A few thoughts on them.

The Clinic metaphor is a good one and a "clinic" is needed for the average bear-- no question. I totally agree with the focus you and your Bn placed on the various echelons in todays world -- but would also submit that if the PLs were better trained, THEY could focus on th Squads while the Company Commander focused on them...

Looking down one echelon is far better than looking down two, precludes micro management, keeps the Co Cdr out of the PLs hair and the Bn Cdr (and Staff...) out of the Co Cdrs hair.

Yes, sorting out the mixes and tracks is difficult. I think, to an extent, we have made that so by having too many Officers (as a percentage of the force) and that many of them are in unnecessary positions. Most Staffs, in my experience are over large (and the higher one goes the overlarger they are...) and I'm still trying to figure out why the Artillery need Officers for FOs -- I know why they did in WW I and even in WW II -- I do not know why that's necessary today. Other than to populate the Branch...

I know we do that for mobilization backup and other purposes, I simply question the efficiency and the dilution of leadership and the forays into strange jobs that add little value to either the Army or the Officer.

All small stuff. There are are two big things where I'd throw in a cynical old fogey whose seen it all (or most of it, anyway) caution:

One is forecasting -- we are unlikely to ever get that right and I'm unsure why we try to such an inordinate extent (other than that Congress and the MBA model expect us to do that, factors of which I'm well aware). The point being; yeah, we sort of have to do it but we should not hang our flop hats on the accuracy of those forecasts. Be very prepared for the unforeseen is what I think I'm saying...

The second is in putting too much stock in a top down approach. I think that's dangerous. Using the NSS is sensible and totally logical way to drive our train(s). Unfortunately, the US Government is not a totally logical beast and it can change complexions, appetites and colors -- much less directions -- on a two to four to eight year basis (and even more often, all on a plitical whim or two). The Army cannot adapt well to that speed of change, it needs to focus on its core missions, concentrate on doing the basics better than everyone else in the world and just be prepared.

Hewing to the 'guidance' or predilections of the government of the day is fraught with danger. Equally bad is attempting (as in the Weinberger or Powell 'Doctrines') to shape that guidance and those desires. The Army just needs to be prepared to do its job as a full spectrum armed force in the service of the nation and it must be prepared for political irrationality and abnormal missions in strange places that fly in the face of the 'strategy' du jour or even common sense.

And it should and must do that TOTALLY apolitically (in thought and word and deed).