Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat

[SWJED]

Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat - Milton Leitenberg. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, December 2005. It is nearly 15 years since biological weapons (BW) have become a significant national security preoccupation. This occurred primarily due to circumstances occurring within a short span of years. First was the official U.S. Government suggestion that proliferation of offensive BW programs among states and even terrorist groups was an increasing trend; second was the discovery, between 1989 and 1992, that the Union USSR had violated the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) since its ratification in 1975 by building a massive covert biological weapons program; third was the corroboration by the UN Special Commission in 1995 that Iraq had maintained a covert biological weapons program since 1974, and had produced and stockpiled large quantities of agents and delivery systems between 1988 and 1991; and, fourth was the discovery, also in 1995, that the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group, which had carried out the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, also had spent 4 years attempting—albeit unsuccessfully—to produce and disperse two pathogenic biological agents. The distribution of professionally prepared anthrax spores through the U.S. postal system in the weeks afterwards September 11, 2001, magnified previous concerns by orders of magnitude. In December 2002, after U.S. forces had overrun much of the territory of Afghanistan, it was discovered that the al-Qaida organization also had spent several years trying to obtain the knowledge and means to produce biological agents. These new factors shifted the context in which BW was considered almost entirely to “bioterrorism.” Within 4 years, almost $30 billion in federal expenditure was appropriated to counter the anticipated threat. This response took place in the absence of virtually any threat analysis. The purpose of this monograph is to begin to fill that gap.

[Jedburgh]

The Challenge of Biological Terrorism: When to Cry Wolf, What to Cry, and How to Cry It

...the fact remains, however, that anyone approaching the subject of bioterrorism still has to be extremely careful about "crying wolf." The fact a threat exists does not define the kind of response that is needed, the priority it should be given, and the level of investment in time, expertise, and money that is required. It is all too easy to "cry wolf" in a post-9/11 world, but the risk of biological terrorism is only one more risk among thousands of other risks that affect human society.

Triage is just as essential an element of counterterrorism as it is of medicine and public health policy. In a world where car and truck bombs can kill over 100 people without warning on a crowded street, and where there are so many other competing priorities for government action, one has to be extremely careful about giving any given threat priority over the others, and even more careful about what to call for in terms of public policy. The years since 9/11 have shown that it is far easier to throw money at a problem than it is to solve one, and it is far easier to focus noisily on the worst case than it is to produce credible risk assessments...

[Jedburgh]

Threats Watch, 10 Mar 08: Focusing on the "Right" Biological Threat

There is an on-going debate about the threat of bio-terrorism and the roles that natural or manmade biologicals might play. Some believe that the attention being paid to man-made pathogens (or the so-called “designer” pathogens) is misplaced and leaves the greater population open to a greater threat, those from the natural world.

So, has the preoccupation with artificial microbes created a situation in which the government has focused more on a broad-spectrum approach to immunity instead of a “one-bug-one-drug” approach? How real is the threat posed by these synthetic germs? According to Michael Kurilla, the Director of Office of Biodefense Research Affairs at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, ‘Mother Nature is the most dangerous terrorist. The microbial world is almost unlimited in its [terrorist] potential.”

However, despite the emergence of new diseases like SARS and the H5N1 bird flu (pandemic flu), he is also concerned about the threat caused by developments in synthetic biology and the possibility that either rogue scientists or bio-terrorists could duplicate some of this laboratory work and use the product(s) against society.....

[Jedburgh]

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 23 May 08: The Expanding Range of Biowarfare Threats

Scientists are developing new substances at the cross section of biology and chemistry--such as peptide bioregulators--that could be used to incapacitate and kill. These substances defy the typical biochemical threat spectrum that includes microbial pathogens such as the anthrax bacterium and toxins such as botulinum. In The Body’s Own Bioweapons, Jonathan B. Tucker, a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, documents this research and its impact on existing arms controls. Below, Tucker and his three fellow discussants continue the debate about the impact of these new lethal and incapacitating agents and suggest ways to discourage their development....

[JJackson]

Mother Nature is the most dangerous terrorist. The microbial world is almost unlimited in its [terrorist] potential

Bioengineering pathogens is at the extremes of our abilities (man’s that is) we have recently 'created life' from scratch for the first time. This was a fairly big deal but all we did was manufacture some DNA to match that of another organism, we do not know enough to make even minor changes to the genetic sequence and be able to predict the effects. The money thrown at bio-terrorism has had two effects (well three if you include that it was diverted from some where it might have done more good) firstly it has probably increased the threat to US citizens from dangerous biological agents by vastly increasing the number of US labs licensed to work with dangerous pathogens. There has, naturally enough, been a commensurate increase in the number of lab accidents, researchers infected etc. (link to post on Texas A&M University lab failures that eventually made the CDC do something). The second, and beneficial effect, of bio-terrorism research has been the fact that a lot of it is dual use and could be of genuine benefit in what is the far greater, and very real danger, posed by zoonotic emergence - H5N1 being the poster-boy candidate. In this field, to paraphrase Ex. Sec. Rumsfeld, it is the known unknowns that we should be losing sleep over HIV/AIDS, SARS, Nipah, Ebola/Marburg etc. are all recent zoonotics. None of our (human) communicable diseases was originally a human disease from Yellow fever & Smallpox to cold & flu they have all been acquired by humans from - and since - the domestication of animals.

H5N1 an object lesson.
For the first time in history we have been given forewarning of an impending zoonotic emergence and it is a humbling (humiliating might be closer) lesson in how poor a match our technology is to this very basic virus' ability to mutate away from any solution we may try and develop. HIV is a classical zoonotic pandemic and despite the research effort over a quarter of a century this is the first year in which we may have broken even. A flu pandemic would follow the same course but due to the difference in its transmission method would reach the same point in the pandemic cycle in about three months. We have no vaccines and no likelihood of producing any in the foreseeable future, we have one antiviral (Tamiflu) that has shown some usefulness (not a cure but can reduce symptoms) but resistance is rapidly developing in seasonal flu and most epidemiological models show this becoming the norm early in a pandemic. Here is an enemy that is a truly worthy advisory only full scale nuclear war can come close to matching its potential for destruction of our cosy human existence.
Y’all have a nice day now.

[Jedburgh]

Officer.com, 26 May 08: Bioterrorist Attack: Fact or Fiction?

....The point to all this is that by the end of the 2008 fiscal year DHS will have spent $50 billion on defense against bioterrorism attacks. Let's assume for the moment that the biological weapons threat is more fantasy then fact, how much law enforcement and emergency response equipment would State and local police department have bought with that amount of your tax payer dollars? Need updated cruisers, computers, commutations systems and centers, or weapons and ammo for use on your beat? Fifty billion will buy a bunch of that stuff....

....So what exactly have we gotten for all that money? For one thing we have a series of National Centers for study of bioterrorism organisms established at major universities around the country. That sounds good on the surface until you realize that most of these were university research departments that were hurting for grant money and all of a sudden saw a way to keep their research going under the guise of "Bioterrorism prevention".....

[AdamG]

A Dutch researcher has created a virus with the potential to kill half of the planet’s population. Now, researchers and experts in bioterrorism debate whether it is a good idea to publish the virus creation ”recipe”. However, several voices argue that such research should have not happened in the first place.

The virus is a strain of avian influenza H5N1 genetically modified to be extremely contagious. It was created by researcher Ron Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Center Rotterdam, Netherlands. The work was first presented at a conference dedicated to influenza, that took place in September in Malta.

http://www.doctortipster.com/6952-du...-millions.html

In a 17th floor office in the same building, virologist Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center calmly explains why his team created what he says is "probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make"—and why he wants to publish a paper describing how they did it.

http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencein...orm.html?rss=1

See also

The influenza pandemic of 1918-1919 killed more people than the Great War, known today as World War I (WWI), at somewhere between 20 and 40 million people. It has been cited as the most devastating epidemic in recorded world history. More people died of influenza in a single year than in four-years of the Black Death Bubonic Plague from 1347 to 1351. Known as "Spanish Flu" or "La Grippe" the influenza of 1918-1919 was a global disaster.

http://virus.stanford.edu/uda/

[Bob's World]

Pandemic influenza will happen. There is no way to stop this. But this? To accelerate and inflate nature in such a manner for no foreseeable benefit to mankind? This is unconscionable. If this is not a major crime it should be.

[davidbfpo]

It will be interesting to see if this story gets traction in Holland, especially given the impact on the national consciousness of the Holocaust and van Gogh's murder.

Good to know, having read the second linked article, that peer reviewed research and a scientific conference were all involved in "missing the point".

Now can the 'door' be closed?

Perhaps we can tease, encourage and urge our Dutch SWC member sennef@cimic-coe to add a comment?

[AdamG]

Now can the 'door' be closed?

I've seen this move before. It doesn't end well.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hHfGSqviKlk

[Presley Cannady]

Now can the 'door' be closed?

Why do you think it was ever closed?

[davidbfpo]

Why do you think it was ever closed?

Presley,

I understood that scientific research had prior to the Internet been largely communicated within the community in printed journals etc. For others to gain access was not impossible, but would take time and effort. Now the Internet makes access cheap, rapid and easy. I have assumed in this example that much of the Dutch work, if not the formulas, are in the public domain and can be found by those who wish harm.

This part of the scientific community appear to have been oblivious to the dangers, even when the traditional methods of oversight have been used, hence my reference to:

peer reviewed research and a scientific conference

Which you refer to as:

controlled conditions

Hardly much sign of those conditions applying, hence my use of the analogy of a door being closed.

[Presley Cannady]

Pandemic influenza will happen. There is no way to stop this. But this? To accelerate and inflate nature in such a manner for no foreseeable benefit to mankind? This is unconscionable. If this is not a major crime it should be.

Newsflash. Homo sapiens is a part of nature. So the question is which do you prefer? A world where mankind isn't intelligent enough to contemplate, execute and study--under controlled conditions--evolutionary pathways of pathology or a world where we just stumble across it? 1918 wasn't a fun year.

[Bob's World]

Newsflash. Homo sapiens is a part of nature. So the question is which do you prefer? A world where mankind isn't intelligent enough to contemplate, execute and study--under controlled conditions--evolutionary pathways of pathology or a world where we just stumble across it? 1918 wasn't a fun year.

Research is important. No argument, but 1918 was most likely far smaller than a similar event that is apt to happen in our lifetime. Bringing a super-virus into a world with no immunity to the same is not science, it is opening Pandora's box.

I've seen estimates that as high as 90% of the North American populace were killed in pandemics from the time Columbus landed in the Caribbean and when the first settlers arrived in Virginia. They thought they had found a wilderness, but had in fact arrived in a ghost town.

I am sure the scientists who create the next virus to have such an effect will rationalize how their work was to advance science as you describe, and it was only some accident or intentional abuse of their work that led to the following disaster. Some things are best left uninvented.

[Presley Cannady]

Research is important. No argument, but 1918 was most likely far smaller than a similar event that is apt to happen in our lifetime.

About ten times smaller than the number tossed around in advanced of publication.

Bringing a super-virus into a world with no immunity to the same is not science, it is opening Pandora's box.

Couple of points:

1. There is no such thing as a super virus.
2. Discovery in virology is serendipitous; there is presently no means to plan treatment until a pathogen emerges.
3. There is no guarantee that H5N1 wouldn't evolve into the discovered strain.

Pandora's box was open the moment organic replicators appeared on this planet, and what was let loose has likely caused several mass extinctions throughout geological time.

I am sure the scientists who create the next virus to have such an effect will rationalize how their work was to advance science as you describe...

Nothing so cliche. Their work advances the cause of identifying and mitigating existential threats to the survival of mankind.

[AdamG]

The days of medical masks at airports and widespread panic may be coming back—that's because at least 12 humans are believed to have been infected with a new strain of swine flu that's not covered by this season's vaccine.

The new swine flu strain, H3N2v, has shown at least some potential for human-to-human transmission in those 12 individuals, which makes it especially dangerous. Between 2009 and mid-2010, more than 17,000 people died worldwide from the highly contagious H1N1 swine flu strain, leading the World Health Organization to call the strain a pandemic.

The 12 people with the new swine flu strain live in Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Officials for the Centers for Disease Control say the sample size of H3N2 infections is too small to know whether it will pose a threat to the population at large.

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/...ine-flu-strain

[davidbfpo]

From FP Blog and possibly a better title would be 'What is the bio-scientist doing in the lab?'.

A long article and hardly calming:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article..._door?page=0,0

The Dutch experiment appears to have reached Hilary Clinton's desk; slightly edited comments she made:

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a surprise visit to Geneva on Dec. 7, addressing the Biological Weapons Convention review conference. The highest-ranking U.S. official to speak to the biological weapons group in decades, Clinton warned "The emerging gene-synthesis industry is making genetic material widely available. This obviously has many benefits for research, but it could also potentially be used to assemble the components of a deadly organism.

A crude but effective terrorist weapon can be made by using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology. Less than a year ago, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for, and I quote, 'brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass destruction".

In the UK in a different field, radiology, much effort is spent on physical defences, but vetting the staff - at universities - is not included.

I do wonder whether the "bubble" of 'trust me, I'm a scientist' is redundant.

[AdamG]

I do wonder whether the "bubble" of 'trust me, I'm a scientist' is redundant.

Art imitates life. Life imitates art.