The Advisory or Advisor Challenge

[SWJED]

Latest at the SWJ Blog - It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps by LTC John Nagl.

In the linked paper I argue that, just as the new realities of warfare demanded the creation of the Special Forces in the 1960's, winning the Long War will require that the Army develop a standing Advisor Corps. It has been informed by the experience of many advisors with service in Iraq and Afghanistan, and may prove of some interest to the Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council community of interest.

"Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps" was published by the Center for a New American Security.

The most important military component of the Long War will not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our allies to fight with us. After describing the many complicated, interrelated, and simultaneous tasks that must be conducted to defeat an insurgency, the new Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes “Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.” Indeed, it has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win for them…

[Old Eagle]

Once again, Colonel Nagl offers an eloquent and persuasive piece on Long War requirements. Hopefully it will engender some meaningful discussion, not just a lot of head nodding.

With that in mind, I have problems with a tactically organized force structure being tasked to provide both "Title 10" type support while simultaneously being responsible for operations on the ground. Can the corps commander fulfill his force provider duties while deployed as an advisor to a minister of defense?

On the blog post, Rob Thornton offers the additional insight for including other JIIM players in the mix. This is also critical. Even if you limit the military involvement to advising security forces, that is still best done by full spectrum joint forces, augmented by civilian experts from other agencies. IMHO.

[Jimbo]

In the Army it exists: It is called the AC/RC units that are set up to advise the ARNG. There has been heistatnce by the Army to deply regular Army AC/RC brigades and battalions to support the training mission. This has been done in limited numbers. What you have is a sturcture as brigade ready to cover down on an entire division. The upside is that when the unit isn't deployed, it is working with the ARNG. Working with the ARNG involves bringing expertise and recent TTP's to to training focused on tactical and administrative requirements. Granted the cultural and language differences are not close to being the same, but it still is enough to "keep your mind right". As far as JIIM, it is going to be 5 years at best beffore anything on the civilian side catches up in the capacity that we would like to see, and that is best case involving the upcoming election not screwing up needed legislation to make this happen.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Old Eagle, Jimbo,

Jimbo are you saying the AC/RC example is a good pattern for hashing out Title 10 turf? Or are you saying that AC/RC is the way to go for advising foreign security forces? It sounds like both.

I've seen one AC/RC unit deploy as MiTTs - 2nd IA DIV MiTT down to the BN level - we replaced them. They had some real challenges as they tried to figure out what was different from the methodology they used working with USARNG units and Iraqis. I think the gap may be too far to bridge and have them do both missions good enough.

I think the value of what LTC Nagl puts forward is that it is a "more" dedicated capability that balances creating units that do nothing but advisory work and hyper specialized with taskings that reach down in to MTO&E and TDA units where their primary missions are compromised. To me it asks the very important question of "How important is the training & use of host nation forces to reduce our global requirements in maintaining stability?" We need to decide that. Much like the Inter-Agency debate, and the debate over conventional war systems aquisitions, the problems we face now are going to influence how we spend our nickel. What is the best way to use the force structure increase? Is it just more BCTs which allow us to slow OPTEMPO for deploying BCTs in Iraq, or do we see the need for more BCTs to do more with in other places, and then we wind up with the same OPTEMPO? It becomes the proverbial self-licking ice cream cone.

The other side of the coin - that I think LTC Nagl is advocating is using those force structure gains as a more dedicated Combat Multiplier - both in the sense of developing Host Nation Security Forces, but also in the sense of what those soldiers bring to the MTO&E and TDA units when they return and are sent out into the Force. While LTC Nagle cites Iraq and Afghanistan for use of the Advisory course, but I think we need them beyond. This could become a core compentency and I don't know if adding it to the MTO&E units METL is a good idea. I'd have to go back, but what I'd like to see is a long enough tour in the advisory core to do perhaps a focused train up on the georgrpahical location they will be working before they deploy for a year. This might require a 2 year tour.

I understand that JIIM cooperation on any real scale is probably a ways out - I know you have been working it, but how much would it cost in reources to establish an HSOC (Home Station Operations Command) in say Riley or wherever home might be that is staffed by either Inter-Agency onesies and twosies or even contractors with Inter-Agency experience to work the connections back to OGAs, Regional CMDs and Embassies? How about some OGA experienced contractors who deploy with the HQs to work LNO issues on the ground? We're not talking about building Host Nation (DIE) capacity yet, we're talking about connectors and wheel grease.

For the Title 10 stuff - I thnk once they deploy they work for the Regional CDR or his designated CDR - you can't have unity of command any other way.

Hopefully will resolve the Inter-Agency piece fully without another 9/11, but I don't know. I guess you can tell what is really important to somebody based on how they spend their money. I guess that is what we're asking, what is really important?

Regards Rob

[Ski]

Perhaps someone can chime in on why Special Forces units in the Gan were more concerned about direct action missions, and not these missions, which to me seem to fall under FID, which is a SF core competency...?

[Rob Thornton]

Ski, I'd say its a question of having enough SOF, and how expensive it is to grow SOF capabilities that are more then just numbers. Our SOF are executing a growing number of DA missions that require time and effort to train and plan, but are also so important (HVT) that to increase the margin of success we have assigned them to a SOF unit. FID/Advisory missions also take resources and are also growing. We can't grow SOF fast enough or big enough with enough QA/QC to ensure we get relevant SOF capabilities so you are left with having conventional forces doing parts pieces to make up the delta, or not doing the missions at all - its a tough choice. A SOF soldier is a huge investment - a very worthwhile one, but a big investment if we are talking about people. Having said that, it would seem a lot more jobs feel more like "special" or "irregular" and less like "conventional".

On that note, I'd point out that serving as an advisor offers a pretty good investment strategy. All the qualities that are emphasized as leadership traits, and the skill sets we say we need such innovation, mental agility, flexibility, etc. are cultivated on advisory duty. It was on par with CMD as both the most professionally rewarding and professionally influencing assignment I've had. It fundamentally altered the way I view training, equipping, and fighting because it afforded me another perspective of the enemy I had not had. It also offered me immersion in another culture under fire - important I think since we fight mostly away games. The benefits of having as many soldiers afforded this opportunity I think cannot be overstated, as they rotate back into the force they will bring the experience of how indigenous security forces deal with problems from a long term perspective vs. a CF unit rotation. This is critical to understanding long term reasons for conflict and identifying and solving potential problems we might create prior to them having an adverse effect on operations. It also helps unit CDRs understand when something is really an operational problem vs. an operational condition. Further it forges ties at the grass roots which will pay off long after an advisor leaves for home.

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Rob and Ski--

Rob certainly has a part of the story but there is more to it.

Part 1: SF, since its founding, has not less than 3 esthos, based on the dominant mission of particular groups. 10th SFG was founded to conduct UW behind Soviet lines in ways similar to the Jedburg and other OSS/SOE teams in WWII. Training partisans was their thing. 5th SFG made its name in Vietnam where it conducted mucho direct action (DA) missions. The high point of its history was the Son Tay Raid - DA all the way. 7th SFG focused largely on LATAM and the FID mission; it was highly successful in El Salvador. All the other groups fall somewhere in between dpending on their peacetime and wartime experience. My sense is that 3rd Group is pretty close to 7th based on discussions with them during Operation Uphold Democracy. In any event, SF reflects many of the divisions within the regular forces on the best way to fight COIN. Obviously, it is far more complex but I really suspect that Group ethos is reflected in the degree to which particular SF Groups are more enemy or population centric in Kilcullen's approach/

Part 2: During Vietnam the JFK Special Warfare Center (JFKSWC) ran a military advisors course called MATA. At the same time, MI had a well received program for Foreign Area Specialists (FAS). General Sam Wilson, an intel guy and SF who commanded JFKSWC noticed that FAS and MATA each had 3 components, two of which were common to both programs - language and in-country training. FAS had a masters degree as its third element while MATA had the advisors course. In Wilson's mind the masters program would be good for advisors and the advisors course would be good for the intel types. So he combined the programs as FAO with the important caveat that either the masters or advisors (now FAO) course could be waived without prejudice. This workded pretty well until 1986 when General Bill Odom (any relation Tom?) made a play to bring FAO under MI. He didn't get it but the enhanced FAO program dropped the FAO course making it practically the same as the old FAS program. The result - along with OPM 21 - was to take the non-SF community out of the advisor business almost completely.

And, then, along came Iraq and Afghanistan....

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ski,
I left something out in answering your question. The advisory mission in Iraq is a little different then the tradional FID mission assigned to ODAs. I think our idea of what FID is has morphed from say building an indigenous capability in say OEF 1 or maybe as a guerilla force that compliments U.S. forces operating in the area to one of building a force capable of functioning independently and indefinately to meet host nation security needs. Jedburgh could shed allot of light on the changing role of FID, if in fact there is one.

However, look at the advisory team composition changes as proposed by LTC Nagl:

Advisor Team Composition
Team Leader
Team NCOIC
Team Adjutant
S1 NCOIC
Team Intelligence Offi cer
Team Intel Sergeant
Team Intel Specialist
Team Ops Offi cer
Team Ops Sergeant
Team Logistics Offi cer
Team Logistics Sergeant
Team Medical Offi cer
Team Medical Sergeant
Team Light Wheel Mechanic
Infantry Squad (Personal Security
Detachment/Infantry Trainers)
Total Strength: 25

It is different from an ODA. This composition has a heavy influence on developing the staff capabilities that sustain, synchronize and focus combat operations.

Below is an excerpt from the JP on FID

From Joint Publication 3-07.1
Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Commensurate with US policy goals, the focus of all US foreign
internal defense (FID) efforts is to support the host nation’s
(HN’s) program of internal defense and development (IDAD).
These national programs are designed to free and protect a nation
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency by emphasizing
the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of
society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely
to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these
needs should prescribe the principal focus of US efforts. The
United States will generally employ a mix of diplomatic,
economic, informational, and military instruments of national
power in support of these objectives. Military assistance is often
necessary in order to provide the secure environment for the
above efforts to become effective.

Regards, Rob