We Still Need the Big Guns

[Old Eagle]

I'm not as convinced that the Army won't revert to the MCO comfort zone. As John T, Ken and perhaps others recall, Ft Benning of the late 60's early 70's had thatched hut villages scattered around the training areas. By the mid-70s, the villages had been razed and the war was refered to only as the "livefire exercise in Southeast Asia". Enter Active Defense and Airland Battle. Weren't gonna do that COIN stuff again.

If Big Army truly can't get the balance for the future right, maybe we need to head down the Krpinevich/Nagl/etc route of 2 armies.

[Steve Blair]

I'm not as convinced that the Army won't revert to the MCO comfort zone. As John T, Ken and perhaps others recall, Ft Benning of the late 60's early 70's had thatched hut villages scattered around the training areas. By the mid-70s, the villages had been razed and the war was refered to only as the "livefire exercise in Southeast Asia". Enter Active Defense and Airland Battle. Weren't gonna do that COIN stuff again.

If Big Army truly can't get the balance for the future right, maybe we need to head down the Krpinevich/Nagl/etc route of 2 armies.

I agree. There are far too many historical examples of this happening to ignore. Big Army (even when it was a small army) has always wanted to focus on the ideal "large force on large force" combat model at the expense of anything else. Even when its main business was acting as a constabulary the training models were firmly focused on fighting a European-style enemy (or re-fighting the parts of the Civil War that appealed...mostly the large Eastern Theater battles against Lee). It wasn't so much Army training that allowed success in the Philippines...it was the large number of Indian Wars veterans within the ranks (both officer and enlisted) who could draw on their own experiences and not their training. That's a model we might actually see in the future...the Army reverting to its "comfort zone" and seeing any success on future COIN battlefields due to the remaining experience of its officer and NCO corps and not its own foresight and training. Of course, given the exodus of that experience (and assuming we see something similar to the weeding that took place after Vietnam) that knowledge might be very thin in the ground within a handful of years.

[zenpundit]

We need both the Fulda Gap -or at least a mini-me version -capacity and COIN, the latter for reasons that need no explanation here.

Building and maintaining the former at a level all potential near-peer competitors find economically prohibitive acts as a systemic/environmental barrier to entry on restarting a serious arms race with the United States. If you can't win anyway from the inception then you avoid risking your entire economy on trying to do so. Much better investment for the U.S. to keep our relative strategic position intact than to risk regional arms races and reviving interstate warfare by trying to scrape to get Defense spending under 2-3 % of GDP and tempting foreign statesmen to roll the dice.

[Ski]

The military has all the money in the world, it spends it foolishly however. You could take 1% of the Navy and Air Force base budget and spend it on the Army quite easily with little to no effect on these services overall performance.

The Army is for certain headed back into the full spectrum/3GW/maneuver warfare/high intensity realm once these wars settle down. The MTOE's have not changed since the beginning of modularity (although there are 2nd gen MTOE's supposedly being written), and these were definately designed for the Fulda Gap.

The MTOE's are the canary in the coal mine. If they change, it means more changes overall are coming.

Fully agree with Ken BTW - Light Infantry is much cheaper to activate, man, equip and train than heavy forces.

It's all about balance - and training...

[wm]

We need both the Fulda Gap -or at least a mini-me version -capacity and COIN, the latter for reasons that need no explanation here.

Building and maintaining the former at a level all potential near-peer competitors find economically prohibitive acts as a systemic/environmental barrier to entry on restarting a serious arms race with the United States. If you can't win anyway from the inception then you avoid risking your entire economy on trying to do so. Much better investment for the U.S. to keep our relative strategic position intact than to risk regional arms races and reviving interstate warfare by trying to scrape to get Defense spending under 2-3 % of GDP and tempting foreign statesmen to roll the dice.

Zenpundit:
I see two problems with this tactic as a way of deterring others from entering a conventional arms race with the US:

(1) Money that would have been spent on such an arms race by potential opponents can be diverted to other uses that might make those potential adversaries believe that a non-conventional conflict is more winnable (or at least more likely) for them. By non-conventional here, I mean anything short of playing the the nuclear card--chem-bio weapons, terrorism, economic warfare, insurgent/guerrilla tactics, info/cyberwar, etc.

(2) The temptation exists/forms for conventional "have-nots" to develop a nuclear weapons capability in order to be able to use the threat of nuclear war to gain political leverage/concessions (e.g., N.Korea, Iran, Iraq under Saddam perhaps). Not quite MAD, but still a potent threat to consider.

BTW, this line of thinking--to deter others by keeping one's own military forces bigger and better than anyone else's--actually causes an arms race with only one contestant. As technology marches on, the single "superpower" must continue to maintain and upgrade its "big stick" military forces while also maintaining the capability to fight the "small wars" that seem more likely to erupt.
"Golly gee, Mr. Wizard, isn't that the dilemma the US is facing right now?"

[zenpundit]

Hi WM

You wrote:

"(1) Money that would have been spent on such an arms race by potential opponents can be diverted to other uses that might make those potential adversaries believe that a non-conventional conflict is more winnable (or at least more likely) for them. By non-conventional here, I mean anything short of playing the the nuclear card--chem-bio weapons, terrorism, economic warfare, insurgent/guerrilla tactics, info/cyberwar, etc."

Hypothetically speaking, you and I are going to fight a war: Would you prefer to play the role of the United States with it's particular advantages and drawbacks or would you prefer to be regional power X who will base their strategy on deploying all the asymmetric weapons you mentioned?

States choose asymmetry options in conflict with America because they have had to do so not because their general staffs and statesmen preferred that alternative.

(2) The temptation exists/forms for conventional "have-nots" to develop a nuclear weapons capability in order to be able to use the threat of nuclear war to gain political leverage/concessions (e.g., N.Korea, Iran, Iraq under Saddam perhaps). Not quite MAD, but still a potent threat to consider.

Nuclear weapons do not run on the same continuum of logic as do conventional arms, either for acquisition or purposes of deterrence.

The USSR was hardly a conventional "have-not" state when it exploded an atomic bomb in 1947. Most of the states that have subsequently developed nuclear weapons have been in a condition of conventional parity or near parity with whatever states they considered their primary threat or they were redressing an imbalance where a rival state had nuclear weapons in addition to conventional parity. Some, including Israel, India and the United States, enjoyed military superiority over their enemies when they developed nuclear weapons while some countries like Britain and France acquired nukes primarily for reasons of prestige than effective defense and elected to build only very modest nuclear arsenals.

Nuclear arsenals of third and fourth rate states are a potent factor, I agree, but their utility is of exceptionally limited value in the context of brandishing them against the United States or Russia. Pakistan's nuclear status was of no help in resisting an ultimatum from Washington in the aftermath of 9-11 thought it remained crucial for deterring India from going to war over Kashmir.

[Ken White]

One trick ponies...

[wm]

Zenpundit,
Your points are appropriate in those cases where another entity chooses to play America's game in a conflict, or chooses to pick a fight with America directly. However, other possibilities exist. Oppponents need not confront the US directly, if at all, in an effort to establish some hegemony.

Hypothetically speaking, you and I are going to fight a war: Would you prefer to play the role of the United States with it's particular advantages and drawbacks or would you prefer to be regional power X who will base their strategy on deploying all the asymmetric weapons you mentioned?

States choose asymmetry options in conflict with America because they have had to do so not because their general staffs and statesmen preferred that alternative.

You are quite right about how things went in the past. I acknowledge that, all things being equal, one might prefer to have the capabilities of the US. However, all things are not equal these days. Now, potential oppponents may choose, rather than be forced, to play the asymmetric card--which was my point. They could also identify critical vulnerabilities to America's conventional forces and bend all their efforts to developing means to exploit them, rather than try to overawe America's military in a force on force slugfest.

Nuclear weapons do not run on the same continuum of logic as do conventional arms, either for acquisition or purposes of deterrence.

The USSR was hardly a conventional "have-not" state when it exploded an atomic bomb in 1947. Most of the states that have subsequently developed nuclear weapons have been in a condition of conventional parity or near parity with whatever states they considered their primary threat or they were redressing an imbalance where a rival state had nuclear weapons in addition to conventional parity. Some, including Israel, India and the United States, enjoyed military superiority over their enemies when they developed nuclear weapons while some countries like Britain and France acquired nukes primarily for reasons of prestige than effective defense and elected to build only very modest nuclear arsenals.

Nuclear arsenals of third and fourth rate states are a potent factor, I agree, but their utility is of exceptionally limited value in the context of brandishing them against the United States or Russia. Pakistan's nuclear status was of no help in resisting an ultimatum from Washington in the aftermath of 9-11 thought it remained crucial for deterring India from going to war over Kashmir.

You are completely right that owning nukes changes the logic/calculus of international relations. I am not sure that I would be concerned about a 2nd or 3rd rate power that has acquired nukes " brandishing them against the United States or Russia."
I'd be more concerned about a scenario where the threat was leveled against one of our allies--NK, for example, says, Do not try to restrict my export of missile technology to Iran or I will nuke Tokyo. Or, to build from your example, what would the US do today should India or Pakistan opt to invade Kashnir and warn of US intervention with the threat of nuke use against the other party (or some other country within range--like Israel, e.g.)?


I wonder why you did not coment on what I thought was the most important point--the apparent dilemma about America becoming involved in an arms race with itself.

[zenpundit]

Hi wm,

Fair enough, I'll start by addressing that specific point:

"I wonder why you did not coment on what I thought was the most important point--the apparent dilemma about America becoming involved in an arms race with itself."

That does qualify as a dilemma ( though a much better one than a bilateral arms race). The iron triangle that exists between defense contactors, the Pentagon and the Congress combined with Executive branch leaders who are unable or unwilling to make long-term strategic choices leads to a great deal of wasted money on weapons systems that try to be everything to all services or are redundant. You are right to raise caveats about that aspect.

That being said, if I were given a choice on spending more money to maintain a defense establishment that is economically out of reach of our nearest competitors and fighting fewer wars and those at a comparative advantage or spending far less, scaling back our capabilities and commitments and risking a revival of interstate warfare, I'll take the former. It's cheaper and safer in the long run.

"

Now, potential oppponents may choose, rather than be forced, to play the asymmetric card--which was my point. They could also identify critical vulnerabilities to America's conventional forces and bend all their efforts to developing means to exploit them, rather than try to overawe America's military in a force on force slugfest."

I think that is a rational assumption. Opponents always could, given their resources, have looked for an asymmetric advantage to complement any traditional conventional military forces or aspects of "hard power". We of course, can and should do the same instead of resting on our laurels and consider our own critical systems in terms of designing them for greater resiliency.

"I'd be more concerned about a scenario where the threat was leveled against one of our allies--NK, for example, says, Do not try to restrict my export of missile technology to Iran or I will nuke Tokyo. Or, to build from your example, what would the US do today should India or Pakistan opt to invade Kashnir and warn of US intervention with the threat of nuke use against the other party (or some other country within range--like Israel, e.g.)?"

Interesting scenarios. "Credibility" is still very much an issue in terms of nuclear posture despite the Cold War having ended. Rogue states and state actors with small arsenals cannot escape the same limitations regarding using nuclear arms to secure political objectives that Bernard Brodie articulated a half-century ago.

The first example, while in line with the tradition of wacky DPRK rhetoric, lacks credibility because if North Korea were to make such a threat in earnest ( visibly make preparations to arm Taepodong missiles) over so minor an issue it would risk not only the prospect of complete annihilation from an American nuclear response but the probability of Japanese nuclearization in response to such a threat - something that would not suit North Korea's patron, China.

In the second instance, either India or Pakistan would already be risking nuclear war by choosing a full-blown invasion of Kashmir - does adding America to this equation increase or decrease the likelihood of nuclear war ? Most likely it decreases it because the prospect of American intervention would be decisive so both parties would have an interest in backing away from the brink.

[wm]

The iron triangle that exists between defense contactors, the Pentagon and the Congress combined with Executive branch leaders who are unable or unwilling to make long-term strategic choices leads to a great deal of wasted money on weapons systems that try to be everything to all services or are redundant. You are right to raise caveats about that aspect.

That being said, if I were given a choice on spending more money to maintain a defense establishment that is economically out of reach of our nearest competitors and fighting fewer wars and those at a comparative advantage or spending far less, scaling back our capabilities and commitments and risking a revival of interstate warfare, I'll take the former. It's cheaper and safer in the long run.

Given your chosen avatar (Emeror Palpatine from Star Wars)), you ought to remember Leia's line to Governor Tarkin as the Empire blows up her home planet. A corollary to her point is that holding the military card will not guarantee peace or security. Hobbes made a variation on that point in Leviathan as a step in his argument that people have a duty to seek peace.

I doubt that your proposal will be "cheaper and safer in the long run." For example,were we to dig into the history of the Roman Empire's budget, I suspect we would find that it nearly bankrupted itself by trying to maintain a strong standing army to defend its outer frontiers while also funding a collection of mobile cohorts for use in putting down internal revolts (like the Zealot's revolt in Judea in 70 AD--and I know that this revolt was actually put down by Vespian and Titus with Legions, not expeditionary cohorts--followed by the Kitos War 40 years later and Bar Kochba's revolt 20 years after that; similar stuff was happening in Dalmatia and Illyria as well as Germannia, Pannonia, Noricum, and Rhaetia in later years). When the Romans found that they could not afford both efforts, they started to trade land to "outsiders" in exchange for an agreement to defend the frontiers and kept a few mobile armies to respond to breakthroughs at the frontiers (See Luttwak's Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire and Isaac's The Limits of Empire ). We know what the outcome of all that was. I fear that if America takes your chosen road, it will end up with something like what happened to the Romans.

Opponents always could, given their resources, have looked for an asymmetric advantage to complement any traditional conventional military forces or aspects of "hard power". We of course, can and should do the same instead of resting on our laurels and consider our own critical systems in terms of designing them for greater resiliency.

This lands us back in the unilateral arms race dilemma I already described. Given the point you made in the first quotation,above, about the "iron triangle," AKA the military-industrial complex that Eisenhower warned us about, and and senior leadership that lacks either the wits or the abdominal or testicular fortitude to do what it takes, I wonder how likely it is that we will not just rest on our laurels. I suspect we will instead buy the latest "gee whiz" solution that the vendors push at us, especially if it happens to mean a lot of job production in "key" Congressional districts.

[Steve Blair]

This lands us back in the unilateral arms race dilemma I already described. Given the point you made in the first quotation,above, about the "iron triangle," AKA the military-industrial complex that Eisenhower warned us about, and and senior leadership that lacks either the wits or the abdominal or testicular fortitude to do what it takes, I wonder how likely it is that we will not just rest on our laurels. I suspect we will instead buy the latest "gee whiz" solution that the vendors push at us, especially if it happens to mean a lot of job production in "key" Congressional districts.

I've always found Eisenhower's caution interesting, especially since his reliance on "massive retaliation" had a great deal to do with accelerating the project development cycle and reliance on high-tech systems (and the concurrent need to maintain those and develop new ones). Bigger, higher, faster certainly began under his watch, and has just accelerated.

America never maintained a large standing army prior to Word War II. What we see now is really the remains of that conflict (as Ken has pointed out before). What we might consider normal is actually quite abnormal for America historically. We're in danger, I think, of becoming a high-tech "one trick pony" (good phrase, Ken) with a training model that's intended for raising a conscript force. Lord knows our personnel system is left over from that period.

[J Wolfsberger]

What we might consider normal is actually quite abnormal for America historically.

I agree - our normal operating mode (historically) seems to be going to war undermanned with antiquated equipment.

It might also be well to remember the nursery rhyme that begins "For want of a nail..." It should begin: "For lack of a smithy, the nail wasn't made..." We can no more expect to turn on a company such as Ford or Caterpillar to make combat vehicles overnight than we can expect to turn an 18 year old into a competent infantryman in 8 - 12 weeks of basic training.

Generally, systems that aren't effective get cut, redirected, or terminated. And, yes, there are also some things that get funded simply to maintain industrial base. I, for one, would be seriously concerned by any politician who threatened to end that. To someone completely ignorant of modern weapon systems, it might seem feasible to just pull in the "freeze dried engineers," a sentiment popular in the late 80s - early 90s, and start the weapon design process. In practice, those novice engineers, and especially their management, will require one or two practice programs just to reach the level of competence needed to develop an effective system. When you realize that those "practice" systems will run into years and $Bs, keeping the base ticking over is a prudent investment.

[selil]

I agree - our normal operating mode (historically) seems to be going to war undermanned with antiquated equipment.

It might also be well to remember the nursery rhyme that begins "For want of a nail..." It should begin: "For lack of a smithy, the nail wasn't made..." We can no more expect to turn on a company such as Ford or Caterpillar to make combat vehicles overnight than we can expect to turn an 18 year old into a competent infantryman in 8 - 12 weeks of basic training.

Generally, systems that aren't effective get cut, redirected, or terminated. And, yes, there are also some things that get funded simply to maintain industrial base. I, for one, would be seriously concerned by any politician who threatened to end that. To someone completely ignorant of modern weapon systems, it might seem feasible to just pull in the "freeze dried engineers," a sentiment popular in the late 80s - early 90s, and start the weapon design process. In practice, those novice engineers, and especially their management, will require one or two practice programs just to reach the level of competence needed to develop an effective system. When you realize that those "practice" systems will run into years and $Bs, keeping the base ticking over is a prudent investment.

Though I don't disagree with the specifics I do disagree with the thread. American technology followed societal mores into specialization and impoverished flexibility. There absolutely no reason a tank chassis can't be shared with a caterpillar dozer or vice a versa. The tank came second and was hung around a custom one off chassis that extremely expensive. In fact if you look back to the 50's and before you find most military equipment was based on civilian models from the ubiquitous jeep to the DC3.

The specification and procurement process lost that and gave us $300 toilet seats and so on. You currently can't mass produce tanks. There will be no way to produce them quickly. Liberty ships are a thing of the past. There seems to be golden memory of the production capability of America but that is plain gone. Not because we can't build or create, but because the final products are so far away from their civilian counterparts as to be impossible to mass produce.

Get rid of single threaded tipping point technologies and deconstruct the mess of contractor abominations and you might be able to make cases for to large of standing army. One beget the other and y'all can argue about which is which.

[J Wolfsberger]

There absolutely no reason a tank chassis can't be shared with a caterpillar dozer or vice a versa.

Unfortunately, there actually are a lot of reasons you can't. The two have almost nothing in common, either functionally or technically. In fact, except for the fact that they're both tracked vehicles with internal combustion engines, they have absolutely nothing in common. (And reading back on this, I realize that "track" and "engine" overstates the minuscule commonality that exists.) And that makes sense. Why would you put tons of armor on a Cat D11? Or a turret? Or a main gun? And all of those (plus a lot of other needs) drive immense design differences.

...The specification and procurement process lost that and gave us $300 toilet seats and so on...

True. There were problems - generally due to the inefficiencies of the procurement process, contractor greed, sheer stupidity, or all of the above. But the critics contributed to that out of ignorance and partisan politics. My personal favorite was Proxmire's Golden Fleece award going to, I believe, Grumman for a $50 hammer. Proxmire claimed he could by the "same" hammer at Sears for $2. Well, no. The hammer was made of a non sparking alloy for use on aircraft carrier flight decks. I'd have bought a six pack of beer to sit (at a safe distance) and watch the good senator bang away - until the light show started.

Get rid of single threaded tipping point technologies and deconstruct the mess of contractor abominations and you might be able to make cases for to large of standing army. One beget the other and y'all can argue about which is which.

I'm not sure what you're driving at. Could you give an example?

[Norfolk]

At peacetime production rates, it took 4 months to manufacture an M-1 tank and 18 months to manufacture an F-15 fighter-bomber, and AFAIK that did not include long-lead items. I have no idea how long it would take to build an F-22, never mind long-lead items, nor the FCS replacement for the M-1 if it ever materializes. And of course there are only a few facilities capable of such production in the entire country.

Ever since the Detroit Army Tank Arsenal was shut down 15 years ago, there's only been the Lima Army Tank Plant, and except for export orders, not a single new M-1 for the US Army or Marine Corps has rolled off the line since about 1992; remanufacturing old M-1s it is. I don't know if FMC's San Jose facility has any capacity to change over to MBT production quickly if it was needed. As is, the country has the (theoretical) maximum capacity of producing a grand total of just 75 M-1 tanks per month, and in just one facility. That's wouldn't cover a day's or even a few hour's losses in heavy conventional fighting, let alone provide new tanks for newly-raised formations.

As to aircraft, well, the war could be long over before an aircraft that first began to take shape in an assembly hall at the start of the war, finally rolled finished out of that assembly hall.

We cannot afford to lose our ability to wage full-on conventional war, including in a General War situation (however unlikely that may seem). And if initial entry training for officers and enlistees were sufficiently long and thorough to begin with (ie, a year for officers, six months for enlistees, and three to six months for experienced enlistees seeking to become NCOs, plus solid advanced and specialty training, etc.), then not only don't you have to skimp on COIN or LIC, but you're also giving your troops the skills they need to continue fighting successfully even if (or when) the high-tech wunderwaffen don't live up to expectations or the enemy adopts a seriously "asymmetric" approach. Kill many birds with a few stones.

[selil]

I'm not sure what you're driving at. Could you give an example?

I'm sorry I'm not being very clear and I take responsibility.

Componentized construction methods within the major manufacturers do exist. The power plant can be moved between chassis. Chassis can be swapped. This is true between cars as much as it is between dozers. A simple example is the door hinges on a Cadillac CTS are built by the same company that build them for the Toyota.

You are correct you can't swap components between a dozer and a tank and they have nothing even similar. That is the exact issue. The power plant could have been a functional component of some shared civilian technology but it is a highly customized one off unit. The suspension system of most armor could have been pulled from a variety of places in the civillian world (even upgraded and advanced but based on).

Sure what you have now for armor has little to do with the civilian world but that one of monolithic hunk of technology is hundreds of times more expensive than using COTS products. To make the point a little finer Caterpillar has continuously improved their technology in large frame, high speed, ultra reliable power train systems. When was the last time an Armor system had a serious drive train update?

One of the things that brought this back to me was a display at the Boeing museum. An SR71 engine was on the deck next to a GE new generation engine(GE90). The GE engine (130K) was FOUR times the horsepower/thrust of the SR71 (30K) engine and used half as much fuel. My understanding is that the contractors in charge of airframes for the Air Force can't even suggest such an update should it become available because of systemic disruption to the rest of the air frame. Everything is custom or one-off so there is no where to go with the technology when an update could be done.

The contracting systems in place and the lack of internalized design by the military services promote highly customized weapons systems. The use of adapted COTS technologies cost less and on a cost plus basis are less profitable. Consider this... A top of the line Boeing 787 costs between 150 and 250 million dollars. That is a monster air craft. Depending on who you believe which is an issue right off the bat the F22 has been reported to cost 330 million to 360 million dollars.

The difference in cost is so substantial and so egregious it can't be explained away simply by saying "stealth". Using terms like "system" as euphemistic effluvia when "system" really means highly customized one off cost plus profit driven war profiteering. Sorry. I let my emotions run away with me when I look at a 787 and know I could order up two for the cost of one F22 load it with stand off weapons and serve coffee to the pilots and still have enough money to buy every serving Marine new cammo uniforms.

[J Wolfsberger]

I understand the frustration. To an outsider, it appears that the entire weapon system procurement process is a monument to inefficiency and waste.

Componentized construction methods within the major manufacturers do exist. The power plant can be moved between chassis. Chassis can be swapped. This is true between cars as much as it is between dozers. A simple example is the door hinges on a Cadillac CTS are built by the same company that build them for the Toyota.

You are correct you can't swap components between a dozer and a tank and they have nothing even similar. That is the exact issue. The power plant could have been a functional component of some shared civilian technology but it is a highly customized one off unit. The suspension system of most armor could have been pulled from a variety of places in the civillian world (even upgraded and advanced but based on).

The services all try to do this whenever possible. Jet engines are a good example. The common chassis for FCS is another. The commonality is desirable for more than reduced acquisition cost. It can also lead to reduced training and a reduced logistics burden. But the reality is that it can only be carried so far.

One of the things that brought this back to me was a display at the Boeing museum. An SR71 engine was on the deck next to a GE new generation engine(GE90). The GE engine (130K) was FOUR times the horsepower/thrust of the SR71 (30K) engine and used half as much fuel. My understanding is that the contractors in charge of airframes for the Air Force can't even suggest such an update should it become available because of systemic disruption to the rest of the air frame. Everything is custom or one-off so there is no where to go with the technology when an update could be done.

True, but remember you're comparing 1960's technology to 1990s.

The contracting systems in place and the lack of internalized design by the military services promote highly customized weapons systems.

It is more accurate that the operational requirements drive the process. Even then, economies are taken advantage of. Stryker and LAV are both derivatives of the Mowag Pirhana, which was designed in the early 1970s. They are both (more or less) off the shelf systems.

The use of adapted COTS technologies cost less and on a cost plus basis are less profitable. Consider this... A top of the line Boeing 787 costs between 150 and 250 million dollars. That is a monster air craft. Depending on who you believe which is an issue right off the bat the F22 has been reported to cost 330 million to 360 million dollars.

The difference in cost is so substantial and so egregious it can't be explained away simply by saying "stealth".

On the other hand, the 787 can't travel at Mach 1.5+, its radar cross section (RCS) is the size of a barn (I know, 'stealth," but it is a huge cost driver), and it can't pull multiple Gs in a maneuver without coming apart.

I let my emotions run away with me when I look at a 787 and know I could order up two for the cost of one F22 load it with stand off weapons and serve coffee to the pilots and still have enough money to buy every serving Marine new cammo uniforms.

The Air Force wouldn't stand for it. Doesn't fly fast enough. Although there is enough room for a putting green and coffee bar.

But, spend AF dollars on Marine commo's?!? Are you daft?!?

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Guys - been doing more reading then writing as of late - plenty to do between learning the new job at work and the house.

Reading this thread gives me an opportunity to consider a policy question I've been thinking about (and a few others). While its still not decided how Iraq or Afghanistan will go down in the History books - and its also true that there is still considerable work to be done in both wars - suppose for a minute that Iraq - and Afghanistan become policy successes (regardless of the path they took to get there, and the pain lessons endured while doing so).

Suppose that on reflection - we decide that its a good idea to have greater capability and capacity to shape regions through security force assistance, or that helping a key regional country wage a counter-insurgency campaign is vital to our regional and broader goals? I ask this because winning and losing create different kinds of introspection.

After all if we can pull off what everyone (even ourselves) said was impossible only a year ago - is it likely that we will accept that our success might have been by the combination of specific quantities of DOTLMPF ingredients in conditions that could only occur in a certain place, at a certain time and in a certain way? Or will we attribute it to a defined chain of events easily traceable in linear fashion to some event that we begin to call the "decisive point"? If we failed, would we dissect a loss differently then a win? How much of why things have gone a certain way do we really know - how much of it do we just attribute to something for sake of desired cause and effect relationships?

How is considering the Army post Iraq and Afghanistan different then when the Army considered itself post Vietnam? Are the current conditions "like" enough to compare what shape the Army will take post Iraq and Afghanistan to post Vietnam?

What other factors played role in the direction the Army took following Vietnam? How did our obligations to NATO, our rivalry with the Soviet Union, our defined vital interests of the time period, the national culture of the mid 1970s, the perception of ourselves as an Army and the need to be something else (I need to Ken to provide real insight here) color our perceptions about the path the Army took in the late 1970s through 2003?. How about the course the nation perceived it needed to take - there had been some hard times during the presidencies over the years we were in Vietnam. What biases are we imposing on ourself with regard to how we think we came to be what we are with regard to military culture and predispositions?

I'm just not sure there are enough parallels to make a comparison between a future that is not here yet, and post Vietnam. I'm also not sure we've considered how success might be interpreted and what are the consequences of succeeding - for instance - we've applied the "just because you can do something does not always make for good policy" elsewhere on the discussion board. You need to start with a good reason to commit military force toward achieving a political end - because even if you are really good at something (or have decided you are good enough) things are never going to go like you planned in an interactive, complex environment like war.

It might be worthwhile to consider what happens if we win, or decide that we did good enough to justify similar policy decisions.

I also don't think we can or should return to the pre 9/11 Army. I don't mean solely force structure, mission set, or focus - its hard for me to put words to - but we are different on a more fundamental level (in a very healthy and positive manner) -from what I've seen leaders are more apt to speak their mind to one another - and the more senior ones seem more apt to listen - we've developed the ability to respect each other; to disagree and still move forward, and the ability to air our grievances and dirty laundry to those outside the military without dragging ourselves down. Its come at stiff price - but its value should not be taken lightly. I think we're also developing the capability to see past the way we'd like things to be, and instead consider what will be required of us in the future - its not always pretty, but at least we'll be less surprised.

Best Regards, Rob

[zenpundit]

One of the great things about the SWC is the conversation is as erudite as it is lively.

WM wrote:

"I doubt that your proposal will be "cheaper and safer in the long run." For example,were we to dig into the history of the Roman Empire's budget, I suspect we would find that it nearly bankrupted itself by trying to maintain a strong standing army to defend its outer frontiers while also funding a collection of mobile cohorts for use in putting down internal revolts (like the Zealot's revolt in Judea in 70 AD--and I know that this revolt was actually put down by Vespian and Titus with Legions, not expeditionary cohorts--followed by the Kitos War 40 years later and Bar Kochba's revolt 20 years after that; similar stuff was happening in Dalmatia and Illyria as well as Germannia, Pannonia, Noricum, and Rhaetia in later years). When the Romans found that they could not afford both efforts, they started to trade land to "outsiders" in exchange for an agreement to defend the frontiers and kept a few mobile armies to respond to breakthroughs at the frontiers (See Luttwak's Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire and Isaac's The Limits of Empire ). We know what the outcome of all that was. I fear that if America takes your chosen road, it will end up with something like what happened to the Romans

The period of decline to which you refer actually was approximately a century longer than the United States has existed. Three centuries is a very long time to ascribe to a single causation. Military overstretch was a problem but so was the loss of economic and social dynamism as the empire moved further away from its republican origins, so was social stratification and centralization of landholding that began before Julius Caesar, so was political chaos and misrule of Diocletian and Constantine's shift of the empire's center of gravity to the East. Even then, the Roman Empire enjoyed periods of good governance and fiscal responsibility, the end did not have to come at the time and in the manner in which it did.

Nor does preponderant power have to mean perpetual wars. Great Britain's naval supremacy and balancing diplomacy was a major pivot of the Long Peace between Waterloo and World War I. Even as the British Navy's absolute strength declined during most of the 19th century, it maintained it's relative supremacy over other navies and tried to multiply that with cooperative relationships with the United States, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and pursuing a Corbett strategy to maximize their strategic reach against any particular opponent. British power was generally used to reinforce stability and inhibit great powers from making war against one another. A worthy objective in my view.

"Given your chosen avatar (Emeror Palpatine from Star Wars)), you ought to remember Leia's line to Governor Tarkin as the Empire blows up her home planet. A corollary to her point is that holding the military card will not guarantee peace or security. Hobbes made a variation on that point in Leviathan as a step in his argument that people have a duty to seek peace"

My avatar notwithstanding, I'm not in favor of casually blowing up planets.

[wm]

One of the great things about the SWC is the conversation is as erudite as it is lively.

The period of decline to which you refer actually was approximately a century longer than the United States has existed. Three centuries is a very long time to ascribe to a single causation. Military overstretch was a problem but so was the loss of economic and social dynamism as the empire moved further away from its republican origins, so was social stratification and centralization of landholding that began before Julius Caesar, so was political chaos and misrule of Diocletian and Constantine's shift of the empire's center of gravity to the East. Even then, the Roman Empire enjoyed periods of good governance and fiscal responsibility, the end did not have to come at the time and in the manner in which it did.

Time distance factors from the 1st C. AD have compressed greatly in the 21st C. AD. What took several centuries back then might occur in a few decades (or even years) now. I acknowledge the multi-causal nature of the decline of Rome (to include claims that they did themselves in through lead poisoning from the pipes they used for their plumbing). I am aware of the issues associated with the military anarchy of the period after the death of Commodus as well with the issues surrounding the growth of the latifundia and extreme social stratification within the Empire, which, some argue, actually started with the reforms of the Gracchi. However to discuss this in depth would take us too far afield of this thread's intent.

Nor does preponderant power have to mean perpetual wars. Great Britain's naval supremacy and balancing diplomacy was a major pivot of the Long Peace between Waterloo and World War I. Even as the British Navy's absolute strength declined during most of the 19th century, it maintained it's relative supremacy over other navies and tried to multiply that with cooperative relationships with the United States, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and pursuing a Corbett strategy to maximize their strategic reach against any particular opponent. British power was generally used to reinforce stability and inhibit great powers from making war against one another. A worthy objective in my view.

A worthy objective that was not realized IMHO. You and I have a different perspective on the so-called 19th Century's Long Peace. Seems to me that the 19th Century saw some very bloody carnage--The Crimean War, the Austro-Prussian (1866), and the Franco-Prussian War are all counterpoints to your claim about stability. Let's also not forget the Mexican War, French adventures in Mexico that put Maximillian on the throne there, the Sino-Japanese War and the Spanish-American War . Of course, there are also all of the UK's "little wars"--like the Sikh Wars, Afghan Wars, Ashanti War, Zulu War, Boer Wars (one overlapped into the 20th C), Sepoy Mutiny, Opium War, etc. My point is that a single "big dog" armed camp has yet to be able to ensure world peace, much like deter attacks against that "big dog." The ends may justify the means (although I doubt it); however, the means you advocate have yet to produce the desired end in my review of history.