Nexus of Proliferation, Narcotics, and Espionage

[bourbon]

For sale: West’s deadly nuclear secrets. The Sunday Times (London), January 6, 2008.

A WHISTLEBLOWER has made a series of extraordinary claims about how corrupt government officials allowed Pakistan and other states to steal nuclear weapons secrets.

Sibel Edmonds, a 37-year-old former Turkish language translator for the FBI, listened into hundreds of sensitive intercepted conversations while based at the agency’s Washington field office.

She approached The Sunday Times last month after reading about an Al-Qaeda terrorist who had revealed his role in training some of the 9/11 hijackers while he was in Turkey.

Edmonds described how foreign intelligence agents had enlisted the support of US officials to acquire a network of moles in sensitive military and nuclear institutions.

Sibel Edmonds is subject to a gag order under the State Secrets Privilege, which I believe she just broke. The gag was invoked when she was subpoenaed in a 9/11 civil suit and for her wrongful termination suit against the DoJ. Edmonds alleged in her personal suit that her termination was a result of her whistleblowing on allegations of misconduct by individuals employed in the FBI’s Language Services Section. A DoJ OIG review vindicated some of her complaints.

The Turks and Israelis had planted “moles” in military and academic institutions which handled nuclear technology. Edmonds says there were several transactions of nuclear material every month, with the Pakistanis being among the eventual buyers. “The network appeared to be obtaining information from every nuclear agency in the United States,” she said.

They were helped, she says, by the high-ranking State Department official who provided some of their moles – mainly PhD students – with security clearance to work in sensitive nuclear research facilities. These included the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory in New Mexico, which is responsible for the security of the US nuclear deterrent.

In one conversation Edmonds heard the official arranging to pick up a $15,000 cash bribe. The package was to be dropped off at an agreed location by someone in the Turkish diplomatic community who was working for the network.

The Turks, she says, often acted as a conduit for the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s spy agency, because they were less likely to attract suspicion. Venues such as the American Turkish Council in Washington were used to drop off the cash, which was picked up by the official.

Edmonds said: “I heard at least three transactions like this over a period of 2½ years. There are almost certainly more.”

The Pakistani operation was led by General Mahmoud Ahmad, then the ISI chief.

Intercepted communications showed Ahmad and his colleagues stationed in Washington were in constant contact with attach�s in the Turkish embassy.

One of the CIA sources confirmed that the Turks had acquired nuclear secrets from the United States and shared the information with Pakistan and Israel. “We have no indication that Turkey has its own nuclear ambitions. But the Turks are traders. To my knowledge they became big players in the late 1990s,” the source said.

Note that Turkish nationals Gunes Cire, director of ETI Elektroteknik and Selim Alguadis, President of EKA Elektronik, were found to supply centrifuge components to the AQ Khan network. Further note the 2004 Department of Commerce sting operation involving export controlled triggered spark gaps. (See: Asher Karni Case Shows Weakness in Nuclear Export Controls, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, September 8, 2004.)

[JeffC]

For sale: West’s deadly nuclear secrets. The Sunday Times (London), January 6, 2008.



Sibel Edmonds is subject to a gag order under the State Secrets Privilege, which I believe she just broke. The gag was invoked when she was subpoenaed in a 9/11 civil suit and for her wrongful termination suit against the DoJ. Edmonds alleged in her personal suit that her termination was a result of her whistleblowing on allegations of misconduct by individuals employed in the FBI’s Language Services Section. A DoJ OIG review vindicated some of her complaints.




Note that Turkish nationals Gunes Cire, director of ETI Elektroteknik and Selim Alguadis, President of EKA Elektronik, were found to supply centrifuge components to the AQ Khan network. Further note the 2004 Department of Commerce sting operation involving export controlled triggered spark gaps. (See: Asher Karni Case Shows Weakness in Nuclear Export Controls, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, September 8, 2004.)

I have a few problems with this story. One is the sensationalist way that it was reported with little regard for facts, and the other is that the whistleblower is the sole source for everything in it. If her evidence was solid, somebody on the Congressional committee that heard her testimony would have taken action. That nothing has been done suggests to me that she probably couldn't prove a lot of what she was alledging.

[bourbon]

I have a few problems with this story. One is the sensationalist way that it was reported with little regard for facts, and the other is that the whistleblower is the sole source for everything in it. If her evidence was solid, somebody on the Congressional committee that heard her testimony would have taken action. That nothing has been done suggests to me that she probably couldn't prove a lot of what she was alledging.

Jeff, it’s a hard story to believe. I think crux is the cold realpolitik of it, and that is that officials and citizens from three nations we have significant interests with are involved. Simply put, turning a blind eye to espionage and proliferation activities by our friends is a cost of maintaining the status quo. An unintended consequence of this could be that those same networks and channels that we reluctantly turn a blind eye to could be utilized for criminal purposes and leveraged by non-state foes.

The State Secrets Privilege is very powerful and used infrequently; the reason offered for using it in the Edmonds case was that her testimony would be detrimental to our diplomacy and foreign affairs. It would not be unreasonable to think that such a legal recourse as used in the Edmonds case would only be turned to in order keep the really dirty laundry from being aired. This of course does not prove anything, but I think is an indicator of the nature of what Edmonds knows. Given the potential nature of what she has to say and the ways used to keep her from saying, I think it is understandable why someone on the Congressional committee has not taken action or been thwarted in doing so. Edmonds has stated she has submitted the casefile numbers to the congressional committee. If adequate proof cannot be provided, a hearing would clear the official(s) good name.

The article notes that they “talked to two FBI officers (one serving, one former) and two former CIA sources who worked on nuclear proliferation”, though “none was aware of specific allegations against officials she names, they did provide overlapping corroboration of Edmonds’s story.” Not a lot in that statement but no necessarily worthless. A 2005 Vanity Fair article by David Rose gives background to the case and illustrates that there may be some proof that exists. Former SA John Cole, who ran FBI’s south Asia counterintelligence, vouches for her claims. As does former SA Gilbert Graham, and SA Mike German who worked counterterrorism. However, these guys are whistleblowers too.

[bourbon]

FBI denies file exposing nuclear secrets theft. The Sunday Times, January 20, 2008.

Edmonds, a 37-year-old former Turkish language translator, listened into hundreds of sensitive intercepted conversations while based at the agency’s Washington field office.

She says the FBI was investigating a Turkish and Israeli-run network that paid high-ranking American officials to steal nuclear weapons secrets. These were then sold on the international black market to countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

One of the documents relating to the case was marked 203A-WF-210023. Last week, however, the FBI responded to a freedom of information request for a file of exactly the same number by claiming that it did not exist. But The Sunday Times has obtained a document signed by an FBI official showing the existence of the file.

[bourbon]

Giraldi served sixteen years in the clandestine service, so he is not exactly a journalist. The Sunday Times articles did not name any names, this article does. It is a disturbing read.

Found in Translation: FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds spills her secrets, by Philip Giraldi. The American Conservative, January 28, 2008.

[bourbon]

Nuke smuggling charges: Woman in Cape court, By Caryn Dolley. Cape Times (South Africa), January 24 2008.

Three years after a Cape Town businessman was jailed for trading in weapons of mass destruction, a US citizen alleged by police to have worked with him in smuggling the devices between South Africa and Pakistan may also find herself behind bars.

Marisa Ann Sketo-Kirsh, also known as Marisa Sketo, 46, appeared in the Cape Town magistrate's court on Wednesday on two charges of importing and exporting "controlled goods classified as components for nuclear devices" without a permit from the SA Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Her appearance in court was Sketo's second since her arrest in November, which came nearly four years after Asher Karni's arrest on the same charge.

Operation takes 'deep state' under the spotlight. Turkish Daily News, January 25, 2008.

Message to the Congress of the United States, By President George W. Bush. Office of the Press Secretary, January 23, 2008.

I transmit to the Congress, pursuant to sections 123 b. and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153(b),(d))(the "Act"), the text of the proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the "Agreement") together with a copy of the unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) and of my approval of the proposed Agreement and determination that the proposed Agreement will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. The Secretary of State will submit the classified NPAS and accompanying annexes separately in appropriate secure channels.

The Agreement was signed on July 26, 2000, and President Clinton approved and authorized execution and made the determinations required by section 123 b. of the Act (Presidential Determination 2000 26, 65 FR 44403 (July 18, 2000)). However, immediately after signature, U.S. agencies received information that called into question the conclusions that had been drawn in the required NPAS and the original classified annex, specifically, information implicating Turkish private entities in certain activities directly relating to nuclear proliferation. Consequently, the Agreement was not submitted to the Congress and the executive branch undertook a review of the NPAS evaluation.

My Administration has completed the NPAS review as well as an evaluation of actions taken by the Turkish government to address the proliferation activities of certain Turkish entities (once officials of the U.S. Government brought them to the Turkish government's attention). The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are confident that the pertinent issues have been sufficiently resolved and that there is a sufficient basis (as set forth in the classified annexes, which will be transmitted separately by the Secretary of State) to proceed with congressional review of the Agreement and, if legislation is not enacted to disapprove it, to bring the Agreement into force.