The Advisory or Advisor Challenge

[Jedburgh]

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Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned - Military Advisor Support

[marct]

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Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned - Military Advisor Support

<grump, grump, grump>. I wish they would add something like "aproved academics"

Marc

[selil]

<grump, grump, grump>. I wish they would add something like "aproved academics"

Marc

Isn't that the truth... Well back to the Ivory Tower and the vestal virgins.

[Jedburgh]

MCCLL access now requires a CAC card. Now I'm cut off too. Damn.

[jcustis]

Once again, the need for information security is kicking our ass. I'm all for ensuring that sensitive FOUO information is secured, but I rarely have the time during a normal workday to rummage through the MCLL site, and would prefer to do so from my home office.

Just another example of fighting with one hand tied behind our back.

[sullygoarmy]

Does anyone have a "Ranger handbookish" version of an advisor handbook? JCISFA is going to take lead on this and wanted to see if there's anything floating around the FID/Advisor community right now. Thanks!

Sully

[RTK]

I think Tom is doing something similar along those lines with CALL.

[Jedburgh]

There's this on the SWJ library:

Military Assistance and Training Advisory Course (MATA) Handbook for Vietnam - US Army Special Warfare School Handbook, January 1966.

Reference material for the military advisor in Vietnam. Reflects doctrine as taught at the Special Warfare School in the 1960's and early '70's. The handbook was prepared for use in the MATA courses of instruction and served as a ready reference for advisors in Vietnam.

There's also the more current FOUO MNF-I COIN handbook, published in May 06. It's not really an "Advisor Handbook", but it does have sections specifically targeted to those in advisory positions. If you don't have it, PM me with a .mil address and I'll get it to you.

[Tom Odom]

Sully,

CALL did one in early 2006 and is doing another right now. I am doing a companion newsletter. the Kilcullen 28 articles project is part of it along with a long piece I wrote on Experience and Cultural Understanding. Rob Thornton and RTK wrote individual articles. I pulled your article and interview from OP 18/19. I would also welcome your help on the Kilcullen 28 project. I just sent that to you and an outline for the newsletter.

Best

Tom

[Jimbo]

Sully,

Let em go through what I have here in DC with me. If you want any feedback on what I learned in 2005 at MNSTC-I, I can provide some stuff. I have been compiling some FID stuff.

Jim

P.S. Sully, have you seen the latest and greatest version of the SAMS reading list yet?

[Tom Odom]

Jimbo

Your assistance in the Advisor Team newsletter would be most welcome.

Tom

[SWJED]

Latest at the SWJ Blog - It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps by LTC John Nagl.

In the linked paper I argue that, just as the new realities of warfare demanded the creation of the Special Forces in the 1960's, winning the Long War will require that the Army develop a standing Advisor Corps. It has been informed by the experience of many advisors with service in Iraq and Afghanistan, and may prove of some interest to the Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council community of interest.

"Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps" was published by the Center for a New American Security.

The most important military component of the Long War will not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our allies to fight with us. After describing the many complicated, interrelated, and simultaneous tasks that must be conducted to defeat an insurgency, the new Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes “Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.” Indeed, it has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win for them…

[Old Eagle]

Once again, Colonel Nagl offers an eloquent and persuasive piece on Long War requirements. Hopefully it will engender some meaningful discussion, not just a lot of head nodding.

With that in mind, I have problems with a tactically organized force structure being tasked to provide both "Title 10" type support while simultaneously being responsible for operations on the ground. Can the corps commander fulfill his force provider duties while deployed as an advisor to a minister of defense?

On the blog post, Rob Thornton offers the additional insight for including other JIIM players in the mix. This is also critical. Even if you limit the military involvement to advising security forces, that is still best done by full spectrum joint forces, augmented by civilian experts from other agencies. IMHO.

[Jimbo]

In the Army it exists: It is called the AC/RC units that are set up to advise the ARNG. There has been heistatnce by the Army to deply regular Army AC/RC brigades and battalions to support the training mission. This has been done in limited numbers. What you have is a sturcture as brigade ready to cover down on an entire division. The upside is that when the unit isn't deployed, it is working with the ARNG. Working with the ARNG involves bringing expertise and recent TTP's to to training focused on tactical and administrative requirements. Granted the cultural and language differences are not close to being the same, but it still is enough to "keep your mind right". As far as JIIM, it is going to be 5 years at best beffore anything on the civilian side catches up in the capacity that we would like to see, and that is best case involving the upcoming election not screwing up needed legislation to make this happen.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Old Eagle, Jimbo,

Jimbo are you saying the AC/RC example is a good pattern for hashing out Title 10 turf? Or are you saying that AC/RC is the way to go for advising foreign security forces? It sounds like both.

I've seen one AC/RC unit deploy as MiTTs - 2nd IA DIV MiTT down to the BN level - we replaced them. They had some real challenges as they tried to figure out what was different from the methodology they used working with USARNG units and Iraqis. I think the gap may be too far to bridge and have them do both missions good enough.

I think the value of what LTC Nagl puts forward is that it is a "more" dedicated capability that balances creating units that do nothing but advisory work and hyper specialized with taskings that reach down in to MTO&E and TDA units where their primary missions are compromised. To me it asks the very important question of "How important is the training & use of host nation forces to reduce our global requirements in maintaining stability?" We need to decide that. Much like the Inter-Agency debate, and the debate over conventional war systems aquisitions, the problems we face now are going to influence how we spend our nickel. What is the best way to use the force structure increase? Is it just more BCTs which allow us to slow OPTEMPO for deploying BCTs in Iraq, or do we see the need for more BCTs to do more with in other places, and then we wind up with the same OPTEMPO? It becomes the proverbial self-licking ice cream cone.

The other side of the coin - that I think LTC Nagl is advocating is using those force structure gains as a more dedicated Combat Multiplier - both in the sense of developing Host Nation Security Forces, but also in the sense of what those soldiers bring to the MTO&E and TDA units when they return and are sent out into the Force. While LTC Nagle cites Iraq and Afghanistan for use of the Advisory course, but I think we need them beyond. This could become a core compentency and I don't know if adding it to the MTO&E units METL is a good idea. I'd have to go back, but what I'd like to see is a long enough tour in the advisory core to do perhaps a focused train up on the georgrpahical location they will be working before they deploy for a year. This might require a 2 year tour.

I understand that JIIM cooperation on any real scale is probably a ways out - I know you have been working it, but how much would it cost in reources to establish an HSOC (Home Station Operations Command) in say Riley or wherever home might be that is staffed by either Inter-Agency onesies and twosies or even contractors with Inter-Agency experience to work the connections back to OGAs, Regional CMDs and Embassies? How about some OGA experienced contractors who deploy with the HQs to work LNO issues on the ground? We're not talking about building Host Nation (DIE) capacity yet, we're talking about connectors and wheel grease.

For the Title 10 stuff - I thnk once they deploy they work for the Regional CDR or his designated CDR - you can't have unity of command any other way.

Hopefully will resolve the Inter-Agency piece fully without another 9/11, but I don't know. I guess you can tell what is really important to somebody based on how they spend their money. I guess that is what we're asking, what is really important?

Regards Rob

[Ski]

Perhaps someone can chime in on why Special Forces units in the Gan were more concerned about direct action missions, and not these missions, which to me seem to fall under FID, which is a SF core competency...?

[Tom Odom]

Council members,

This is just to announce that the CALL Newsletter 07-28 Advisor Teams is on the CALL gateway for those with access.

I should also like to thank the Small Wars Journal community because that community played a large role in this effort.

Special thanks go to Council members:

Rob Thornton

RTK

Sullygoarmy

Finally I would again like to thank everyone who helped in anyway. Dave Dilegge and Bill Nagle are of course the real heros because they are SWJ.

Best

Tom Odom

[Jedburgh]

Special Warfare, Jan-Feb 08: The Advisory Challenge

.....Critical to an adviser’s success is his ability to achieve “an unnoticed influence” for the ultimate purposes of furthering the objectives of the adviser (which are the national-security objectives of the adviser’s government). The amount of influence an adviser attains will be directly proportional to the sum of three factors: the rapport between the adviser and the host-nation commander or counterpart; the credibility of the individual adviser; and the perception by host-nation forces of the continued value of the relationship.

The complexity of these tasks and the unique skill set required have historically been underestimated, possibly because of a lack of personal experience or familiarity on the part of most military leaders. This limited exposure and understanding has contributed to a long-standing bias that questions the value of advisory efforts or, at least, whether advisory efforts warrant the expenditure and diversion of limited resources, such as personnel, which are needed by the conventional fighting force. The intent of this article is to convey some of the critical aspects that enable advisers to be effective. Many of these aspects are intangible, are often not required of leaders of U.S. forces, and are therefore relatively unfamiliar.....

[Jedburgh]

Study on Army Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam, 10 June 1960

.....The vast differences in terms of reference and nature of the threat as applied to the many countries receiving aid make selection of a truly representative worldwide sample nation impractical. Many of the basic principles governing the establishment and maintenance of an effective military force structure in the Western European NATO nations are invalid for application in the slowly developing countries of SE Asia. Since the US Army has much actual experience data with respect to the type threat existent in Europe and Korea, the study should explore an area in which our experience is more limited. Thus the example selected would most profitably be a HAAG operation in an area where the primary threat is an irregular force employing unorthodox organization and tactics. South Vietnam appears most typically representative of such a situation; study findings in this area would have the broadest possible application and would be of value in a wide variety of similar cases. Vietnam was selected therefore to be the primary country of investigation.....

[VMI_Marine]

I've recently been tagged for a year-long OIF MiTT. I'm pretty disappointed, as I was slated to command a company bound for OEF, but I'm studying up to make the best of this opportunity. I came across the following studies and articles which may be of interest to other advisors.

US Marine Advisor Publications
Communion in Conflict: The Marine Advisor in the Middle East
Cross-Cultural Psychology: The Marine Advisor: Preparation for Duty Overseas

For some historical perspective:
Communion in Conflict: The Marine Advisor, Volume II, 1975
Communion in Conflict: The Marine Advisor, Volume III, Vietnam 1954-1973
Analysis of a Culture in Conflict: Comparative Personality Determinants between U.S. Marine Advisors and Vietnamese Soldiers