Ken - good point about reconnaissance and how we use it (or not). I think a case could be made that Divisions and Corps also had specialized units for reconnaissance and or enabling type functions - CORPS LRS-D and DIV Pathfinders come to mind. Having an actual person on the ground to assess the situation and feed back information in a manner that "paints the picture" so leaders can make critical decisions on is invaluable. Again, some have a more natural aptitude to not only be able to go forward and thrive, but to show discipline and restraint while being able to pick up on what is really important beyond a staff's standard PIR that sounded right back before anyone began movement. Two of the best guys I ever knew who had a knack for employment of reconnaissance were both OPFOR at the CTCs - one was LTC (R) Daryll Shoening (also the one who coined the phrase for me of "there are no lessons learned, only lessons available"), and the other is Dave Indermuhle (sp?) who is a CAV guy probably either a LTC or COL now) - both understood the value of being somewhere in force where the enemy did not expect, and the value of preventing him from doing likewise to you.

We were wrestling with the employment of plain clothes reconnaissance for our IA counterparts. We knew we wanted to do it - knew we needed more Sunni Arabs for the Scout platoon vs. the Yizidi Kurds who'd been there since its inception to pull it off. The Kurdish scouts were fantastic troops, and damned fine snipers to boot; they could even de-arm an IED (then they'd bring it back to your room and fish the various components out of their pockets), but they could not blend in with the local Arabs in Mosul. As such the BN came up with a good plan to get more Arabs in the reconnaissance business (see that article in VOL 8 of the SWJ on building indigenous forces with regards to METT-TC) - this I think is part of what Slim was advocating about the need for "locals" to conduct reconnaissance - there are few places where we are likely to fight where an Anglo is going to pass for local (I saw a few red-headed Macedonian descendants but they did not share much in common physically with me - lucky for them I suppose).

This is also what UBL and his organization have reportedly been trying to recruit for operations in the U.S. and Europe (or for that matter where ever they wish to conduct operations). I think they understand the need for good target reconnaissance given the resources they have to achieve their purpose - better to make sure something will work (SWC member Davidfbpro has some interesting thoughts on how the enemy is working in that regard).

I think that is an area where our ID and advisory training is going to have to improve. Its all that much tougher because we often don't understand the value of a good reconnaissance, how to go about getting it (other then IMINT,SIGINT or other tech type collection means) in our own "pure" training, or are willing to accept the risks involved with placing men (and could be indigenous women) in harms way without a surefire means to retrieve them, which might mean compromising the mission - it easier just to bring the whole crew (Brads, KWs, Shadows, 1151s, etc.) based off old or incomplete info with little to no analysis then to take the time to develop the networks required to put our enemies operating on home (or like home) turf at a disadvantage.

It took us awhile to figure out why the enemy was executing his IEDs at certain times and his complex ambushes in certain places on 8-10 day cycles - but then we did the reverse planning on how it might go down, and once you figure in the drive time, the planning, the recon, the refinement of the plan, the staging for the ambush - it all worked out - then we were able to adjust our own IA patrols to disrupt his operations and catch him with his pants down - how much more effective we could have been with a large number of plain clothes types collecting around likely sites from Opals, Bongo trucks, mopeds and maybe manning a kiosk that reported back to a good analysis cell that could inform operations and direct uniformed patrols or strike forces with better effect. Again I'm talking about training - because all of the things that go into effective operations require it.

As we wage war in these other places - across the spectrum of conflict - it will pay huge dividends to employ locals to enhance our collection and analysis capabilities (this is nothing new - when we've been smart and able we've (and every other good army operating abroad) has done so)- but we have to train to do so (along with the many other tasks we are going to be asked to do) - and the resources we put toward that training have to match.

Well enough for one day - time to call it a night.
Best, Rob