We Still Need the Big Guns

[zenpundit]

WM wrote:

I was only looking at the period 1815-1900. When Zenpundit shifted the right boundary to 1914 I didn't readjust fire.

But I had written:

We do indeed have a very different perspective regarding the Long Peace of 1815-1914

and

Great Britain's naval supremacy and balancing diplomacy was a major pivot of the Long Peace between Waterloo and World War I.

Perhaps it isn't the boundary that's shifting but the gun that's firing at it ?

On the substance, I infer that you are suggesting that because Great Britain's military primacy and balancing diplomacy did not prevent "fairly large conflicts" or colonial wars from occurring 1815 to 1914, that such a policy was a failure and not one worth attempting to emulate by the United States. Correct?

If so, that's quite a yardstick! What grand strategy or force structure are you suggesting that could be enacted by the United States that would be more successful in suppressing or detering the outbreak of war on a global scale ? I asked you this earlier, BTW:

Which begs the question of the means that you advocate for and what standard you are measuring against

On the subject of armaments, you wrote:

BTW, the carnage in WWI and WWII were partially made possible by massive arms buildups by losers in earlier wars (France after the F-P War, Germany after WWI). After their loses, each of the "have nots" thought they could get big and bad enough to win the next time

.

In part you are correct but only in part. Have you considered that the underlying cause might not be armaments or even "losing" but a strategic environment of having a multipolarity of great powers toward the end of the Long Peace ?

Germany, under the influence of Tirpitz, rapidly built a large, modern, navy prior to WWI despite not having been a "loser" in any conflict with Great Britain or having much use for a Navy. Japan poured much of it's energies during the Meiji and Taisho era into building a powerful Navy and was rewarded with an alliance with Britain. Italy did the same after WWI, despite having been a victor and an ally of Britain.

BTW, it has been argued that limitations on Japan's capital ship count in the Washington and London Naval Treaties of the teens and 20s had a similar effect on Japan and was a main factor that resulted in Pearl Harbor

If that is being argued then the arguers know relatively little about the internal politics of Japan during the period. Or the comparative economic strength of the three countries at the time. Even by 1941 the Japanese were producing only roughly 7 million tons of steel - what was the figure in 1922? 2/3 that number? Half? Where exactly were these extra capital ships going to come from ?

The limitation rankled the Japanese ultranationalists and it had a racist edge to it, no argument. However, it was a good deal for Japan which cooler heads in Tokyo knew very well as Japan lacked the steel making capacity and the money to achieve true naval parity, much less race against the U.S. in a ship-building contest, something that was amply demonstrated after Pearl Harbor. Nor could the British, for that matter. All parties to the negotiations were well aware that the U.S. was offering to voluntarily hold it's Navy to a number well below what it could afford to build or maintain and Japan and London had every incentive to lock the United States into that position.

[Norfolk]

Hi Rob,

No, its not 1:1. What's happening is more complicated. The deployed Battalion's LAVs/Strykers (I think it was around 60-70 or so that were originally sent) that can't be repaired at the 3rd-line level are being sent back to Canada, and non-infantry carrier variants in Canada are being converted to infantry-carriers and sent back to replace losses. AFAIK, the Strykers are now being used as much as possible for convoy-work, staying on the roads as much as possible. There are Armoured Corps (and I think maybe Artillery as well) drivers handling some of that.

The upgraded M-113s handle more and more of the the off-road field-ops - 40 of them are deploying to A-Stan to equip the Infantry Battalion there (3 Rifle Companies and a CS Company). The LAV-25 Coyotes, having all the recce/surveillance kit, are eventually (ie. planned) to be at least partially replaced by a recce variant of the Cheetah or RG 32 MRAP - there are still some Nyala MRAPs, but these are (or have been) taken out of service due to a shortage of spare parts.

There are 20 of the "new" Leopard 2A6Ms - a full 4-Troop Squadron - to handle both field ops and assist the Strykers in convoy duties. Both the Leopards and the M-113s were airlifted into Kandahar by rented An-124s (and damaged vehicles airlifted out the same way). The 15 Leopard 1's already there may be given to the Afghans. I can't tell you what damage they have caused to the roads, but a full Engineer Squadron is on hand to take care of such problems.

The Leopards have been operating in different places throughout Kandahar and Helmand Provinces at times, but the tanks spend more of their time doing convoy escort rather than offensive ops. It seems that those using Armour occur somewhat infrequently, for the most part. How much of that is by choice, and how much of that is due to logistical constraints, or what, I don't know. So for the Leopards, and the M-113s when all of them have arrived (if they haven't already), the optempo probably won't be too intense, except from time to time.

I'm not a logistics expert, but I can tell you that partial replacement of the Strykers with 20 Leopards and 40 M-113s will at least triple - maybe quadruple, even with many of the Strykers and light vehicles no longer in service - fuel and general POL requirements, since the Strykers are retained for the road-work, never mind having to stock completely new and substantial amounts of spare parts. That's not so much of a problem as it could have been because 2nd- and 3rd-line Logistics for the multinational NATO Brigade in Kandahar is handled by the Canadians anyway, but it certainly increases the load considerably.

Spare parts have been the only significant logistical problem that I am aware of, and that's just been because as one vehicle has been found inadequate for Afghanistan, it is replaced by another, and an entire set of Class IX stocks has to be replaced as a new vehicle replaces it: so...from Iltis to G-Wagen to Nyala (it was replaced because the manufacturer couldn't provide sufficient spare parts to meet demand) to LAV-III/Stryker and now M-113 TLAV as well, and also Leopard 1 to Leopard 2; so it's no wonder spares are a bit dicey at times when entire vehicles models are being replaced so quickly.

There are 82 armoured heavy trucks (bought in 2006) in Kandahar - of which 12 are tank transporters. They supplement dozens of unarmoured 10-tonners (Steyrs if I remember correctly). When the MBTs were sent over, the Support Group was augmented accordingly, and presumably have been further augmented as the M-113's have arrived. Bulk fuel has not been a problem, and AFAIK, neither has been packaged fuel. I think the US handles a great deal of the logistics load in Kandahar anyway.

There should be a full Basic and a full Maintenance load of fuel, parts, and ammo once the stocks have all been brought in (mainly by air); that may have already been accomplished, but don't quote me on that. There is a ton of Class VI; apparently you can buy just about anything on KAB. I suspect that this is largely (but not entirely) the work of the US. Lots of Class IV (even pre-fab concrete forms for building bunkers), and of course, Class X for reconstruction and humanitarian work. Supply just does not seem to be an issue in particular, publicly at least - so far.

Practically everything is flown in, and US, NATO, and rented Russian and Ukrainian transports coming in and out of Kandahar. Land transport across Pakistan to Quetta and then to Kandahar, of course, is not an option. Supposedly there are something like 20-30,000 troops based out of Kandahar - most of them US.

It's a really intensive logistics effort, in short.

The Stryker's just don't have a good time of it in the mud. I remember on the first Ex that I was ever in a LAV (the 6x6 LAV-1), it got stuck in a creek-bed. The LAV-III Stryker has become a real problem at times in Afghanistan, and when some of them have gotten stuck - way out in the boons - they've had to blow them up before nightfall when they couldn't get them unstuck. Troops are making derisive videos of the Stryker getting stuck in the mud in both Canada and Afghanistan (soon they'll be making derisive vids of M-113's blowing up or something, or at least rattling and scrambling everyone inside). The Canadian Army has used three generations of LAV for 30 years now, and although it improves with time, it just can't seem to get past some mobility problems.

[Norfolk]

This doesn't make much sense to me. Not to be disrespectful, but are the Canadians incapable of holding the terrain around the vehicle until a maintenance team can be sent the next day?

No disrespect taken, RA. The problem is, the Taleban sometimes operate in groups of 100, and in rare cases up to 400. When you've only got 3 Rifle Companies, a Tank Squadron, and an Engineer Squadron, and you're 50-100 klicks from base, leaving a Platoon out in the open to keep a grip on a stuck vehicle is just baiting the Taleban's trap for them.

[William F. Owen]

I worked with the original 6x6 LAV-1 and then the 8x8 LAV-25; the first was a horror, the second was much better, but I remain a Stryker skeptic.

I am also a Styker skeptic. I (am ashamed to admit that I) was heavily involved in the old Mike Sparks Stryker controversy. After 2 years of debate and research, I came to following conclusions.

1. The Stryker vesus Heavy was a debate only conducted by those who did not understand the problem.

2. The Stryker concept was sound at the Platoon level, in that you made light infantry far more capable. It worked at the Company level if you got rid of the MGS fiasco.

3. Stryker falls down in that a very good idea was very poorly executed. The critics were mostly and equally as poorly informed as the proponents and this lead to a real mess.

4. The reality of current operations would indicate to me that there is not much difference between a LI Coy equipped with Stryker and the same being equipped with a well thought out MRAP type vehicle with RWS and good comms.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Norfolk,

I've got a buddy who is deep into the theater LOG effort with Afghanistan - he showed me some interesting (and creative) ways they've attempted to skin the cat. However, it comes down to trying to wage war in a remote, land locked place with inhospitable conditions. Trying to bring in technological advantages creates new requirements and the tail goes up.

I feel for our partners, nobody really has the capabilities of the U.S. in terms of logistics or reach, and even we have a tough time in a place like Afghanistan. Compounded by the more stuff you bring in, the greater your LOG requirements become.

William,

4. The reality of current operations would indicate to me that there is not much difference between a LI Coy equipped with Stryker and the same being equipped with a well thought out MRAP type vehicle with RWS and good comms.

I agree with you, as long as the chosen vehicle can put a full squad in the back. However, there is is bit more to a U.S. SBCT company in terms of organization that give it more potential capability. Numbers and types of skills are up front - there are 170 men in a SBCT Rifle company - In addition to the 3 full rifle platoons of 3 x 11 man Rifle squads (9 + 2 vehicle operators) plus a weapons squad of 9 (7 + 2) you get an organic sniper team - not an Adhoc one, but the slots to get them trained at Benning and they are not culled out of any other formation, you get a pretty robust mortar section - with 60s or 120s, and you get your own organic FiST team complete with an FSO - not a habitual attachment, but your very own that is with you all the time. You also get the MGS platoon - I don't care too much about the chosen vehicle - although I was up at Yakima for the MGS integration exercise when I had the HHC and I like it allot better then the ATGM ILOV I had as a SBCT Rifle CO CDR - it did more of what I wanted it to do for my Infantry - however what is important is having a dedicated element to do those tasks in support. So while you could enhance a 100 man Light Infantry Company with a ICV MRAP - to get the full capabilities of a SBCT unit you have to start adding a host of other capabilities - at company, at BN (you get a sniper section, a mortar platoon with 81s and 120s, and the standard HHC package of a medical platoon with its MEVs, and your Recon Platoon + the 3 full rifle companies. At the SBCT level you get more capability in addition to your 3 full up IN BNs, SPT BN and FA BN you get a robust RSTA Squadron (you also get special companies such as the signal, ENG and an AT CO - the latter 2 are based on the Stryker as the platform as well).

In sum, the SBCT is a robust large organization with allot of bodies and capabilities - to bring other organizations up to that level requires allot more investment then just a truck and comms. This is why comparing how other countries are able to use their vehicles (or even other services, and formations) and how we are able to is touch and go - it does not have nearly as much to do with the platform as the organization, leadership, numbers and types of capabilities present to make use of all that. Even for us that is a huge investment - but it makes for a very capable organization from BDE to Squad. This may be why we've had allot of success in its use - numbers do matter.

Best, Rob

[selil]

Reading a variety of threads within the SWC, the issues with servicing, transporting, and getting the materials of war between production facilties and the soldiers in the field, and the host of security concerns. Reading here on SWC about the abysmal and decrepit mission orientation of the Air Force in regards to CAS (highly opinionate I think we will agree on all counts). Now reading about the Stryker and movement issues in country, and having seen recently some pictures of Army and Marine Corps trucks being washed away in the rains of Afghanistan. And, having recently read a cute little book called "Three Cups of Tea" which talks about building schools in Pakistan near the Afghanistan border. Which gives a real good flavor of the transport and communication issues..

It seems that we've run up against all the issues the Russians found and they had a shorter supply and logistics line. It would seem this is an area that our own USAF should be able to fill the gaps even if it means they have to get dirty. It seems to bring big guns to a fight you have to have heavy movers and big time transport capability. No matter how remote the location and regardless of the issues (like ground to air missiles) this is an area that the USAF should be making the sky pavement between the producer and user. I realize I may be way to simplistic but if the utilization of weapons systems is being determined by the tactical need, but restricted by logistical constraints a simple management 101 concept is stream line or effect those constraints. The tactical need will always be there.

Sorry if I'm missing the point but does it make any sense to artificially restrict the tactics when a solution should be a foregone conclusion?

[Rob Thornton]

Sam,
Your not missing the point - unless you start a war (and I mean in the sense of something more akin to the decision to implement the Von Schlieffen Plan) - then you often wind up enexpectedly fighting in some inhospitable, remote places that were hard to predict with enough certainty to commit large resources to or make changes for ahead of time. On top of that is the requirement to consider all the other things that could go wrong and cause you to fight somewhere else during or on the heels of your current war (consider the shortage of allied amphibious capability during WWII and the choices that ensued).

That is the challenge for force development folks - and we have tools to have us do that. The QDR for example is a good tool. Out of the DOTMLPF spectrum, material is the last one most sensible people want to muck with on a large scale - because it affects the other elements disproportionately – generates all kind of other requirements etc. The services know how hard it is to justify new capabilities that would provide “new” funding lines that did not at some point tap into those funds already being used to resource critical roles and missions – ex. Congress might mandate new funds from more C-17s – but you then have to consider the strain on all the other supporting systems from wear and tear on bases to the LOG burden, more pilots to recruit, train, retain etc. It is never as simple as just buy more of “X” – because it is so hard to predict the future with enough accuracy to justify major departures from where we are at.

It is been compared to turning a super tanker – which is not a bad way to think about it. It is also not bad to have it that way in at least on regard – people often don’t know or forget how hard it was to build up and sustain the mechanisms which got you to where you are at, or the thought out rational for why something was done a certain way. There are always consequences and unseen costs to change – ex. saw an article in the paper this morning about new BRAC funding being sought to expand the road network in Maryland and Va. To support the increased in traffic they now expect as a result of consolidation – took them awhile to figure out that if you put more people in one spot the existing road network will not accommodate the increase well. Same with Fort Belvoir – can you imagine the traffic that place is going to get with moving Walter Reed Hospital there? We tend to make decisions based on the perceived benefits without considering the adverse consequences or problems we’ll generate in pursuit of those benefits.

For one of the best reads on insights to campaigning in a ####ty place to wage a war – I’d recommend you read Field Marshall Viscount Slim’s account of waging war in Burma – the last chapter in the back is entitled “after thoughts”- while the entire book is worth the read, the last chapter is pure gold! I’ve done some planning and sims in places that are equally ####ty, but I think in different ways. Each new place is going to offer new challenges and if we stay there anytime we’ll be scratching our collective Brain Housing Groups on why we can’t do something better, or why we could not anticipate something. In the end it’ll be like Slim said (paraphrased) “you’ll be surprised what you can get done with the material at hand” The USAF is doing allot of things very well in Afghanistan and the other theaters it supports in what might be called non-traditional ways, as well as fulfilling its responsibilities in traditional areas. They have adapted much like we (the ground forces) have – through innovative folks on the spot.

I final thing I think is worth considering – when we (the United States) conduct combined operations, it is generally our LOG that supply the durational needs of our partners. This is a great capability, but it seldom gets the attention it deserves. The Army often got criticized under a former SecDef for being so big, and so seemingly inefficient – but he did not seem to understand just who the Army was supporting, or what the requirements are for long term Joint, Inter-Agency and Combined campaigning. Nor did he seem to understand that war is not a short term stock investment – it is rife with fog, friction and chance that eats supplies up. So while Wal-Mart can order a new widget and ensure delivery of that widget with near certainty, and anticipate based on local buying patterns associated with that store – War can not do likewise with anywhere near the same certainty. You can do so in peace time training – because its full of frequency and ratios and allotments that allow units to forecast reasonably accurately, but war is chaotic and offers the unexpected with serious consequence.

Well, did not mean to ramble, but LOG and the challenges of campaigning interest me greatly.

Best, Rob

[wm]

Perhaps it isn't the boundary that's shifting but the gun that's firing at it ?

I'll take the hit for that. I focused on the 19th Century, not the actual years of the your post.

On the substance, I infer that you are suggesting that because Great Britain's military primacy and balancing diplomacy did not prevent "fairly large conflicts" or colonial wars from occurring 1815 to 1914, that such a policy was a failure and not one worth attempting to emulate by the United States. Correct?

Britain's policy was not a complete failure. However, their policy did not involve them in a race to keep up in the technology battle. IIRC, the Horse Guards were adamantly opposed to equipment modernizations--Wellington seemingly took the position that if it was good enough to win at Waterloo, it would be good enough to win forever. I think part of the Brits' casualty problem in the 2nd Boer War can be attributed to being well behind their opponents in rifle technology.

I think the point I was trying to make is that our adopting a similar strategy would force us to engage in a unilateral arms race to maintain technical superiority. In today's world, we can't afford the kind of time delays to bring our military up to speed that the state of transport and communications allowed Britain in the 19th Century and through WWI.

Additionally, as you point out, unlike the period leading up to WWI, the current world does not have a "multipolarity of great powers" competing for hegemony. 21st Century states are much more differentiated and seem to recognize that their economies are much more interconnected than they were in 1900.

If so, that's quite a yardstick! What grand strategy or force structure are you suggesting that could be enacted by the United States that would be more successful in suppressing or detering the outbreak of war on a global scale ? I asked you this earlier, BTW

First, I have little concern that we will see " the outbreak of war on a global scale." I do not think we need to worry about deterring that level of conflict. So with that as background,to repond based on the differences in the 21st C world noted above, I suspect that the military card ought to be a much less pivotal piece of the country's overall strategic deck. We need a large enough defense force to protect our borders and help our allies when attacked (AKA the Army with USAF and USN conventional and nuclear firepower/strategic lift support). We probably need an expeditionary force to conduct punitive, short-term campaigns (AKA the USMC with strategic lift support from USAF and USN). However, I submit that we ough to try not to commit ourselves to reshaping the rest of the world's nations in America's image. We need to start treating our current and potential allies in a much less high-handed fashion and work with them more like partners than as our "go-fers". With our allies' help, we can work to sustain "good" governments by judicious use of foreign aid and trade policies. We can pressure "bad" governments to change by withholding aid and curtailing trade, rather than by invading or supporting insurgent movements. BTW, I think good and bad governments may best be definable in terms of their support (by acts of either commission or omission) for uncivilized conduct (AKA terrorism). I am not, however, advocating a foreign policy based on a country's human rights record. Except for the invading and support for insurgents, this ought to sound a lot like what US policy was for most of the 20th Century.

So we still need the big guns. However, I don't think we need to have them deployed to cause regime changes in countries that do not measure up to our standard of democratic government (or to provide some "testosterone flexing" by our national leadership).

[Rank amateur]

No disrespect taken, RA. The problem is, the Taleban sometimes operate in groups of 100, and in rare cases up to 400. When you've only got 3 Rifle Companies, a Tank Squadron, and an Engineer Squadron, and you're 50-100 klicks from base, leaving a Platoon out in the open to keep a grip on a stuck vehicle is just baiting the Taleban's trap for them.

I could word this with more military buzzwords, but what happens if you run into 400 Taleban when the vehicle isn't stuck? Does the platoon withdraw?

I know you're not here to educate me, but I do appreciate your responses. Aren't less troops required to set up an ambush with the vehicle as bait, than to to mount an offensive operation? Are these reconnaissance missions only?

[Cavguy]

Hi Rob,
No, its not 1:1. What's happening is more complicated. The deployed Battalion's LAVs/Strykers

Norfolk, for my education, does the Canadian Army use the LAV-3's or the US Stryker version of it (same chassis, different upgrades)? I just want to make sure we're talking about the same vehicle.

[Norfolk]

I could word this with more military buzzwords, but what happens if you run into 400 Taleban when the vehicle isn't stuck? Does the platoon withdraw?

I know you're not here to educate me, but I do appreciate your responses. Aren't less troops required to set up an ambush with the vehicle as bait, than to to mount an offensive operation? Are these reconnaissance missions only?

First off, here's a quickie Wiki on what the Canadians in A-Stan have been up to.

Mostly the missions are just patrols, either out of Kandahar itself, or out of an outpost. In that case, you've got a relatively small number of troops very far removed from higher-level support to deal with a large number of Taleban troops if something happens. Don't play their game - you cannot get large numbers of troops in a "Pile-On" type of operation, because 1. they're usually unavailable, as the NATO forces are grossly inadequate in size, and 2. it's not always easy to get them there in time if something goes wrong. Most NATO countries do not have the resources that US forces do - and a lot of what the NATO forces do use is provided by the Americans anyway. So it's not worth the risk of baiting an enemy force when you can't be sure that you can get large numbers of troops to close the trap when it's sprung. Save that for large-scale offensive ops when you can make a killing, literally.

You have to bear in mind that the Taleban more or less own much of the countryside - you don't. 30 or 40 guys 50 or more clicks from base looking to tangle with 400 Taleban who have the home-field advantage - local knowledge of terrain, NATO troop locations and movements, local "support" from the natives, and ready supplies at hand - aren't brave, they're incompetent.

Afghanistan is not Iraq - the Taleban switch back and forth between classic Partisan Warfare with individuals or small groups doing their terrorist or guerrilla bit, and then standing up and going toe-to-toe in real set-piece battles with hundreds or even a few thousand troops at a time in pseudo-Conventional Warfare. These guys are much closer to Rednecks than they are to Arabs in the way they fight; come to think of it, in fact there is a bit of a whiff of Mao's "Peoples' War" about it, how they use Partisan Warfare to stay in the game until they're strong enough to engage in something like large-scale conventional ops. And what they often lack in tactical skills they make up for through cunning and sheer bravery - and use of the home-field advantage.

It's actually a good thing for NATO that the Taleban are willing to stand up from time to time to slug it out in the open, full-on, no-holds barred. NATO doesn't have the means to wage a true counter-insurgency campaign, so it's rather considerate of the Taleban to oblige them and kindly face off with NATO every few or several months in convenient large-scale pitched battles. After taking a good beating at the hands of British, Canadian, and Danish troops and losing hundreds and hundreds of men, the Taleban go back to doing the G-stuff for a while until they've rebuilt themselves sufficiently to come out back into the open to go through the whole cycle all over again.

During Operation MEDUSA, at the Second Battle of Panjwai, a Platoon from 1RCR was ambushed in a village by ~100 Taleban who held the high ground (cliffs) around said village. The Platoon fought back but suffered heavy losses, including most of one Section. It was after this particular fight that the decision was made to bring back MBTs, which had been taken out of service two years before; the LAV-IIIs/Strykers that the Platoon had couldn't cross the Taleban entrenchments without getting stuck, and because someone in Canada had decided that slat armour wasn't needed, the LAVs/Strykers couldn't get past the RPG volleys anyway. To add insult to injury, the same Platoon then took casualties to friendly fire when they were attacked by an A-10 at the end of the fight. The flyboys are not viewed with equanimity by the troops.

You will note that in the Second Battle of Panjwai, a Canadian Battle Group (based on an Infantry Battalion - about a thousand men) attacked an entrenched Taleban force of between 1,500-2,000 men, and destroyed it.

The majority of the 2,800 Canadian troops in Afghanistan are logistics and headquarters types to support the NATO Brigade in Kandahar.

[Norfolk]

Norfolk, for my education, does the Canadian Army use the LAV-3's or the US Stryker version of it (same chassis, different upgrades)? I just want to make sure we're talking about the same vehicle.

Cavguy, the LAV-III has the turret-mounted 25 mm; otherwise it's basically the same as Stryker.

[Rob Thornton]

Nrofolk - LAV III has a fuel cell integral to the back and is amphibious capable isn't it? I saw one at the Armor Conf a few years back, and a brother CDR had some as ILOV (along with a host of other armored vehicles for training.) - There might be some other changes since we first picked it up as well - PM Stryker could probably draw up the comaprrison data.
Best, Rob

[Rex Brynen]

Mostly the missions are just patrols, either out of Kandahar itself, or out of an outpost. In that case, you've got a relatively small number of troops very far removed from higher-level support to deal with a large number of Taleban troops if something happens.

I agree with the thrust of Norfolk's postings that Canadian forces in and around Kandahar are simply too small to do much more than play whack-a-mole with Taliban groups, except when the Taliban are obliging enough to give them a stand-up fight.. and that full-spectrum COIN operations suffer as a result.

That being said, I heard Brigadier-Gen David Fraser (the former Canadian commander of ISAF Regional Command South) speak about intel requirements in Afghanistan a few months ago, and I was underwhelmed. It was largely about speeding up the target acquisition loop to shooters and getting IO on engagements out faster than the bad guys, and little on the importance of understanding local power structures, alliance patterns, grievance mobilization, etc--in short, the socio-political aspects of insurgency.

At the time, I assumed that we had a better doctrinal and practical grasp on COIN, and that I was either missing something or that Fraser doesn't speak well (which may be part of it). Discussing it with several colleagues--the policy/practitioner community is small enough that I have to be very vague, but those who've been on the ground or involved with the Ottawa end of things--I'm still unclear that we really do know how to do COIN well. Indeed, one made comments almost identical to the ones SecDef Gates made to the LA Times.

I think we've assumed here that Canadian expertise in PKOs would translate into COIN skills at the strategic and operational levels. (I'm not speaking here of tactical, small unit, narrowly military skill sets.) I'm now unsure that they do or have --although I would be pleased to be convinced otherwise.

---

I should have probably posted this in an Afghanistan thread, despite spinning off from Norfolk's comments above. Ah well, perhaps anyone in hot pursuit can follow up there.

[Stan]

Nrofolk - LAV III has a fuel cell integral to the back and is amphibious capable isn't it? I saw one at the Armor Conf a few years back, and a brother CDR had some as ILOV (along with a host of other armored vehicles for training.) - There might be some other changes since we first picked it up as well - PM Stryker could probably draw up the comaprrison data.
Best, Rob

Rob,
The Stryker for all intended purposes is a LAV. Some of the exceptions are the Stryker has a RWS (.50 or MK19) together with 10 versions and the LAV-III has but three versions (APC, DP and FOO). All LAV-IIIs currently come with a 25mm gun...Bigger guns are coming though . Other than that, some minor suspension configurations (the Stryker has a suspension management system and the Kanucks have gas-charged struts).

This site has a bit more detailed info.

Regards, Stan

EDIT: Norfolk has a good point. Ever seen a 113 or 114 swim ? Amphibious isn't the word I'm looking for !

[Norfolk]

Nrofolk - LAV III has a fuel cell integral to the back and is amphibious capable isn't it? I saw one at the Armor Conf a few years back, and a brother CDR had some as ILOV (along with a host of other armored vehicles for training.) - There might be some other changes since we first picked it up as well - PM Stryker could probably draw up the comaprrison data.
Best, Rob

I'm afraid that I wouldn't bet on it being amphibious; its precursor, the 8x8 LAV-25 Bison (more like the Stryker in some ways than the LAV-III, as it had no turret) was tested at Port Stanley for its amphibious capablility. It obligingly drowned in Lake Erie for the local news cameras (CFPL) and newpaper photographers (especially for the London Free Press). The locals still joke about it.

Being a former grunt and not a crewman, I didn't pay much mind to the location of the fuel tanks, as long as I wasn't sitting on top of them. So far as I know, there were fuel cells running along the side of the hull to the rear on both sides.

I suspect that to the extent that there are problems with the LAV/Stryker concept is that it's taking a vehicle that was designed in the late 60's for Aid to the Civil Power and Internal Security, and in Western European conditions - which it is ideal for - and has been impressed into service in roles that it's not really intended for. Can it do Peacekeeping? As long as it's Pearsonian-type, Yes. Can it slug it out with MBTs? No. How about in between? Depends on what you're doing. If it works in Iraq, then keep it. If it doesn't work in Afghanistan, replace it - that's what Canada and Australia are doing, both LAV/Stryker users, and together with the Dutch and the Danes are moving to upgraded M-113s (sad, isn't it?) for cross-country ops there.

There's a little DND Virtual Tour on Quick Time for the LAV-III. And just to be clear, because the Canadian LAV-III has the same turret-mounted 25mm as the USMC LAV-25, it can only carry 7 dismounts whereas the Styker (which uses the same chassis) is supposed to carry 9.

[Norfolk]

That being said, I heard Brigadier-Gen David Fraser (the former Canadian commander of ISAF Regional Command South) speak about intel requirements in Afghanistan a few months ago, and I was underwhelmed. It was largely about speeding up the target acquisition loop to shooters and getting IO on engagements out faster than the bad guys, and little on the importance of understanding local power structures, alliance patterns, grievance mobilization, etc--in short, the socio-political aspects of insurgency.

At the time, I assumed that we had a better doctrinal and practical grasp on COIN, and that I was either missing something or that Fraser doesn't speak well (which may be part of it). Discussing it with several colleagues--the policy/practitioner community is small enough that I have to be very vague, but those who've been on the ground or involved with the Ottawa end of things--I'm still unclear that we really do know how to do COIN well. Indeed, one made comments almost identical to the ones SecDef Gates made to the LA Times.

I think we've assumed here that Canadian expertise in PKOs would translate into COIN skills at the strategic and operational levels. (I'm not speaking here of tactical, small unit, narrowly military skill sets.) I'm now unsure that they do or have --although I would be pleased to be convinced otherwise.

Rex, I have noticed that in recent years, a lot of our COIN and LIC doctrine had been dispersed across a number of pams; formerly, a good deal of it had been centralized in the 3 volumes of Aid to the Civil Power, but that was scrapped years ago. The tactical COIN skills are still there as far as I'm aware, but the operational and strategic stuff was scattered and submerged in a couple of different Land Force Operations pams (under the general rubric of CIMIC) as well as others, and even the new COIN pam is only a couple years old now (I can't remember whether it or the new Urban Operations pam is a virtual re-print of the US one).

That said, PKO's were probably a training ground of mixed utility for COIN. Was there COIN to be performed during PKO's? Of course there was, and much of what is required in Peacekeeping is the same as what is required in COIN. But year after year of PKO's had the effect of driving experienced officers and men out of the military. You can't put the Army into the Balkans for ten years (plus other, sometimes weighty, committments elsewhere - Africa, Haiti, etc.), understrength, underequipped, and over-committed, often with little recovery time betwen deployments, without driving out a lot of your people. And over-committment to PKO's also destroyed the Army's capacity to conduct Conventional Combined Arms ops above Company and Combat Team level; that has only been partially reversed in recent years.

But probably the other thing going on is the political pragmatism (fatalism, even) that the Canadian senior leadership is renowned for. Completely lacking the capability to wage a genuine COIN campaign because of domestic political pressures back home and inadequate troop levels and resources in-theatre, the senior leaders simply give up and make do the best they can, and do what's possible. And for them, that means
basically pursuing an outpost and patrolling-based campaign that culiminates every now and then in a conventional "Decisive" engagement with the Taleban, only for both sides to start the cycle all over again, but at a notch higher than the last time.

In any case, there have been longstanding problems within the senior leadership, and we haven't got a Petraeus of our own in Afghanistan to handle things - though we do have a Hillier in Ottawa still - so far.

[Rank amateur]

the senior leaders simply give up and make do the best they can

I figured that blowing up your own equipment had to be a symptom of a larger problem. Thanks for helping me understand it. I'm more convinced than ever that not making Afghanistan the "central front in the war on terror" was a huge strategic mistake. Maybe there's still time.

[Ken White]

I figured that blowing up your own equipment had to be a symptom of a larger problem. Thanks for helping me understand it. I'm more convinced than ever that not making Afghanistan the "central front in the war on terror" was a huge strategic mistake. Maybe there's still time.

were we not in Iraq, Afghanistan would certainly have been worse and probably would now be far, far more difficult than it is. Not that it's really that bad now...

Look at the bright side, ISAF and its Canadian Commander in the south will soon have two Marine BCTs for the summer...

One might also consider that most, not all, of the bad guy's losses in Iraq have been as much a deterrent as an attraction to new recruits, that they have effectively given up on Iraq and are now shifting to Europe (slowly), Pakistan and Afghanistan as having more IO potential if they can concentrate on NATO forces to force a public outcry for withdrawal from Canada, the Dutch and the UK in that order.

They've pretty much given up the idea that we would quit, take our marbles and go home so they're going for what they see is the weak link...

Wonder what the US strategy for that shift will be? Possibly balanced forces? We shall see.

Not to mention that Afghanistan is not in the ME and that's important...

[Rank amateur]

They've pretty much given up the idea that we would quit, take our marbles and go home

A) They've also figured out that if they mass in groups of 200-400 in certain parts of Afghanistan no one will attack them.

B) I don't know. If they have an Internet connection they might be able to figure out that Obama has promised an immediate withdrawal and there's at least a chance he'll win.

Look at the bright side, ISAF and its Canadian Commander in the south will soon have two Marine BCTs for the summer...

If 3,500 is good why isn't 135,000 better?

having more IO potential if they can concentrate on NATO forces to force a public outcry for withdrawal from Canada, the Dutch and the UK in that order.

I'm not certain about your position on this point. If our allies withdrew, would it be good, bad or irrelevant because we're winning in Iraq.

One might also consider that most, not all, of the bad guy's losses in Iraq have been as much a deterrent as an attraction to new recruits,

I'm concerned that they'll remember that recruiting was pretty strong when they sent people to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and they're smart enough to figure out that as long as they keep their training mobile and surrounded by 200-400 Taliban, they can train as many people as they want.