Last edited by SWCAdmin; 01-19-2008 at 01:43 PM. Reason: fix link
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
How about:
--Developing Metrics for Small Wars
--Security Forecasting Models for Small Wars
--Statistical Process Control for Infrastructure Development and Operation
--Statistical Process Control for Good Governance
--A Comparison of Select Small Wars Metrics to 20th and 21st Century Small Wars
Steve
Sapere Aude
What about an essay about the roles of SOF and conventional forces in COIN? Prior to OIF, the attitude in the big Army was that COIN was the realm of SOF and they wanted no part of it. That attitude has changed (though not gone away completely) but there is still a disconnect between SOF and the conventional forces. What should each one's role be? What responibilities should be shared and what ones kept sepparate?
Also I was reading one of Kissinger's books and he talked about how the concept of holding the state to the same moral standards as the individual is a relatively new one. At what point does the state's obligation to protect it's people outweigh moral considerations? The state must of needs do things that the individual would find unpleasant or even abhorent. How do we find and define the line that the state must not cross, even to defend its citizens?
SFC W
Last edited by Uboat509; 01-19-2008 at 05:27 AM. Reason: trying to type on an Iphone
Good Topic
I would find my personal inclination in this to be that
When and if it becomes more about the security of the state then about the security of the people the line has probably been crossed.
Well intended powers for well intended leaders without taking into account future leadership possibilities can generally lead to this.
It would be a good study
why not ask for paper that Usefully inform practitioners as to the conduct and understanding of modern conflict.
I am becoming more and more convinced, (by reading these forums) that trying to keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict is utterly counter-productive and even delusional. War is war. Conflict is conflict. Trying to create discrete groups of conflict does not help - witness the mess that gets made of it.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I would like to read the thoughts of others on the responsibilities of States that embark on small wars - or as seems increasingly common - give the nod to others. How to keep a small war from becoming a long war, several related small wars or just a major conflict.
Looking at Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Somalia my concern is differences between transient political regimes are leading to disproportionate humanitarian crisis for the largely innocent civilian population. Would Ethiopia have invaded Somalia if not given tacit permission by the US, and why would the US back such an adventure if not in the hope of recovering some embassy bombing suspects; was the predictable disaster justifiable given the potential gains? Were the UIC really that big a threat?
So in short ethical questions for nation states and I second,
Selil --ethics in small wars?
Uboat509 --At what point does the state's obligation to protect it's people outweigh moral considerations? [and I would add the state's obligation to protect other civilians from direct and indirect consequences of its actions]
JJ --Rednecks, should they be trusted with guns - discuss?
Intelligence support to small units in urban operations.
Balancing killing and building when conducting SSTRO in a major urban center.
IDPs, refugees, ethnic/sectarian tension and terrorist infrastructure in an urban environment.
Interagency, coalition and host nation cooperation, collaboration and interoperability at the small unit level.
Well said, I know exactly what you mean. In the past few years, I have found in almost every area I have studied this almost irrepressible movement to categorize and separate issues to death. In theory, everything can be separated, analyzed and turned black and white. In reality everything is one big greyish area. To try to "keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict" (William F Owen) is akin to not allowing surgeons to consult non-surgical specialties.
Adam L
---The Irony of "Small" Wars: They're Not Just for the Military to Execute
---Are Small Wars Any More "Political" Than Conventional Wars?
---AS/D SOLIC: The Case for a Similar Arm within Each Governmental Department
---Who Rightfully Defines the Term, "Small War," and Is There Really Such A Thing As a "Small War"?
---If Small Wars Are So "Small," Then Why Do Great Powers Struggle With Their Execution?
1-SBW theory (Slapout Based Warfare) VS: Small Wars Theory
2-History of Law Enforcement influcene COIN TTP's.
3-Small Wars on $5.00 a day or less.
4-Economic Targets as The Key to Winning Small Wars.
5- How The Police Would Fight And Win Small Wars.
Uboat509,
This quote of yours has been pinging around in my head today, that and the iPhone comment you lucky...
I would like to share an experience with you that changed my thinking about things SOF. "No ####, so there I was..."
The 2000 copy of FM 41-10 has figure 1-1 which provides a nice clean visual about the continuum of conflict and how we CA-bubbas try and drain the swamp throughout the full-spectrum of things. This is the picture that was in my mind when I hit the ground in Iraq in 2003.
Iraq covers about 167400 square miles / 433400 square kilometers depending upon which website you quote and in this large area I was very aware that SOF were in short supply and conventional forces were plentiful. My AO was too large for me to cover every day but the 101st did a damn fine job of it. When then MG Petraeus shifted the whole DIV from 'Cordon and Search' to 'Cordon and Knock' operations I realized that US conventional forces are capable of COIN op's. When MG Petraeus had his BCT commanders meet with the locals, id problems and work to resolve them I saw that with the right leader and given time and experience conventional forces can excel at COIN. Necessity is the mother of invention and with the current situation Big Army has no choice but to excel at COIN and to keep those skills sharp or risk losing this fight and future fights.
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure and we have learned this lesson in spades. For SOF, I am of the opinion that we need to ensure that we are regularly inserted further upstream in the time continuum in AO's of concern to US interests to conduct our missions before things get to where they are today. SOF must also effectively educate, advise, and train with our conventional forces on our mission just as we do with host nations. Failure to effectively execute either of these missions is harmful to the nation. In the meantime we all need to play team and kick some ass.
My 0.02 cents,
Steve
Last edited by Surferbeetle; 01-20-2008 at 01:35 AM.
Sapere Aude
[QUOTE=Surferbeetle;38187]How about:
--Developing Metrics for Small Wars
It would be very useful if it could be defined for Infantry Squad/Platoon leader.
Ranger 94,
I carry a laminated copy of GTA 41-01-001 with me when I head downrange. Pages 34 - 40 of this publication might have some of the focus that you seem to be looking for.
For those who do not have access to the GTA the portion I mentioned revisits the SPHERE and UNCHR standards and indicators for populations.
Steve
Last edited by Jedburgh; 01-21-2008 at 08:27 PM. Reason: Added link.
Sapere Aude
Based on a lot of the discussion I've read since joining, how about:
The spectrum of war?
Does the nature representative government prevent winning small wars?
Whatever you do, require the entries be written in English, not techno- or acadamebabble.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
to Stop Worrying and Love Small Wars.
LIC and the Defense Acquisition Process
Small Wars in the Context of National Security Strategy
Airpower Application in Small Wars (A Charlie Dunlap fave!)
Are Small Wars the Future?
"What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."
The version of the Civil Afffairs Planning and Execution Guide linked above is dated Oct 02. It has just been superseded by a new version, dated Jan 08. (AKO log-in required)Originally Posted by Surferbeetle
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