The Advisory or Advisor Challenge

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Rob--

I hope that nobody is mistaking my point - you certainly are not - for I do believe that John Nagl's proposal has merit. I just don't think that the Army as an institution will buy it and I believe that an advisor corps is inherently a joint organization. Moreover, USSOCOM, in its Title 10 institutional role, seems to be the ideal vehicle to raise, train, and equip the advsor corps force. SOCOM, in that role, also has the clout to force the services to support with manpower and common equipment. It was, in part, I believe the power that USSOCOM wielded that provided the impetus for the creation of SF branch. (I could be wrong on this but it seems a logical deduction for a partial explanation.)

The sub-unified command proposal that I made in the previous post would be crafted from Nagl's structure with modifications to fit both the joint nature of the beast and the input of both the SOF and conventional communities. It is a really interesting prospect and 20k is not all that many troops.

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

Hey John,
yep, I knew where you were headed. The good thing about SOCOM is they seem more flexible in their mainstream thinking. However unless you are talking about ear-marking increases for an Advisory Corps you'd probably get resentment and foot dragging, especially if we're talking about putting them under a different service HQs (well in that they get their own budget anyway). That would really spark resistance and probably raise more civil-military tension.
I would like to see Joint, it would provide a base of skills sets that we cannot provide. I would like to see Inter-Agency for the same reason. I think that may have to be more of an external decision though, since its unlikely that any of the services are going to want to pony up (historically), particularly one that sees itself as giving up the lionshare of people. If the U.S. were to pursue that, then it might be a reasonable idea to just go ahead and look at Trufioun's proposal and make a new entity with all the capabilities we'd mentioned. The downside we'd mentioned before (starting from scratch can be awfully hard), but the up side would be allowing the services to preserve their lanes, and their people (right after a few had been lifted), and the new organization would have its own budget, you can design it from the ground up with civil-military functions, and it walks in with a semi-clean slate. Expensive up front though, very expensive - plus ugly $$$$ fights on the Hill - plus you would not gaurentee Joint, or Inter-Agency - just another 3 letter agency/organization.

I go back to the need to define the problem as one that is not going away, but will expand (?), gain consensus about a solution, and then provide some clear guidance about who provides what to whom for how long, etc. There needs to be (and there may already be) a dialogue between the ends, ways and means legs of the stool. It may be for the reasons that we discussed that SOCOM is the way to go, but it would be a big rock in their rucksack, and some of the other services would probably see themselves as losing needed resources to fulfill their missions.

For simplicity's sake, I can see an argument for LTC Nagl's pitch "as is" because there is not allot of wake to it since the Army gets its folks back and benefits. I'd also say they are currently fielding the bulk of the numbers (not proportionally, just sheer numbers) because they have the mass to absorb it (even though its a tasker to many units). It may also be easier given the exposure of senior leaders to OIF and OEF to understand and implement a big step like this, without requiring direction from the Hill, but rather an OK - in the Title 10 wiggle room. I don't think they'd get as much pushback from the other services since this is a resource intensive proposal. It also has what I see as a huge benefit of increasing the skill set and maturity of the individual soldiers as they rotate through. The loss however is the other BCTs form the increase.

If we start doing the math of how much it will take to form, equip, train & sustain the additional BCTs vs. the value raised by doing I think we'll have the stuff decisions are made from. I think there is a solid argument that an Army Advisory Corps would be a very efficient and effective way to meet important current and emerging needs, increase the proficiency of the force through individual experience and training, and be able to focus limited monies to reset the existing BCTs with their equipment. The mission benefits because it is institutionalized and becomes a part of professional development, the MTO&E & TDAs win because they have predictability and focus. In those regards it also sounds pretty safe as a way not to get our capabilities sturcture too far wrong.

[John T. Fishel]

Rob--

I appreciate your argument and if the Army would buy in, I'd support it. My problem is that, without a major change in the players in key decision roles, I don't see it happening. Just too much for the institutional Army. The changes required to make it happen would be GEN Petraeus and those who think like him as CSA, VCSA, TRADOC Cdr, CAC Cdr, FORSCOM Cdr, etc and people who think like them succeeding them for at least a decade. Then, there are the legitimate claims of the conventional force Army that would have to be balanced.

For a start from scratch approach to work, I think that, like Goldwater-Nichols, it would have to be imposed on the military services by the Congress. And I don't see any Barry Goldwaters, Sam Nunns, Bill Cohens, et. al. in any positions of Congressional leadership. The current Democrats won't buy in because they suffer from the Vietnam/Iraq syndrome in spades as do the current Republicans to only a slightly lesser extent

So, where does that leave us? Looking for a home and incremental development of the advisor capability in ways that will institutionalize it.

On that cheery note....

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

Hey John,
I just wanted us to lay out all the challenges so it would not remain just a really cool theoretical "what if we" sort of idea. I think we have pretty well done that & thanks for taking us there.

I think you have raised the best question though - Do we have the strategic leadership required to be both diagnostic and prognositic in our approach to problem solving?

History would point out that without strategic leadership in our GOs/Flags, Congress and President we run the risk of passing on truly innovative thinking (designed to redirect resources in meaningful ways that solve the correct problems) whereas a lack of strategic leadership can often focus on the reasons why we should preserve the status quo (rice bowls, etc.) and continue to apply reources in the same ways toward the same ends. Strategic Leadership is the catalyst by which challenge our original assumptions, assessments and make course corrections to put us out in front.

Must be lunch

regards, Rob

[Bill Moore]

I think Nagel is on the right track, but I for one have not been impressed with the Army’s and Marine’s approach to training and advising programs to date. For the most part, although there are exceptions, their performance has been substandard. Any approach we develop must be based on the force we have, not the force we which we had. For example:

1. We have very few strategic corporals (or equivalents) in our ranks.
2. Our soldiers/marines come from an technologically advanced society, that makes it much harder for the kids today to emphasize with their developing nation counterparts.
3. Our soldiers/marines today also come from such an extremely liberal society that we’re an aberration to much of the developing world, which is clinging hard to its traditional values (some argue the reason for the current fight), which makes it very difficult for our soldiers to understand cultural norms in developing nations.

I think the secret to making Nagel’s proposal work is selection and training. The only unit remaining that has the professional culture, doctrine, selection process, and training to support developing capable foreign trainers and advisors is the Army's Special Forces, but they have limitations based on their size and other missions, so it is necessary to assume that the conventional army should be able perform the training and advisory role.
I think that would be a fair assumption if:

1. Soldiers and Marines were specially selected for this mission.
2. Then they were trained and equipped to do the mission (not some shake and bake program)
3. They had a supporting chain of command focused on this mission (which we do)

I have seen it too many times where young conventional soldiers and marines working with foreign troops become quickly frustrated, because their training didn’t prepare them for what to expect, or simply they were the wrong person to put in that position. They end up accusing the local soldiers of being stupid because they don't speak English, can't shoot their weapons well, and they have no maintenance systems or skills, etc. Not only does the training fall way short of expectations, we end up creating a bad impression of Americans in the eyes of the soldiers being trained, yet these same American kids will perform adequately soldiers with their American peers, because they're a culturally integrated package operating trained to perform that role. It isn’t the kid that failed, rather we failed to prepare the kid to execute the mission.

Assuming the Army would support Nagel’s proposal I think the key to success is personnel selection. While the Special Forces assessment process works well, it is much too rigorous for what we're attempting to build (we need a lot of soldiers and marines not an elite few), because we would end up weeding out several potentially great advisors who may not have the athletic ability or mental/physical toughness to be an unconventional warrior behind enemy lines. The key is identifying what we’re looking for, and then determining how to assess for it. It will probably be based more personality based than physical skills.

Then we have to develop a training program. This sounds easy, but if you look at much our training has evolved in recent years, you’ll realize it is a big leap to all the sudden being placed in some north African nation with a battalion of poorly equipped troops, no designated training ranges, etc. You need guys and gals that can solve problems, and work in far less than ideal conditions.

I don’t think the Army will raise to the occasion, and they’ll fight hard to avoid forming an advisor unit, so we need an interim measure in the short run, and I think that answer may be providing a cadre of training and advisor leaders, who probably for the most part would hail from the senior ranks of Special Forces Officers, Warrant Officers and NCOs. They would work through, by, and with designated conventional forces as the leaders for their advisor units. For this to work, they would have to be placed in key leadership positions.

Another option, perhaps cheaper and more effective is going back to contractors. I worked with MPRI at my side more than once, and my experience was very positive. This gives our nation the capability to rapidly surge and contract the size of the advisory force as needed, based on the threat.

Just some thoughts on the way ahead.

[Rob Thornton]

Bill, great points

Then we have to develop a training program. This sounds easy, but if you look at much our training has evolved in recent years, you’ll realize it is a big leap to all the sudden being placed in some north African nation with a battalion of poorly equipped troops, no designated training ranges, etc. You need guys and gals that can solve problems, and work in far less than ideal conditions.

There is also something said to providing these teams with the mechanisms for obtaining resources. This would be a much larger scale then the previous efforts. We're talking about both self sustaining resources, and resources provided to the HN rather for training or fighting.

One of the problems we had on the MiTT was the $$$ assigned to us by quantity and type were for conventional units living on a FOB (TIF and OMA), not a TT living on a remote site embedded with its HN unit. While we had access to PRC funds, the approval process was convoluted and as such untimely. TTs are not resourced the way ODAs were. We wound up having to either scavage through the CF FOB dump (you'd be surprised what you can find and carry out with a Kraz 7.5t), or going and making a case to the MSC who was forced to weigh those priorities against his units. The MSC often came through, but he had to make some hard choices and that ate up time.

Take that and consider how an effort that sends lots of teams to remote locations across the globe and you start to see the fiscal authority these teams are going to need. You could say we'll move stuff by TRANSCOM all the time, but that only gets you so far - probably not enough lift unless you constrain yourself to certain regions with the required infrastructure. You could go commercial, but even that is only going to get you so far in many cases. You can purchase locally, but that raises some interesting issues such as contracting and all the headaches that go with it. This also points to the need of a study that considers the logistical impacts of adopting this in the robust manner we are discussing - certainly the LOG & C2 makes it a Joint issue.

The organization is going to have to be built and resourced with that in mind. Part of it comes with selecting agile thinkers who can solve problems in ways that match their conditions. Part of it comes with the parent organization understanding that this is not a side show or distraction, but requires a great deal of authority commensurate to its responsibility.

The beauty in this from an operational perspective would be an in place organization to provide insights back to mainstream Army or the SOF community for related operations.

To set this up right requires acknowledgement that this is a critical part of GWOT and should be resourced in all areas accordingly. This requires a departure from the way we like to see ourselves and our role on the battlefield. Advisory work done right is hard and its requires as good as leadership and people as any other job on the battlefield. It also requires resourcing more in line with an ODA then a rifle company. Nobody should have any illusions, we'd be putting these teams into austere conditions where they will face disease, sub-standard living conditions, sub-standard (by FOB standards) Force Protection, threats & isolation, and a host of other threats main stream Army does not usually have to deal with as KBR usually either beats us there or arrives as soon as the $$$ is allocated. These teams will have to be comfortable living with each other and immersed in foreign cultures without either going crazy, jeopardizing the mission or both. They will have to be able to move between the conventional and the unconventional with relative ease.

The upside is we circulate through the force team members who are not only technically and tactically proficient, but emotionally tough problem solvers who can lead under the most challenging of conditions. To me this is more akin to a revolution then any NCW type application - we would be challenging the conventional mindset we have cherished as a model of success for so long.

[Rob Thornton]

Also from Bill

I have seen it too many times where young conventional soldiers and marines working with foreign troops become quickly frustrated, because their training didn’t prepare them for what to expect, or simply they were the wrong person to put in that position. They end up accusing the local soldiers of being stupid because they don't speak English, can't shoot their weapons well, and they have no maintenance systems or skills, etc. Not only does the training fall way short of expectations, we end up creating a bad impression of Americans in the eyes of the soldiers being trained, yet these same American kids will perform adequately soldiers with their American peers, because they're a culturally integrated package operating trained to perform that role. It isn’t the kid that failed, rather we failed to prepare the kid to execute the mission.

We need to ask ourselves what type of training is required to ensure success for a mission like this with all of its austereness, and unpredictability. We need to ask how long it will take, and based on the demands for teams, how much throughput must we generate?

I think a good starting place is SFAS & Q-Course models vs. say a Ranger School approach. I'm not sure it needs to be an exact template, but it does need to consider the approach it uses to build moral strength and resolve in individuals while also building an understanding of what a small team is and how important each individual on that small team is. Then have a portion of the training that takes the skill set that individual already has and modifies it to working on a small team that is going out to build and advise larger HN organizations. No, we probably should not be trying to build SFers - if it were that easy to get that quality in the required quantity, we'd probably already done it. Its not. So what we need is something to transform mindsets of conventional soldiers used to operating in mainstream Army organizations into an unconventional mindset of the type required to succeed on a small team with little access to the things we take for granted in the conventional one. We're talking mental & spiritual over physical. We want guys who believe in their decisions and will take initiative on big issues, but are still well grounded enough to move back and forth. The benefit would be you only have to attend this part of the training once in your career, after that all you'd show up for is the team building events and the events which prepare you either for a new role on the team, or the focused training to prepare you for the area you will operate in.

I'd say a cadre at the course probably made up of PMCs with advisory or SF backgrounds would probably be the most cost effective way to do it with ARSOF so busy. The S3 of the school could be either a contractor or green suiter with the same background. The S3 would fall up under a BDE (Adv Training BDE) charged with a training, but the green suit BDE CDR would report to the green suit Advisory Corps CDR.