The Advisory or Advisor Challenge

[Steve Blair]

Hi Rob and Ski--

Rob certainly has a part of the story but there is more to it.

Part 1: SF, since its founding, has not less than 3 esthos, based on the dominant mission of particular groups. 10th SFG was founded to conduct UW behind Soviet lines in ways similar to the Jedburg and other OSS/SOE teams in WWII. Training partisans was their thing. 5th SFG made its name in Vietnam where it conducted mucho direct action (DA) missions. The high point of its history was the Son Tay Raid - DA all the way. 7th SFG focused largely on LATAM and the FID mission; it was highly successful in El Salvador. All the other groups fall somewhere in between dpending on their peacetime and wartime experience. My sense is that 3rd Group is pretty close to 7th based on discussions with them during Operation Uphold Democracy. In any event, SF reflects many of the divisions within the regular forces on the best way to fight COIN. Obviously, it is far more complex but I really suspect that Group ethos is reflected in the degree to which particular SF Groups are more enemy or population centric in Kilcullen's approach/

The 5th started out doing quite a bit of advising work for the CIA (if memory serves) with the Montagnards in Vietnam and earlier in Laos with some of the elements there. It was after Operation Switchback in 1965 that they got more into DA, but that was due to pressure from the Army at large who saw the CIDG program (and others) as a quick source for light infantry and not a local defense force as originally envisioned by the CIA (and most likely the 5th Group as well). And, of course, once SOG got ramped up (and the Greek programs run directly by the 5th Group) they got hauled heavily into DA and never looked back.

[John T. Fishel]

Steve and Rob--

As Rob says, "I've [just] learned something." Again, there is nearly always more to the story. That said, why do we keep having to learn the same lessons over and over?

Rob, look at John's proposal: it is an adaptation of an ODA (which in turn was an adaptation of an OSS/SOE concept. These things need to be adapted because one size does NOT fit all. Still, a good idea is one that can be modified to fit different circumstances.

Cheers

JohnT

[hostagecow]

I was embedded as a journalist with a Marine MiTT advisor team near Habbaniyah, Iraq in 2006 and was shocked by the lack of logistical support for the team and the slapdash nature of their preparation. They were the best group of Marines I'd ever seen in operation but they were desperately short of gear and support. Nagl's concept should be adopted asap.

[Ski]

Thanks for the info.

I still believe that SF - not SOF - but SF, should be used to train indiginous forces as a primary mission.

The DA stuff should be left to the Rangers, MARSOC and other black SOF elements. If we need more DA capabilities, it seems to this treadhead that it would be easier to grow them (what is the difference between these SOF elements and the Marine Raiders/Army Rangers of WWII?) then Special Forces capabilities, which are admittedly much more difficult to grow.

It's very interesting to see the history behind how DA has been incorporated into the SF Groups...but I wonder if it really the way it should be.

Then again, no one asked my opinion! LOL!

[Tom Odom]

Thanks for the info.

I still believe that SF - not SOF - but SF, should be used to train indiginous forces as a primary mission.

The DA stuff should be left to the Rangers, MARSOC and other black SOF elements. If we need more DA capabilities, it seems to this treadhead that it would be easier to grow them (what is the difference between these SOF elements and the Marine Raiders/Army Rangers of WWII?) then Special Forces capabilities, which are admittedly much more difficult to grow.

It's very interesting to see the history behind how DA has been incorporated into the SF Groups...but I wonder if it really the way it should be.

Then again, no one asked my opinion! LOL!

Just finished working a long project on advisors and thanks to guys on here it will soon be out. But in the course of that effort, I had an in-depth conversation with a senior officer who was a key player in the MiTT effort in Iraq. We agreed that yes this is an SF mission but SF is not built on the scale necessary to get the job done. As for RC components taking on the mission, they just do not have the correct tools for the job. They are structured to train conventional reserve units in conventional tactics and they share the same culture. And culture is bar none the key consideration in whether one of these advisory efforts works or fails. I see the need for an advisor functional area like FAO that adds a greater manpower pool to those available for such duties--AND THEN REWARDS THEM FOR IT. Forgive the caps but without rewards, this goes no where beyond the ever growing stack of good idea PPT presentations.

Best

Tom

[Old Eagle]

Spot on. However, the effort has to be HUGE, based on the magnitude of the mission. Not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but many other locations now and in the future.

Good luck.

I'd like to see what your presentation looks like. Maybe a PM?

[MASON]

What will the umbrella organization look like?

This seems like a Dept of State mission in some ways and a military mission in others. ??? Civil affairs work with Agricultural, Police, engineering, educational, medical , business and financing etc expertise required depending upon situation faced locally. Long term 5-10 yr + assignments.