Hessian screens, but I am really not sure of the effectiveness versus the time spent training. All for learning how to hit buildings or wood frontages at 3,000m but I just see that as best done over open sights, with a little less "map prediction."