There certainly is the danger of inwardness and insularity, and just like any family, there may be "in" and "out" groups, cliques, and factions. Regimental politics is a fact of Regimental life. And this can have tactical consequences, as any reader of WWII history and some other wars can see. There are mediocre and even bad regiments, but the Regimental system (in Europe and the Commonwealth at least) usually helps to maintain a degree of personnel stability and professional continuity that an individual-system can rarely match, let alone surpass.
In the US Army, the Rangers effectively maintain a de facto Regimental system that approaches the European/Commonwealth one; and the USMC likewise maintains a Regimental system that, while different, still mitigates some of the aspects of the frequent rotation of individuals through Units. And of course, the US Army ran COHORT and related programs in the 80's and early 90's; if anything, they may have exceeded the Regimental system in certain tactical respects, while at the same time helping to filter out some of the deadwood that may still accumulate in a Regimental system.
And I'll just add my old plug for the German Divisional system here, where individual officers and soldiers tended to "grow up" within a combined-arms divisional system (albeit within a regiment of said division), with regiments of all arms effectively "brigaded" together both tactically and administratively. The focus of one's professional career and loyalities lay with the Division, and helped to break down Regimental and Corps/Branch parachiolisms. It also promoted a combined-arms mentality and guarded against tactical ossification; this is basically what Rifleman has been plugging for too for a while.
Last edited by Norfolk; 01-05-2008 at 07:46 PM.
I know little of Colonel Tim Collins, but his book, "Rules of Engagement" (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article...626689,00.html) , seems to give a reasonable overview of the battle rhythm of a unit under a regimental system - the Royal Irish Rangers, if memory serves. A lot of interesting aspects to it. I found the book while in Halifax, and you probably won't find it in the US, but Amazon has it.
As for how it would work in the US Army - the Brits (and if I'm getting it wrong, I ask that one of the Commonwealth soldiers correct me) train as batts, then form into battlegroups for deployment. We could use the same concept under our ARFORGEN\unit life cycle model. So a brigade battlegroup is formed for a three year cycle (train-deploy-reset). 64th Armor gets tapped for x number of companies plus staffers, 15th infantry for y number plus staffers, 7th Cav for a certain number of cav troops. The MP, Signal, et al Regiments send their guys. Big Army trains and certifies the battlegroup. In the meantime, most of the roles of the branch chiefs fall to the various Colonels of the Regiments. The Regiments would all be CONUS based, with home stations, e.g. 64th Armor calls Fort Stewart (or wherever) home. You could work the cycles different ways, but I have to think that through. If you want to get really clever, you could mix and match - e.g. a heavy battlegroup taps one company from the traditionally light 22nd Infantry to give that regiment heavy force exposure. Or the Guard sends a couple of companies on a majority AC battlegroup, or the AC sends a couple companies on a majority RC battlegroup. Or whatever.
It'd be possible to screw up (I can think of a bunch of ways), but would offer great rewards if done correctly. A bunch of issues come to mind - I'll think them through and add as another post.
Last edited by Jim Rodgers; 01-05-2008 at 10:56 PM.
"Dave ####nuts" -
It's a good thing I'm not an E-4 anymore - given our velcro nametapes, I might be on the way down to Clothing Sales to have a batch made up.
Last edited by Jim Rodgers; 01-05-2008 at 10:25 PM.
The Army could also utilize some of the smaller posts around the country in order to spread the regional UOA system around. A while back, Army Times ran a story that showed a map possible UOA locations after the units came back from Germany and Korea. It was a hypothetical map that featured bases I had never even heard of. It had active duty infantry UOA in Michigan and Wisconsin. The more distributed the units are the better. The local unit would be part of the community and I think recruitment would go up too. A lot of times, people don't want to join because they don't want to be too far from home. The war would be closer to the American people too. Dependents would interact more with the community, instead of only knowing the Army Post culture. An Army post would also have a university that it would be connected too. ROTC's would interact more and soldiers would have more opportunities for cultural training.
"Politics are too important to leave to the politicians"
Ratzel, I think you're very much on to something there; and by tying into the local universities (something I would not have thought of), you could both train your officers and tap into academic expertise and research facilities/opportunities. Great idea! (dependent of course, upon the universities meeting the Army half-way).
Jim wrote:
Jim, I think that proposal of yours, if properly handled (and not, as you pointed out might happen, get messed up) would combine many of the best elements of both the Regimental System and past programs like COHORT; it is probably better than either one by itself. And with it all taking place within the context of a Brigade Group, it institutionalizes Combined Arms throughout. I also noticed that you placed the formation of a Brigade Group in a context that is approaching that of Mobilization; very shrewd.As for how it would work in the US Army - the Brits (and if I'm getting it wrong, I ask that one of the Commonwealth soldiers correct me) train as batts, then form into battlegroups for deployment. We could use the same concept under our ARFORGEN\unit life cycle model. So a brigade battlegroup is formed for a three year cycle (train-deploy-reset). 64th Armor gets tapped for x number of companies plus staffers, 15th infantry for y number plus staffers, 7th Cav for a certain number of cav troops. The MP, Signal, et al Regiments send their guys. Big Army trains and certifies the battlegroup. In the meantime, most of the roles of the branch chiefs fall to the various Colonels of the Regiments. The Regiments would all be CONUS based, with home stations, e.g. 64th Armor calls Fort Stewart (or wherever) home. You could work the cycles different ways, but I have to think that through. If you want to get really clever, you could mix and match - e.g. a heavy battlegroup taps one company from the traditionally light 22nd Infantry to give that regiment heavy force exposure. Or the Guard sends a couple of companies on a majority AC battlegroup, or the AC sends a couple companies on a majority RC battlegroup. Or whatever.
That might work. The Brigade is the source of IDF cohesion and thus it equates to the very basics of a Regimental type System, except that Israeli military and social culture is so far from US or UK, that it doesn't really translate that well.
EG: Ask a British soldier "who were you with" and he'll say 1st Battalion Matabele Rifles. Ask an Israeli soldier and he'll usually just say armour or infantry or the appropriate description. Even if he was a paratrooper, he may very well just say infantry, or "Fighter" - and more importantly he'll ask why the hell you care!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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