America’s relationship with the world is in disrepair...

[Stan]

"Anger, resentment, and fear have replaced the respect the United States once enjoyed. What single policy or gesture can the next president of the United States make?"

Note: In order to read the whole kit and caboodle, you need to be a member. If anyone would like the larger versions, please PM me and I'll get the copies to you.

Here's my 3 choices out of the 12 published.

Foreign Policy asked 12 of the world’s leading thinkers to answer a question: What one policy or gesture can the next president of the United States make to improve America’s standing in the world?

Step on the Gas By Kenneth Rogoff

...insist that the U.S. Congress pass a huge increase in gas taxes. To be more precise, the United States should implement steep carbon taxes that hit coal, heating oil, and natural gas. The tax should be enough to raise the price of gasoline by at least $2 a gallon.

Unrepentant Power By Jorge I. Domínguez

Re-read the opening lines of the U.S. Declaration of Independence. There, the Founders pledged the nation to bear “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” They vowed to resist the temptation to insist that American views should always prevail. They affirmed that the very idea of liberty intrinsically presumes that we will not all follow the same path.

Steady as She Goes By Fouad Ajami

...the pretense of intellectuals and pundits who shelter under American power while bemoaning the sins of the country that provides their protection. When and if a postAmerican world arrives, it will not be pretty or merciful. If we be Rome, darkness will follow the American imperium.

Nothing dramatically new needs to be done by the next American...

[SteveMetz]

Steady as She Goes By Fouad Ajami

...the pretense of intellectuals and pundits who shelter under American power while bemoaning the sins of the country that provides their protection. When and if a postAmerican world arrives, it will not be pretty or merciful. If we be Rome, darkness will follow the American imperium.

Nothing dramatically new needs to be done by the next American...

"We shall be mobbed when we go there by people who are eager for deliverance from the tyranny and the great big prison of Saddam Hussein."

Fouad Ajami, Senate testimony, September 2002

[John T. Fishel]

Steady as She Goes By Fouad Ajami

...the pretense of intellectuals and pundits who shelter under American power while bemoaning the sins of the country that provides their protection. When and if a postAmerican world arrives, it will not be pretty or merciful. If we be Rome, darkness will follow the American imperium.

Nothing dramatically new needs to be done by the next American...

"We shall be mobbed when we go there by people who are eager for deliverance from the tyranny and the great big prison of Saddam Hussein."

Fouad Ajami, Senate testimony, September 2002

for about 5 minutes! (I exagerate, of course.)

[J Wolfsberger]

Steady as She Goes By Fouad Ajami

...the pretense of intellectuals and pundits who shelter under American power while bemoaning the sins of the country that provides their protection. When and if a postAmerican world arrives, it will not be pretty or merciful. If we be Rome, darkness will follow the American imperium.

Nothing dramatically new needs to be done by the next American...

"We shall be mobbed when we go there by people who are eager for deliverance from the tyranny and the great big prison of Saddam Hussein."

Fouad Ajami, Senate testimony, September 2002

This may not be the place for it, but I think a large part of the mess in Iraq lays squarely at the feet of Rumsfeld. If he had listened to Shinseki and sent in more troops, if we had developed a solid plan for the occupation period, if we hadn't engaged in wholesale, zero-tolerence de-Baathification .. We might be looking back on Ajami's words as prophetic.

I know that "woulda, shoulda, coulda" isn't useful as excuse or explanation, and that therre were other parties involved. Nonetheless, the sheer arrogant incompetance of Rumsfeld, by itself, was the necesssaqry and sufficient condition for the situation thaat ensued.

[tequila]

Ajami's words were meant as justification for Rumsfeld's light footprint. There was no need for large numbers of American troops to provide security for the Iraqis or themselves - the Iraqis would embrace the Americans like Paris in 1944 and would regulate themselves under the stalwart leadership of Ahmad Chalabi.

[J Wolfsberger]

Ajami's words were meant as justification for Rumsfeld's light footprint. There was no need for large numbers of American troops to provide security for the Iraqis or themselves - the Iraqis would embrace the Americans like Paris in 1944 and would regulate themselves under the stalwart leadership of Ahmad Chalabi.

Too bad. That means he contributed to the lousy decisions. So the next question is, did he learn from his mistakes? Does this mean I have to buy the current issue of Foreign Policy?

[tequila]

Why would he learn from his mistakes? It's not like he's paid a price either personally or professionally for them. Foreign Policy still thinks he's worth consulting for their survey.

I've browsed his latest and it's obvious from just flipping through that he doesn't believe he's made any mistakes.

[SteveMetz]

Why would he learn from his mistakes? It's not like he's paid a price either personally or professionally for them. Foreign Policy still thinks he's worth consulting for their survey.

I've browsed his latest and it's obvious from just flipping through that he doesn't believe he's made any mistakes.

I think you've hit on the key point. Pundits and policy experts are never held accountable for faulty analysis or bad advice. Heck, Bill Kristol and Richard Perle are still proffering wisdom on Iraq.

[LawVol]

This may not be the place for it, but I think a large part of the mess in Iraq lays squarely at the feet of Rumsfeld. If he had listened to Shinseki and sent in more troops, if we had developed a solid plan for the occupation period, if we hadn't engaged in wholesale, zero-tolerence de-Baathification .. We might be looking back on Ajami's words as prophetic.

I know that "woulda, shoulda, coulda" isn't useful as excuse or explanation, and that therre were other parties involved. Nonetheless, the sheer arrogant incompetance of Rumsfeld, by itself, was the necesssaqry and sufficient condition for the situation thaat ensued.

You are right. We had our chance at having a Paris-style welcome in Iraq, but we blew it because we were unprepared. We believed we knew what was right and we ignored the warnings. I think the word is hubris.

I think the next prez needs to act with a little less arrogence and a little more humilty. We need to learn to give in a little, if and when we can. We are viewed as the bully and, right or wrong, that perception needs to be changed.

[SteveMetz]

You are right. We had our chance at having a Paris-style welcome in Iraq, but we blew it ...

Maybe, maybe not. Here's the way I address this in my conclusion:

...One thing is beyond dispute: the Bush administration failed to gauge and prepare for the difficulties of stabilizing Iraq after Hussein. There are three explanations for this. The first is that mismanagement, incompetence, or bad decisions derailed what could have been a relatively successful transition from dictatorship to democracy. The administration sent too few military forces, failed to plan, made major errors (such as the dissolution of the Iraqi army), relied too much on the advice of exiles, refused to make concessions which might have attracted more partners to the stabilization effort, created unrealistic expectations in the American public, and, in a general sense, tried to undertake a massive effort on the cheap. Those who subscribe to this position will search for culprits, from the President himself on down. Rumsfeld is likely to receive much of the blame, with Bremer, Rice, Wolfowitz, Feith, and Franks getting a share as well. Generals Sanchez, Abizaid, and Casey may also be incriminated. Powell, Myers, and congressional Republicans may be seen as contributors to the failure since they could have influenced, perhaps even derailed the march to war but did not. The second explanation is that transforming Iraq from a parasitic dictatorship to a democracy was unachievable from the start. Even the best designed strategy could not have brought the easy success promised before the intervention. In one variant of this, President Bush himself is still to blame since he made the decision to undertake an impossible mission. In a second, the President's advisers are the culprits for failing to explain the impossibility of the undertaking. The third explanation is the "stab in the back" theory—success was attainable had not some organization deliberately prevented it. Those who promote this insidious position—and they are likely to be die-hard supporters of the Bush legacy from either within the administration or the conservative idealist community—will blame the U.S. military or the intelligence community, or the media and Democrats for turning the public against the counterinsurgency campaign.

These explanations have more than scholarly importance. Whichever one is adopted will form a strategic "lesson." If policymakers, strategists, political leaders, and the wider strategic community accept the notion that the post-Hussein problems in Iraq were the result of mistakes or bad decisions by the Bush administration, then the implication is that future policymakers and strategists need only to be wiser. Experts within the military, the intelligence agencies, Congress, other components of the government, and the scholarly and strategic communities must be more assertive to assure that policymakers understand the likely results of their decisions. There is nothing systemically flawed in the system by which Americans generate strategy. It was simply a matter of the wrong people in power at the wrong time, or a post-September 11 collective myopia. On the other hand, if the strategic and policymaking communities accept the idea that transforming Iraq into a democracy was an impossible mission, then the strategic "lesson" is that the United States should not undertake such actions. Rather than doing it better the next time, there should be no next time. This suggests that a strategy based on ameliorating the sources of conflict in the restive parts of the world is itself flawed and was not just badly executed. Some degree of disengagement, containment, and cauterization makes much more sense. The third explanation—the "stab in the back"—is unlikely to gain widespread support. If it did, however, the "lesson" would be that the guilty organization must be controlled or marginalized in the future...

[J Wolfsberger]

Maybe, maybe not. Here's the way I address this in my conclusion:

Which paper is this from? Could you provide a link?

The first is that mismanagement, incompetence, or bad decisions derailed what could have been a relatively successful transition from dictatorship to democracy. ... Those who subscribe to this position will search for culprits, from the President himself on down. Rumsfeld is likely to receive much of the blame, with ... etc.

I know I've got a bias on this - I cringed when Rumsfeld was named. Even taking that into account, and acknowledging that he didn't act in a vacuum, I think he bears the brunt of responsibility for the outcome. Expecting a Paris type welcome was, indeed, unrealistic. But we did start off with a brief window of goodwill, and that was a squandered opportunity. I also think Bush carried the virtue of loyalty toward a subordinate to the point of a vice.

The second explanation is that transforming Iraq from a parasitic dictatorship to a democracy was unachievable from the start. Even the best designed strategy could not have brought the easy success promised before the intervention. In one variant of this, President Bush himself is still to blame since he made the decision to undertake an impossible mission. In a second, the President's advisers are the culprits for failing to explain the impossibility of the undertaking.

Its one of life's ironies that the neo-cons adopted the pre-Viet Nam ideology of (arrogant ) "nation building," with almost the same result.

The third explanation is the "stab in the back" theory—success was attainable had not some organization deliberately prevented it. Those who promote this insidious position—and they are likely to be die-hard supporters of the Bush legacy from either within the administration or the conservative idealist community—will blame the U.S. military or the intelligence community, or the media and Democrats for turning the public against the counterinsurgency campaign.

I agree that this has the most potential for long term damage. The entire "Bush lied, people died" meme will lead to lot of problems, not the least of which is that people (i.e. voters) will wind up with some level of expectation that perfect intelligence is possible. Also, while I condemn the behavior of the media and some Democrats, blaming them for the problems we encountered is just as unrealistic as blaming Bush because the intelligence was wrong.

[LawVol]

I concur that the third explanation is unlikely to gain traction, at least beyond the neo-con community. The first and second theories are much more plausible. Of course, from my last post, you know I subscribe to the first.

I do not subscribe to the second theory because I believe that people want freedom, perhaps not American-style democracy, but freedom nonetheless. I do not believe that Iraqis are incapable of some form of representative democracy, it just may look different than what we have.

Thus, since a free government for Iraq is acheivable, we must have done something wrong that resulted in what we have there now. However, I am less interested in assigning blame than identifying the issue and solving the problem because I believe that we'll do this again somewhere (most likely in Africa). I think we need to understand how to address human security needs in order to prevent the kind of chaos that resulted in Iraq. Now before anyone jumps on me and accuses me of being a defeatist, I do believe we are on the right track for success in Iraq. I just believe that a different approach would have produced positive results much quicker and with less bloodshed.

Question: in your conclusion you state that "One thing is beyond dispute: the Bush administration failed to gauge and prepare for the difficulties of stabilizing Iraq after Hussein." Doesn't your third explanation presuppose that this statement is incorrect? In other words, doesn't the stab in the back crowd argue that the Administration had a good plan but that it was foiled by [insert scapegoat here]?

[SteveMetz]

Which paper is this from? Could you provide a link?

It's from the conclusion to the book.

Have I mentioned that I'm working on a book?

[SteveMetz]

I do not subscribe to the second theory because I believe that people want freedom, perhaps not American-style democracy, but freedom nonetheless. I do not believe that Iraqis are incapable of some form of representative democracy, it just may look different than what we have.

The thing is, that while everyone wants freedom for themselves, that's not enough to make a democracy works. It also requires that people accept and tolerate other people's freedom as well. I'm not sure that exists in Iraq.

[tequila]

I'd like to register my objection to the inclusion of amorphous concepts like "freedom" in this argument. I believe that what we are seeing is a scramble in Iraq amongst different factions for power, wealth, and ultimately a struggle over the definition of what sort of nation Iraq will be in the future. The Mahdi Army does not round up and execute Sunnis because it wants them to be unfree --- it is seeking to gain control over an area by expelling those who might possibly be opposed to an explicitly religious Shi'i movement in power, or who might host their enemies.

[SteveMetz]

I'd like to register my objection to the inclusion of amorphous concepts like "freedom" in this argument. I believe that what we are seeing is a scramble in Iraq amongst different factions for power, wealth, and ultimately a struggle over the definition of what sort of nation Iraq will be in the future. The Mahdi Army does not round up and execute Sunnis because it wants them to be unfree --- it is seeking to gain control over an area by expelling those who might possibly be opposed to an explicitly religious Shi'i movement in power, or who might host their enemies.

Just as AQ did not attack the United States because it "hates freedom."

The problem is that because the American public and Congress have an influence on our strategy, we have to cast it as a moral crusade. When reality shatters that portrayal (as it often does), we become ineffective.

[J Wolfsberger]

It's from the conclusion to the book.

Have I mentioned that I'm working on a book?

WHAT! Who knew?

[SteveMetz]

WHAT! Who knew?

Sometimes I'm just too subtle for my own good.

[Ken White]

"leading thinkers" comprise the right group to provide much decent 'advice' simply because they, as Steve aptly illustrates, will bear no responsibility for what the next President does or does nor do. America's standing in the world is unlikely to be changed too much by the actions of that individual (though he or she will certainly have an effect on short term perceptions). I say that because the "thinkers" will bring their agendas into the answer, as illustrated, and that their views will almost certainly be rather unrealistic and generally of little substance -- as Stan's three choices show.

To comment on the off-thread commentary above:

Ajami obviously did what I suggest and pushed his agenda. That anyone believed or acted on that is a lick on them.

Rumsfeld did err in pushing for too small a force; Bush deserves an Attaboy for overruling him and giving Frank's most of what he asked for. Rumsfeld, when all is said and done was a civilian and a businessman. He did not possess -- and almost no SecDef has possessed or will possess -- the military experience to make decisions of force movement, application and effects; that's the job of the Armed Forces and it is not a stab in the back to say that they did not do that aspect of the job at all well. That needs to be acknowledge and rectified so that it does not happen again.

The CentCom and Joint Staffs and the Army deserve a knock for not developing a solid plan for post attack period. In fairness to all of them, they were victims of a doctrine and training gap created by their predecessors. The BCTP, for example, is a great program -- except for the fact that in prior years when the 'victory' was won, they then turned off the computers and lights and left the room. No real effort was expended on Phase IV actions. People who are not trained to perform and action generally will "ad-hoc" it and are likely to err. I understand that has been fixed. What we should not lose sight of is the fact that the misguided attempt to eschew nation building and COIN as a real doctrinal tenet did the nation, this particular administration, DoD and the Army -- and, more importantly, the Troops themselves -- and even the Iraqis a distinct disservice.

The post Viet Nam leadership of the Army built a great force, almost certainly the best we've ever had and they deserve great praise for doing that -- while that does mitigate it does not excuse their attempt to lead foreign policy with flawed 'doctrines' and wishful thinking. Failure to provide a full spectrum force was an error, pure and simple. Many studies in the early 80s warned of the problem but DoD and the Armed Forces desperately tried to ignore them. there are many reasons for this -- the validity of those reasons is suspect.

Our penchant for listening to the Perles, Kristols -- and yes, Talbots and Albrights -- when they try to dictate policy based on their agendas and ideology is one of our national weaknesses. Appointing these 'thinkers' to policy positions has never worked well. The Bundys, the Feiths and the Wolfotwits should never be put in a position to actually affect anything.

We never had a chance to achieve a "Paris style welcome" in Iraq and, in fairness to the Intel Community, that was said. Also in fairness, they did not say it strongly enough and thus got ignored. I place the blame on that failure to be assertive on the innate desire of the IC to never be wrong -- as well as on the degree of uncertainty caused by the Humint failures engendered by a number of Congresses and idealistic efforts that inadvertently emasculated the IC over the years from 1962 forward. To again be fair, the politicization by the IC themselves helped create that problem (and the continuing trend will not help them much). If the next Prez wants to really do some good, the IC will be put in a big bag and thoroughly shaken up...

Originally Posted by Steve Metz:
The third explanation is the "stab in the back" theory—success was attainable had not some organization deliberately prevented it. Those who promote this insidious position—and they are likely to be die-hard supporters of the Bush legacy from either within the administration or the conservative idealist community—will blame the U.S. military or the intelligence community, or the media and Democrats for turning the public against the counterinsurgency campaign.

While I do not disagree with what you say and do agree it has potential for long term damage, I also suggest that in effect occurred post Viet Nam and that the Armed Forces tried to ascribe the problem to Politicians and the Media and claimed they just did what they were told to do. True -- but we have never really acknowledged that the most significant problem in Viet Nam was the that a Euro-centric Army tried to fight a land war in Europe in the paddies of southeast Asia for seven long years before it got smart.

In Iraq, we did the same thing and the institution needs to acknowledge that error. The institution deserves an Attaboy for realizing that error in only 18 month, a quantum improvement over Viet Nam -- it also should ask itself why it took that long; why it took another 18 months to start remediating that error; and why it took 18 more months to implement that remediation and it needs to avoid a repetition by developing full spectrum forces that know what to do in ANY situation where they Army be deployed. This is being done and it needs to continue and forthright honesty in addressing and admitting the errors would be a distinct asset

Originally posted by Steve Metz
Just as AQ did not attack the United States because it "hates freedom."

The problem is that because the American public and Congress have an influence on our strategy, we have to cast it as a moral crusade. When reality shatters that portrayal (as it often does), we become ineffective.

Which gets me back on-thread.

If the next President wants to return the respect the US nominally enjoyed in some mythical time (1945-47 ??? ) with a single action (dream scenario...) S/he can reform our totally ignorant and incompetent media so that they educate (since our education K-12 system does not do this well) and inform the public and the Congress (since they seem incapable of absorbing the information available to them) of the real world in which we live instead of the entertainment and celebrity world they inculcate (deliberately). Our media is a world laughing stock and bears great responsibility for our lack of perceived respect...

I won't even go into the difference between 'like' and 'respect' as it appears many confuse the two words...

[Stan]

Does this mean I have to buy the current issue of Foreign Policy?

If anyone would like the larger versions, please PM me and I'll get the copies to you.

John, No you don't have to...I have access
Let me know what you want.

Regards, Stan