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Thread: We Still Need the Big Guns

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    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Default We Still Need the Big Guns

    We Still Need the Big Guns by Major General Charles Dunlap Jr. - New York Times op-ed.

    The relative calm that America’s armed forces have imposed on Iraq is certainly grounds for cautious optimism. But it also raises some obvious questions: how was it achieved and what does it mean for future defense planning?

    Many analysts understandably attribute the success to our troops’ following the dictums of the Army’s lauded new counterinsurgency manual. While the manual is a vast improvement over its predecessors, it would be a huge mistake to take it as proof — as some in the press, academia and independent policy organizations have — that victory over insurgents is achievable by anything other than traditional military force.

    Unfortunately, starry-eyed enthusiasts have misread the manual to say that defeating an insurgency is all about winning hearts and minds with teams of anthropologists, propagandists and civil-affairs officers armed with democracy-in-a-box kits and volleyball nets. They dismiss as passé killing or capturing insurgents...

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by SWJED View Post
    — that victory over insurgents is achievable by anything other than traditional military force.

    Unfortunately, starry-eyed enthusiasts have misread the manual to say that defeating an insurgency is all about winning hearts and minds with teams of anthropologists, propagandists and civil-affairs officers armed with democracy-in-a-box kits and volleyball nets. They dismiss as passé killing or capturing insurgents...
    I am broadly in agreement with this sentiment. Defeating any type of armed opponent still requires an effective degree of military force.

    I would also add that the current fascination with so-called COIN risks creating an entirely predictable back lash, because the study of COIN may (or even has) become a source of promoting personal and organisational agendas. - and I speak as an advocate of Infantry Doctrine, so I am prone to just this hazard.

    COIN is what most armies, spend most of their time doing. A skilled army posses the skills sets and equipment to operate across the spectrum of conflict. Being good at the top end, does not preclude being good at the bottom.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I am broadly in agreement with this sentiment.
    As many might have guessed, me too!!

    Unfortunately the American Army has become a counterinsurgency-only force which is exactly what MG Dunlap is getting at in his piece. I have also argued in other places that our hyper-focus on Counterinsurgency and our dogmatic approach to Iraq clouds our ability to see things in Iraq (and Afghanistan) as they really are.

    Another solid piece in this regard that argues for an American ground force that is built on mobility, technology, and protection (and not a light infantry-only force for pre-determined irregular warfare in the future) is Major Daniel L Davis's Heavy and Agile in the January edition of AFJ.

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Once again it's an "either/or" scenario...and those don't work. I didn't really expect to see anything different from Dunlap, though.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
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    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Question In reference to this

    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    As many might have guessed, me too!!

    Unfortunately the American Army has become a counterinsurgency-only force which is exactly what MG Dunlap is getting at in his piece. I have also argued in other places that our hyper-focus on Counterinsurgency and our dogmatic approach to Iraq clouds our ability to see things in Iraq (and Afghanistan) as they really are.
    For those of us without the exposure and experience to be able to clearly see it; would it be possible for you to help define how things really are that we might be missing?

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    Council Member MattC86's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    Once again it's an "either/or" scenario...and those don't work. I didn't really expect to see anything different from Dunlap, though.
    No, either/or is not particularly helpful, but there isn't the money or manpower available for everything. The Army and Marine Corps claim they need new troops, the Air Force claims it needs a new fighter fleet (and Dunlap, apparently, includes a fighter BEYOND the F-22?) and the Navy new submarines, cruisers, and a coming new fleet of aircraft carriers.

    It's just not realistic. There's going to be major pressure for a drop in defense spending if we disengage from Iraq, especially if a Democrat is in office (and they control Congress), and even if there wasn't, there certainly wouldn't be a massive hike beyond current levels, as this piece suggests is necessary. Beyond that, there isn't time to train personnel effectively in all areas. Guys like Dunlap know there is no way we can do both, so it's a deceptive way of saying stop doing this COIN boondoggle and buy us more jets.

    Prioritizing and compromising are difficult and painful, but just going to be a fact of life.

    Matt
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey View Post
    For those of us without the exposure and experience to be able to clearly see it; would it be possible for you to help define how things really are that we might be missing?
    It has nothing to do with "exposure and experience" but a willingness to confront conventional wisdom and ask hard questions about what has really brought about the lowered levels of violence in Iraq; and then consider reasonable policies for the future that align ends and means with strategic interests.

    Specifically to your question I lay out an argument in a short article that is currently running in Armed Forces Journal, Our Coin Doctrine Removes the Enemy from the Essence of War, which is a response to another article, More Soup Please: Coin Manual Provides Guidance for Modern-day Tactical Commanders, written by Major Chris Rogers, also in this edition of AFJ, that criticizes my earlier Eating Soup with a Spoon piece.

    gian

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    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Post Thanks for the links to the new article

    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    It has nothing to do with "exposure and experience" but a willingness to confront conventional wisdom and ask hard questions about what has really brought about the lowered levels of violence in Iraq; and then consider reasonable policies for the future that align ends and means with strategic interests.

    Specifically to your question I lay out an argument in a short article that is currently running in Armed Forces Journal, Our Coin Doctrine Removes the Enemy from the Essence of War, which is a response to another article, More Soup Please: Coin Manual Provides Guidance for Modern-day Tactical Commanders, written by Major Chris Rogers, also in this edition of AFJ, that criticizes my earlier Eating Soup with a Spoon piece.

    gian
    I remember when eating soup with a spoon first came to my attention and there where discussions about it.

    Upon first reading it I responded with the following:

    I can see in his writing that LTC Gentile is a soldiers soldier who see's the job for what it is; that being a fighter who's overarching purpose is fighting.

    This being said I would think the true determining factor in how and when a counter-insurgency should be handled would be contingent on the expected outcome in the end.

    In other words if one is fighting an insurgency in their own country for the survival of their pre-existing government/leadership infrastructure such as many communist/dictatorial countries have historically then attrition is a definitive goal of their actions.

    Also in this context they seek to discourage any further growth of that insurgency through harsh and awe inspiring action designed to create fear of standing against their power.

    This is where I think the greatest difference can be found in Iraq. One would not expect police officers to come into a riot/demonstration and shut it down through attritive actions despite how much the adrenalin rush might do for the the officers mental states in as far as believing in their cause.

    If the ultimate goal of any military is to provide an environment in which a democratic construct and new culture of empowered populace may come into existence than you kind of have to change your approach from that of a traditional war or counter insurgency standard.

    If your soldier staying in a joint station, armed and looking for the enemy is unable to feel relatively safe than one would assume that that local populace definately is not in a situation where they may try to stand up.

    As soldiers your job is to fight this is true, just as a boxer's job is to box. There are however countless factors outside of the physical interaction that the boxer must study and be aware of in order to enter the ring confidently. Once the bell rings it comes down to mano y mano but if you know that the other guy can't last longer than 2 rounds than your first step is to avoid contact and keep him moving to wear him down.
    This helps to equalize the battle when it does happen. and just as in the boxing match in order to win punches must be thrown so to even in counter insurgency the blows will come ( from both sides).

    Long and short I think 3- 24 is not meant to redefine war so much as to guide and encourage thought before during and after the actions take place.
    I wrote this in September of last year. I have continued to study, listen and learn all I could in regards to your concerns and yet I consistently come back to one major conclusion.

    3-24 was not written to replace 3-0 and as such it would seem that those responsible for developing it would be just as if not more concerned about it being applied in ways not intended. I believe they have shown this is true in their honest responses and continued reminders to all that it's not everything but something very important given current operational environments.

    In the effort to build and maintain true Full Spectrum capabilities it is and ( I don't see anyone saying differently) just as important that the force be skilled in large scale manuever and warfare as small and assymetric capabilities. I can tell you one thing I know without a doubt.

    Any Brigade commander would have a much better chance of deploying a truly capable large or small scale fighting capability now then they would have between 1990 -2000. Simply if for no other reason than the officers and enlisted now have not only recieved more effective training but most have been there done that on both scales at this point.

    Although I understand your underlying concerns, It really would seem that considering the current training and fighting cultures, Forgetting about the big fights would be about the last thing most soldiers would do.

    But as I said this is just my take on it for what it's worth

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey View Post
    Although I understand your underlying concerns, It really would seem that considering the current training and fighting cultures, Forgetting about the big fights would be about the last thing most soldiers would do.

    But as I said this is just my take on it for what it's worth
    My fear remains that, as they have constantly in the past, too many will forget about the smaller fights. They're far more common in our operational history, and we tend to do poorly in them in many cases. That's why we cannot afford the "either/or" mindset any longer.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
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    Default Dunlap is a lawyer

    He is therefore a master of framing arguments to suit his purpose. If you're busting some guy, you want him as a prosecutor. If you're up on charges, you want him defending your butt.

    1. He indeed frames his argument as either/or and once you buy into that, then much of his rationale indeed follows.

    2. Gian is right in that the Army is overwhelmed by COIN. Not by choice. We are simply too small not to have everyone engaged. Our PME is definitely not COIN-only, nor should it be. And our senior leadership is definitely not COIN only.

    3. 3-24 is not a Boy Scout handbook and it does not say that kinetic operations are unimportant.

    Competent conventional (multi-purpose) forces are critical. I haven't heard anyone argue otherwise. To be clear on the predominant USAF perspective, no future enemy will be so accomodating as to line up all their tanks in a populationless environment ever again, and if they do, we don't need ground forces to deal with them.

    We definitely need concentional heavy forces to man the next equivalent of the Fulda Gap.

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    Default Good post, Ancient One...

    Though Cav Guy's picture makes you look younger...

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    Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
    We definitely need concentional heavy forces to man the next equivalent of the Fulda Gap.
    There's always the option of getting people like Stan to antagonize the Russians enough to start Cold War II.
    Example is better than precept.

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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    There's always the option of getting people like Stan to antagonize the Russians enough to start Cold War II.
    Can Do Sir...Consider it done...When should I start
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    Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
    Competent conventional (multi-purpose) forces are critical. I haven't heard anyone argue otherwise. To be clear on the predominant USAF perspective, no future enemy will be so accomodating as to line up all their tanks in a populationless environment ever again, and if they do, we don't need ground forces to deal with them.

    We definitely need concentional heavy forces to man the next equivalent of the Fulda Gap.
    To reinforce your point, the Army is working on Heavy Brigade Combat Teams as well as Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The improvement is that adding the ability to conduct COIN ops gave us full spectrum capability.

    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    There's always the option of getting people like Stan to antagonize the Russians enough to start Cold War II.
    And how do you know he isn't already?
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    Quote Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger View Post


    To reinforce your point, the Army is working on Heavy Brigade Combat Teams as well as Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The improvement is that adding the ability to conduct COIN ops gave us full spectrum capability.
    I'm not entirely up to speed on exactly what the TO&E and capabilities of a SBCT are versus a heavy brigade, but what does the Army view the role of SBCTs being in a high-intensity combat environment?

    Or do they plan to shuffle its personnel back into some Abrams and Bradleys to fight a more conventional war?


    Quote Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger View Post
    And how do you know he isn't already?
    I'm willing to bet several six-packs of beer that tensions with Russia have been on the rise in the years since Stan arrived in Estonia.

    Matt
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    Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
    He is therefore a master of framing arguments to suit his purpose. If you're busting some guy, you want him as a prosecutor. If you're up on charges, you want him defending your butt.

    1. He indeed frames his argument as either/or and once you buy into that, then much of his rationale indeed follows.

    2. Gian is right in that the Army is overwhelmed by COIN. Not by choice. We are simply too small not to have everyone engaged. Our PME is definitely not COIN-only, nor should it be. And our senior leadership is definitely not COIN only.

    3. 3-24 is not a Boy Scout handbook and it does not say that kinetic operations are unimportant.
    Agreed with all - more later - the either/or rhetoric is tiring and severely underestimates the intelligence and flexibility of our officers and NCO's - and the role of kinetic ops. I've beat that dead horse in other threads - here, here, here, here, here, and here.

    Bottom lines - a) force is not necessairly bad in COIN, you just have to think about it before you do it - and COIN doctrine doesn't state otherwise b) we have smart, adaptable leaders who need grounding in COIN theory before being asked to execute it (not true prior to 2003), c) Dropping bombs and shooting artillery has its uses, and d) there is a leadership disconnect issue in the army that is driving many promising junior officers away, e) we need to get away from this amateurish either/or debate about competencies and define what our leaders SHOULD look like for the future. HINT: it's neither a COIN/IW or a MCO specialist, but somehwere in between - finding what that is should be our direction, and get past this COIN/MCO focus name calling.
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    Quote Originally Posted by MattC86 View Post
    I'm not entirely up to speed on exactly what the TO&E and capabilities of a SBCT are versus a heavy brigade, but what does the Army view the role of SBCTs being in a high-intensity combat environment?

    Or do they plan to shuffle its personnel back into some Abrams and Bradleys to fight a more conventional war?
    3rd of the 2nd Infantry was the first formed. You can check out its MTO&E on Wikipedia. The Stryker/LAV has a lot of capability. The Army would probably emply SBCTs as mech infantry, absent the ability to fight mounted. (Remember, the Infantry's basic mobility still comes from the Foot, Mark 1. )

    Quote Originally Posted by MattC86 View Post
    I'm willing to bet several six-packs of beer that tensions with Russia have been on the rise in the years since Stan arrived in Estonia.
    And I am not willing to take that bet.
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    Quote Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger View Post
    And I am not willing to take that bet.
    Good choice ! Matt, send the beer
    If you want to blend in, take the bus

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    Cavguy, great post. I figure the COIN tactics are designed to separate the insurgent fish from the sea, allowing him to be destroyed by kinetic or political means - and the combination thereof, in whatever percentage you like - eventually eliminates the insurgency. And I agree that it is a matter more of training leaders and troops to be comfortable in different environments, rather than providing an equipment/force structure that is optimized for this mission or that.

    JWolfsberger, I looked at the TO&E, but mechanized divisions in the Cold War had indigenous armor - in Fred Franks' into the storm, he says the difference in tanks between an armored division (he had 1st and 3rd, + 1st Cav) and 1st Infantry (Mechanized) was 50-75 tanks. 1st Inf had a large indigenous tank force. Without it, they couldn't have done the breach. Forced entry ops would require chopping tank assets to the SBCT, unless you were going to ditch the self-contained BCT idea for the operation and work as a division.

    I'll probably let this go just because I know I'm moving out of my depth here.

    And finally, Stan, you're gonna have to travel to collect. Free beer offerings don't come without hidden costs.

    Matt
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    ...the either/or rhetoric is tiring and severely underestimates the intelligence and flexibility of our officers and NCO's - and the role of kinetic ops...we need to get away from this amateurish either/or debate about competencies and define what our leaders SHOULD look like for the future. HINT: it's neither a COIN/IW or a MCO specialist, but somehwere in between - finding what that is should be our direction, and get past this COIN/MCO focus name calling.
    I am not sure where you get the idea that Dunlap, or me, or others are taking an "either/or" position. I am certainly not nor is Dunlap in his oped. Of course we need the capability to do Coin and MCO but how do you build a force and train it to do both in resource constrained environment. If you were a battalion commander today and you knew you had to deploy your battalion to iraq in 10 months what would be your focus? To complicate matters a bit and to build on this hypothetical, what if you could look into a crystal ball and you knew that 6 months after you returned from Iraq your battalion would be deployed to Korea to fight against a north korean invasion of the south? How would you structure your training in these hypotheticals?

    The point that Dunlap makes that many still dont want to accept is that the American Army has become a counterinsurgency only force; so to use your words its not an academic argument over either a coin force or an MCO force; instead it is an ACTUAL problem that the American army is now ONLY Coin. That is a reality and a problem that we must face squarely and accept and was the point of the Dunlap oped.

    In another thread there is talk about the new FM 3-0 being released in February. Will it receive the same attention that FM 3-24 did when it was released over a year ago? Will the authors of the new FM 3-0 be appearing on the Charlie Rose show anytime soon? I hope so but sadly i suggest probably not. I dont make this comment to be mean (or catty) toward those who have appeared on the Charlie Rose (or other popular shows) but to highlight the point that our Army today is a Coin only force and we should be worried about that.

    gg

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