errr.... really? How can you use the M2 for "Map predicted fire?".Originally Posted by GI Zhou
- I've never seen an indirect fire kit for an M2 - Will it use the C2 sight?
- Beaten zone for an M2 at 3,000m?
- Cyclic rate of an M2?
Does not sound well thought through to me.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I don't know much about it other than what I have read. I expect it would have a greater range than 3,000m and its cyclic fire is sufficient for the role as from memory they are not fired continuously. It would be great against choke points. I expect it would use the C2 sight for want of something better and a soft recoil mount.
I wonder how much emphasis is placed on teaching "the theory of small arms fire" to officers and senior NCOs today? Maybe a lack of understanding in this leads to missed opportunities?in Viet Nam -- as did many things...
It is not a role, it is a capability that has uses, particularly but not only in the defense. It isn't that hard, basically just putting plunging fire on reverse slopes, in trench lines, wadis, ditches or other defilade positions. It is most accurate when done from the tripod but can be done on the bipod simply by walking the bullet strikes as long as they are visible.
Not many today have a clue about this:LINK.
I see this training as the means of keeping the use of machine guns in a sustained fire role alive as a concept and as a tactical option.
Of course all these permanent and semi permanent base camps are defensive positions and should theoretically benefit from the strategic siting of machine guns in the sustained fire role. Is it being done?
Ammunition to supply machine guns employed in this role is always going to be an issue and apart from in static bases and when deployed virtually right up to its firing position by vehicle I don't see their employment being feasiable. It seems todays soldiers can bearly carry the own weapons an personal load with out now expecting them to hump 1,000 roads for the MGs on top of that.
I found this link which I perused and it was such a happy nostalgia trip. It helps when an instructor loves his subject with a passion (as my sergeant major instructor did) as the enthusiasm tends to rub off:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...-68/index.html
Last edited by JMA; 05-01-2010 at 12:19 AM.
Yes , very strange!
I don't have an educated position on what caliber best to use for rifles so I will leave it there. I do however, note that the issue of range has come up in the odd thread... as has the effect thereof on individual markmanship ability (or the lack thereof) of the individual soldier.
I said: “If the enemy is hiding behind a wall 800m away of even 300m away then there is no firefight. If you are receiving effective fire then the enemy can see you to aim at you. Likewise then you can see them and direct fire on them.”
Beaten zone? Don't know at that range but I have my doubts that the fire could be effective fired from a bipod. There is another thing here. These long range contacts where people actually take cover. Why are troops walking around in such open areas? Are they expecting to find the TB hiding under the stones? So then they get caught out in the open where the field of vision is 400, 500, 800m and they take cover????????
It seems that sometimes they have vehicles, then why don't they lay down some supporting fire and then carry the troops forward. Or has something changed recently? I was taught that the role of the infantry was to close will and kill the enemy. Not sit back and lob a few mortars then go home for tea.
----------------------
I said: “Moral of this story seems to be don't get your soldiers out of the projects but rather go find them out in the farm lands or get the physical training component of training up a few notches.”
Maybe not farmers but there are still a lot of rural boys whose day includes a high degree of physical labour. But then if the skinny malnourished city kids are recruited into the army then the physical development component (not just the physical exercise component) needs to be scientifically introduced into both training and the regimental life thereafter.Well today there are very, very few farmers and the guys from the projects have a great deal to offer, especially when working in urban terrain.
Sure, I've seen hard lads from East London, terrified and confused by their first night in the woods, but they quickly get used to it, plus they know about 30 different ways to steal almost anything - which can be useful.
Some say the kit is too heavy. Too heavy for whom? Any kit will always be too heavy for weaklings but where is the benchmark in all this? I hear people say that the MAG and 500 rds is too heavy. So I ask again, too heavy for whom? Can you see where I'm coming from?
I've done map-predicted on the M2 in training. It was explained that it served 'harassing' fire purposes against a particularly vulnerable enemy target but we were told unofficially that it also served to bridge a skill-set gap between HMG crews and mortar-men - the idea being that the FSCC could be manned by either branches, and having an elementary knowledge of throwing rounds indirectly from a .50 would assist in appreciating what a mortar crew went through.
I'm not going to defend either proposition - at the time I thought it rather pointless an endeavor, and still do. In answer to your questions though - yes, you do use the C2 sight in an identical fashion to calculating a mortar fire mission, only with the .50 tables. I cannot remember the beaten zone and would have to consult a manual but it was substantially smaller than a mortar pl's beaten zone in the default pattern of four guns converging.
As dubious as the effect is, conducting a pl night-shoot with all tracer is a sight to behold.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
The range is out to half-a-kilometer-ish, from rough memory. Using a C2 sight you do indeed require the soft-mount, although I do know that there are now computer units that will provide you a firing solution for both .50 and 40mm if your willing to invest sufficient dosh.
From my reading you would only ever fire all allocated guns simultaneously. Like anything indirect, the best effect would be achieved in the opening minutes of initiation when you have surprise on your side.
I can't think of a tactical situation where you would have the time to deliver HMG indirect fire against a target within the 5 km radius when mortars at the very least could do the job far better. Combine this with the fact that MG's are normally sited in a defilading position, it can be a very impractical undertaking to move your entire gun out of a pit to be orientated to the map-predicted target which it is unlikely to be able to cover from its primary arcs.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
Do you mean "Map predicted" or "Pre-registered." Back in the day, "Pre registered meant direct fire, where you sighted in in daylight and had the shoot dialled in at night.
Map Predicted meant shooting to 4,000m + in the low trajectory against targets you could not see, or observe the fall of shot. - something that came from WW1 and not a very good idea, IMO.
I just cannot see how you can do that effectively with an M2. Very low ROF, very heavy, and very accurate - so no beaten zone!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Well that's why you do training.
The real issue today is body armour, not weapons weight. When your body armour weighs what a Mag does, the the weight of the Mag and 500 rounds is TOO heavy.Some say the kit is too heavy. Too heavy for whom? Any kit will always be too heavy for weaklings but where is the benchmark in all this? I hear people say that the MAG and 500 rds is too heavy. So I ask again, too heavy for whom? Can you see where I'm coming from?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
No, I am talking about map-predicted. As in, (and this is from memory, so excuse any basic errors in process) orders come in to fire into Grid XXXX YYYY, which is then plotted onto a map, bearing calculated and converted to the gun-line, the range is likewise id'd and elevation is calculated through the use of tables (identical process to a mortar fire mission). The HMG crews then use their C2 site to level off their guns and put in the data from the FSCC which they then fire on command - so yes, when I say map predicted fire I'm not making a mistake nor making things up. Pre-registered is a far simpler undertaking!
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
OK, just checking....
And the M2 has some sort of effect? I was always very doubtful of the GPMG in this role and the M2 would seem even less so.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Apologies, I didn't mean to come across up-tight or defensive (which on a re-read of my post, I did). Yours was a legitimate query wondering if I had got it wrong, as pre-registered fire is common sense and map predicted is not.OK, just checking....
And the M2 has some sort of effect? I was always very doubtful of the GPMG in this role and the M2 would seem even less so.
Effect? Would have no idea. However, given that we had been hauling the HMG kit dismounted for that FTX we were more enthusiastic about getting rid of the ammo than we were about what was happening at the other end!!
I agree with you in that a MG (HMG, GPMG, etc) in the indirect role is at best novel misuse, and at most completely stupid.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
Wilfs comments jogged my memory and reminded me of Fuller’s regarding the lewis gun’s role in the platoon attack from J. F. C. Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, Chapter VIII The Physical Sphere of War (the entire text, and some other very interesting works by other authors, is available here courtesy of the US Army Command and General Staff College);
By strategy an enemy is out-manoeuvred; that is, he is placed in a bad position from which to hit out. First it should be remembered that the purpose of tactics is similar to that of strategy, namely to carry out the intention of the commander- his plan. The instrument is not only the troops but the organization of the troops. Organization must be maintained. Further movement must be maintained, or at least the power to move must exist when the commander desires to move. We here get as our battle problem the maintenance of a moving organized body of men. This body must be able to move, and it must remain organized. The enemy is attempting to stop this movement, not only by killing and wounding our men, but by destroying their organization. We must, therefore, protect our men and their organization, and we do so to a great extent through offensive action. By hitting we reduce the chances of being hit.
Tactical action may, therefore, be defined as: protected organized movement through offensive action. To accomplish this we require three orders of troops. Troops which will protect the attackers, troops which can attack, and troops which can pursue. These three orders remain fundamental, and to pull their full weight they must co-operate-that is, work together to attain a common object. In a present-day army these orders are represented by artillery, infantry, and cavalry; and the reason why in the last great war a decision was so long delayed was due to:
(i.) The immobility of artillery.
(ii.) The defensive strength of infantry.
(iii.) The offensive weakness of cavalry.
The number of guns employed and the enormous supply of ammunition required tied artillery down to definite areas, and as intensity of fire had to be maintained, and guns cannot fire when in movement, the result was that when they had to move the attack virtually had to be suspended. The defensive power of infantry and the lack of ability on the part of cavalry to pursue needs no accentuation. What we have got to do now is to think in the terms of the elements of war and make good the above deficiencies. Thus, artillery must be endowed with a higher power of movement. Infantry must be endowed with higher offensive power, and cavalry must be more highly protected. I have laid down three orders of troops from the major point of view, now I will examine them from the minor-the tactical organization and co-operation of the attackers themselves.
According to the accepted theory of war, the true attackers are the infantry. They attack from the base supplied them by the protective troops-the gunners-and on defeating the enemy’s infantry, theoretically, they form a base for cavalry action. If, from the major point of view, three orders of troops are necessary, so also are they necessary from the minor. Consequently an infantry platoon should be a threefold organization, and it virtually is one. To prove this I will first divide the platoon into two equal parts, a forward body and a reserve-the left and right fists of a boxer. Both consist of two weapons-a protective weapon, the Lewis gun, and an offensive weapon, the rifle. The object of the forward division is to deprive the enemy of power to move, so that the reserve division may move forward and destroy him. The reserve may assist the forward body by protective fire, but, in any case, the Lewis-gun section of the forward body should protect the advance of the rifle section. Thus we find, in miniature, the tactics of an army repeating themselves in the platoon. The forward Lewis gun is the field artillery, the forward rifle section the infantry, and the reserves the cavalry and horse artillery. But, whilst theoretically the cavalry in pursuit can move faster than infantry in flight, in the platoon battle the reserve cannot do so. Consequently, whilst in the main battle the object of the infantry is to disorganize the enemy's infantry so that the cavalry can pursue, in the platoon battle the object of the forward division is to fix or hold its antagonist until the reserve division can move forward and disorganize him. Each time such a disorganization is effected the enemy's battle-body sustains a scratch. In the infantry attack as conceived to-day an antagonist is scratched to pieces. The diagram (No. 13) shows what I mean [see image attached below]. D is the enemy; A is the forward Lewis-gun section; and B the forward rifle section; C is the reserve. Under the protective fire of A, B manoeuvres, and through offensive action fixes D. When once D is fixed, C makes the fullest use of movement to manoeuvre into a position from which D can be annihilated or compelled to surrender.
Even in so small an action as this we see the close interplay between the three physical elements of war, and, through them, back to the three elements of force. Stability, activity, and co-operation (mobility) demand three types of weapons; these demand three types of soldiers; and these soldiers express their combined action in a threefold order of tactics, namely to protect, to fix, and to destroy or paralyse. Again we get a close relationship between strategy and tactics. The position occupied by A is first of all tactical-that is, offensive; secondly it is strategical-to cover the movement of B. B's movement is strategically, then tactical; and so also is C's. If strategy and tactics cannot be separated in the platoon, neither can they be separated in an army. Even if our force comprises three men, one should act protectively, one offensively, and the third in a mobile manner; even if only one man, he should protect himself with one fist, hit out with the other, and move by leg-power; and one man is our ultimate model, for one man is our military molecule. (my emphasis underlined, pp.170-173)
The mere addition of new weapons and means of movement and protection must not delude us into supposing that an army is guided by progress, for the " test " of progress is tactical idea. How are they being used ? This is the question. The answer is to be sought in the training manuals and on the manoeuvre grounds. Here we can learn how they are being used, and then, possessed with this information, we should turn to the weapons and means and ascertain their powers and limitations. Does tactical theory express them? If it does, then we learn that an army is thinking scientifically;
if not, then that its command is composed of alchemists. This is a tremendous and decisive discovery to make.
Next we should examine the military structure of organization. Does it admit the true tactical values of the means being expressed, and does it permit of a co-ordination of tactical structure and maintenance, and is it easily controllable ? To be controllable and maintainable it must be simple. Is it simple or complex ? Is it growing like the body of a man, or like an amorphous polypus : that is, is each new means accentuating the power of the elements of war by correlation, or by mere addition? If by addition, then we are faced by a monster, and monsters are seldom to be feared. As the power of each weapon is limited, so also is the force of an organization limited. What are its limitations, and how can they be overcome. (p.174, Fuller’s emphasis in italics; mine underlined)
Tukhas mate,
a.) Good job and well done for finding this. All new to me, as in...
b.) More good stuff, turned into utter b*llocks by Fuller's style of writing and byzantine thought process. He excelled in taking the simplest of ideas and making endlessly complicated and confusing.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I agree that using the M2 in that role is
both novel misuse and stupid for the reasons that Wilf cites("Very low ROF, very heavy, and very accurate - so no beaten zone!").
For the GPMG, I don't agree that it is misuse or stupid though I fully acknowledge it would have little use in the types of warfare in which the the west currently engages. However, given an even slightly more intensive war against a like armed opponent and some use of the defense, be it hasty or deliberate and if delays and combat outpost lines are employed, the technique is valuable. Nor is it as complex as ChrisJM seems to imply. Further, while the mortar can indubitably do a better job in the indirect role, there are not nearly as many of them and they should go to the priority targets while the GPMGs with their poor accuracy and thus large beaten zone can do enough damage on the less important targets. Not to mention the times when the mortars are not available for one reason or another. Particularly valuable technique if your enemy has counterfire radar -- Mortar guys hate those, I bet...
I can see why Chris and Wilf alone here (of all you kids...More here: LINK, LINK. The US used the firing tables and the clinometer as opposed to using the C2 Sight. The M60 MG had milled flats for placement of the Clinometer atop the two bands that attach the gas cylinder to the barrel.The Vickers was used for indirect fire against enemy positions at ranges up to 4,500 yards. This plunging fire was used to great effect against road junctions, trench systems, forming up points, and other locations that might be observed by a forward observer, or zeroed in at one time for future attacks, or guessed at by men using maps and experience. Sometimes a location might be zeroed in during the day, and then attacked at night, much to the surprise and confusion of the enemy. New Zealand units were especially fond of this use. A white disc would be set up on a pole near the MMG, and the gunner would aim at a mark on it, knowing that this corresponded to aiming at the distant target. There was a special back-sight with a tall extension on it for this purpose. The only similar weapon of the time to use indirect fire was the German MG 08, which had a separate attachment sight with range calculator. LINK.(emphasis added / kw)
Last edited by Ken White; 10-27-2011 at 01:20 AM.
I fully concur that it is a skill that would have application in more regular warfare. Our "ideal" target was enemy bridging or ferry sites, to try and disrupt work rates etc - but it does require a lot of practice.
I never found it that easy either. While the C2 sight isn't that complex calculating the line of flight in the low trajectory and "terrain shadow" gave me a few problems!!Nor is it as complex as ChrisJM seems to imply.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
But just as we had "approach march" or "march and shoot" exercises to test the fitness for battle levels of the soldiers there should be a measure to test this in todays army. But it is yet another training question mark. It is strength and fitness which we can now add to question marks about marksmanship. To this we add question marks about tactical nous where platoons and companies patrol vast areas of open ground either as instructed or by choice and then we are left with the minor ractics ability. The prognosis is not good.Well that's why you do training.
When on the staff of the School of Infantry I came across a US publication where the wound locations from Vietnam were assessed. I remember a diagram of the human body front and rear where the areas of wounds by percentage were indicated. I am wondering if they have such stats on Afghanistan already? And any which relate to wounds and injuries which have been avoided through the use of body armour?The real issue today is body armour, not weapons weight. When your body armour weighs what a Mag does, the the weight of the Mag and 500 rounds is TOO heavy.
Don't see any chance of taking the body armour way at this stage as soldiers are probably psychologically 'hooked'. But I would suggest that they be required to wear the full body armour for at least a month prior to their 'tour' during their full working day including during and PT or runs etc. Conditioning is the key and this applies to the heavy helmets as well. After a month of that they won't notice the weight anymore. Then all you need to find is a hill for them to climb in full kit everyday just to tone those calf muscles up.
No amount of conditioning can make you superhuman. There is plenty of research that says the fighting load should be limited to about 45lbs before you start interfering with the ability to fight effectively. Well, full IBA and helmet is over 30lbs, so you are GOING to bust this, and no amount of conditioning is going to fix it. Guys that wear their kit and hump the mountains day-in and day-out for a year still get smoked, and can't catch a Taliban wearing a pair of flipflops and carrying an AK and 3 mags. That's part of the reason that we are using plate carriers, and testing other means of lightening the load.
Yes, the weight of just a MAG/M240 + ammo is doable. When you are carrying the weight of MAG + ammo, vest + helmet, and the rest of the crap you need, it becomes a serious degradation of capability.
Here is study done of my BDE during its first deployment to OEF, in 2003. It has been posted before. The weight of body armor has increased significantly since 2003, although it has started to drop. Where should we start cutting weight?
http://thedonovan.com/archives/moder...LoadReport.pdf
Well I cannot speak for the US, but the UK infantry are probably just as fit and just as robust as in past times. The same is probably true for their shooting.
..... but there are a number of pressing questions to be asked about UK infantry training, if only because what we did "back in the old days" was not good, and we might still be doing the same things today. IMO, a lot can be simplified. In my Kingdom, infantry training would be different from today and nothing like the bad old days.
For the UK, there is masses of data on every injury from Iraq and A'Stan, and it's all used to inform body armour design.I remember a diagram of the human body front and rear where the areas of wounds by percentage were indicated. I am wondering if they have such stats on Afghanistan already? And any which relate to wounds and injuries which have been avoided through the use of body armour?
IMO, there are some sensible questions to be asked about body armour, especially the ballistic standards in relation to aerial density, and coverage.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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