The Importance and Role of Training in Creating/Sustaining the Best Possible Forces

[Rob Thornton]

Although not necessarily the subject of the thread - it leads into it. In the last chapter I mentioned Slim has a section on Special Forces - again, he is talking about forces grown, equipped and trained for a specialized purpose:

"There is however one type of special unit which should be retained - that designed to be employed in small parties, usually behind enemy lines, on tasks beyond the normal scope of warfare in the field. There will be an increasing need for highly qualified and individually trained men - and women - to sabotage vital installations, to spread rumors, to misdirect the enemy, to transmit intelligence, to kill or kidnap individuals, and to inspire resistance movements.They will be troops, though they will require many qualities and skills not to be expected of the ordinary soldier and they will use methods beyond his capacity (Rob's note - think about what Slim is implying when he says beyond capacity and link it back to some of the possible missions he's outlining). Each small party would study and train intensively for a particular exploit and should operate under the direct control of the Higher Command (Rob's note - we are still learning about this one - and it gets more to unity of effort and purpose then command I think). They should rarely work within our lines. Not costly in manpower, they may, if handled with imaginative ruthlessness, achieve strategic results. Such units based on the Army, but drawing on all Services and all races of the Commonwealth for specially qualified men and women, should be an essential component of our modern Armed forces."

pg 548 of Slim's memoir.

I think Slim has it about right, and I think it is what we have endevoured to do with our own SOF - the mental mindset issue I've tried to address is not on the part of SOF by and large, but with our own (GPF/MPF) mind set - where we sometimes suffer from self-imposed constrained thinking (until War began to change it).

Slim goes on to address control of SOF, but then transitions to a new section on the future - contrast his thought on SOF to these:

In Burma we thus developed a form of warfare based more on human factors then on lavish equipment, which had certain characteristics. The chief of these were:
(i) The acceptance of normal of the regular movement and maintenance of standard formations by air (Rob's note - normal means just that - not specialized DIVs, etc.)
(ii) Great tactical freedom for subordinate commanders (Rob's note - emphasis on "what" not "how" and purpose over task)
(iii) The operation, over wide distances, in most difficult country, in tactical independence but strategic combination.
(iv) Reduced scales of transport and equipment, supplemented by ingenuity and improvisation from local resources (Rob's note - we might call this agile and adaptive mindsets- or the agility and innovation piece guys like SWC member TT spend allot of time thinking about)
(v) The high quality of of the individual soldier, his morale, toughness and discipline, his acceptance of hardship, and his ability to move on his own feet (Rob's note - given the conditions and the requirements. I'd also extend move on his feet - to being able to think on your feet - again the agility and adaptiveness issue)

pg. 549

Slim goes on to expand on his chief characteristics as he considers the challenges in the post WWII environment - much in the same way we consider the Joint COE and in the way the Army considers the FOE (There is no FOE currently in Joint doctrine I think). Again I think he had it about right with regard to linking what is needed with what is possible - the interesting part for me is Slim was considering the post WWII commonwealth, and in many ways the U.S. may have inherited (or assumed) many of the roles in which he was considering.

Finally Slim tells a story about an encounter he had as a cadet. He was pouring over Jomini's "Principles" as describe by the Field Service Regulations when along came the SGM:

"Don't bother your head about all them thing's me lad, there is only one principle of war and that is this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him the most, when he ain't lookin!"

Sound familiar - funny how other leaders in other wars from other countries often divine some of the bare bone truths - Slim's SGM's quote sounds allot like "get there first with the most" - what teacher experience is.

I like that, and also like his thoughts just prior to telling that story:

Until the very horror of mass destruction forces men to find more sensible ways to of settling national disputes, war will remain, and while it remains it will continually change. Yet, because it fought between men rather then between weapons, victory will still go, when armaments are relatively equal, to the side which is better trained and has higher morale - advantages- which are obtained neither easily, quickly, nor without the sacrifice of more then money in peace. War remains an art, and like all arts, whatever its variation, will have its enduring principles.

I like this for a number of reasons - Slim gets to the challenges of preparing for the unknown, and the hard choices that accompany those challenges. He also opens up the consideration of comparing different types of advantages - it might not just be in weaponry or technology! He also outlines why people are important - because men go to war to achieve political purposes as defined by other men -but once we begin waging war -the rational for achieving victory is apt to change.

Now I know that is a kind of round-about way to address the topic - but it gets to the value and rational for investing more resources into training the men (and women) who go forward to wage war.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

Thanks, Rob. It preempts a blog article I was working on but that's good -- hopefully, it'll get more discussion here. Everyone above has some great points!

Rob asks:

"I’d also like to ask if we think we could do better? Is the training and resourcing available to our SOF the best we can do, or could we extend that level of training and resourcing to the larger force"

That is an important question and it gets obscured here and elsewhere because, IMO, the issue becomes not one of roles, missions, capabilities and the attainment of the desired effects for the US but rather a battle of egos, turf, dollars and spaces. Having been on both sides of the Big Army and SOF curtain I have no doubt that BOTH sides are guilty of this.

There is no question of a need for SOF or for SF -- the two are not synonymous regardless of efforts to make them so -- but I believe there are roles and missions questions that will impact training. We are confronted with the fact that a Battalion from the 82d is doing Ranger like missions for a variety of reasons -- and doing them well. We are confronted with the fact that organizations designed for the UW mission (and some of its highly classified adjunct missions) are being employed on ID missions. There are certain skill sets form UW that translate very well to ID; there are also a number of UW skills (to include those adjunct missions) that are not needed for ID.

As Norfolk says, most Armies use their conventional forces for ID and do it well; thus we are confronted with SF being essentially over qualified for the ID mission. We're using Hummers to do pickup truck work. A further concern is the quantity of folks required for ID; the SOF community cannot and should not provide the quantities required, to even attempt to do so will cause a dilution of quality problem in the community. My question is that, accepting the need for a UW mission capable force for a large variety of missions in both peace and war, should that difficult to obtain capability be roled as a primary ID element to the detriment, however slight, of its primary mission?

The Groups are also used for DA missions -- that amounts to using those same Hummers for sports car work. Not that they cannot and do not do the missions well; just that it's misuse and has the potential to do damage as individuals switch between missions. The great guys will cope -- everyone isn't great. The question to me is should DA be a SF mission or are competing skill sets and perhaps a different mental attitude and full time focus required?

Look also at Strategic Recon, an openly known mission. Is SF best for that job? They certainly can do it but in some cases they are again overtrained with regard to total skill sets and perhaps not as well trained in some desired skills as they might be. That mission is so difficult and dangerous that we may be sending that Hummer to do a job better suited to a Motocross bike (IOW, are we spending a quarter mil to train folks for a 60 K job? Can we afford the loss of the hard and long time to develop UW skills to a mission a different training regimen can handle?). The question is should that mission devolve to a new and different sort of unit that is culturally tuned to use extreme stealth?

The issues then for UW versus ID are that the Groups are over qualified and their critical skills are degraded (and this is even more disadvantageous when the DA mission moves to the fore; in the current or most envisioned environments mentoring local Security Forces is perhaps more important than taking down HVTs even if it isn't as much fun), they do not and probably never will have the quantity of people needed for ID in a medium sized nation. Regardless of all that, the question that then arises is can they do it better than conventional forces which have been provided better training? I think not but that is certainly arguable. What is not arguable in that case is that best is the enemy of good enough...

None of that should be construed as SF/SOF bashing, it is not. Been there and done that -- I am merely asking questions that I think deserve honest consideration. This is not the place to answer them in any detail, certainly -- but thinking it through wouldn't hurt.

All that is way off the question that Rob raised; can we do a better job of training our conventional units. I submit that the answer is, emphatically, yes. That we do not is due to habit (we're still operating on WW I parameters), inertia (as Wilf said:

"More than you know. US SOCOM is a hostage to the institutions and events that created it. You always get back to the "I wouldn't start from there, if I were you." Look at all the mucking about in the re-creation of the 75th Ranger Regiment. If you started with a clean sheet of paper, things would look a whole lot different. - same for UK SF." (emphasis added / kw)

and parochialism. We really need to take an objective look at what we're doing, realize that the Army of today is not much like the Army of even 2000 -- much less 1918 -- and fix the problem.

Lieutenants today are routinely doing things that the LTs of 2000 in most units could not dream of doing and that's a good thing. Joe today has gear that only some SOCOM elements had in 2000 -- and generally, he uses it well. It's a different Army, it trains better than it ever has before and, IMO, that's still not good enough. It deserves better training, most particularly at the enlisted and officer entry levels.

Another part of the problem is that there are senior people who are not terribly enthusiastic about fighting wars, they'd prefer waxing and polishing combat vehicles, brassoing cartridges, fretting over uniforms and haircuts and worrying unduly about their and their units reputation or mystique -- and I have, unfortunately, worked for folks who did all those things -- instead of truly thinking about how to do the job better and doing what's best for the nation. Those kinds of folks have always been around and probably always will be. There are more of them in the big Army simply because it's bigger; they also exist in elsewhere. They just have to be bypassed.

Norfolk also mentioned the training and employment of Battalion Scout Platoons in Canada and here. I have to agree with him. I've watched Commonwealth Armies do Recon and they have us beaten across the board. Our so-called Recon elements are ideally structured and equipped for Flank Screens, Covering forces and Economy of Force employment and they do those things well -- they are not trained and equipped for reconnaissance and, mostly, do not train for it very well so they naturally don't do it well. That doesn't address the problem of Commanders who do not know how to use their recon elements -- or are afraid to 'risk' them doing their designed job...

I noted the organization for the HBCT Cav Squadron and was happy they had created a true Recon element (except for the M3s, don't get me started on that vehicle) -- until I found out that the new proposal is for three Brad plts and two Tank plts per troop. Great for the combat missions but they ain't gonna be Scouts. Regardless of the fact that both CTCs have nicked most units for poor to non-existent recon work for years and still do so...

Back to the north German plain...

Rob also posts some more of Slim's thoughts, all of which are still totally valid, all of which we also learned in WW II and all of which we too often ignore today. We need to take care of Joe -- and we are not doing that.

[Global Scout]

Norfolk you have presented some fair challenges regarding our Special Forces. After several years in SF I sometimes wonder how to describe our value, or return on investment without sounding condescending to our conventional force brothers. What makes us unique is not easy to quantify, because it largely based on our culture.

In some ways we’re not much more flexible than our conventional counterparts, for example consider our 12 man ODA concept. The only changes in recent years have been replacing the LT with a Warrant Officer (better for the force), and replacing the Assistant Operations Sergeant with an Intelligence Sergeant (worse for the force).

The ODA organization was designed to support unconventional warfare operation, especially guerrilla warfare which is one aspect of UW, and then under JFK we assumed a key role as advisors in counterinsurgencies, based on the assumption, since we knew how to support an insurgency, who better to fight them? Then seeing the emerging threat of terrorism certain SF units started focusing on the counterterrorism mission (specialized raids), such as Project Blue Light in 5th SFG(A) and some other initiatives throughout the force. However, starting the late 1970's the Department of Defense started forming units that were better equipped and trained to handle high risk CT than SF. UW still had its value, as demonstrated in Afghanistan against the USSR and in Nicaragua when we supported the Contras. It was assumed there was resistance support throughout Europe, should the USSR decide to invade Western Europe (much like the Resistance elements that fought the Nazi’s), so some SF units were hopefully prepared to support that potential. I would argue that a highly trained Infantry unit is not capable of infiltrating a denied environment and then combat advising a resistance force. A highly trained conventional force can and do support community watch organizations in Iraq, but there is a significance difference. True the Brits were not very good at this, and perhaps because they didn’t train for it? An officer who still has the red coat mentality shouldn’t sleep well in a patrol base that mostly composed of irregulars.

Unfortunately, to justify resourcing, especially before the formation of SOCOM we had to show value directly to the conventional fight (apparently the conventional army didn’t see the value of guerrilla type operations in the enemy’s rear, or didn’t think they were feasible), so we focused on special reconnaissance and limited direct action missions. What is interesting, at least to me, is that we didn't change our task organization significantly to adjust to each mission. We tried to make the 12 man ODA fight every mission, whether it called for four men or 20 men.

Since 9/11 and especially the perceived SF successes in Afghanistan and Northern Iraq SF is now growing again. The focus now is irregular warfare, and lucky for our old ODA task organization and training seems to be a near perfect fit for this type of war. Whether the rest of Europe, to include England or our friends down under see a need for this type of organization is irrelevant. It is a needed tool for our national strategy.

I could go on and on about what is broken about SF, but the important piece still remains in tact and that is our culture. Despite an occasional dogmatic officer, we still maintain a unique range of skills that can be applied creatively to solve complex problems. Those skills are implemented by our tools, which are our people. While you can give everyone in the Army better, more SF like, training you still can't make chicken salad out of chicken crap. While approximately 50-70% of a good combat unit could probably graduate the SF qualification course (there are two keys to success, first the ability and second the desire), you have the remainder who can't, and majority who don't want the challenge, so in SF you a unique group of Soldiers who are all mission focused. Does it hurt the conventional army to have our best NCOs in these units? Yes and no, I would argue that many of our talented NCOs wouldn't stay in the Army if they didn't have a place like SF to go where they can self actualize as warriors.

[Ken White]

"replacing the Assistant Operations Sergeant with an Intelligence Sergeant (worse for the force). "

As a former A team Intel Sgt, I resemble that remark!

Though I'm not sure I agree with it...

"It was assumed there was resistance support throughout Europe, should the USSR decide to invade Western Europe (much like the Resistance elements that fought the Nazi’s), so some SF units were hopefully prepared to support that potential. I would argue that a highly trained Infantry unit is not capable of infiltrating a denied environment and then combat advising a resistance force."

Unquestionably true.

"...Unfortunately, to justify resourcing, especially before the formation of SOCOM we had to show value directly to the conventional fight (apparently the conventional army didn’t see the value of guerrilla type operations in the enemy’s rear, or didn’t think they were feasible)..."

Also true and almost entirely due to the latter; that and risk aversion in high places which was due to misreading the leasons of Viet Nam and attempting to go into the "Fight but no casualties" mode -- and much to the chagrin of Joe Cincotti...

"...I would argue that many of our talented NCOs wouldn't stay in the Army if they didn't have a place like SF to go where they can self actualize as warriors."

True again and fortunately, the majority of them are good at what they do so everybody wins...

[Rob Thornton]

Ken - good point about reconnaissance and how we use it (or not). I think a case could be made that Divisions and Corps also had specialized units for reconnaissance and or enabling type functions - CORPS LRS-D and DIV Pathfinders come to mind. Having an actual person on the ground to assess the situation and feed back information in a manner that "paints the picture" so leaders can make critical decisions on is invaluable. Again, some have a more natural aptitude to not only be able to go forward and thrive, but to show discipline and restraint while being able to pick up on what is really important beyond a staff's standard PIR that sounded right back before anyone began movement. Two of the best guys I ever knew who had a knack for employment of reconnaissance were both OPFOR at the CTCs - one was LTC (R) Daryll Shoening (also the one who coined the phrase for me of "there are no lessons learned, only lessons available"), and the other is Dave Indermuhle (sp?) who is a CAV guy probably either a LTC or COL now) - both understood the value of being somewhere in force where the enemy did not expect, and the value of preventing him from doing likewise to you.

We were wrestling with the employment of plain clothes reconnaissance for our IA counterparts. We knew we wanted to do it - knew we needed more Sunni Arabs for the Scout platoon vs. the Yizidi Kurds who'd been there since its inception to pull it off. The Kurdish scouts were fantastic troops, and damned fine snipers to boot; they could even de-arm an IED (then they'd bring it back to your room and fish the various components out of their pockets), but they could not blend in with the local Arabs in Mosul. As such the BN came up with a good plan to get more Arabs in the reconnaissance business (see that article in VOL 8 of the SWJ on building indigenous forces with regards to METT-TC) - this I think is part of what Slim was advocating about the need for "locals" to conduct reconnaissance - there are few places where we are likely to fight where an Anglo is going to pass for local (I saw a few red-headed Macedonian descendants but they did not share much in common physically with me - lucky for them I suppose).

This is also what UBL and his organization have reportedly been trying to recruit for operations in the U.S. and Europe (or for that matter where ever they wish to conduct operations). I think they understand the need for good target reconnaissance given the resources they have to achieve their purpose - better to make sure something will work (SWC member Davidfbpro has some interesting thoughts on how the enemy is working in that regard).

I think that is an area where our ID and advisory training is going to have to improve. Its all that much tougher because we often don't understand the value of a good reconnaissance, how to go about getting it (other then IMINT,SIGINT or other tech type collection means) in our own "pure" training, or are willing to accept the risks involved with placing men (and could be indigenous women) in harms way without a surefire means to retrieve them, which might mean compromising the mission - it easier just to bring the whole crew (Brads, KWs, Shadows, 1151s, etc.) based off old or incomplete info with little to no analysis then to take the time to develop the networks required to put our enemies operating on home (or like home) turf at a disadvantage.

It took us awhile to figure out why the enemy was executing his IEDs at certain times and his complex ambushes in certain places on 8-10 day cycles - but then we did the reverse planning on how it might go down, and once you figure in the drive time, the planning, the recon, the refinement of the plan, the staging for the ambush - it all worked out - then we were able to adjust our own IA patrols to disrupt his operations and catch him with his pants down - how much more effective we could have been with a large number of plain clothes types collecting around likely sites from Opals, Bongo trucks, mopeds and maybe manning a kiosk that reported back to a good analysis cell that could inform operations and direct uniformed patrols or strike forces with better effect. Again I'm talking about training - because all of the things that go into effective operations require it.

As we wage war in these other places - across the spectrum of conflict - it will pay huge dividends to employ locals to enhance our collection and analysis capabilities (this is nothing new - when we've been smart and able we've (and every other good army operating abroad) has done so)- but we have to train to do so (along with the many other tasks we are going to be asked to do) - and the resources we put toward that training have to match.

Well enough for one day - time to call it a night.
Best, Rob

[William F. Owen]

K
We were wrestling with the employment of plain clothes reconnaissance for our IA counterparts. We knew we wanted to do it - knew we needed more Sunni Arabs for the Scout platoon vs. the Yizidi Kurds who'd been there since its inception to pull it off.

- how much more effective we could have been with a large number of plain clothes types collecting around likely sites from Opals, Bongo trucks, mopeds and maybe manning a kiosk that reported back to a good analysis cell that could inform operations and direct uniformed patrols or strike forces with better effect. Again I'm talking about training - because all of the things that go into effective operations require it.

The use of indigenous covert reconnaissance (ICR) goes back to biblical times, and recurs constantly throughout history, yet is constantly neglected. It is an essential element of modern operations and you ignore it at your peril.

I have to hand to Rob for starting this thread. It is, after all what I have spent the last 3-4 years working on, and I am still utterly amazed about how limited the Big Army's (US and UK) vision of this subject is.

[Ken White]

"I think a case could be made that Divisions and Corps also had specialized units for reconnaissance and or enabling type functions - CORPS LRS-D and DIV Pathfinders come to mind..."

Yes, the Corps had and have LRS Companies but there are two constraints on their missions and one big impediment. The constraints are risk aversion on the part of Corps staffs and commanders -- that varies, of course but it is real sometimes. Another that is almost universally true is infiltration and exfiltration. Because they're 'Big Army' the 160th SOAR doesn't even want to talk to them; the USAF SOC types are much the same and conventional Army Aviation units aren't trained or equipped to get the LRS Dets where they need to go. That needs to be addressed.

"...Having an actual person on the ground to assess the situation and feed back information in a manner that "paints the picture" so leaders can make critical decisions on is invaluable. Again, some have a more natural aptitude to not only be able to go forward and thrive, but to show discipline and restraint while being able to pick up on what is really important beyond a staff's standard PIR that sounded right back before anyone began movement."

That is, believe it or not, the impediment. For real and in training, I've seen people out miles, literally, in front of major units, rendering good reports -- which are ignored or disputed. I have seen MI types directly refute reports because they have no confirmation from their sources and methods; I have seen Commanders flatly state "Those kids can't see that, it isn't happening." or words to that effect. I think a big part of that is training related -- and about which more in a second.

"(I saw a few red-headed Macedonian descendants but they did not share much in common physically with me - lucky for them I suppose)."

Heh. The standard answer in the ME for the Red Hair or blue Eyes is "Al Iskander was here..."

"As such the BN came up with a good plan to get more Arabs in the reconnaissance business (see that article in VOL 8 of the SWJ on building indigenous forces with regards to METT-TC) - this I think is part of what Slim was advocating about the need for "locals" to conduct reconnaissance - there are few places where we are likely to fight where an Anglo is going to pass for local."

Too true and we, moving into a new AO with folks that haven't done this before are way too slow in picking up locals for Scouts; we're also too slow, sloppy and inadequate in the HumInt business (before Jedburgh attacks, that's addressed at command attitudes and the quantity of HumInt people, not the quality).

Back to the failure to use our recon assets -- or to put enough stock in what those who are used report, my contention is it's a training issue. We do not train them well; not nearly as well as the Brits do (they don't do a lot of things any better or sometimes as well as we do but they do a far better job on, among other things, recon and intel gathering, far better). Since people know the scouts and recon folks aren't all that well trained, the information they provide thus is automatically suspect.

That tumble down 'trust' -- or lack of it -- aspect plagues us in all spheres. Lieutenants aren't trusted because we all know they are not adequately trained and are still learning. It's pervasive and insdious and our lack of ability to trust subordinate due to perceived shortfall potential or lack of judgment leads to micromanagement, failure to delegate and over centralization. From being one of the most innovative Armies around we have descended into being one of the most hidebound. Fortunately, both Afghanistan and Iraq are changing that; commanders are being forced to delegate to the point of acute discomfort on the part of the commanders -- and it all works out...