All-Mercenary service?

[Jones_RE]

Very true, Stratiotes, however the logistical challenges of invading the continental United States (as well as the sheer size of the place) make this sort of problem very unlikely for us. The problems we do have, however, are bad enough as it is.

For example, it takes a long time to train a professional infantryman. Light infantry are the backbone of any small war effort, and infantry are mandatory for the big wars, too. I worry about our nation's ability to handle a truly major theater war - something on the scale of the US Civil War and the two world wars. The fact that we don't have an enemy on the horizon doesn't mean this kind of thing won't happen again - history shows us that it likely will. We had several million men under arms in the last big war - and that was with a much smaller population. How will we put a twenty million man army together? Militia offer up something of an answer - a big body of part trained men who will take to soldiering better than totally untrained recruits. To my mind, they should focus on five skill sets and ignore everything else: 1) Physical fitness 2) Marksmanship 3) First aid/emergency medicine 4) Night operations and 5) Squad level tactics of the most basic sort. By concentrating on a few fundamentals the militia can remain competent at the most basic job - higher level training will come when and if they need it.

[Stratiotes]

I have to agree with you on the training of the militia being of great importance. I think returning to the pre-WBTS militia which was not much more than a social club would make it meaningless.

As for wars requiring a lot of manpower. I think the mercenary force can provide that supplement. The need for huge forces is usually due to the need to project power in foreign theatres - something a militia is not designed to do, that's a given.

But, watching Thomas Barnett's Blueprint presentation where he talks about the US being, in effect, a big club that can be used to hammer evil doers.... I came realize, one could argue that we have an all-volunteer force now that acts as a mercenary force to others already. Our current fulltime military is sent all over the place to break things and kill people. We are not just consumers of such a force, we are in essence providers of that service. So, the fact that we can provide merc services with an all volunteer service now tells me we would not likely have much difficulty with manpower in the future.

[Fabius Maximus]

As a newbie to this site, I am astonished at the high quality of this discussion.

Jones_RE, I wish I had talked to you before writing the militia article! All great points!

I have a few brief comments, on which I'd appreciate seeing your replies. I'll post those in a separate reply.

But first, a mechanical note. On the web the number of readers decreases sharply with length of an article. I've found aprox 7 pages (2500 words) as the upper limit. That does not allow the kind if detailed analysis these subjects require!

Note that SWJ has similar limits. Feature stories are 1,000 - 2,000 words, the length of my light, topical articles. Short articles are 750 to 1,000, the length of my letters to Mom.

My "Militia" article, in which you would have liked more detail, was 4400! In hindsight, much too long. Yet I left a lot of material on the cutting room floor to keep it that short.

Something to keep in mind when reading articles!

So I have taken to writing articles in a series. That's what I did in my review of the Iraq War (2 parts), and the current series on developing a Grand Strategy for America (3 parts).

In fact, you can see my 4GW articles as chapters in a book. It's collectively written, as readers hammer on each article as it gets posted -- which improves the next article.

[Fabius Maximus]

I see militia as disaster response and "Homeland Security" only. Not as Reserves. They should never go overseas, except as the first stage of a draft.

The "Militia" article describes their strong points, which are those of a Police reserve force more than Army Reserve. Also, the Disaster response aspect should not overlooked. In a 4GW era we'll likely have man-made disasters.

What many of your are reaching for, I think, is a sense of how the pieces (army, militia, mercs, etc) fit together to acomplish our national goals.

That is, you would like to see the full chaim from a Grand Strategy down to the operational art. Barnett and "Pax America" advocates have such a vision. Neither the "Revolution in Military Affairs" or 4th Generation War" communities have it.

Without such a plan it is not possible to sensibly talk about force details and doctrine. I realized that after writing "Militia." Rather, the critiques forced me to start again at a higher level.

Here is part one of this long chain ...

"The Myth of Grand Strategy"
Part one in a three-part analysis of grand strategy in a new Era of warfare
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_myth...d_strategy.htm

The next two articles will be even more controversial.

Part II explains how in times of great change it is difficult to determine who is strong, who is weak. This is easy to see in the RMA at the close of the Middle Ages. The author uses Israel vs. Palestinians as a current example. By the important metrics in an era when the State is declining, Israel is weak. The Palestinians are strong, and seem likely to win. A horrible outcome, another historical tragedy.

Part III considers the US, describing how the US is weak in several vital dimensions. From this the author develops an appropriate strategy -- defensive, so we can conserve our strength and rebuild while we adapt to this new era.

After this series, the next series will describe the force structure suitable to implement my proposed Grand Strategy. Why and how to use a militia? Why not to use mercs. And a proposal for an American Foreign Legion.

Apologies for the length of this post. I hope it is relevant to this discussion.