We Still Need the Big Guns

[SWJED]

We Still Need the Big Guns by Major General Charles Dunlap Jr. - New York Times op-ed.

The relative calm that America’s armed forces have imposed on Iraq is certainly grounds for cautious optimism. But it also raises some obvious questions: how was it achieved and what does it mean for future defense planning?

Many analysts understandably attribute the success to our troops’ following the dictums of the Army’s lauded new counterinsurgency manual. While the manual is a vast improvement over its predecessors, it would be a huge mistake to take it as proof — as some in the press, academia and independent policy organizations have — that victory over insurgents is achievable by anything other than traditional military force.

Unfortunately, starry-eyed enthusiasts have misread the manual to say that defeating an insurgency is all about winning hearts and minds with teams of anthropologists, propagandists and civil-affairs officers armed with democracy-in-a-box kits and volleyball nets. They dismiss as passé killing or capturing insurgents...

[William F. Owen]

— that victory over insurgents is achievable by anything other than traditional military force.

Unfortunately, starry-eyed enthusiasts have misread the manual to say that defeating an insurgency is all about winning hearts and minds with teams of anthropologists, propagandists and civil-affairs officers armed with democracy-in-a-box kits and volleyball nets. They dismiss as passé killing or capturing insurgents...

I am broadly in agreement with this sentiment. Defeating any type of armed opponent still requires an effective degree of military force.

I would also add that the current fascination with so-called COIN risks creating an entirely predictable back lash, because the study of COIN may (or even has) become a source of promoting personal and organisational agendas. - and I speak as an advocate of Infantry Doctrine, so I am prone to just this hazard.

COIN is what most armies, spend most of their time doing. A skilled army posses the skills sets and equipment to operate across the spectrum of conflict. Being good at the top end, does not preclude being good at the bottom.

[Gian P Gentile]

I am broadly in agreement with this sentiment.

As many might have guessed, me too!!

Unfortunately the American Army has become a counterinsurgency-only force which is exactly what MG Dunlap is getting at in his piece. I have also argued in other places that our hyper-focus on Counterinsurgency and our dogmatic approach to Iraq clouds our ability to see things in Iraq (and Afghanistan) as they really are.

Another solid piece in this regard that argues for an American ground force that is built on mobility, technology, and protection (and not a light infantry-only force for pre-determined irregular warfare in the future) is Major Daniel L Davis's Heavy and Agile in the January edition of AFJ.

[Steve Blair]

Once again it's an "either/or" scenario...and those don't work. I didn't really expect to see anything different from Dunlap, though.

[MattC86]

Once again it's an "either/or" scenario...and those don't work. I didn't really expect to see anything different from Dunlap, though.

No, either/or is not particularly helpful, but there isn't the money or manpower available for everything. The Army and Marine Corps claim they need new troops, the Air Force claims it needs a new fighter fleet (and Dunlap, apparently, includes a fighter BEYOND the F-22?) and the Navy new submarines, cruisers, and a coming new fleet of aircraft carriers.

It's just not realistic. There's going to be major pressure for a drop in defense spending if we disengage from Iraq, especially if a Democrat is in office (and they control Congress), and even if there wasn't, there certainly wouldn't be a massive hike beyond current levels, as this piece suggests is necessary. Beyond that, there isn't time to train personnel effectively in all areas. Guys like Dunlap know there is no way we can do both, so it's a deceptive way of saying stop doing this COIN boondoggle and buy us more jets.

Prioritizing and compromising are difficult and painful, but just going to be a fact of life.

Matt

[Adam L]

No, either/or is not particularly helpful, but there isn't the money or manpower available for everything. The Army and Marine Corps claim they need new troops, the Air Force claims it needs a new fighter fleet (and Dunlap, apparently, includes a fighter BEYOND the F-22?) and the Navy new submarines, cruisers, and a coming new fleet of aircraft carriers.

It's just not realistic. There's going to be major pressure for a drop in defense spending if we disengage from Iraq, especially if a Democrat is in office (and they control Congress), and even if there wasn't, there certainly wouldn't be a massive hike beyond current levels, as this piece suggests is necessary. Beyond that, there isn't time to train personnel effectively in all areas. Guys like Dunlap know there is no way we can do both, so it's a deceptive way of saying stop doing this COIN boondoggle and buy us more jets.

It's not realistic, but unfortunately necessary. The AF needs new aircraft. The more advanced aircraft have short lifespans. The AF made a big mistake "skipping" a generation of fighter after the F15 in order to jump ahead to the F22. Advanced avionics and composite structures are only dependable to 20 years. (Look at all the grounded F15's) We are stuck replacing them every 20-?30? years from here on out. Whether we replace them with a newer version of the same aircraft or develop a new aircraft is a big question.

The Navy definitely needs new ships (or to retrofit current ships which would cost just as much if not more.) Although I am skeptical of many of the ships under development (and the overall direction of it), I must admit that it's necessary.

The Army does need more men (and a lot of equipment.) I'm not as sure about the Marine Corp, but that stems from the debate of exactly where they fit into everything these days (something that seems to be an ongoing and popular debate on this site.)

Prioritizing and compromising are difficult and painful, but just going to be a fact of life.

Matt

The problem is I don't think there is much we can do without there. This country could afford all of this (recruiting is a different issue) if we were more economically responsible and practical. A big defense budget (a responsible one) is good for America and the economy. People need to start understanding this.

(Sorry about this rant. Especially since it's a little late.)

Adam L

[Ron Humphrey]

As many might have guessed, me too!!

Unfortunately the American Army has become a counterinsurgency-only force which is exactly what MG Dunlap is getting at in his piece. I have also argued in other places that our hyper-focus on Counterinsurgency and our dogmatic approach to Iraq clouds our ability to see things in Iraq (and Afghanistan) as they really are.

For those of us without the exposure and experience to be able to clearly see it; would it be possible for you to help define how things really are that we might be missing?

[Gian P Gentile]

For those of us without the exposure and experience to be able to clearly see it; would it be possible for you to help define how things really are that we might be missing?

It has nothing to do with "exposure and experience" but a willingness to confront conventional wisdom and ask hard questions about what has really brought about the lowered levels of violence in Iraq; and then consider reasonable policies for the future that align ends and means with strategic interests.

Specifically to your question I lay out an argument in a short article that is currently running in Armed Forces Journal, Our Coin Doctrine Removes the Enemy from the Essence of War, which is a response to another article, More Soup Please: Coin Manual Provides Guidance for Modern-day Tactical Commanders, written by Major Chris Rogers, also in this edition of AFJ, that criticizes my earlier Eating Soup with a Spoon piece.

gian

[Ron Humphrey]

It has nothing to do with "exposure and experience" but a willingness to confront conventional wisdom and ask hard questions about what has really brought about the lowered levels of violence in Iraq; and then consider reasonable policies for the future that align ends and means with strategic interests.

Specifically to your question I lay out an argument in a short article that is currently running in Armed Forces Journal, Our Coin Doctrine Removes the Enemy from the Essence of War, which is a response to another article, More Soup Please: Coin Manual Provides Guidance for Modern-day Tactical Commanders, written by Major Chris Rogers, also in this edition of AFJ, that criticizes my earlier Eating Soup with a Spoon piece.

gian

I remember when eating soup with a spoon first came to my attention and there where discussions about it.

Upon first reading it I responded with the following:

I can see in his writing that LTC Gentile is a soldiers soldier who see's the job for what it is; that being a fighter who's overarching purpose is fighting.

This being said I would think the true determining factor in how and when a counter-insurgency should be handled would be contingent on the expected outcome in the end.

In other words if one is fighting an insurgency in their own country for the survival of their pre-existing government/leadership infrastructure such as many communist/dictatorial countries have historically then attrition is a definitive goal of their actions.

Also in this context they seek to discourage any further growth of that insurgency through harsh and awe inspiring action designed to create fear of standing against their power.

This is where I think the greatest difference can be found in Iraq. One would not expect police officers to come into a riot/demonstration and shut it down through attritive actions despite how much the adrenalin rush might do for the the officers mental states in as far as believing in their cause.

If the ultimate goal of any military is to provide an environment in which a democratic construct and new culture of empowered populace may come into existence than you kind of have to change your approach from that of a traditional war or counter insurgency standard.

If your soldier staying in a joint station, armed and looking for the enemy is unable to feel relatively safe than one would assume that that local populace definately is not in a situation where they may try to stand up.

As soldiers your job is to fight this is true, just as a boxer's job is to box. There are however countless factors outside of the physical interaction that the boxer must study and be aware of in order to enter the ring confidently. Once the bell rings it comes down to mano y mano but if you know that the other guy can't last longer than 2 rounds than your first step is to avoid contact and keep him moving to wear him down.
This helps to equalize the battle when it does happen. and just as in the boxing match in order to win punches must be thrown so to even in counter insurgency the blows will come ( from both sides).

Long and short I think 3- 24 is not meant to redefine war so much as to guide and encourage thought before during and after the actions take place.

I wrote this in September of last year. I have continued to study, listen and learn all I could in regards to your concerns and yet I consistently come back to one major conclusion.

3-24 was not written to replace 3-0 and as such it would seem that those responsible for developing it would be just as if not more concerned about it being applied in ways not intended. I believe they have shown this is true in their honest responses and continued reminders to all that it's not everything but something very important given current operational environments.

In the effort to build and maintain true Full Spectrum capabilities it is and ( I don't see anyone saying differently) just as important that the force be skilled in large scale manuever and warfare as small and assymetric capabilities. I can tell you one thing I know without a doubt.

Any Brigade commander would have a much better chance of deploying a truly capable large or small scale fighting capability now then they would have between 1990 -2000. Simply if for no other reason than the officers and enlisted now have not only recieved more effective training but most have been there done that on both scales at this point.

Although I understand your underlying concerns, It really would seem that considering the current training and fighting cultures, Forgetting about the big fights would be about the last thing most soldiers would do.

But as I said this is just my take on it for what it's worth