FM 3-0 (Operations) Roll Out

[TROUFION]

Generals of the US Republic are in many ways similar to those of the Roman Republic. Roman Generals in the Republic age were well trained and capable; all had come up with experience through the ranks of Centurion etc. They lead arguably the finest, best equipped troops in the ancient world. But they were uninspired; they were checked and kept in check by bureaucracy. They were deliberately kept mediocre in order to not let them become a threat to the Republic or to the Senate from whence they came and received appointment. The enemies they faced could all be overcome through the superior organization and execution at the tactical and operational levels by the Legion itself. The General was ancillary. Until they met Hannibal.

Hannibal represents the dynamic, warrior general that cannot be replicated in our system. To defeat Hannibal the Republic eventually had to place more power, freedom of action and duration of Command into the Generals hands. Scipio Africanus became that type, a general who was developed in independent command and given the ability to have a true Commander-in Chief role. Ultimately, and I greatly oversimplify here, this would lead to the end of the Republic as Generals began to see greater and greater autonomy over time leading to the rise of the Caesars.

Ok not the likelihood in the US but the point is the system is designed to create managers. Managers who can and will follow prescriptive actions in order to employ great troops, incredible equipment and assets so as to formulaically defeat any standard adversary.

The problems arise when the Manager Generals face non-standard adversaries, the dynamic warriors those not tied to doctrines and dogmas. In the end victory can still be had but not until the reigns of control are loosened.

The FM’s we use to train ourselves are very good, but they are formulas. Unfortunately many beleive that if you read it and apply liberally to the situation success will occur. FM’s should always be read with a historical study lying right next to it and a working knowledge of practical combat behind. They like the principles of war and other formulas should be used as guidelines and nothing more.

I now step off the soapbox.

[Jedburgh]

FM 3-O Operations, 27 Feb 08

FM 3-0 is one of the Army’s two capstone doctrinal publications; the other is FM 1, The Army. FM 3-0 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. The eight chapters that make up this edition of Operations constitute the Army’s view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations on land and sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. FM 3-0 also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Education System curricula:

• Chapter 1 establishes the context of land operations in terms of a global environment of persistent conflict, the operational environment, and unified action. It discusses the Army’s expeditionary and campaign capabilities while emphasizing that it is Soldiers and leaders who remain the Army’s most important advantage.

• Chapter 2 describes a spectrum of conflict extending from stable peace to general war. From that spectrum, it establishes five operational themes into which various joint operations fit. This chapter helps Army leaders to understand and differentiate between the requirements of diverse joint operations such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. It shapes supporting doctrine for each operational theme.

• Chapter 3 is the most important chapter in the book; it describes the Army’s operational concept—full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results through combinations of four elements: offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations. It establishes mission command as the preferred method of exercising battle command.

• Chapter 4 addresses combat power, the means by which Army forces conduct full spectrum operations. It replaces the older battlefield operating systems (“BOS”) with six warfighting functions, bound by leadership and employing information as the elements of combat power. Combined arms and mutual support are the payoff.

• Chapter 5 reviews the principles of command and control and how they affect the operations process—plan, prepare, execute, and assess. The emphasis is on commanders and the central role that they have in battle command. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess.

• Chapter 6 discusses operational art, offering Army commanders a bridge between military theory and practice.

• Chapter 7 is about information superiority, particularly the five Army information tasks, purpose, and staff responsibility.

• Chapter 8 discusses the requirement for Army forces in joint campaigns conducted across intercontinental distances. It frames the challenges created by the requirement for Army forces in terms of strategic and operational reach.

Four appendixes complement the body of the manual. The principles of war and operations are in appendix A. Command and support relationships are in appendix B. A brief description of modular force is in appendix C. And a discussion of the purpose of doctrine in the Army is in appendix D.

This appendix includes a chapter-by-chapter summary of the important changes made in this edition of FM 3-0. It also includes tables listing new, modified, and rescinded terms for which this manual is the proponent.

Army doctrine is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-0 links landpower doctrine to joint operations doctrine as expressed in joint doctrinal publications, specifically, JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. FM 3-0 also uses text and concepts developed with North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners. When published, Allied Joint Publication 3.2, Doctrine for Land Operations, will contain this material.