I wouldn't say "lots", but they are there. There's a little of everything. The unit before us had what I THINK was a Remington Rolling Block rifle that they'd pulled out of a cache somewhere.Originally Posted by William F. Owen
So lots of .303 SMLE are being encountered in Theatre?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I wouldn't say "lots", but they are there. There's a little of everything. The unit before us had what I THINK was a Remington Rolling Block rifle that they'd pulled out of a cache somewhere.
Well good luck to the man carrying it.
At best it's a poor-mans DMR and probably not a very good one either because the ammunition is probably of very poor quality the barrel's gone to rats, with lack of cleaning.
If the guy has all the zeroing tools and knows how to use the sights properly, then that's all a plus.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The presence of maybe a battalion's worth of old simple rifles is being counted as argument against the assertion that most Taleban don't come close to a decent WW2 sniper or MG team?
That seems to rather support my assertion.
You're talking of a fraction of the total enemy force, emphasize their survivability (only one aspect of competence) and hint at the potential of their outdated hardware instead of actually asserting that they come close.
I know that the hard body armour is a huge protection (in Afghan firefights), but nevertheless, a MG42 team or a WW2 sniper could relatively easily exact a higher toll on a patrol than the Taleban seem to do in about 99% of all engagements, even with much more personnel.
There's a reason why the Taleban kill almost no-one in firefights and on average only a few hundred per year (mostly with explosives).
They suck. They are so incompetent that their repertoire has been reduced to almost nothing, to little more than mining and harrassing. They aren't even close to the league of a regular, well-trained infantry force.
It's about time to face the truth; the Taleban are an enemy of marginal lethality.
It is extremely important to acknowledge this, for we would otherwise draw wrong lessons learned for later conflicts from firefights in Afghanistan.
Our infantry would be slaughtered Somme-style in the first weeks of a later conflict if it applied the standards and tactics/behaviour from Afghanistan. Unexperienced and untrained troops would probably have no worse first weeks than troops who confuse competent opposing infantry with Taleban-quality opponents.
You are close to being spot-on.
As far as the shooting part of the war goes it is the least incompetent that wins.
That the Taliban are surviving in such great numbers despite the numbers of coalition forces in the country underlines your assertion (as I understand it) that the strategy, the tactics and sadly the standard of soldiering of ISAF is so poor as to make the Taliban appear to be masters of insurgency warfare.
It is all so very sad.
My exact point is a combination between the above, this
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9841
(especially the suppression thing) and a third phenomenon:
Imagine you've got a very irritating itching. That can annoy a lot and easily be considered an urgent problem, ruining your day.
Now imagine you get a gunshot wound in a leg. I bet you forget the itching immediately.
Well, WW2 was a gunshot wound, AFG is the itching. AFG is being taken seriously, TB are (only) being taken seriously for lack of a greater (and sufficiently obvious) problem.
The Taliban would not have been considered to be a noteworthy power in WW2, ranking perhaps below the Filipino guerrilla's level. Taliban small units wouldn't have been considered as serious force or even a tactical challenge either in 1940-1945.
The Taliban have been suppressed to a marginal degree of effectiveness (they have almost no usable repertoire and options left), and were smart enough to avoid destruction and maintain recruiting (their political activities are likely more interesting than their primitive efforts in combat).
Again, the worst thing that could happen is that we allow these marginally effective skirmishers with their marginal harassment capability to coin our mental image of a serious enemy!
-----
In regard to Western competence in Afghanistan:
I'd like to see a statistic how many KIA and WIA were likely avoided by hard body armour alone (even before taking into account the consequences of a KIA/WIA on small unit actions and performance).
The reports don't seem to offer much good news about the performance of troops in absence of air or heavy weapons (arty/mortar) fire support.
We're in my opinion in a '1911' situation. Our understanding of modern ground war is based on theory, fashions, obsolete military history, small wars and too specific small modern wars. We might experience disastrous surprises in the next great war.
Last edited by Fuchs; 06-15-2010 at 08:10 PM.
Possibly. However, you forget
both the scale and social acceptance of violence in WW II are almost totally different when compared to the current fight in Afghanistan. While your statement is correct, it provides a comparison so bizarre as to be almost meaningless. It's tantamount to saying Berlin is larger and more sophisticated than is Lashkar Gah. Yep, sure is. Yet to the kid who hasn't seen more than a few small houses in his life, Lashkar Gah is a big city...
You're forgetting context.That is true and is a valid premise. It also part of the reason, along with their marginal military but absolutely superb population blending capability why they are problematic to western forces forced by political correctness to fight under significant handicaps....were smart enough to avoid destruction and maintain recruiting (their political activities are likely more interesting than their primitive efforts in combat).We can agree on that. Frankly, I don't think that is happening except in the eyes of the ignorant news media and a few others who seem to have little appreciation for the terrain and type of fight there. Or those who base their opinions on other wars -- all wars are different. Quite different.Again, the worst thing that could happen is that we allow these marginally effective skirmishers with their marginal harassment capability to coin our mental image of a serious enemy!It's the war of the moment, so such attention is perfectly natural and this war then is not really a problem. Your comment on theory and fashions though do accurately reflect a real problem.We're in my opinion in a '1911' situation. Our understanding of modern ground war is based on theory, fashions, obsolete military history, small wars and too specific small modern wars. We might experience disastrous surprises in the next great war.
One that's bugged Armies around the world for many years. Why do you think "Generals always prepare for the last war" is such prevalent platitude...
I disagree. You narrow down the context to a tunnel vision.
Taliban:
marginal opponents
army on the European model:
Able to create a big mess, and everybody who thinks in 'Taleban are tough fighters' terms is screwed in such a war.
I don't care whether an Afghan boy may think that some Afghan town is big. I care about Western troops believing that the Taleban are problematic opponents (because they didn't see a real war yet and repressed what they were told about real wars).
The Taleban are the equivalent of straggling soldiers on a disorderly retreat or low morale support troops in a pocket that's about to be eliminated.
Their dangerousness is obviously on an anecdotal level.
We can recall the location and year of "battles" when a single platoon was in danger of being overrun by Taleban. In WW2, such failures would hardly have made it into an infantry division's daily report.
No Tunnel vision to it, rather the reverse
I doubt that, Some will be screwed, no doubt -- most will not be, they'll adapt. Thus, I think you're the one with tunnel problems.I'm not sure who told them about real wars; been my observation that isn't being done. As for the Talibs being real opponents -- they are to those who are there; those safely elsewhere can carp but it's unbecoming IMO. Still you're correct -- most have not seen a real war yet. What they may do when the encounter such a war is not known by you, me or anyone else. What history says they will probably do is adapt. Just like all those kids from many nations on both sides of World War II had to do -- most of them had never seen a real war either...I care about Western troops believing that the Taleban are problematic opponents (because they didn't see a real war yet and repressed what they were told about real wars).Easy to say from your computer. Less easy out there walking around in Platoon sized packets.Their dangerousness is obviously on an anecdotal level.Sigh. No kidding. Nor would they in Korea or Viet Nam. Even in those post WW II scuffles, society was different, the rules were different and the forces committed were several orders of magnitude larger. WW II was even larger and it was an existential, all out war in a time of very different social mores, to compare it to the minor scuffle in Afghanistan in today's dipwad society with excessive niceness is just silly.We can recall the location and year of "battles" when a single platoon was in danger of being overrun by Taleban. In WW2, such failures would hardly have made it into an infantry division's daily report.
Nor would they again, were the West fighting existential, full-scale wars. We're not. I doubt we will be any time soon (although that's not in itself a reason not to prepare them.)
We're sensitive to individual casualties now because we can afford to be. When we can't afford to be, we won't be. Israel is a case in point: when its military actions are limited and marginal to national survival, every casualty is the focus of intense national angst. Nonetheless, if the Syrians tried to roll across the Golan tomorrow, the IDF wouldn't hold back a bit.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
That's why I referred to a DIVISION's daily report. A smaller force.
@Rex Brynen:
Years of uninterrupted peace in continental Europe before WWI:
for UK: 58
for Austria-Hungary: 46
for Italy: 46 (except if you count the actions against the Ottomans in 1913)
for Germany: 43
for France: 43
for Russia: 36
rating of small wars experiences of mentioned powers in 1913: A-C
rating of great war readiness of the mentioned powers in 1913 : D-F
description of the 1871-1914 period:
quick technological advance, huge growth of wealth, prosperous culture, greatly increased world trade, greatly improved physical and communication connections between countries (railroad, telephone)
Heh, once again, context...
The snip you quote referred to Korea and Viet Nam but the principle is the same for WW II. The issue is not really the size of forces; it is the magnitude of effort expended as well as the nature of the rules of a particular war and the overall intensity of the combat. Afghanistan really cannot be usefully compared to either of those two wars or to WW II.
Nor can it even be compared to the small wars of even a generation ago, much less to those far earlier -- to include Afghanistan itself -- due to the level of effort exerted by the western forces and the vast changes in societal mores and attitudes. An existential war would change those societal attitudes but the Afghan operations of today are no more than minor effort to most nations. While that "minor effort" is tough on the troops involved, virtually all are volunteers, doing what they get paid to do. Western society is largely uninterested in the whole affair.
Afghanistan can be contrasted to the three earlier wars I mentioned as the differences are extremely significant in all aspects. Those differences make attempts at comparison almost meaningless.
I have a similar question which questioned KIA/WIA avoidance through the universal use of body armour. This I would wish to trade off again the resultant loss of combat mobility of dismounted troops wearing the the heavy stuff.
Is your question based on the effect a higher KIA/WIA incidence would have on troops morale and the respective nations 'will' to keep their troops in Afghanistan?
As to the effect on combat performance of a lack of air and other fire support I agree.
You take some kids out of London and stick them in a totally foreign environment half way round the world and don't give them the fire support needed to offset the lack of local knowledge and combat expertise then little wonder why a handful of Taliban can tie down and 'play' with whole companies at a time.
Yes the Taliban are refusing to take on the US forces head on and choosing to rather give way and let them pass and thereby living to fight another day. This is a sane decision IMO.
My personal assessment is that the Taliban are doing pretty well. Certainly the Brits are at the end of their tether and looking for a way out all because they have been unable to counter the Taliban tactics of IEDs and the odd ambush. I fear history will be harsh on the Brit actions in Afghanistan.
Wars are fought successfully when the enemy and terrain (and more recently population) considerations are properly thought through.
Whatever happened in other wars it is certain that these factors have not been carefully thought through in the case of Afghanistan.
What you "wish" is actually the debate. That's what the discussion has been focussed on. BUT- the issues come down to rigourous operational analysis, and feed back from theatre.
Having had a professional background in body armour design and testing, I can tell you that the issue is trade-offs, and the big areas for trade-offs is standards and coverage.
Body armour works. There is no doubt about it. Trade-offs are the issue.
I fear the same, but because folks will opt for the "Armchair" version of events and not actually engage with the issues in a constructive way.I fear history will be harsh on the Brit actions in Afghanistan.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The trade-off is itself dependent on the scenario.
Keep in mind the very much varying kill share of fragments and bullets. The fashionable hard body armour plates would probably be much inferior to a greater soft body armour coverage in more fragmentation-dominated scenarios.
Again, a topic where small war experience might lead to horrible long-term misunderstandings.
The Russian Permyachka kit is so far the only almost full coverage soft body armour known to me (excluding bulky EOD equipment, of course). There are probably dozens in existence, but they don't get even nearly the desirable attention because of the hard body armour frenzy of 2003 - ~2006.
MILITARY PROTECTIVE KIT (MPK) "PERMYACHKA"
In most armies in the world of modern means of body armor - helmet and flak jacket, and their total area of protection does not exceed 30 - 35% body surface area, thus remain unprotected limbs and face of the soldier. At the same time, statistical analysis of the causes of losses among military personnel during combat operations in modern conditions has shown that over 75% of them are on ballistic injuries, 80% of which are caused by the impact of fragments of shells, mines and grenades, more than half of these injuries have on the upper and lower limbs. These facts provide irrefutable evidence of the lack of protection, a fighter, equipped with a bulletproof jacket and traditional helmet. To address the comprehensive protection of a military personnel company "Kirisa" in conjunction with leading scientists and specialists of the Ministry of Defense developed MPK "Permyachka." This outfit a soldier of the XXI century is made of aramid materials, and provides a circular ballistic protection not less than 80% body surface area from low-speed fragments as well as protection against short-term exposure to open flame. The basis of the suit, depending on your choice of usage, make overalls or protective jacket and trousers. Torso of a soldier is protected by a more reliable light fragmentation vest, to protect vital organs from damage by bullets of small arms bullet-proof vest reinforced steel or ceramic armor, the other elements of the ballistic protection, part of a package - helmet and protective mask. In addition to the ballistic-protected equipment, set "Permyachka" incorporates elements of the camoflage (for summer and winter conditions), vest designed for easy placement of the weapons, ammunition and other items of equipment, raid backpack, etc. - a total of 20 items. Using the MPK in the military units of Joint Military Group that conduct counterterrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of Russia confirms its effectiveness at protecting personnel and high ergonomics; According to the participants of tests, the use of MPK preserves ability to fight and the life of a real soldier in combat conditions.
I doubt that is totally correct
In fact I believe that is generally untrue. Rather the thinking in Afghanistan has been forced into an adverse reactive mode by domestic politics in the western nations involved. Such thinking as has occurred at the upper levels of most armies is further adversely impacted by rote adherence to lessons learned (often poor lessons, badly modified) in earlier wars that cannot be applied in Afghanistan due to political constraints, international, western domestic and local.
At the lower levels, poor training and education, lack of familiarity and practice in the combat basics induced by the current social mores of democratic societies compounds the difficulty stemming from the above pair of problems. I am convinced that shortfall is broadly endemic and will not be changed in the near term due in large part (and again...) due to domestic politics. I know that is the case in the US.
To say that the apparent operations in Afghanistan are nor going as most would prefer is true. However there are things occurring that are not open source that might if known counter that perception. They will not be apparent for some time and those good things do not counter totally -- and are no excuse for -- those three bad items.
Add in the terrain, the culture, the location and other non military factors plus logistic difficulties and Afghanistan today is a unique military problem. No one should discount those factors in assessing what appears to be happening there.
Enfields and Remington Rolling Blocks
Some years back on an American gun forum I saw it said that when the Russians were occupying Afghanistan the U.S. Government bought Canada's war reserve of No. 4 Enfields in .303 caliber and gave them to the Mujahadeen. I'm skeptical of much of what I see on the net, this forum excepted of course, so I'm merely mentioning that for what it's worth.
Back in the 1960s the international firm Interarms imported into the U.S. a tremendous number of .45-caliber Martini-Henry rifles as well as some Remington rolling-block actions with Arabic markings on them. Some of the Martini-Henrys had Arabic markings as well. I believe they were imported from the former British Raj--India, Pakistan, or both. Therefore Remington rolling blocks being in the region wouldn't be that far-fetched at all.The unit before us had what I THINK was a Remington Rolling Block rifle that they'd pulled out of a cache somewhere.
This post of mine on another thread has relevance.
One aspect that appears not to be considered is that as the foot soldiers are 'overloaded' there should be a concern for the physical nature of the tasking given this limitation. In addition there should be a concern for to what extent the ability to maneuver in combat is degraded and the effect this has on the ability to kill the enemy. Returning to my point then that to send these Michelin men out on patrol is merely setting them up for failure.
History as presented is harsh and not always accurate, I know this from personal experience, but what have or are the Brits doing to dispel the erroneous impression that they are out of their depth in Helmand? I feel desperately sorry for the Brit squaddie and Tom for the impression being created that they are not up to it when the problem lies with how they are deployed and the restrictions placed upon them.I fear the same, but because folks will opt for the "Armchair" version of events and not actually engage with the issues in a constructive way.
I waited to see if others would respond to your post.
I agree totally and would ask whether the loss of situational hearing in one ear was a good trade off for gaining access to the radio net?
If these radios 'work' then why is there so much shouting during a contact? (as witnessed on all of the videos)
The long range of these supposed contacts 300m+ in the open and 100m+ in bush/cultivation seems to be merely the Taliban playing with the soldiers with a little shoot and scoot. Yet there seems to be little attempt made to "close with and kill the enemy". This restriction on movement probably sensible in response to the IED threat effectively makes it near impossible to do anything by pull back and call in an airstrike (except where the Taliban are clever enough to initiate contact close to a location of civilian presence. So i ask once again what exactly is the point of this patrolling if no positive result can be achieved? So whats the solution?
In my time we lacked enough night vision equipment even in choppers so we made the best of night movement using mark-one eyeball. The biggest problem we had when a contact ran into the night was that the choppers departed and the troops went static (because the troops on the ground we all over the place and could not risk walking into each other). If we had had sight at night we could have continued and if we had had thermal imaging in choppers and on the ground we could have cleaned them up and increased the kill rate even more. I would have suggested that rather than just drop off the night vision equipment to the troops who were already on the ground if would have been better to drop in fresh troops who were well rehearsed in taking contact actions forward into the night probably guided by and in conjunction with aircraft likewise fitted with thermal equipment but with a good over target endurance. To have had the option to take the contact into the night would have been really exciting stuff. I did quite a lot of night work and once the nav and tactical movement stuff has been mastered the confidence level makes anything possible especially in an African full moon phase. Surely there must be enough 'wackos' out there who would volunteer to specialise in night follow-up/night tracking activities? If the stuff is easily portable then I suggest you use it.
Last edited by JMA; 06-19-2010 at 09:54 PM.
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