Fmtu
Don't know if it has been mentioned before but inside MARSOC is the FMTU-foriegn military training unit. The structure is based on SF, the missions are designed for operating everywhere except Afghanistan and Iraq, I think they are conventionally minded currently but the structure and trainingcould be shifted. Unfortunately I don't know that much about them, it is too new to have any real history.
Hello
I have read the article. I personally think it is a good idea. I have a few questions (feel free ignore them if they are pointless).
1) Would the Corps deploy with all 3 divisions or would they have 1 division at a time deployed?
2) Where are the people who speak the native language going to come from and how would they fit into the structure? (ie this would vary depending one where the Corps was deployed)
3) Does anyone think if this works a reconstruction corps would be a good idea? (for winning hearts and minds and for construction).
4) Do you think a smaller model (brigade or battalion size) could work for smaller countries? (im thinking the Anglo-Sphere).
I really enjoyed the article!
Would the Army really do it?
There is another issue here and that is: would the Army really be willing to create an advisor corps on its own? The Army has gotten rid of Rangers and almost did SF in until El Sal came along and saved it. What would have happened without Cohen-Nunn, SO-LIC, and USSOCOM under GEN Jim Lindsey, I shudder to think about. And the costs of the "enhanced" FAO program have been significant resulting in less advisor capability than before "enhancement."
This is what brings me to the idea of SF proponency - JFKSWC has the training skills - and a sub-unified command of SOCOM. Many of the ideas John proposed derive from the old Security Assistance Force concept and its development as a FID Augmentation Force (FIDAF) concept. Putting this together with a PRT and a JFC with JTFs makes some sense to me.
John,
Spot on. I thought about it, but decided I'd edge around it indirectly. Service cultures are not known to make big departures - it has to do with not getting it too far wrong, even if it means giving up something that might get it right. To get LTC Nagl's proposal (and the logical extensions of it) taken seriously, will require us to decide what is really important to us in terms of capabiliites that match not only existing requirements, but deciding on which future requirements are most likely. You have to measure what you get by investing in more of the known quantities, vs. the semi-experimental. A couple of bonuses to an organization such as an Advisory Corp would be its utility, Inter-Agency flexibility, potential as a combat multiplier, the rotational commitment (i.e. its not a either-or seperate branch, but rather a new skill set) and that the mission strengthens the skills of the individual in ways that will benefit MTO&E & TDA units - there are somethings you cannot build any other way in as condensed a period as when you immerse someone.
Don't get me wrong
Hi Rob--
I hope that nobody is mistaking my point - you certainly are not - for I do believe that John Nagl's proposal has merit. I just don't think that the Army as an institution will buy it and I believe that an advisor corps is inherently a joint organization. Moreover, USSOCOM, in its Title 10 institutional role, seems to be the ideal vehicle to raise, train, and equip the advsor corps force. SOCOM, in that role, also has the clout to force the services to support with manpower and common equipment. It was, in part, I believe the power that USSOCOM wielded that provided the impetus for the creation of SF branch. (I could be wrong on this but it seems a logical deduction for a partial explanation.)
The sub-unified command proposal that I made in the previous post would be crafted from Nagl's structure with modifications to fit both the joint nature of the beast and the input of both the SOF and conventional communities. It is a really interesting prospect and 20k is not all that many troops.
Cheers
JohnT
Hey John,
yep, I knew where you were headed. The good thing about SOCOM is they seem more flexible in their mainstream thinking. However unless you are talking about ear-marking increases for an Advisory Corps you'd probably get resentment and foot dragging, especially if we're talking about putting them under a different service HQs (well in that they get their own budget anyway). That would really spark resistance and probably raise more civil-military tension.
I would like to see Joint, it would provide a base of skills sets that we cannot provide. I would like to see Inter-Agency for the same reason. I think that may have to be more of an external decision though, since its unlikely that any of the services are going to want to pony up (historically), particularly one that sees itself as giving up the lionshare of people. If the U.S. were to pursue that, then it might be a reasonable idea to just go ahead and look at Trufioun's proposal and make a new entity with all the capabilities we'd mentioned. The downside we'd mentioned before (starting from scratch can be awfully hard), but the up side would be allowing the services to preserve their lanes, and their people (right after a few had been lifted), and the new organization would have its own budget, you can design it from the ground up with civil-military functions, and it walks in with a semi-clean slate. Expensive up front though, very expensive - plus ugly $$$$ fights on the Hill - plus you would not gaurentee Joint, or Inter-Agency - just another 3 letter agency/organization.
I go back to the need to define the problem as one that is not going away, but will expand (?), gain consensus about a solution, and then provide some clear guidance about who provides what to whom for how long, etc. There needs to be (and there may already be) a dialogue between the ends, ways and means legs of the stool. It may be for the reasons that we discussed that SOCOM is the way to go, but it would be a big rock in their rucksack, and some of the other services would probably see themselves as losing needed resources to fulfill their missions.
For simplicity's sake, I can see an argument for LTC Nagl's pitch "as is" because there is not allot of wake to it since the Army gets its folks back and benefits. I'd also say they are currently fielding the bulk of the numbers (not proportionally, just sheer numbers) because they have the mass to absorb it (even though its a tasker to many units). It may also be easier given the exposure of senior leaders to OIF and OEF to understand and implement a big step like this, without requiring direction from the Hill, but rather an OK - in the Title 10 wiggle room. I don't think they'd get as much pushback from the other services since this is a resource intensive proposal. It also has what I see as a huge benefit of increasing the skill set and maturity of the individual soldiers as they rotate through. The loss however is the other BCTs form the increase.
If we start doing the math of how much it will take to form, equip, train & sustain the additional BCTs vs. the value raised by doing I think we'll have the stuff decisions are made from. I think there is a solid argument that an Army Advisory Corps would be a very efficient and effective way to meet important current and emerging needs, increase the proficiency of the force through individual experience and training, and be able to focus limited monies to reset the existing BCTs with their equipment. The mission benefits because it is institutionalized and becomes a part of professional development, the MTO&E & TDAs win because they have predictability and focus. In those regards it also sounds pretty safe as a way not to get our capabilities sturcture too far wrong.
I appreciate your argument
Rob--
I appreciate your argument and if the Army would buy in, I'd support it. My problem is that, without a major change in the players in key decision roles, I don't see it happening. Just too much for the institutional Army. The changes required to make it happen would be GEN Petraeus and those who think like him as CSA, VCSA, TRADOC Cdr, CAC Cdr, FORSCOM Cdr, etc and people who think like them succeeding them for at least a decade. Then, there are the legitimate claims of the conventional force Army that would have to be balanced.
For a start from scratch approach to work, I think that, like Goldwater-Nichols, it would have to be imposed on the military services by the Congress. And I don't see any Barry Goldwaters, Sam Nunns, Bill Cohens, et. al. in any positions of Congressional leadership. The current Democrats won't buy in because they suffer from the Vietnam/Iraq syndrome in spades as do the current Republicans to only a slightly lesser extent
So, where does that leave us? Looking for a home and incremental development of the advisor capability in ways that will institutionalize it.
On that cheery note....
JohnT
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