The Advisory or Advisor Challenge

[Rob Thornton]

Bill, great points

Then we have to develop a training program. This sounds easy, but if you look at much our training has evolved in recent years, you’ll realize it is a big leap to all the sudden being placed in some north African nation with a battalion of poorly equipped troops, no designated training ranges, etc. You need guys and gals that can solve problems, and work in far less than ideal conditions.

There is also something said to providing these teams with the mechanisms for obtaining resources. This would be a much larger scale then the previous efforts. We're talking about both self sustaining resources, and resources provided to the HN rather for training or fighting.

One of the problems we had on the MiTT was the $$$ assigned to us by quantity and type were for conventional units living on a FOB (TIF and OMA), not a TT living on a remote site embedded with its HN unit. While we had access to PRC funds, the approval process was convoluted and as such untimely. TTs are not resourced the way ODAs were. We wound up having to either scavage through the CF FOB dump (you'd be surprised what you can find and carry out with a Kraz 7.5t), or going and making a case to the MSC who was forced to weigh those priorities against his units. The MSC often came through, but he had to make some hard choices and that ate up time.

Take that and consider how an effort that sends lots of teams to remote locations across the globe and you start to see the fiscal authority these teams are going to need. You could say we'll move stuff by TRANSCOM all the time, but that only gets you so far - probably not enough lift unless you constrain yourself to certain regions with the required infrastructure. You could go commercial, but even that is only going to get you so far in many cases. You can purchase locally, but that raises some interesting issues such as contracting and all the headaches that go with it. This also points to the need of a study that considers the logistical impacts of adopting this in the robust manner we are discussing - certainly the LOG & C2 makes it a Joint issue.

The organization is going to have to be built and resourced with that in mind. Part of it comes with selecting agile thinkers who can solve problems in ways that match their conditions. Part of it comes with the parent organization understanding that this is not a side show or distraction, but requires a great deal of authority commensurate to its responsibility.

The beauty in this from an operational perspective would be an in place organization to provide insights back to mainstream Army or the SOF community for related operations.

To set this up right requires acknowledgement that this is a critical part of GWOT and should be resourced in all areas accordingly. This requires a departure from the way we like to see ourselves and our role on the battlefield. Advisory work done right is hard and its requires as good as leadership and people as any other job on the battlefield. It also requires resourcing more in line with an ODA then a rifle company. Nobody should have any illusions, we'd be putting these teams into austere conditions where they will face disease, sub-standard living conditions, sub-standard (by FOB standards) Force Protection, threats & isolation, and a host of other threats main stream Army does not usually have to deal with as KBR usually either beats us there or arrives as soon as the $$$ is allocated. These teams will have to be comfortable living with each other and immersed in foreign cultures without either going crazy, jeopardizing the mission or both. They will have to be able to move between the conventional and the unconventional with relative ease.

The upside is we circulate through the force team members who are not only technically and tactically proficient, but emotionally tough problem solvers who can lead under the most challenging of conditions. To me this is more akin to a revolution then any NCW type application - we would be challenging the conventional mindset we have cherished as a model of success for so long.

[Rob Thornton]

Also from Bill

I have seen it too many times where young conventional soldiers and marines working with foreign troops become quickly frustrated, because their training didn’t prepare them for what to expect, or simply they were the wrong person to put in that position. They end up accusing the local soldiers of being stupid because they don't speak English, can't shoot their weapons well, and they have no maintenance systems or skills, etc. Not only does the training fall way short of expectations, we end up creating a bad impression of Americans in the eyes of the soldiers being trained, yet these same American kids will perform adequately soldiers with their American peers, because they're a culturally integrated package operating trained to perform that role. It isn’t the kid that failed, rather we failed to prepare the kid to execute the mission.

We need to ask ourselves what type of training is required to ensure success for a mission like this with all of its austereness, and unpredictability. We need to ask how long it will take, and based on the demands for teams, how much throughput must we generate?

I think a good starting place is SFAS & Q-Course models vs. say a Ranger School approach. I'm not sure it needs to be an exact template, but it does need to consider the approach it uses to build moral strength and resolve in individuals while also building an understanding of what a small team is and how important each individual on that small team is. Then have a portion of the training that takes the skill set that individual already has and modifies it to working on a small team that is going out to build and advise larger HN organizations. No, we probably should not be trying to build SFers - if it were that easy to get that quality in the required quantity, we'd probably already done it. Its not. So what we need is something to transform mindsets of conventional soldiers used to operating in mainstream Army organizations into an unconventional mindset of the type required to succeed on a small team with little access to the things we take for granted in the conventional one. We're talking mental & spiritual over physical. We want guys who believe in their decisions and will take initiative on big issues, but are still well grounded enough to move back and forth. The benefit would be you only have to attend this part of the training once in your career, after that all you'd show up for is the team building events and the events which prepare you either for a new role on the team, or the focused training to prepare you for the area you will operate in.

I'd say a cadre at the course probably made up of PMCs with advisory or SF backgrounds would probably be the most cost effective way to do it with ARSOF so busy. The S3 of the school could be either a contractor or green suiter with the same background. The S3 would fall up under a BDE (Adv Training BDE) charged with a training, but the green suit BDE CDR would report to the green suit Advisory Corps CDR.

[Bill Moore]

Rob,

Great points, and I didn't want to touch the systems yet, but you're absolutely correct. If we don't have pots of money and authorities for these guys, they won't be set up for success. Additionally they would have to get a priority mission status with TRANSCOM, or be given enough money to do it via contract air. Having worked a number of projects with the State Department, they have cracked the code for using contract air/sea to move military equipment. However, as we have all been stating, this is a complete break with the current Army culture. That is why I reluctantly think contractors might be the better option, at least in the short term. The Army will do studies on this for 10 years, then come up with a solution that would have worked 10 years ago

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Bill, I hear you, but I think we'd be hurting ourselves

That is why I reluctantly think contractors might be the better option, at least in the short term. The Army will do studies on this for 10 years, then come up with a solution that would have worked 10 years ago

That is the appeal of using contractors in roles you might ought to be using green suiters - it makes it appear as though you don't have to make any tough choices or changes, just .ppt deep ones. In truth you cede a great deal of authority and preserve organizational aspects that probably need to change - and you become more resistant to change. With PMCs you also basically lease without an option to own - and before long you get physically and psychologically addicted to the PMC option.

In this case of going with PMCs there'd be a huge employment opportunity for green suiters - many of them would be the very talent you hoped to preserve in the uniformed services. I would not be surprised to see attractive presentations from the PMCs on how they can do this better for less, I only hope before we buy into a Vegas show, we consider that the price is much heftier then just the cover charge.

I'm OK for using PMCs for limited tasks that have either an expiration date until you can grow your own, or because the shelf life and scope of the task are limited, but if you have identified a mission that indicates a major change, you need to grow the capability to sustain it with outsourcing. Advisory functions could quickly become a core competency. It also provides the type of experiences we say are required in our uniformed soldiers for this long war no matter if we are talking on an advisory team or in a conventional unit, the soldiers, sailors and marines responsible for the tactical end of this war require these skills.

I was just going over the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. Here is a fantastic quoute lifted from the Exec Summary on pg. 8

"It remains vital that the United States, our allies and partners face this enemy with a force of intelligent, and culturally attuned professionals. Now is the time to invest in the human capital needed to combat this enemy for the coming decades."

If that is not a mandate for change, then it should not have been included.

Regards, Rob

[jonSlack]

Developing a professional national military capable of defending its borders and providing internal security is necessary in the development of a functional state. However, it is a long term program that will take a decade or more in each place it is started. What do you do in the near term to provide security and allow for a political system to development free from disruption from groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan and the former Baathists, AQI, and Shiite militias in Iraq? Relying solely on foreign troops to provide the security and combat the anti-government groups poses problems while employing the new military too quickly can have equally disasterous results such as mass desertions.

There needs to be another option, a way to quickly raise and employ domestic forces to combat insurgents and terrorists and provide security. My inspiration for this idea are the units created by the British such as Queen Victoria's Corps of Guides in India. Basically, these units would consist of local nationals who are NCO'd and officered by American or other coalition advisors and paid and equipped by the coalition nations and fall under the chain of command of coalition leadership. The forces would be raised and centered in the geographic area where each force is recruited from, similar to a militia or national guard. The long term end state of these units is to either integrate them into the host country's professional military or disband them once the new professional military and other security forces are fully functional. Also, there should be a mechanism for volunteers to move from the "intermediate" forces to the professional military if they desire.

I think we are already seeing this half happening now in Anbar and possibly other parts of Iraq where Iraqis are being supplied if they agree to go after AQI. But again, what is happening now appears to be only a 50% solution, there needs to exist an advisory organization for taking control and leading these "intermediate" forces.

If an Advisor Corps is created, it should have the mission of working to develop professional and lasting military organizations. However, the corps should also the ability to lead "intermediate" forces until the professional military of the host nation is ready and able to operate independently from its advisors.

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Jon--

Take a look at the USMC Small Wars Manual of 1940 for an American approach to the problem. The difficulty is the disconnect between the trained military.constabulary/security force and the political/governmental capacity of the client state. In what became India, it worked pretty well, not so in what became Pakistan or (for the US, Central America and the Caribbean).

This does not negate the need nor the notion that the intervening power is responsible for developing local security forces. It simply highlights the fact that security is tied directly to governance.

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

Hey all,
I wanted to return to the issue of more BCTs vs. an Advisory Corps because I think it is essential to developing force capabilities that meet our current and future needs. Keep in mind, I'm not advocating one over the other (yet), but I am acknowledging that the two take a different approach and offer advantages and disadvantages to addressing our current and future needs.

Attached is a JPG I adopted from a .ppt brief on Joint Systems from the AWC. It goes over the linkages from the NMS to capabilities. However I have deleted the capabilities and replaced it with a question mark to foster the discussion since the capabilities listed were constrained to current force structure. What is left is the NMS' military objectives linkage to the missions and tasks. I also placed Green/Yellow/Red Color Codes over the top reflecting Significant Increases/ Insignificant Increase or Loss/ Significant Loss respectively in terms of capabilities to start the discussion about advantages and disadvantages between BCTs and an Advisory Corps.

This is a first glance assessment of what an Advisory Corps over more BCTs would bring. It does not mean that one done on the BCTs would be exactly the inverse. The context of the missions should be somewhat universal - ex. in the Protect the U.S. its arguable that BCTs provide the structure and response to respond more quickly and effectively then a advisory BN or BDE, however, the TTs might be able to provide Staff liaison and planning functions to facilitate inter agency coord better then a BCT which must also C2 its own lower echelons. Under Prevent Conflict and Surprise attacks its yellow - an Advisory Corps would not be able to deter much - but might be able to improve HN deterrence, however by being on the ground can gather good HUMINT through the HN force lessening the chance of surprise. Some I think are clearly green (others may disagree) , such as eliminating safe havens since a long term persistent presence on the ground can better shape (more effective and efficient) the HN environment then say a BCT rotating through.

I think that if you compare this one with one done on the BCTs it might show that an Advisory Corps and the existing BCTs compliment each other. It might also allow supplementing the exisitng BCTs with SSTRO capabilities that are currently being taken out of hide - ex. more MPs, CA, PsyOps, Medical and other LOG.

What I'd say is any discussion that challenges accepted notions about how we spend our money (in this case - force structure increases) must show how those changes would provide advantages, and what disadvantages we'd gain/lose by doing so.

Thoughts?