Understood...
But...Originally Posted by William F. Owen
and MG plus Ammo is lighter and more flexible than a Mortar plus Ammo.Behind a wall or far side of a raised road would be my guess. The 51mm goes to 800m, so I'm not surprised that an HE round caused casualties when weapons fire did not.
Both can do good things, properly employed.
Plunging MG fire into defilade is easily possible with no tripod in visual range as well and at a greater distance than the 40mm LV can touch...
Training time spent on particular scenarios largely depends on where the guns are located, organizationally.
Last edited by Ken White; 04-29-2010 at 04:35 PM.
You seem think almost always of infantry as being on the attack (or on patrol).
Light machine guns of WWI had afaik primarily the value of being able to bolster the defense of a weakly occupied captured trench against counter-attacks.
They weren't primarily an offensive suppression weapon - especially not in the zone of well-prepared entrenchments.
Yes that sums it up pretty well. The trouble we see with the military is that most often the lessons learned from the previous war are applied to the next war regardless of whether the old war may have been in the jungle and the current one in a dessert. I use the term trying to turn a super tanker in rough seas. Always playing catch up.Each one is different and different equipment, organizations and techniques are required and developed and what works is employed. Then comes peace and / or the budget people who cannot stand chaos (which is what war mostly happens to be...) and they attempt to impose order by defining a limited and limiting TOE. Those are usually designed for the last war and generally are biased toward cheap as opposed to effective.
Perhaps it would be helpful to try and identify where and how and in which type of warfare machine guns are best located. Close range low visibility environment (jungle and dense bush) demand a different approach to dessert conditions.I'd vote for the Platoon, separate section at a minimum IF -- big if -- a decent LMG (which the Minimi / M249 is not), preferably magazine fed were available for the rifle platoons. As there are none out there in common use today, the GPMG has logically become the preferred substitute. They work, they're just too heavy and require too much maintenance. Lighter belt feds like the Minimi and Mk 46 or 48 will work for in and out SOF like ops but aren't rugged enough to be beat up in line infantry combat for weeks on end.
Well lets keep it simple for the colonial boys who still exist. Stick to one caliber of ammunition at company level. I think the armies of the world have experimented with 5.56x45mm and maybe its time to come back to 7.62×51mm NATO?The PKM is probably the best one out there right now with the Vektor VS 77 and the 5.56 version being a close second. The MAG is one of the more reliable jobs out there but the price for that reliability is excessive weight. All belt feds suffer from a weak link (pun intended), the belt and misaligned ammo plus twigs and leaves. That plus maintenance and weight. That and mostly weight...
The weight issue with the FN MAG is often raised. I wonder why this is. Are soldiers becoming weaker (cause of all the junk food) or what exactly is the problem. One sees pictures of soldiers these days carrying even rifles on a sling or with the magazine resting on the webbing. A fit young man 18-20 should be able to not only carry an FN MAG with 500rds (10x50 round belts) but also be able to skirmish from cover to cover with the weapon (probably carrying it by the handle on the move). Mainly the farm boys with short string backs were the ideal gunners but there were city boys who managed pretty well. (Moral of this story seems to be don't get your soldiers out of the projects but rather go find them out in the farm lands or get the physical training component of training up a few notches.
I dished out the extra belts sometime 6 more, sometimes 10 more to myself and the others (for ops where resupply may not be immediately available). My Sgt dealt with this spreading of the load (for example you got a radio, you got radio batteries, you get 2 belts you got the medic pack and so on to evenly spread the load.)
It is (in my humble opinion) more important to carry more belts for the gunner than the riflemen to carry more magazines for themselves. In many cases in our little war it was the riflemen who were there to protect the gunner (with his fire being directed by the stick commander ) while he did the business. Don't think of the machine gun as a personal weapon like a rifle think... firepower.
Last edited by JMA; 04-29-2010 at 08:48 PM.
If the enemy is hiding behind a wall 800m away of even 300m away then there is no firefight. If you are receiving effective fire then the enemy can see you to aim at you. Likewise then you can see them and direct fire on them.
We need to read that report.
1.Problem in Afghanistan is troops are often moving from the desert into close country like the Green Zone in Helmand with its dense bush, mud compounds and canals, and out again, in the same day.
2. Don't know about the US but from what I've read its common for British GPMG gunners to carry the gun plus 600-800 rounds of link, Minimi gunners sometimes even more. I think the problem is all the other stuff guys are carrying today- body armour, ECM kit etc. There is a very interesting thread on this on ARRSE at the moment; quite a few guys who have recently served in Helmand think that in many circumstances body armour is not worth the weight and that it should be up to commanders on the ground whether it is worn or not.
Last edited by baboon6; 04-29-2010 at 10:07 PM.
I’d say the weight issue today is compounded by all the other stuff carried in addition to primary weapons. Any photos I’ve seen from Rhodesia, the troopies seem to carry little more than their weapon, ammo and a bottle of water, and some obviously a radio. Today’s soldiers in the sandbox probably come close to that weight just with armour (including helmet) and all the additional gadgets (HE projectors, electronic, sights, coms etc). So even running around with an M4 carbine would be pretty exhausting, comparatively.
For what it’s worth, HK have remade (in metrics) the L7A2 in two barrel lengths. It is supposed to be about 2 kg lighter. That should bring it down to about the same weight as an L4A4 and lighter than the standard Vector. Not sure why they didn’t just use the already metric (and heavier) MAG 58 as a starting point…..perhaps to do with licensing etc.
As an aside, I’ve never come across mention of balancing the barrel on the MAG 58. I’ve only ever come across it regarding the L7 with its 10 gas settings. I suppose it wouldn’t make much sense on the MAG with only three settings.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
We hit the submit button at the same time.
The ANZACs in NAM rarely used to wear even helmets, like the Rhodesians. I suppose you get used to it eventually (wearing a helmet that is). I'm pleased to say that I've had few exercises where we've had to wear them; I hated it. Then again, I've never had shrapnel coming in my direction.quite a few guys who have recently served in Helmand think that in many circumstances body armour is not worth the weight
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Precisely. The British government has the licence for the L7 and they gave it to HK to build guns for them; HK has apparently already delivered quite a lot of normal-length GPMGs to the British Army.
They weren't really complaining about helmets too much (as you said they have probably worn them a lot), apparently the new Mk7 is better than the Mk6, but bitching about the 13kg tortoise shell that is Osprey.
Last edited by baboon6; 04-29-2010 at 10:48 PM.
Well that would be an erroneous impression. I do not, and we very rarely discuss the dismounted defence.
True. By 1918 Commonwealth troops hugged a creeping barrageLight machine guns of WWI had afaik primarily the value of being able to bolster the defense of a weakly occupied captured trench against counter-attacks.
The Platoon organisation was primarily offensive. The manuals say so explicitly.They weren't primarily an offensive suppression weapon - especially not in the zone of well-prepared entrenchments.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Beaten zone of a PKM at 800m? Chance of spotting the firing point if it's a 8 x8 inch whole knocked in a wall?
-------------------
I submit, that if you've made the right choices the weapons set will work almost everywhere, with some small adjustments.
I would be extremely careful of that assertion. I grew up in both all 7.62mm and then all 5.56mm Platoons. After much contemplation and research, I feel a mix is called for. 5.56mm in magazines, 7.62mm 4-BIT in belts.Well lets keep it simple for the colonial boys who still exist. Stick to one caliber of ammunition at company level. I think the armies of the world have experimented with 5.56x45mm and maybe its time to come back to 7.62×51mm NATO?
It's not quite the "BREN gun and STEN gun" approach of the Palmach, but the round that works well for hand-held fire, is not the round that works best in an MG.
Well today there are very, very few farmers and the guys from the projects have a great deal to offer, especially when working in urban terrain.Moral of this story seems to be don't get your soldiers out of the projects but rather go find them out in the farm lands or get the physical training component of training up a few notches.
Sure, I've seen hard lads from East London, terrified and confused by their first night in the woods, but they quickly get used to it, plus they know about 30 different ways to steal almost anything - which can be useful.
I would strongly agree. This was very much the lesson from both WW2 and the Falklands. It is yet again being re-learnt currently. The current catch phrase for weapons effect is "GMPG PLUS" as being the thing that does the killing.It is (in my humble opinion) more important to carry more belts for the gunner than the riflemen to carry more magazines for themselves. In many cases in our little war it was the riflemen who were there to protect the gunner (with his fire being directed by the stick commander ) while he did the business. Don't think of the machine gun as a personal weapon like a rifle think... firepower.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Exactly. I understand the ammunition expenditure problem but surely training/fire discipline will alleviate that to some degree. Lets take the following, admittedly simplistic (and, yes, somewhat childish), example as a point of discussion; In terms of full auto use imagine a 6 man fire team equipped with IARs / True Auto rifles...” Charlie fire team, 400m, enemy RPG team, full auto, one magazine, Fire!” For that specific engagement you have six barrels firing 30rds each at a specific target at, what, 600rds/pm on cyclic for each gun which amounts to 3,600 rds/pm total for the three seconds (and 180 rds down range) it takes each man to empty his 30 rd mag. That’s an impressive amount of “suppressive/ destructive” fire fired at a controlled rate with minimum expenditure (in a theoretically pure case rather than in combat conditions) compared with a SAW/LMG firing 200rds link (firing in bursts of say 10-20 and taking much longer). Ally that to HE projectors of the MGL-140/M203 kind firing HEDP or even Hellhounds (or even a SMAW/LAW) from an adjacent fire team and you’re most enemy’s worst nightmare (grammer?). The mag fed IARs ammunition expenditure should actually be less given proper fire discipline drills. Fire team cdr then orders fire team to revert to burst or single shot mode. Flexibility is retained all round while devastating firepower is available on tap as it were where and when needed (a SAW/LMG is always as SAW/LMG) for better overall weight distribution amongst the team (of course, I haven’t factored in the magazine weight or anything else a grown up would/should consider). Given that IARs would also weigh less than SAW/LMGs and, if issued as proper IW, would have better sights (an assumption based on literature rather than experience) and would be easier to “swing into action”. The weight saved having to carry an LMG/SAW could be replaced with something meatier (HE wise; say a couple of LAWs per man instead of the 200 rd belt). True GPMGs located in the coy spt plt (say a section of four guns manned by three-four men each) could then exploit the range and capabilities of a SF GPMG in the grazing, plunging, searching, traverse & search modes rather than just the usual fixed direction mode (single aim point) employed at squad/fire team level (although I realise that’s METT-T flexible/dependant). Forgive the maths, never was my strong point but the above is just an example of how I personally try to get my head around such matters.I would be inclined to agree with you if the IAR is no or little heavier than an IW, like the HK416 or the LWRC. But in that case (and indeed along the lines of Webb) why call it an IAR? It would then really just be an improved assault rifle. That would make sense to me.
So I do think that a simplification here would make a lot of sense. Have ‘improved assault rifles’ that can be used on full auto when required and 7.62 beltfeds, anywhere between 7.62 Minimi and MAG 58. Then decide where those beltfeds need to be, and perhaps that should remain more flexible and situation dependant.
That of course negates Ken’s:
That is more likely to happen with IARs across the board as ‘improved assault rifles’.Yet it may still waste less ammo then the current situation with a bit of everything, or in fact so much of everything else that IWs are hardly carried anymore (slight exaggeration there
).
The following quote is from Doug Beattie MC An Ordinary Soldier which describes a contact by two Brit WMIKs and sixteen ANA with Taliban fighters on the outskirts of a village (not as I had earlier stated a fight between a pure Brit plt and Taliban);
There were three of them-no, four. Out in the open, just to the right of the building I had seen several Taliban fighters using as cover; repeatedly darting out of it to fire short bursts towards the Afghan policemen who were fifty meters in front of us.
The enemy were also using RPGs. As I put my binoculars to my eyes again, a blast shook the ground in front of our position.
“Geordie”, I yelled. “Bring up the 51mm mortar”
He ran forward, hunched over, carrying the short tube in one hand, a bag full of bombs in the other; they were a mixture of smoke and high-explosive rounds.
From where he was, crouched down beside my vehicle [Land Rover WMIK], he wasn’t able to see the human targets who were becoming ever more brazen, standing out in full view, squirting bullets in our direction, and now only occasionally disappearing back into and behind the house probably to reload. I estimated that they were some 400 metres away. It would be up to me to relay back the firing information to Geordie. I could see where his weapon was pointing and it didn’t look good. I shouted out instructions.
I glanced down again to see him adjusting the weapon’s range to 400 metres and then turn forty-five degrees clockwise. He bedded it into the soft sand so the recoil would not throw the bomb off its intended trajectory. He was ready.
‘I want you to fire a smoke round so I can see what you are like for line. I will bring you in from there’.
Geordie knelt up and dropped a shell down the barrel, grabbed hold of the firing lanyard and pulled it sharply. There was a whoomph as the mortar kicked into life and the smoke bomb shot out. I kept peering through my binos, waiting for the impact; waiting, waiting. There it was; a plume of white smoke billowing up from a point some twenty metres in front of the enemy position, drifting lazily towards them.
All four men were in view once more, three standing, firing with their rifles, the other down on one knee about to unleash another RPG.
‘Good line, Geordie. Try adding another 100 in range and this time go with the HE’
Chipper stood ready with another round as Geordie made the necessary changes. He took the bomb, safety pin out, and dropped it down the tube. Bang. The second mortar was spat out.
What I expected to see was the round dropping somewhere close enough to the enemy for them to be brought to their senses, forcing them to dash for cover. What I actually saw was an impact as precise as any I had ever witnessed. The bomb landed no more than five meters [my emphasis] from its intended target, just to the right of the group as I looked at them.
All four were flung to the ground as if rag dolls; either thrown off their feet by the force of the blast or cut down by shards of flying shrapnel and lumps of rock. Probably both.
‘Great shot, Geordie. Keep it there’. I shouted, professional pride overcoming any sense of revulsion, shock or horror at what I was seeing. For good measure Steve continued pumping away with the .50-cal.
My attention remained glued on the site of the explosion. Two of the men were motionless. The others were moving; one only just, the second writhing about. Geordie had fired three more HE rounds. The first of these landed almost exactly were the first had exploded, almost within spitting distance of the man who had been frantically twisting and turning on the ground. Now he lay completely still. The next two rounds landed well short, but it didn’t matter; the damage had been done’. (pp.183-185)
Hmmmm, that doesn’t look very impressive. Two WMIKs with at least one HMG and presumably 2 GPMGs, at least all of their IWs, and they need a mortar to deal to 4 TB hopping about in the open at 400 m. I hope that’s not an accurate account of what happened; certainly with regards to the ‘in the open’ bit.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Looking back to WWI:
THE AEF WAY OF WAR: THE AMERICAN ARMY
AND COMBAT IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR
...
...During the latter phases, when no barrage existed, “the officers and men were too reckless,” often charging enemy machine guns, instead of outflanking them. 102 Even the division commander remarked that generally “there was no time wasted in flanking these obstacles; the men . . . took them all by frontal attack and at the point of the bayonet.” 103
...Buck reported that his “leading waves” were “not thin enough,” and he wanted at least eight toten paces between riflemen when advancing under fire. “Better still,” he suggested, would be an irregular line of small columns at wide intervals, each small column being an independent unit whose mission is to gain the flank or rear of machine gun nests, with the permission to advance rapidly or slowly according to conditions of the resistance met, always picking its way through barrages or areas swept by machine gun fire. These small columns (4, 6, or 8 men each) should have Chauchat rifles, or V-Bs [rifle grenades], or hand grenades, but the absence of any or all of these should not alter the action of purpose of the group.104
..."It was by observation of the Moroccans in this action that the regiment learned the
method of advance ordinarily utilized by European veterans, whereby the assault line,
having lost the barrage, progressed steadily forward, individuals, under the eye of their
squad leaders, moving at a run from shell-hole to shell-hole. When stopped by
resistance,--usually a machine gun,--the squad, section, or platoon engaged it by fire
from the front, while flankers immediately worked around with rifles and grenades to
take it from the flank. It was a common saying in the 1st Division that the Moroccans
taught them how to fight." (p73)
...The division’s officers took a number of actions to solve these problems. Junior officers who reported that “Infantry is handicapped against organized machine gun nests without the mortars or one pounders [37mm],” made certain they always went forward with those pieces in the future, and they learned to make good use of them.107 Summerall ordered an investigation into the use of machine guns and automatic rifles, directed changes to the way the guns were to be advanced during battle (always “from cover to cover” behind the leading waves, with a forward observer looking for prospective fire missions), made improvements in their method of ammunition supply (every rifleman would carry a clip for the Chauchat), and stressed the importance of their fire during the attack (he claimed that one of the primary “lessons” of Soissons “was the great advantage of employing all of the machine guns in the most powerful manner to support the infantry”).108 Summerall even announced the heresy that “the service rifle” was “greatly inferior in value” to the automatic rifle, and he directed that every rifleman be trained to shoot the automatic. (p74)
This little snippets must of course be seen in the context of the concept of a late WWI set-piece attack. The relative importance on the infantry weapons increased in the more fluid phases and semi-open warfare as the coordination with the artillery became more difficult.During this period Summerall also issued a directive specifying how he wanted his infantry tofight, and it shows that he expected it to make maximum use of its available firepower.
"Hostile strongpoints and machine guns must not impede the advance of any part of the
line not obstructed by them. They will be vigorously reduced by the intense fire of
machine guns, automatic rifles, Stokes mortars and 37mm guns, and the accompanying
artillery. Under cover of this fire the infantry must advance by rushes around the flanks,
in small groups or individually, accompanied by automatic rifles.5"
The standard service rifle was conspicuously absent from the list of crucial infantry weapons. Also, in keeping with the directives of Pershing’s newly issued Combat Instructions, Summerall intended to employ a few light guns as accompanying artillery pieces in order to give the infantry more power. He likewise directed that all twelve machine guns of each machine-gun company would be used to advance the infantry in all attacks, and that each gun was to follow all infantry advances with a minimum of 2,500 rounds.
It really seems that the upper brass went to Europe with great faith in the rifle, the bayonet and the will of the soldier and tried to defend their doctrine. Younger and lower ranks adapted generally much more quickly.
Going back to the topic one can see just how much and how rapidly the importance of the auxiliary infantry weapons increased, just like the one of the combined arms (artillery, tanks and aircraft) did on a larger scale.
Machine guns, light 37mm guns, automatic rifles, hand grenades, (WP, HE) rifle grenades, flamethrowers, bangalore torpedos became very important indeed. Specialists like "bombers" were selected and trained for specific tasks with 10-15 hand or rifle grenades. (The same concept was used by German raiding parties in WWII) The automatic rifle (Chauchats) was a key element for the infantry during the attacks and seems to have had a very strong influence on the concept of the BAR.
I was never quite aware just how massive the production of rifle grenades was both in WWI and WWII. I have never fired a rifle grenade, perhaps this is the major reason why this important component of the platoons and squads of the two World Wars remained under my personal radar.
Firn
P.S: (Wiki)The initial two-man Chauchat team was also found insufficient and eventually grew to a four-man squad by October 1917 (the squad leader, the gunner, the assistant gunner who handled the magazines plus one additional magazine carrier). Later on, during the German spring offensive of 1918, the war had moved out of the mud of the trenches and into open fields thus making the guns more reliable and easier to maintain. Furthermore, French infantry regiments had been reorganized into multiple small (18 men) combat groups ("Demi-Sections de Combat"). Those were made up of a full Chauchat squad plus four VB (Viven-Bessiere) rifle grenade specialists and eight conventional grenadiers/riflemen. At this point in time, in 1918, the preserved French regimental records and statistics of medals given to Chauchat gunners document that they had contributed in no small part to the success of the new infantry tactics. Those were focused on the suppression of enemy machine gun nests by the combined action of portable (Chauchat) automatic fire plus the VB rifle grenades, always used within a range of less than 200 yards.
Last edited by Firn; 04-30-2010 at 10:31 AM.
My question would be, why do you need 180 rounds down range in three seconds? If they are disciplined then we can presume that even with the stress levels way up they can shoot well enough to get the rounds close to the target even if they don't hit it at first. I'm not sure that 180 rounds snapping past your head in three seconds really has that much more suppressive effect than say, 15-20 single shots snapping past your head in the same amount of time. I don't even know that a lot of people would register the difference once the stress response kicks in. In any case, fully automatic fire will never be as accurate as semi-auto and this is especially true with rifles which are lighter and more prone to barrel climb.
Taking all that into account, you have now expended ~ 14% of your ammunition (for those 6 guns) in the first three seconds of the engagement and you haven't even begun to maneuver on the target yet. You still have to suppress for whatever time it takes for whatever action is taken, whether it is the textbook bold flanking maneuver, bounding forward, breaking contact or whatever.
“Build a man a fire, and he'll be warm for a day. Set a man on fire, and he'll be warm for the rest of his life.”
Terry Pratchett
I forgot to mention earlier that the Australian Army has apparently decided to get rid of the MAG-58 in the indirect fire sustained fire machine gun role. They will swap them for M2 .50cal Brownings which will be used to provide indirect fire. Now that will stop light vehicles as the projectiles will go through light steel even at long ranges and will be more accurate with its heavier streamilned projectile. Dead ground and light overhead cover has just become a mite less safer.
I am assuming that you are referring to the defense. We have never had an indirect fire role for our machine guns, unless that is just a different term for plunging fire but even that is not a role. The role of the machine gun is the same, it's just the terrain that may different. I am a bit confused by this change though. That is a pretty significant change in equipment, going from a GPMG that is common in many Western light infantry forces to a heavy machine gun that is rarely seen anywhere but mounted on a vehicle. There really isn't space in the infantry for an M2 except for mounted on a vehicle.
“Build a man a fire, and he'll be warm for a day. Set a man on fire, and he'll be warm for the rest of his life.”
Terry Pratchett
We did but it got lost
in Viet Nam -- as did many things...
It is not a role, it is a capability that has uses, particularly but not only in the defense. It isn't that hard, basically just putting plunging fire on reverse slopes, in trench lines, wadis, ditches or other defilade positions. It is most accurate when done from the tripod but can be done on the bipod simply by walking the bullet strikes as long as they are visible.
Not many today have a clue about this:LINK.
Yep, all good points. It was just meant as an example if what could be done as a technique to replace SAW/LMG fire when needed without actually needing a SAW/LMG. More for me to chew over. Ta for the feedback.
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 04-30-2010 at 02:38 PM.
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