me too which is why i posted and recommended it on another thread. Major Daniels does warn against getting so fixated on the current fight (coin) that it causes us to conclude that the future will just look just like today and then build a force structure around that misconception.Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger
gg
I agree with everything MAJ Davis wrote here. What if FCS is built upon a flawed premise? I don't like the capabiliites I lose as a recon guy with the FCS at all.
I don't disagree with LTC Gentile on this area of the subject. I just respectfully disagree that we've become an exclusively COIN Army.
Example is better than precept.
Having read a lot of the input, it seems that I'm hearing that our training has been dominated by COIN. Understandable, because that's the war we're in. I had a different perspective, knowing the effort going into material development to support full spectrum ops. I've come around to LTC Gentile's point of view, but I'm not sure it's really a problem that will bite us in the alpha.
Last edited by J Wolfsberger; 01-11-2008 at 09:34 PM. Reason: Correct spelling
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
Sorry about the repost. I used the search function thinking it would already be here, but it didn't show up.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
Steps? "Step away from the cookie jar..."
RTK said:I agree with that. Both thoughts. I'd also suggest that the current emphasis on COIN is, as many say, totally understandable -- that's what we're doing now.I don't disagree with LTC Gentile on this area of the subject. I just respectfully disagree that we've become an exclusively COIN Army.
Thus it may appear that we're over emphasizing it but that perception is heightened by the fact that our determination from 1975 until 2005 to concentrate solely on MCO and thus to deny that the COIN function existed, much less was an Army mission, led to a capability gap that was -- or should have been -- an embarrassment to the Army and many who 'grew up' in that era prefer the relative clarity and ease of focus a single mission type provides and though they prove daily they can adapt to the COIN arena, they don't like it (who would? Totally understandable) and want to move away from it.
The world today is chaotic, is not itself simple enough to allow that and it has been repeatedly proven that politics and not Army desires are the determinant on where, when and to do what the US Army will be deployed in future -- and no one can predict that where, when or what...
I'm less afraid of excessive emphasis on COIN than I am of an overcompensation led by both the heavy and FCS communities over the next few years to again relegate COIN to oblivion because of the threat to equipment purchases or for other reasons. That would be a mistake, one we've made before and do not need to repeat.
We can do all the missions; MCO and COIN and things that lay between the two. We may have to do them all. The emphasis and effort should be on how to get there -- not to exclude a spectrum for cost savings and simplicity. The troops can handle it.
Can the system?
Ken:
I agree with most of what you say especially the first couple of sentences where you point out that the army, wrongly, turned its head away from any kind of irregular training and emphasis when history and a careful prediction of future operations should have demanded at least some attention to it.
I also accept the practical reasons for the army's complete (operational and not necessarily institutional training) focus now on counterinsurgency operations. Because of the size of the Army we have no slack and really have no choice but to focus almost completely on Coin. RTK disagrees from his persepective as a trainer of junior officers from the institutional training base; of course i acknowledge the weight that his training places on mco. But when those combat lts go out to the field army they do only coin; either actual coin in iraq and afghanistan or in trainups for the next deployment. That is the reality of the operational army today.
I am less sanguine, however, than Ken White is with the future. He worries about the Army regressing into an 80s mindset where we again disregard coin and irregular war for mco and hic. I have an opposite worry; that since we are so focussed on coin today it causes us to see a future of a security environment described by people like TX Hammes that is predominated by irregular warfare. That conception of the future then drives ideas like lightening the American army and basically turning it into a nation-building, light infantry force (there was an article in another thread a few months ago titled something like "rage against the machines" that made this argument). Nagl's recommendation for a permanent advisory corps is a step in this direction.
gian
Thanks for the response. If WM is correct and you
hail from the Bay area originally, let it be known that (a) San Francisco is till my favorite US city and (b) I'm concerned that you've lost that sunny optimism...
Not so much worried as concerned about the fact that I already see community battles as opposed to a focus on what the ARMY needs to do.I am less sanguine, however, than Ken White is with the future. He worries about the Army regressing into an 80s mindset where we again disregard coin and irregular war for mco and hic...A valid concern -- as I've always agreed. As as an aside, my 18 years of service Son met Hammes and heard him speak. He wasn't at all impressed or convinced nor do I expect the Army is (with all due apologies to my Marine brethren). Really.I have an opposite worry; that since we are so focussed on coin today it causes us to see a future of a security environment described by people like TX Hammes that is predominated by irregular warfare...
Yes, there's a great deal of that COIN to the fore babble going around but I suspect part of my willingness to not get unduly perturbed about it is the fact that also occurred just as loudly from 1962-70 and as soon as that COIN op headed for the boneyard, so did the excessive emphasis on COIN then prevalent because it meant money in the coffers.
That time it got replaced by burying COIN; I hope we're smarter than that this time -- and I also would hope we do not yet again succumb to Branch warfare. That happens, it becomes a crap shoot and squeaking wheels get oiled then by default, Congress makes decisions because the Army can't get its act together...I suspect that the plus up will be mostly light infantry as that is the cheapest set of stuff to buy. No other reason. We need the heavy stuff and the leadership knows it, it is not going away. As that same Son (an Airborne infantry type) told me when he was in Baghdad in '04 "The M1 and Iraq mean all this foolishness about the demise of the Tank will go away, the Tank is here for another fifty years at least."...That conception of the future then drives ideas like lightening the American army and basically turning it into a nation-building, light infantry force (there was an article in another thread a few months ago titled something like "rage against the machines" that made this argument)...
The heavy divisions will stay and the FCS guys will fight to bring that to life; light infantry will get a plus up because its cheap (and easy to cut when the budget gets sliced) and needed in Afghanistan where I suspect we will be operating after Iraq chills and we draw down to overwatch mode (that I expect within a year).Yes it is -- couple of months ago I wrote a SWJ Blog Article saying that was a really bad idea -- I expected a lot of 4GW lovers to attack, got very few responses. None, IIRC. Surprised me. Regardless, I'll bet big bucks that ain't gonna happen and it should not unless it's an RC element less than half the size he sought -- and I doubt that'll occur unless the RC sees it as a space generator....Nagl's recommendation for a permanent advisory corps is a step in this direction.
Awful long way of saying I agree with your concern and I hope mine is misplaced and we end up with a balanced, multi spectral force.
I also hope we fix our initial entry training, officer and Enlisted to enable that to occur with less effort.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but Rummy canceled this big gun long before he used the term "dead enders." Can you lay all the blame on COIN or must transformation take its fair share too?
Last edited by Rank amateur; 01-12-2008 at 03:14 AM.
Ken:....If WM is correct and you...hail from the Bay area originally, let it be known that (a) San Francisco is till my favorite US city and (b) I'm concerned that you've lost that sunny optimism...
Of course me too; I actually grew up in the East Bay but as a kid we often went into the City. I am still an optimist at heart but with some SanFran fog-like sadness hanging over me by the silence of the families of the soldiers who I left behind.
Thanks for your thoughtful response; we are in general agreement on things. If I disagree with you it is always with much trepidation.
gg
COIN Hangover
I'm not as convinced that the Army won't revert to the MCO comfort zone. As John T, Ken and perhaps others recall, Ft Benning of the late 60's early 70's had thatched hut villages scattered around the training areas. By the mid-70s, the villages had been razed and the war was refered to only as the "livefire exercise in Southeast Asia". Enter Active Defense and Airland Battle. Weren't gonna do that COIN stuff again.
If Big Army truly can't get the balance for the future right, maybe we need to head down the Krpinevich/Nagl/etc route of 2 armies.
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