FM 3-0 (Operations) Roll Out

[Ken White]

and sleeve garters.

[Ski]

I think the biggest problem with the Army right now still is the ridiculous manning system that is in place.

It's the ultimate form of socialism. Everyone gets their shot at command. If you happen to be good at it, it doesn't matter, because there are holes in the system that need to be filled, and you're going to fill it or leave.

And once that company command is complete, you have about a 20% chance of getting a battalion. Basically, you're not going to lead troops anymore, and you have 10+ years left before you retire. If you're lucky, you'll have 5 years of troop leading time...even if you are the second coming of Rommel and Abrams combined.

So in that aspect, it doesn't matter what the doctrine is, because we have a system that makes almost impossible to create experts at any job.

On a good note, it only took 6 years for a new FM 3-0 to get published.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken,

We do not select great Commanders; we select those who will be adequate Commanders. That worked with the mass armies of yesteryear. I simply suggest it is not desirable for the Army of today.

Ken, That reminds me of a discussion I was having a while back with a bud. When you have competing requirements - mass based and competency based - and I think we do - where do you draw the line? Since we don't get to say, well we can only produce enough of X so everything you might contemplate employing the military in, must not exceed our capacity, I'm not sure we can meet unknown requirements. This is and has been part of the rationale for development of specialized forces - you would incentivize (in one way or another), develop qualification criteria that excludes those not up to the task, and then find ways to keep them in the positions that we say are our combat multipliers. I've always thought there were several problems with that (along with several advantages). There is also no guarantee that those we "select" will stick around - this makes for a potential leadership vacuum. Again you are back to asking where to accept risk - depending on the conditions, the key commander might be that of a QM company. I'd also say there is the issue of development and when talent manifest itself - I think this is different depending on where the guy or gal is along the path - they might be a good PL - but never make a good CO CDR, BN CDR, or BDE CDR, or the same qualities that made them good at any of those jobs might limit them as a GO.

I guess what I'm getting at is that even identification is going to be subjective - particularly in the conditions associated when we have unpopular long wars and the volunteer force we decided to sustain prior to the war winds up smaller then the one we probably needed (although there may have been actions taken early in a war that would have impacted other things – but its OBE and that is why you want “more” vs. “less” to make up for Murphy and bad judgment. Could we do better – if it were just a matter of considering the actions we must take to do so, I’d say yes – however it would seem to be human nature to design systems and create conditions which cause us to work against ourselves to a degree. Why did it take till 1865 to end our Civil War – because that is how long it took. Given the scope of the problem, it may just be the best we can do – meaning applying leadership where it matters most because that is the best we can do. I heard an Ambassador at the RoL conference discussing the pragmatics of helping someone institute a different judicial system – the quote that stuck out was “justice for some”.

Smiling Jack Cushman was the Grand Guru of the IV Corps Tactical Zone in Viet Nam. I'm not a fan of him or his actions then but acknowledge he did turn into a reasonably decent writer later in life. Of the 'don't do as I do, do as I say' variety...

I figured you would have a different perspective on LTG Cushman – one that was, I don’t know deeper? I can only evaluate what I’ve seen – which would be his writings – which have a solid ring to them. What I can’t do is contrast them to his actions, or the intent of his actions when they occurred. However, sometimes the actions you do (or wish you’d done) don’t make sense until after the fact – if you can articulate them in a manner where others can benefit, I’m all for that too. Having your perspective though helps me place value a bit more though.

Sorry, do not agree. Human nature as you said is important and a factor but the downstream receivers in this case are mostly willing to listen and willing to work. The ol' bottom line is that most people will try to do their job to the best of their ability. To enable them to do this, they must have the proper education and training (we aren't too bad at that and we're getting better, still more to be done) and then they must be turned loose to do their job (we may be getting better at this, my sensing is that we are. My sensing also is that many would like to roll back that freedom...).

Unless of course, you're talking about the message UPstream from your One Stars; then I can agree that some do not want to listen. And that, as they say, is precisely the problem.

I think the biggest problem downstream is making sure the message means to the receiver what you intended it to mean – that it gets placed in the right context, and its importance is assigned. The intent to do right is usually there, but depending on the conditions, the message may not get there the right way – particularly once it goes through the vertical filters –this would go back to the value of flat communications in the first place – however I think there will still be vertical influencers – not everyone in between the sender and the various receivers is going to have the same authorities and responsibilities. As you say, this is where education, training and also doctrine come in – the latter being a kind of common language (or in some ways may the analogy of the “Rosetta Stone” is better?) through which we can communicate and operate – in its better form(s) it allows for initiative at all levels.

Ref. the up stream – maybe its less the message, and more the solidification of past cultures? They say many people get more conservative the longer they live. I don’t mean solely political philosophy, but I mean their likes and dislikes – they not only have a better understanding of what they like and don’t but a more solid belief in “why” they do or don’t. Some of this is good – its part of wisdom. Some is probably not so good because the conditions in which those beliefs were formed may not be as applicable as they were when they formed. I’d have to ask Marc, but I think this is how culture is formed – over time, and without enough outside influences or pressures to change. In this case we are trying to change the culture from both the inside (inside the Army), and by the changes in conditions on the outside – be it our civilian leadership, the wars we are waging, the greater American Society and Culture, and some of the independent with their own agendas – think tanks, etc. This is interesting because just because you have multiple “engines” for change – they can be (and I’d argue at least in some cases are – working against each other.

This gets you into the – “can’t overcome the inertia” to change direction, or to get the ball rolling. For whatever reason we seem to see this also reflected over the last few years in our greater culture – look at the primaries of both parties – and I imagine we’ll see this in the general election again as well. With the exception of 9/11 we have not really had a defining event that acts as a catalyst that gets the two sides of inertia to stop working against each other. Both within the military and within our society we are still trying to figure out what exactly changed, how it changed and what it means to us.

This gets us back to evaluating and assigning risk oddly enough – a NSS that either won’t or can’t assign vital interests, an Army that can’t decide where to accept risk across the DOTLMPF because the direction the policy may take it is very broad. Fortunately, I think we (the Army) are largely OK in many areas – but we need to acknowledge that at our core level we are capable of doing more then many (including ourselves) often give us credit for. While we must inform folks of our limitations, we must also do a better job of evaluating and articulating our real capabilities – the foundation of capabilities are people and leadership.

OK – did not mean to go on a Saturday morning stroll, but I think it is good to ponder some of this stuff here – helps me work through things and consider the angles and relationships without it feeling too much like work.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

...
When you have competing requirements - mass based and competency based - and I think we do - where do you draw the line?

For competency, every time. Given, say, a ~750 man Infantry Battalion, I'd rather be 300 people short with good ones than be 300 over with mediocre ones. No question.

Since we don't get to say...

I don't and should not, I'm out of it. You aren't -- your say should be heard.

... There is also no guarantee that those we "select" will stick around - this makes for a potential leadership vacuum....

Vacuums get filled. I've seen more than one SSG run a platoon quite well, more than one new 2LT take over a Company and even a couple of CPTs run Bns. Best Div Cdr I ever saw was a BG

...they might be a good PL - but never make a good CO CDR, BN CDR, or BDE CDR, or the same qualities that made them good at any of those jobs might limit them as a GO.

True but that's the case now and will always be a human factor.

I guess what I'm getting at is that even identification is going to be subjective

True but that's the case now and will always be a human factor.

...particularly in the conditions associated when we have unpopular long wars

I've never seen a popular war. We, as a nation, do not do long wars at all well and they should be rigorously avoided --and they can be...

However, sometimes the actions you do (or wish you’d done) don’t make sense until after the fact – if you can articulate them in a manner where others can benefit, I’m all for that too.

Cushman did that. He never actually admitted an error -- Generals rarely do (which is a whole different thread... ) but his later writings were pretty good.

As you say, this is where education, training and also doctrine come in – the latter being a kind of common language (or in some ways may the analogy of the “Rosetta Stone” is better?) through which we can communicate and operate – in its better form(s) it allows for initiative at all levels.

Therein lies the problem and, I think, our disconnect; no slam or snark at you or anyone, just a statement of fact as I see it: It allows for initiative at all levels. Most folks in the Army and Marines will agree with you however I submit that it should demand initiative at all levels. Initiative and competence can replace mass in far more situations than most realize.

Ref. the up stream – maybe its less the message, and more the solidification of past cultures?

It is that, little question.

In this case we are trying to change the culture from both the inside (inside the Army), and by the changes in conditions on the outside – be it our civilian leadership, the wars we are waging, the greater American Society and Culture, and some of the independent with their own agendas – think tanks, etc. This is interesting because just because you have multiple “engines” for change – they can be (and I’d argue at least in some cases are – working against each other.

Totally true. Unfortunately. The civil / military relationship is pretty much change resistant however, that civilian leadership is generally amenable to what the Armed forces agree they need to do so it is not necessarily and adverse factor. Congress is another and far more difficult issue and its ability to stifle change is immense. The Armed Forces have been, are now and probably always will be a reflection of society (and the Millenium generation is looking to be pretty intolerant of BS and incompetence. Oughta be interesting... ); the attention paid the Think Tanks by the Armed Forces should be significantly diminished in my opinion. However, I acknowledge that's unlikely as long as we are as over cautious as we are.

Fortunately, I think we (the Army) are largely OK in many areas – but we need to acknowledge that at our core level we are capable of doing more then many (including ourselves) often give us credit for. While we must inform folks of our limitations, we must also do a better job of evaluating and articulating our real capabilities – the foundation of capabilities are people and leadership.

Agreed -- totally.

[Rob Thornton]

he is us

Somebody reminded me of that recently when I was complaining about advocates on 2 opposing sides of an issue who wound up working together to try and get something going that really did not solve the problem, lays the ground work for more problems, and muddies the importance of the question we should be asking. Why do we do that I thought - why would we settle for something that not only is not what we were after, but complicates the problem we're trying to solve?

I think it has something to do with human nature - and probably biology. It goes back to the joke about the evolutionary process that has produced modern man - the ones who were too inquisitive got eaten! We are naturally suspicious of others and their ideas to a point where we often work to our own disadvantage. My son told me he wanted $30 for a video game - I told him he could earn it by doing 5 chores for a $1 a piece for 6 weeks. He told me that was too hard - he'd wait 6 months till his Birthday. This is kinda funny I thought, because I'm going to ave him do the chores anyway - the difference is he'd have gotten paid, and I would not have to tell him to do them - same amount of work - but somehow he thought it was easier to wait

We all point to institutions like HRC, DFAS, OSF, OTC, Congress, IRS etc. as if by abolishing the institutions and the bureaucracy we could solve our problems. We ascribe value to them that may be better ascribed to individual people who work there and the sub cultures that develop around the jobs and functions they do. People are pretty adept at changing hats – I knew a BN XO who could be the world’s most anal fellow in the office, but outside the role – he was not even close to the same person. He simply adopted the personage he needed to be the CDR’s hit man on accountability and maintenance issues – it was an enabler to fulfill his role.

Its also useful to consider why we build institutions, processes, and bureaucracy – there is either a real need, a perceived need, or a desire to attempt to make our lives easier. The last one is kind of interesting because it might mean the genesis of the idea was by someone who believed that regardless how the world really operates – their way is better. The former two though are reasonably altruistic – our desire to make something work better. Like many things though – the original function of the system, process, institution, etc. takes on a life of its own, far beyond the intended purpose. This could be good or bad, but we often take it for granted that it is still a good idea.

Now we may not be able to ascribe its worth in terms that let us consider if it should be abolished, or improved because we don’t really understand how it fits in, and probably don’t understand its original purpose in the first place. We could be talking about an Army system, or the Supreme Court. Even if there is written evidence, people will argue over the context and true intent of something to get their way – regardless of if the outcomes really benefits them or is harmful to them in the long run.

I’d say the tendency to try and create efficiencies is also human nature – it drives pursuit of technology and it is often the criteria by which we evaluate ourselves ad other cultures. The issue of efficiency vs. effectiveness is tough one to crack – even when we know from experience that there are some things that will not coincide – that somethings require blood and hard work to procure and secure, even when we know the sacrifice that was required to do so, even when we know there are people who want to take it way or advantage themselves – we still remain glued to the idea that we can have it both ways. This is why I believe you have to stay involved in these things – you can’t succumb to the delusion that you’ve fixed something – there is always somebody or something following you around unfixing it – or fixing it the way think it should be. If you abolished the Hoffman building, somebody come right behind you and build a new one and call it something else and hire all the same people back.

I think you can influence and inform the process though. We do that right here. The key is in communications that describe the risks and benefits so that we get closer to real solutions. There has to be tension and there must be some disagreements – or the truth gets muddled over and the important pieces don’t stick out – arguing (or even risking War over) should be a clear signal as to what is important.

We may not like the bureaucracy, but it provides a means to an end. Without it, lots of supporting things we take for granted would have to be recreated – and I think it would not be long before the same conditions occur – kinda like when I read the Cushman articles, or any personal accounts that recall events that have the “well, seen this one before” feel to them.

The difference I think is the role leadership plays. Leaders can animate the process, stave off the tide for awhile (or at least protect a few important things). Leaders can keep us from killing the things which are most important and can not be easily rebuilt. Leaders can convince folks with seemingly disparate interests to cooperate. I think I’ve acknowledged to myself that we’re going to go down this road again, its just a matter of time – there are just to many external factors, and as much as we’d like to believe it – events beyond our control will effect our decisions. This is another reason why I think its important to have the discussion about the changing role of the military – why its important that the CAC CDR informed Congress that we are placing importance on Stability Operations in our Capstone Doctrine – whatever else was said – part of the message is that we acknowledge that “you” the civilian control side have the better of the unequal dialogue and as such we must be prepared to do the things to support that – even if you the civilian side don’t know when or where that will be. Now getting our internal culture to acknowledge that is another matter.

Funny how a person can undervalue a well known statement like “we’ve met the enemy and he is us” – maybe it is because we hate to hear truths like that – it makes all we do seem less important – and makes us question the futility of some of our efforts. I hate that duality stuff – it makes my head hurt.

Best Rob

[Norfolk]

Since I have not read the new edition of FM 3-0, it it not possible for me to comment on it directly much more than to say that if SSO and the like are thoroughly and comprehensively covered by it, then that's good; but if SSO will subsequently receive the same priority for time and resources as MCO as a consequence, then that's bad. 1/4, at most 1/3rd, of all time and resources should normally be devoted to LIC/COIN/SSO/OOTW/Aid to the Civil Power combined. And that is including the same individual and sub-unit/minor-unit level skills and proficiencies that are needed for most MCO as well.

Since the publication of the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 (admittedly it featured the definitive and comprehensive inclusion of Operational Art in particular for the first time in US Army doctrine), the increasing doctrinal inclusion of OOTW into Capstone publications has tended to come at the expensive of MCO. Whatever criticisms may be made of the 1982 and 1982 editions of FM 100-5, there was no mistaking that ultimately, the Army lived or died by victory or defeat in the Big One. It is most unlikely that a Small One, or even several Small Ones, would threaten the survival of the nation as much as the loss of even a single Big One.

While there is a certain logical consistency to including OOTW in a major way (as opposed to more modest attention) into the capstone Operations pub, I do recall that when Commonwealth Armies were at their best in such LIC/OOTW ops as COIN and SSO, much of their doctrine for doing so was concentrated in a separate "Aid to the Civil Power" pub. In Canada, it consisted of three volumes; the Rhodesians admittedly created a separate COIN pub in two volumes, but much of its content was found in Canadian doctrine divided between the ACP pub and a few tactical pubs. That same doctrine has now been largely dispersed amongst both the keystone and capstone Operations pubs as well as to a series of separate subordinate pubs. I suspect that may not have been an improvement, however.

I have also noticed a slide in the British Army reflected in the 1996 edition of its top doctrinal pub, and that appears to have continued in the 2005 edition; Australia has similarly followed in its 2002 top doctrinal pub. There is a touch of unreality that may strike one in these pubs, especially with regards to MCO. Perhaps when FM 3-24 was published, it should have comprehensively covered all OOTW rather than just Counterinsurgency, and allowed for much more modest attention paid to it in both the first edition and especially the new edition of FM 3-0. Until I have read the new edition of FM 3-0, however, and especially how it approaches and deals with MCO, I can only speculate that its raising of OOTW to the same status as MCO may be the culmination of what I find to be an unsettling doctrinal trend.

As such, what (OOTW) for Commonwealth Armies has been up until very recent years a matter of almost routine consideration has, in the US, swung from a matter of near-indifference to one of near-obsession - and due to political, social, and institutional factors (and especially deterioration and decline) at home within Commonwealth societies and militaries, the increasing influence that US issues and concerns wield over Commonwealth polities and militaries exerts a dislocating and destabilizing influence in their own doctrine in some ways.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken,

That got me thinking – about who we are. Avoidance of something is usually attributed to a couple of things – the desire to do so, and the means to do so. I think they go hand in hand in this case. When you consider how some of the various cultures consider time, and why they do, it seems to have something to do with how long they have considered their culture to have been around. I saw something in the paper today about an advocate in OSD for what we now popularly describe as the “Indirect Approach” – and to which we consider a key component of “by, with, through” – the article went on to lament the policy advisor was not sure if the American People had the political stomach for long commitments (I think we’re assuming here that events within the duration have drawn attention – its not under the radar).

I think it goes beyond that – American Culture seems to be allot more along the lines of instant (or relatively instant) gratification. We would seem to believe that if its worth doing, then we must be able to accomplish it in one fell swoop. The idea of investing heavily in the means to conduct a broad indirect approach to FP that might really help us avoid wars, while maintaining our other goals would seem to be in opposition (damn there is that duality crap again). Since producing FSOs and others types needed to go forward does not seem to correlate with production of stuff in congressional districts – there does not seem to be much of an appetite for such things up on the hill. We might also consider ourselves (the military) part of the means to affect such an indirect approach – and there is a rub in there too.

We may fear the way the Chinese wield “soft power” to achieve an indirect influence in a growing number of places – with their abundance of human capital and growing economy as the means to do so, but we’re not willing to break from our culture to contest it in a like manner either. We’re simply not Chinese.

While you’ve never seen a popular war – I think the term popular in itself invites all kinds of comparisons – more popular than X, popular among X, etc. Popular might not have been the most accurate word I could have used – but I suppose since the word is useful in describing its effects on domestic politics it is useful. I guess then a more popular war would be one where we win, where we did have to incur high cost to get it, and where the outcome remains uncontestable for a reasonably long period of time. The benefits of going to war must be more attractive then the risks of avoiding it. Those would seem to be more clear on the back end, then the front end – and are also probably subject to historical interpretation(s). Those wars we most identify as having been “worth” the sacrifice would be those that combined the latter with some kind of moral value – where clearly the enemy’s beliefs and values were in the wrong – almost inviting a justification of force – this can lead you into all kinds of good discussions from targeting dual use facilities-such as hospitals and communities that shield insurgents to fire bombing Japanese cottage industries.

I’d also add that we have a knack for getting ourselves into the deep end without realizing it – again possibly because we seem to be culturally opposed to building (and listening) the means that might warn us when we were adrift. Why do we have such a big Snap-On Hammer in the prize tool box and while we keep our other dinky no-name tools in the kitchen drawer – because that is the way we built it, why did we build it that way – because we chose to – we are at fault.

So while I do believe long wars could be avoided – I don’t think it is in our nature, and I don’t think we currently have the means or the will to do so. This is why I think we have to be pragmatic about this within the military – if we are not prepared for the inevitable policy misstep – we have nobody to blame but ourselves. Could be a big war, could be a small one – could be one that turns into the other, etc. We're going to be "Full SPectrum" because we have to be. Its back to the duality thing again – the “non-violent” right to life folks that advocate the destruction of the abortion clinics, the “non-violent” tree huggers who spike the trees and cause the injury of the blue collar cutter trying to feed his family, and all the other folks who claim advocacy for their peaceful causes until somebody challenges them on it – and then its game on. The Elizabethan playwright nailed it “man; what a piece of work he is”

Well, wife is back – enough musing, I’ve got to go refinish a table for the wife.
Best Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Norfolk - FM 3-07 on stability Operations is pretty good and not far off (I've seen the draft). I think it will fill in the gaps between 3-24 and 3-0. As sson as there is a releasable copy I'll send it to you. As for that - it might be a good idea if we hung links to new doctrine (approved for public release) somewhere on SWJ so folks could review it and comment.
Best, Rob

[Rank amateur]

h

Funny how a person can undervalue a well known statement like “we’ve met the enemy and he is us” –

"Know your enemy and know yourself." The former requires information. The later requires self awareness and honesty. I often think that the later is more difficult.

[Norfolk]

Hey Norfolk - FM 3-07 on stability Operations is pretty good and not far off (I've seen the draft). I think it will fill in the gaps between 3-24 and 3-0. As sson as there is a releasable copy I'll send it to you. As for that - it might be a good idea if we hung links to new doctrine (approved for public release) somewhere on SWJ so folks could review it and comment.
Best, Rob

Much obliged Rob. I think I still have a copy of the 2003 FM 3-07.

[marct]

Hi Rob,

Hey Norfolk - FM 3-07 on stability Operations is pretty good and not far off (I've seen the draft). I think it will fill in the gaps between 3-24 and 3-0. As sson as there is a releasable copy I'll send it to you. As for that - it might be a good idea if we hung links to new doctrine (approved for public release) somewhere on SWJ so folks could review it and comment.
Best, Rob

That would be a great idea - I've only got an old copy of 3-0, so I'm sitting on the sidelines on this .

Marc

[Ken White]

That should be okay, it certainly is with me.

"Like many things though – the original function of the system, process, institution, etc. takes on a life of its own, far beyond the intended purpose. This could be good or bad, but we often take it for granted that it is still a good idea."

True. I believe that's called inertia. In my experience, something best avoided in human affairs.

"This is why I believe you have to stay involved in these things – you can’t succumb to the delusion that you’ve fixed something – there is always somebody or something following you around unfixing it – or fixing it the way think it should be...

True. I believe that opposes inertia...

...If you abolished the Hoffman building, somebody come right behind you and build a new one and call it something else and hire all the same people back."

Some folks would certainly do that, they would be the cautious ones. Others would create a different organization that served as opposed to exercising more control than it should. Neither of those parties should be dumb enough to hire the same people back (No offense to the many folks there who work their buns off; it's the policies, not the people)

"The difference I think is the role leadership plays. Leaders can animate the process, stave off the tide for awhile (or at least protect a few important things). Leaders can keep us from killing the things which are most important and can not be easily rebuilt. Leaders can convince folks with seemingly disparate interests to cooperate."

All very true. I've met a few great ones and many okay leaders and some sorry ones. Been my observation that the great and good tend to accept risk and are innovative. If a large organization is in danger of erring or has demonstrably erred on a critical task, seems to me the leadership needs to be questioned.

"We may fear the way the Chinese wield “soft power” to achieve an indirect influence in a growing number of places – with their abundance of human capital and growing economy as the means to do so, but we’re not willing to break from our culture to contest it in a like manner either. We’re simply not Chinese."

Why would we fear that? I don't fear it. I've fought the Chinese; they're people, no more. Yes, we're different and that's not a problem. They play to their strengths, we should play to ours and avoid a Eurocentric solution to an American problem -- we aren't Chinese and we aren't Europeans.

"I’d also add that we have a knack for getting ourselves into the deep end without realizing it – again possibly because we seem to be culturally opposed to building (and listening) the means that might warn us when we were adrift. Why do we have such a big Snap-On Hammer in the prize tool box and while we keep our other dinky no-name tools in the kitchen drawer – because that is the way we built it, why did we build it that way – because we chose to – we are at fault."

Again all true; it's the American way We don't do reconnaissance well, we're too impatient so we just send a bunch of folks out and they blunder around and start a fight so everyone else can pile on. Works more often than not. Not really the best way to do it but it is a way and it's very 'American.' We should do what we do well. As you said earlier:

"While we must inform folks of our limitations, we must also do a better job of evaluating and articulating our real capabilities – the foundation of capabilities are people and leadership."

(emphasis added / kw) True dat.

"So while I do believe long wars could be avoided – I don’t think it is in our nature, and I don’t think we currently have the means or the will to do so.

You may be correct but I believe that is more than arguable, albeit on a different thread.

This is why I think we have to be pragmatic about this within the military – if we are not prepared for the inevitable policy misstep – we have nobody to blame but ourselves. Could be a big war, could be a small one – could be one that turns into the other, etc. We're going to be "Full SPectrum" because we have to be.

Totally agree. I'll also flatly say that we cannot do that without the Reserve Components. That bears considerable thought by the leadership of the Army -- and by Congress...

Consider the fact that after the stupidity of Viet Nam, the intransigence of the leadership of the Army caused the formation of USSOCOM (I know there were other factors but that was a big one); the Army's refusal to deploy ArNG Combat Units to DS/DS caused, over the objection of the leadership of the Army, a massive infusion of resources into the Reserve Components in the 90s -- and that allowed the RC to deploy very effectively to this one. No one is going to attack the Army while we're in Iraq but when it's over you can bet they'll come out of the woodwork and try to pin some blame for the massive expenditure of dollars and 'unnecessary' casualties. Either the Army fixes itself or someone will provide a 'fix' that we don't like...

After all that, I still say, with respect to our doctrine and our training:

It allows for initiative at all levels. Most folks in the Army and Marines will agree with you however I submit that it should demand initiative at all levels. Initiative and competence can replace mass in far more situations than most realize.

[slapout9]

Hey Norfolk - FM 3-07 on stability Operations is pretty good and not far off (I've seen the draft). I think it will fill in the gaps between 3-24 and 3-0. As sson as there is a releasable copy I'll send it to you. As for that - it might be a good idea if we hung links to new doctrine (approved for public release) somewhere on SWJ so folks could review it and comment.
Best, Rob

Very good idea Rob.

[Rob Thornton]

Dr. Jack,

Any chance as 3-0 goes up on digits you can emplace a hyper-hyper link for the SWC to pour over? Or - you could email it to Dave or Bill here at the SWJ and we could see about getting it on the library? I'd recommend the same with 3-07 as soon as it comes out - given the diversity of the SWC (to include the lurkers) there will be some genuine review.
Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken,
I agree - I think if people can disagree in a way that brings out things that would otherwise go unsaid, unwritten, and uncommunicated - but do it in away that leaves room for individual growth, then we benefit. I think its when there is no disagreement is when we are most apt to get ourselves into trouble.

Going back to the early ref. abut the Neo-Classical description about the clock - and then forward to the ref. to people who pick up things and make assumptions about how they work, or should work - I think its worthwhile to say that the natural state of things (at least as I've discerned them) is much closer to dis-harmony, then harmony. People pick up a watch and say "what a great thing - all the pieces working together - gears turning hands and so forth - but I think only the watchmaker probably can appreciate the imperfections, the fragility of the mechanisms, the caution required when winding the springs.

We've gone to self-winding, digital, atomic, etc. and spent allot of effort to get things perfect - easier, more maintenance free. We mass produce things and make them cheaper so that when the watch no longer works the way it is supposed to, we can go out and get a new one.

It seems we get frustrated when wars (and other people centric - activities) won't perform like watches. You can wind a spring till it pops, but there are no guarantees. That is one of our big problems I think - we want self-winding, maintenance free, low cost solutions that always give us the time we want it to be- we try and make our policies like that, we try and build our bureaucracies like that - we lose site of the need to maintain it, and to infuse it with leadership. Then we wonder how we've created "self-licking ice - cream cones” or things that are monuments unto themselves full of folks that don't help the people or the purpose they were designed for.

One of the things I like here on the SWC is "how" we disagree. I come here to challenge, and to be challenged - to inform and to be informed. I often leave here with a hurt head - growth is not painless.

One thing I want people who are lurking and who may not have served to understand is that there are real people (uniformed and non-uniformed) who are wound up, not gears and hands. While we do our best, we make some mistakes - we are not perfect - and that should not be forgotten – the recruitment, training, education, selection and retention of good people is part of this, and is also hard work that never stops. You could have the best doctrine in the world, but without good people to employ it, it remains inanimate. On the other hand, I think one of the reasons we have good doctrine is because of the people we have, and the ways we designed to inform the process – but even that requires vigilance!

Well time to make the doughnuts – Have a great Sunday,
Best, Rob

[Global Scout]

We will never have a perfect leadership culture, simply because we're human and subject to imperfection, but we can't even seem to get the basics right in most units, and one of those key basics is empowering those on the tip of the spear and having the moral courage to underwrite their mistakes (mistakes are part of the learning curve, but the majority of officers don't want toi endure risking thier OER by facilitating their subordinates' learning curves).

Personally I like the majority of officers I have worked with, but I have serious concerns about their values and their ability to lead. Many officers feel they are in an entitled position, thus they themselves are "entitled". I wish they had half the knowledge they tend to think they have when it comes to war fighting or conflict management. As for doctrine, most rarely seem to be able to apply it effectively. It took Abe Lincoln to get the Union Army on the right path during the Civil War, and if we left it up to the Army's officers the Union would have lost. It took civilian leadership to intervene and put the right Generals in place. Why couldn't the Army do it? The same can be said about Vietnam and Iraq to a large extent, though in both cases there was a substantial amount of civilian leadership incompetence also. Still, the the point is that once we are going down a path, our culture of "excessive" loyality to the rater (careerist versus professional) doesn't permit us to flex. Once we start going down that road we put blinders on and God help us if we're not on the right road. Voices of dissent from the tip of the spear are frequently silenced. Despite the fact that our doctrine emphasizes maximum flexibility at the tip of the spear with our junior leaders at the platoon, squads, and ODA level, the reality is our culture prohibits it.

I believe this is one reason many of our young officers are leaving the Army in large numbers. They understand the world has changed, they see the problems first hand, and they have some ideas for dealing with them, yet they are prohibited by an overly stifling chain of command.

Doctrine alone will not fix this, we have to change our officer culture, and I'm not sure a President can do that. We're talking more along the lines of a miracle like parting the Red Sea.

[Ken White]

Well said.

I agree on all counts though I do think the Red Sea might, just might, be able to be parted. I certainly hope so for the sake of the Army.

Boring history. After WW II, a war won by the Army (practically if not realistically speaking), the Army rested on its Laurels. With predictable effects seen in the first few months in Korea. Given the stalemate in Korea and the lesson on resting, after Korea, the Army set about fixing itself. It really worked pretty and among other things, it came up with the Pentomic concept.

The Pentomic concept worked better than many think; most of the denigration of the effort is retrospective justification by the Army personnel community for its failure to adapt its personnel policies to the new tactical environment that concept entailed (remember that). In the event, it was scrapped for a return to a triangular organization (which again had some personnel policy induced problems and again, remember that). Then we went to Viet Nam.

Another stalemate, to be polite. Contributed to, in part, by very flawed personnel policies (remember that). It also essentially introduced the risk aversion and career oriented attitudes which have done us no favors. After Viet Nam the Army went into denial and did little or nothing except foster the so-called Weinberger and / or Powell Doctrines to avoid similar future embarassments -- we've seen how really well that worked out for us...

That failure to react by the Army was a part of the reason for the formation of USSOCOM. That was not a bad thing but it was partly a smack at the Army by Congress. Then came Desert Storm and Shield and the Army fought tooth and nail to avoid deploying ArNG combat units to Kuwait. Congress payback after the war for that stupidity was tons of money -- and other Army resources -- devoted in an attempt to make sure that failure to deploy the Guard did not again occur. Congress could've just passsed a law that said "The Army will deploy..." but Congress doesn't work that way, it attempted to box the Army in.

As an aside, all the RC folks have deployed this time and have generally done well. They deserve better care by and more respect from the Army than they get.

When Iraq settles down and there's no fear of being accused of "not supporting the Troops," the knives will come out simply due to the costs and the very obvious fact that the Army did poorly in Iraq early on. A contributor to that was the fatally flawed attempt to 'doctrinally' influence the Politicians in the late 70s, another was, wait for it -- flawed personnel policy (i.e. the all commanders are created equal and the 'it's your turn' processes among others).

Regardless, Henry Waxman will go on a quest for victims.

The Army can part the Red Sea itself by developing coherent (and concise) doctrine, fixing the personnel polices -- and getting a course correction on the officer and the senior NCO cultures, further improvement of the training processes and rationalizing its equipment and its procurement policies. It can do those things quickly or someone will come up with other solutions that do not address the problem and possibly do more harm than good. That's what happened the last two times and the Army suffered for its lapses...

[Ski]

Ken

I hate agreeing with you so much, I feel like a sycophant.

The Army is losing officers because of two things: culture and OPTEMPO.

I just met a guy last week out at Leavenworth who had done 8 deployments since 97 - thrice to Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and two Central America fun rides. He asked for a job where his wife could stabilize since she has a brand new $100K law degree. The collective genii at the Hoffman Building told him that he has X Y and Z to choose from. He chose X and was then told he couldn't have that job, so he told his Commander that he was turning in his paperwork and went into the Guard full time. Good for the nation and the Guard, bad for the Army. I have a CPT working for me as a full timer Guardsman who was a Marshall ROTC grad, led an infantry platoon in Iraq with the 82nd for a year, and then joined the Guard. Of course, he's leaving for Iraq in a few months as a BN S3 (he'll pin on 04 by then), and again, bad for the Army, good for the nation and the Guard.

I've read a LOT about the debacle in 91 with the ARNG Brigades - more than what is available publically. The Army leadership should have been ashamed, but again, it's all about protecting the institution, force structure and resourcing.

As I much as I love the Army - and that includes all components despite the snipes I take on a daily basis from my AC brethren - I am firmly convinced that it is either going to take a 21st George Marshall to rise from the field grade positions, or it's going to get shoved down the Army's throat by Congress. It's become that bad in my limited opinion.

Rob touches on an interesting point - he mentions how the Army is expected to operate like a watch..and he's correct. We hear the word "synchronization" a trillion times by the time we make CPT. The Germans called it "harmonization" and I think that fits the situation much better than the "synchronization" path we've been led on. Synchronization kills initiative - simple as that. If one piece of the watch doesn't work, then the synchronization is off. Same goes for all the bazillion pieces running around while in training or in war...because that's the culture that was created in the 70's, and has only been enhanced with all the digital communication and positioning equipment weer festooned with now. You can track individual vehicles now from operational and higher level HQ's if you really wanted to. Why? Because of the overwhelming desire to be synchronized. Sorry for the rant.

GS - agree with you 100%. I always liked GEN Sullivans quote of "Discussion is not dissent" but the culture seems to overpower that.

[Ken White]

a greater impact than even the acknowledged OpTempo problem. True on the loss reasons.

Not to worry, my kids say I'm a psycho-phant...

On the 91 debacle, not only is there a lot more to that than has been made public (and as you say, it was literally shameful) but the Army, in its brilliance, took an AC guy who was solely responsible for the biggest screwup in the whole deal and, after DS/DS, put him nominally in charge of RC training -- and he was, aside from being stupidly arrogant, totally ignorant. The good news is that later, after he got a couple of stars, they bounced him for sexual harassment.

"You can track individual vehicles now from operational and higher level HQ's if you really wanted to. Why? Because of the overwhelming desire to be synchronized. Sorry for the rant."

Don't be sorry. That's rant material and is, IMO, a criminal waste of money. The Germans in WW II -- no slouches at this military business by anyone's admission -- had radios that were allowed to talk only one echelon up , to peers and one echelon down. IOW, a Battlaion could not even talk to a Platoon; Division could not talk to a Battalion. Our fetish for over control has held us back since the end of WW II; I've got control stories out of Korea that are mind-numbing and Viet Nam was worse. My kids last trip to Afghanistan produced some hilarious stories about the number of General Officers involved in company level decisions there...

Stupid and scary.

[Tom Odom]

Don't be sorry. That's rant material and is, IMO, a criminal waste of money. The Germans in WW II -- no slouches at this military business by anyone's admission -- had radios that were allowed to talk only one echelon up , to peers and one echelon down. IOW, a Battlaion could not even talk to a Platoon; Division could not talk to a Battalion. Our fetish for over control has held us back since the end of WW II; I've got control stories out of Korea that are mind-numbing and Viet Nam was worse. My kids last trip to Afghanistan produced some hilarious stories about the number of General Officers involved in company level decisions there...

Ken

The more we automate, the more people we need to run/watch/interpret/manipulate the automated systems. The end result is that increased automation of C2 has only made staffs bigger and the things they control--the units fighting--smaller.

Best

Tom