The Advisory or Advisor Challenge

[Old Eagle]

"Iraq isn't going to be in the current state much longer, nor is Afghanistan. The potential for another commitment needing such capability in large numbers anywhere in the next few years is slight."

Gotta disagree here. I see a very large requirement for continued advisory capacity among GPF.

First, I'm not convinced that the Iraq and Afghanistan missions are going to end any time soon, at least not the advisory portions.

Secondly, when I look across the horizon, I see numerous countries that are important to us, threatened by disruptive forces of various ilks. Developing their indiginous capability to protect themselves is the only long term solution to their stability. The requirements of the future outstrip the capacity of my friends with the funny green hats.

Thirdly, we don't have sufficient tools in the rucksack to perform the required advisory functions. Train and equip doesn't work unless you're working with a sophisticated, capable ally -- sellin F-16s to NATO partners, T&E works. Other traditional security assistance also falls short. Shortly after the Nixon Doctrine was announced, stating that we would in fact bolster host nation capabilities to look after themselves, congress placed heinous restrictions on the programs to ensure that they would not be effective (AECA 76 (as amended)).

We now have an opportunity to move forward and develop truly effective means of organizing, training, eqiupping, (re)building and advising foreign security forces. The requirement to do so will remain large for the forseeable future.

[SteveMetz]

"Iraq isn't going to be in the current state much longer, nor is Afghanistan. The potential for another commitment needing such capability in large numbers anywhere in the next few years is slight."

Gotta disagree here. I see a very large requirement for continued advisory capacity among GPF.

First, I'm not convinced that the Iraq and Afghanistan missions are going to end any time soon, at least not the advisory portions.

Secondly, when I look across the horizon, I see numerous countries that are important to us, threatened by disruptive forces of various ilks. Developing their indiginous capability to protect themselves is the only long term solution to their stability. The requirements of the future outstrip the capacity of my friends with the funny green hats.

Thirdly, we don't have sufficient tools in the rucksack to perform the required advisory functions. Train and equip doesn't work unless you're working with a sophisticated, capable ally -- sellin F-16s to NATO partners, T&E works. Other traditional security assistance also falls short. Shortly after the Nixon Doctrine was announced, stating that we would in fact bolster host nation capabilities to look after themselves, congress placed heinous restrictions on the programs to ensure that they would not be effective (AECA 76 (as amended)).

We now have an opportunity to move forward and develop truly effective means of organizing, training, eqiupping, (re)building and advising foreign security forces. The requirement to do so will remain large for the forseeable future.

I'm kind of having second thoughts about the centrality of the advising function in our strategy. I've been thinking about this hard because I've participated in a two part wargame that focused on it.

Here's my problem: the approach is based on an assumption, viz that the shortfalls that other militaries have are the result of a lack of a body of knowledge and expertise which we possess and can impart to them. There's a little voice in the back of my head that tells me that assumption may be wrong. If it was simply a matter of acquiring the requisite knowledge and expertise, weak militaries would have done so long ago. I think the reasons for their weakness are much deeper and broader than that, lying within culture and history. If I'm right, this means that we can advise until we're blue in the face and it may not make much of a difference.

Now, I'm not saying don't provide advice. I'm just saying that making it the centerpiece of our strategy worries me.

[Steve Blair]

I agree, Steve. Too often we assume that our experience and expertise is somehow both needed and relevant to the situation at hand (Vietnam comes to mind in terms of the advisory effort, but that's more as an example than a direct parallel).

There are too many disconnects and divergences to make an advisory effort the centerpiece of every involvement we have (to include our current ones). There needs to be much more in terms of a cultural evaluation like the one you suggested before making an advisory program the main focus of effort.

[Old Eagle]

I fully understand both of your concerns. However, I am at a loss as to what the alternative might be. Occupation comes to mind, but that can be long and messy and woefully unpopular both at home and in the HN.

Let's keep this discussion rolling.

[SteveMetz]

I fully understand both of your concerns. However, I am at a loss as to what the alternative might be. Occupation comes to mind, but that can be long and messy and woefully unpopular both at home and in the HN.

Let's keep this discussion rolling.

In my Rethinking Insurgency study, I argued that rather than viewing Foreign Internal Defense, with its emphasis on advice and assistance, as a one-size-fits all model, we only use it where it has a good chance of working--there is a reasonably effective security force and government willing to undertake serious reform, and which view the conflict the same way we do (e.g. El Salvador). When there is no functioning security force or government (e.g. Iraq), if there is mulitnational and U.N. support to create and sustain a trusteeship for a decade, we participate. If not, we simply work with neighboring states to contain the conflict and limit the humanitarian suffering through aid and the creation of safe zones (e.g. Somalia, initially).

On nations not yet facing conflict, advice and support can be positive but, again, it often will not work. Many African states, for instance, have what we consider to be ineffective security forces. So our instinct is to provide advice and support to make them more effective. But we forget that African governments often see their own military as a greater threat than insurgents, so they don't want them to be more effective. This sort of dissonance is a real problem for us.

[Old Eagle]

Steve

Yep. I like your categories. BUT

Future efforts, as you imply, have to be across all elements of national power and aimed at broader HN targets -- gov't, economy, etc.

Means future efforts have to be interagency, and probably multinational, etc (JIIM).

Therefore, places where we were originally having success in Africa, or where we need to have success in the future, need to be engaged on a much broader scale than in the past. If the central government does not evolve, I truly doubt that we can be successful.

[SteveMetz]

Steve

Yep. I like your categories. BUT

Future efforts, as you imply, have to be across all elements of national power and aimed at broader HN targets -- gov't, economy, etc.

Means future efforts have to be interagency, and probably multinational, etc (JIIM).

Therefore, places where we were originally having success in Africa, or where we need to have success in the future, need to be engaged on a much broader scale than in the past. If the central government does not evolve, I truly doubt that we can be successful.

I think we pretty much agree.

[Old Eagle]

We may actually end up organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising non-state security forces. SF mission in the past, but may need to migrate to GPF.

What think?

[Ken White]

"Iraq isn't going to be in the current state much longer, nor is Afghanistan. The potential for another commitment needing such capability in large numbers anywhere in the next few years is slight."

Gotta disagree here. I see a very large requirement for continued advisory capacity among GPF.

First, I'm not convinced that the Iraq and Afghanistan missions are going to end any time soon, at least not the advisory portions.

Secondly, when I look across the horizon, I see numerous countries that are important to us, threatened by disruptive forces of various ilks. Developing their indiginous capability to protect themselves is the only long term solution to their stability. The requirements of the future outstrip the capacity of my friends with the funny green hats.

Thirdly, we don't have sufficient tools in the rucksack to perform the required advisory functions. Train and equip doesn't work unless you're working with a sophisticated, capable ally -- sellin F-16s to NATO partners, T&E works. Other traditional security assistance also falls short. Shortly after the Nixon Doctrine was announced, stating that we would in fact bolster host nation capabilities to look after themselves, congress placed heinous restrictions on the programs to ensure that they would not be effective (AECA 76 (as amended)).

We now have an opportunity to move forward and develop truly effective means of organizing, training, eqiupping, (re)building and advising foreign security forces. The requirement to do so will remain large for the forseeable future.

Re: my quoted statement, you'll note I said that the two nations were not going to be in their current state much longer. That doesn't say or imply that the missions will end soon; I believe we'll be in both for many years. It does mean that the types and numbers actions are changing daily and that the situation will differ in the near and distant future. Yes, there'll be an Advisory requirement but it can be met by the 1st ID model with a MAAG add-on.

So, first, we'll be there and the advisory effort will continue. The question is does that require a 'dedicated' advisory corps or such like. My answer would be no. The GPF are capable of doing the job in the ME with minimal extra training.

I've been a MAAG Adviser in the ME and in SEA and worked elsewhere with Advisers including some from other nations who have a far, far, smaller but more effective foot print than we do. I've been to Iraq and my guess is that the number of Americans that would gain real traction there as Advisers is microscopic. The capability to fully integrate and be effective in that job is a crap shoot; it's personality dependent and whether or not your counterpart likes and trusts you -- or to what extent he does those things. Culture, religion and traditions all have a very significant effect on the abiltiy to establish real rapport and lacking that, the Adviser is only marginally effective -- and may even do harm. In that light, the conventional wisdom says that long advisory tours are preferable. I disagree, short tours are better to offset the personality disconnects that are bound to occur -- that and the Stockholm syndrome effect...

Secondly, I agree with your view. The question is will Congress agree with it? Another question is how many of those nations are likely to invite us in any significant numbers? Some will take Advisers -- but only to insure the benefits and equipment with which we bribe them to take an Advisory Team (or for the money a MAAG will spend in country), such nations Armed Forces tend to be very polite to the advisers and yet change their processes only slightly. I think 1st SF Gps efforts in the Phillipines and elsewhere offer a far better model than the large Advisory Team effort.

Recall I said "for the next few years." That is, IMO, due to Congress and the fact that we're on the world's nasty list right now (not a problem, we have been before and I don't think it's as bad as it was during Viet Nam) and will be for a bit. We have to time to think and do something smart instead of just jumping into a large structure that will be underemployed for a while; say in the 2010-2015 period.

Thirdly, you're correct -- and I seriously doubt a large advisory effort will improve our ability in this regard. I also doubt Congress will relax those restrictions to any significant extent in the near future. A more important point is that other nations have seen that failure to implement the Nixon Doctrine, watch the current disconnect in Congress and have significant doubts about our ability to stay the course. Justifiably, I might add...

I submit the number of invitations to us for help (other than $$ and goodies) will be slim for a few years. A small footprint may be accepted; few will want a large one.

Don't misunderstand me; I agree we need to work on the Advisory bit, reinvent that wheel as it were and I agree that the effort is important. I am, however, saying that the "Advisory Corps" is massive overkill and is unlikely to be approved by either DA or Congress in any event. The 1st ID effort is a fair start and an adequate base and the SF model in Asia has more merit than it is given credit for, it's been successful and the Army cannot say that either the Afghan or Iraqi campaigns have been. Yes, that's partly due to some factors from outside the Army but we did not do it well. Thirty plus years of ignoring the developing nation issue were the Army's fault. That damage will not be repaired by over reacting in trying to jump back into the ball game willy nilly. My fear is that we will do the age-old American thing and swing too far as we oscillate from virtually no involvement with developing nations to attempting to overdo said involvement.

As to your conclusion, we can disagree on that

[Old Eagle]

Ken,
Like you, I am examining John's proposal for an advisory corps, not buying it outright. The capacity to advise is still critical.

Rob's "nation-building" unit, or whatever he calls it blends with this concept because of the disconnects between security forces and some governments you point out.

If it is necessary, according to U.S. interests to bolster the security forces of a given country, then we need to find the $$$/equipment enticements you refer to to make it happen.

SF is still the weapon of choice. A coupla problems:
1. SF was built for an A-Team to train, equip and advise a light infantry battalion. That leaves a lot of area uncovered by their capability (other branches of military, other echelons above bn).

2. SF is too small to do it all, as we see in Iraq and Afghanistan where we are training/advising hundreds of thousands of HN forces.

3. SF's other missions in the Long War, DA, SR, CT, etc., have pulled them away from the train/advise mission.

Steve,
Even in your third case where we contain a smoldering insurgency by assisting neighboring countries, we may still need to develop their security forces.

And it's not just FID. We need the capacity to develop security forces capable of deterring/defending against conventional incursions from neighboring states. Kinda like KMAG after WWII.

Bottom line -- this is going to be a GPF mission over the next decades.

Sorry that was so disjointed, but I didn't want to write an epistle.

[Rob Thornton]

OE,
I posted the HSC report link under the FID category, but you can get some of their thought/recommendations in CH 7 which looks at the past/present/future of TTs.
Regards, Rob

[Old Eagle]

Yeah, I saw that. Recommendation for a thousand more reports. Reminds me of the Wellington quote from Spain about defeating Napolean or accounting for jams and jellies.

Still, the issue has some visibility in DC.

[jonSlack]

Max Boot - Rejecting Nagl (Commentary Blog)

I’ve blogged before about Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl’s idea to create an Advisor Corps within the army that would focus on producing training teams to work with foreign militaries.

I thought Nagl made a convincing case for such an unorthodox approach, and he certainly knows what he is talking about: He is in charge of a battalion at Fort Riley, Kansas, that trains advisors for Iraq and Afghanistan, and he has concluded, based on that experience, that the current training and manning system for advisory teams is too haphazard and too small to meet all of our national security needs.

Not surprisingly, the army doesn’t see it that way. The newsletter Inside the Pentagon reported on September 13th that the army has officially decided, in the words of a public affairs officer, “that is not the way to go.” The army would prefer building cookie-cutter Brigade Combat Teams and relying on a small number of Special Forces to specialize in the training mission. This decision comes, by the way, in the face of copious evidence that there are not nearly enough Green Berets to meet all the demands thrown their way.

There are certainly good arguments that can be made against Nagl’s proposal. But my suspicion is that the army’s view is simply the default position of a lumbering bureaucracy averse to new thinking—even when it comes from within its own ranks. (Perhaps especially when it comes from within its own ranks.)

The larger problem here is the difficulty that the armed services have in assimilating and rewarding brainy officers like Nagl (author of a much-cited book on counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam) who don’t fit the standard mold. Others in that category include a pair of Ph.D. colonels—H.R. McMaster and Peter Mansoor—who have both earned stellar reputations not only in the academy, but also on the battlefield. But they are both in danger of not being promoted to general. Mavericks like them deserve support from the outside—especially on Capitol Hill—to help transform the military in spite of itself.

Quoted the entire blog post because it was relatively short.

You can find the "Inside the Pentagon" story cited in the post by going to google and searching for: "Fawzia Sheikh" Nagl

You should get two results returned. The story is the first result and is visible through google's caching system.

[Rob Thornton]

I think you really need concrete rationale for visible, large scale organizational change. As it considered how to use the increase, it probably scrutinizing what the nation is asking it to do, and has assigned it to do, and made some hard choices about organizations and force structures.

Maintaining an OPTEMPO of sustaining sufficient BCTs in OIF and OEF while allowing flexibility for other contingencies and resting and refitting those BCTs out of the rotation is a tall order. Add in attempting to keep the Reserve Component BCTs free to perform their Civil Support roles in their home states is also very challenging

There are no easy choices. I believe Army leadership strongly considered (and is still considering) all the options in meeting the needs of its commitments.

What can drive the major changes in the Armed Forces:

What are our foreign policy goals - and how do we provide means and describe the ways in which we will best achieve them?

The congressional involvement in the various HASC, SASC, Foreign/International Affairs committees that consider the roles/missions, authorities, etc.

The service involvment and obligation to provide our best military advice to civilians in helping make the above decisions - this last one is a bit subjective, because we may be culturally predisposed within our comfort zone - so while it takes the civilian side to provide the binding action - the uniformed side is expected to articulate why and to live with the consequences.

This is not to say that the civilian side does not have alternatives. If they feel that they are not getting the best advice, they can call pretty much anybody they want to testify. This also is not without consequence.

I think at this time the creation of a permanent advisory corps is part of a much larger question that involves all the instruments of national power - the Inter-Agency question and the threats/challenges of the post 9/11 world. Remember the sense of urgency where Congress asked GEN P/AMB C about the linkage between AQ and Iraq - they were not just sharpshooting the Executive - they were examining the relationship between foreign and domestic policy. Since their constituents are more concerned with domestic policies they must always consider that as the primary and the influence of foreign policy as the secondary - all politics are first local. However, 9/11 was a watershed event - it was a very terrible but visible event that stated that foreign policy "matters" (as in its damned important to domestic politics), national security matters, and that in this increasingly globalized world, the ties between domestic and foreign policy get stronger everyday. Congress must play an important role in the "debate" that shapes the policies/ends, has the legal responsibility for allocations/means & must remain informed and understand the implications of the strategies/ways - IMHO, to ignore it would be great domestic political risk.

My sense is we are just starting to sort things out. Leaders (inside and outside the military) are starting to ask the right, hard questions. I apologize for making the detour, but this is not just a simple Army decision, and we have to understand that. There are "Must Dos", "Have/Need to Dos", and there are "Would like to Dos". Its nice when they all three (or even two of them) coincide, but its not usually the case when you are talking about doing something as big as meeting the NSS. If the civilian side really wants something done, they make it a "Must Do" - but unless they provide the additional means to make it happen, they risk compromising a "Have/Need to Do".

So we'll see what happens.
Best regards, Rob