The Advisory or Advisor Challenge

[Rob Thornton]

OE,
I posted the HSC report link under the FID category, but you can get some of their thought/recommendations in CH 7 which looks at the past/present/future of TTs.
Regards, Rob

[Old Eagle]

Yeah, I saw that. Recommendation for a thousand more reports. Reminds me of the Wellington quote from Spain about defeating Napolean or accounting for jams and jellies.

Still, the issue has some visibility in DC.

[jonSlack]

Max Boot - Rejecting Nagl (Commentary Blog)

I’ve blogged before about Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl’s idea to create an Advisor Corps within the army that would focus on producing training teams to work with foreign militaries.

I thought Nagl made a convincing case for such an unorthodox approach, and he certainly knows what he is talking about: He is in charge of a battalion at Fort Riley, Kansas, that trains advisors for Iraq and Afghanistan, and he has concluded, based on that experience, that the current training and manning system for advisory teams is too haphazard and too small to meet all of our national security needs.

Not surprisingly, the army doesn’t see it that way. The newsletter Inside the Pentagon reported on September 13th that the army has officially decided, in the words of a public affairs officer, “that is not the way to go.” The army would prefer building cookie-cutter Brigade Combat Teams and relying on a small number of Special Forces to specialize in the training mission. This decision comes, by the way, in the face of copious evidence that there are not nearly enough Green Berets to meet all the demands thrown their way.

There are certainly good arguments that can be made against Nagl’s proposal. But my suspicion is that the army’s view is simply the default position of a lumbering bureaucracy averse to new thinking—even when it comes from within its own ranks. (Perhaps especially when it comes from within its own ranks.)

The larger problem here is the difficulty that the armed services have in assimilating and rewarding brainy officers like Nagl (author of a much-cited book on counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam) who don’t fit the standard mold. Others in that category include a pair of Ph.D. colonels—H.R. McMaster and Peter Mansoor—who have both earned stellar reputations not only in the academy, but also on the battlefield. But they are both in danger of not being promoted to general. Mavericks like them deserve support from the outside—especially on Capitol Hill—to help transform the military in spite of itself.

Quoted the entire blog post because it was relatively short.

You can find the "Inside the Pentagon" story cited in the post by going to google and searching for: "Fawzia Sheikh" Nagl

You should get two results returned. The story is the first result and is visible through google's caching system.

[Rob Thornton]

I think you really need concrete rationale for visible, large scale organizational change. As it considered how to use the increase, it probably scrutinizing what the nation is asking it to do, and has assigned it to do, and made some hard choices about organizations and force structures.

Maintaining an OPTEMPO of sustaining sufficient BCTs in OIF and OEF while allowing flexibility for other contingencies and resting and refitting those BCTs out of the rotation is a tall order. Add in attempting to keep the Reserve Component BCTs free to perform their Civil Support roles in their home states is also very challenging

There are no easy choices. I believe Army leadership strongly considered (and is still considering) all the options in meeting the needs of its commitments.

What can drive the major changes in the Armed Forces:

What are our foreign policy goals - and how do we provide means and describe the ways in which we will best achieve them?

The congressional involvement in the various HASC, SASC, Foreign/International Affairs committees that consider the roles/missions, authorities, etc.

The service involvment and obligation to provide our best military advice to civilians in helping make the above decisions - this last one is a bit subjective, because we may be culturally predisposed within our comfort zone - so while it takes the civilian side to provide the binding action - the uniformed side is expected to articulate why and to live with the consequences.

This is not to say that the civilian side does not have alternatives. If they feel that they are not getting the best advice, they can call pretty much anybody they want to testify. This also is not without consequence.

I think at this time the creation of a permanent advisory corps is part of a much larger question that involves all the instruments of national power - the Inter-Agency question and the threats/challenges of the post 9/11 world. Remember the sense of urgency where Congress asked GEN P/AMB C about the linkage between AQ and Iraq - they were not just sharpshooting the Executive - they were examining the relationship between foreign and domestic policy. Since their constituents are more concerned with domestic policies they must always consider that as the primary and the influence of foreign policy as the secondary - all politics are first local. However, 9/11 was a watershed event - it was a very terrible but visible event that stated that foreign policy "matters" (as in its damned important to domestic politics), national security matters, and that in this increasingly globalized world, the ties between domestic and foreign policy get stronger everyday. Congress must play an important role in the "debate" that shapes the policies/ends, has the legal responsibility for allocations/means & must remain informed and understand the implications of the strategies/ways - IMHO, to ignore it would be great domestic political risk.

My sense is we are just starting to sort things out. Leaders (inside and outside the military) are starting to ask the right, hard questions. I apologize for making the detour, but this is not just a simple Army decision, and we have to understand that. There are "Must Dos", "Have/Need to Dos", and there are "Would like to Dos". Its nice when they all three (or even two of them) coincide, but its not usually the case when you are talking about doing something as big as meeting the NSS. If the civilian side really wants something done, they make it a "Must Do" - but unless they provide the additional means to make it happen, they risk compromising a "Have/Need to Do".

So we'll see what happens.
Best regards, Rob

[tequila]

Military Training Units seen as Career Detours - Washington Post, 24 Oct.

The United States' exit from Iraq and Afghanistan depends on stepping up U.S. advising of those nations' security forces, Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Wednesday as he visited military training teams preparing to deploy.

"It's the way out, no question, in both countries," Mullen told Lt. Col. Geoffrey D. Ellerson, whose 11-man training team will leave in three weeks for a year-long tour in a volatile region of Iraq east of Baghdad. "I can't overstate the importance" of the teams, he said.

The military is planning to expand the advisory teams and expects to have a decision by spring on the numbers and composition of additional U.S. forces needed for the effort, said Maj. Gen. Robert Durbin, who oversees the training. Durbin said he could easily double the number of troops going through the 72-day training program. In all, about 4,800 team members have been trained over the past year.

The teams are critical to the U.S. military strategy in Iraq, where they include about 1,500 military personnel, and in Afghanistan, where they have about 600 members. In Iraq, the teams live and work alongside Iraqi army and police units, teaching them basic tactics and planning, providing them with intelligence, air power and other support, as well as monitoring their operations for signs of sectarian activity and other abuses.
One challenge to expanding the advisory effort, however, is attracting highly qualified Army officers to leave traditional career paths to join the teams, which some see as hurting their chances for promotion, according to several officers interviewed this week ...

[jcustis]

Is the negative impact just hype, or concrete and damning? I could esily grasp how a infantry major might assume that advisory duty isn't sexy, and thus not career-enhancing, but I wonder if the promotion board preceptss tell a different tale.

Many months ago I stated here that the services need to make a concerted effort to recognize the advisors for the sacrifices they make in this mission, as well as for the experiences that they gain while in the breech.

If Xenophon's recent update about his advisor team training cycle is any indication, we are still getting th pre-deploy training wrong. And why are we getting it wrong? Because someone senior enough doesn't care enough to devote the resources and time to doing it right.

I've long wanted to put my hat in the ring to go out on a team, but the more and more I think about it, it may just be a fool's errand akin to putting a bullet in a .38 and spinning the cylinder.

I suspect that we are drawing some talent to the effort, otherwise we wouldn't get the articles that pop up in the various professional journals, but we will need more of it if we are to break out of the cycle of pulling team structure out of units on the on deck circle to deploy.

Anyone here from either the Army of USMC who is involved in the advisory effort (from policy perspective) and is willing to dispell any myths?

All this tracks into another thought I had while listening to NPR on the way home from work recently. We (as a military establishment) had better get our act together real quick and decide if we subscribe to the "Long War" concept of 15-20 years of conflict. Then we need to decide if FID and advisory efforts are going to remain the province of SF and bodies like the Corps' MSOAG, or are we going to make a call and align resources to the mission at hand and deal with the reality that "conventional forces" need to do heavy lifting in this arena. Same holds true as to whether we are going to analyze the long-term impact of COIN operations, and start training our new warriors to be able to tread lightly as well as they can flip the kinetic switch.

[Rob Thornton]

You know it is interesting though. The job has not shown up on my ORB as a position - instead its listed as incoming personnel to FT Knox - not exactly something that is going to express what we say you gain by going out on a TT, although its in the OER I got for the deployment. This goes back to LTC Nagl's comment about how do we show something is important? If its not on your ORB - the chances of the board even considering it are lessened. Its hard to make a case about professional enhancement in subjective terms for allot of folks if they can not correlate it to something - when you weight it with BQ jobs - it will take on different meaning.

For me, I got an experience out of it that really means something - but I'm getting older, my kids need roots and my wife has pretty much made clear her thoughts on staying in past 20, and like I told you at Quantico my interest in being an 06 or GO is fleeting (in regards to the former) if existent at all (in regards to the latter)

Best, Rob