The Importance and Role of Training in Creating/Sustaining the Best Possible Forces

[Rob Thornton]

Although not necessarily the subject of the thread - it leads into it. In the last chapter I mentioned Slim has a section on Special Forces - again, he is talking about forces grown, equipped and trained for a specialized purpose:

"There is however one type of special unit which should be retained - that designed to be employed in small parties, usually behind enemy lines, on tasks beyond the normal scope of warfare in the field. There will be an increasing need for highly qualified and individually trained men - and women - to sabotage vital installations, to spread rumors, to misdirect the enemy, to transmit intelligence, to kill or kidnap individuals, and to inspire resistance movements.They will be troops, though they will require many qualities and skills not to be expected of the ordinary soldier and they will use methods beyond his capacity (Rob's note - think about what Slim is implying when he says beyond capacity and link it back to some of the possible missions he's outlining). Each small party would study and train intensively for a particular exploit and should operate under the direct control of the Higher Command (Rob's note - we are still learning about this one - and it gets more to unity of effort and purpose then command I think). They should rarely work within our lines. Not costly in manpower, they may, if handled with imaginative ruthlessness, achieve strategic results. Such units based on the Army, but drawing on all Services and all races of the Commonwealth for specially qualified men and women, should be an essential component of our modern Armed forces."

pg 548 of Slim's memoir.

I think Slim has it about right, and I think it is what we have endevoured to do with our own SOF - the mental mindset issue I've tried to address is not on the part of SOF by and large, but with our own (GPF/MPF) mind set - where we sometimes suffer from self-imposed constrained thinking (until War began to change it).

Slim goes on to address control of SOF, but then transitions to a new section on the future - contrast his thought on SOF to these:

In Burma we thus developed a form of warfare based more on human factors then on lavish equipment, which had certain characteristics. The chief of these were:
(i) The acceptance of normal of the regular movement and maintenance of standard formations by air (Rob's note - normal means just that - not specialized DIVs, etc.)
(ii) Great tactical freedom for subordinate commanders (Rob's note - emphasis on "what" not "how" and purpose over task)
(iii) The operation, over wide distances, in most difficult country, in tactical independence but strategic combination.
(iv) Reduced scales of transport and equipment, supplemented by ingenuity and improvisation from local resources (Rob's note - we might call this agile and adaptive mindsets- or the agility and innovation piece guys like SWC member TT spend allot of time thinking about)
(v) The high quality of of the individual soldier, his morale, toughness and discipline, his acceptance of hardship, and his ability to move on his own feet (Rob's note - given the conditions and the requirements. I'd also extend move on his feet - to being able to think on your feet - again the agility and adaptiveness issue)

pg. 549

Slim goes on to expand on his chief characteristics as he considers the challenges in the post WWII environment - much in the same way we consider the Joint COE and in the way the Army considers the FOE (There is no FOE currently in Joint doctrine I think). Again I think he had it about right with regard to linking what is needed with what is possible - the interesting part for me is Slim was considering the post WWII commonwealth, and in many ways the U.S. may have inherited (or assumed) many of the roles in which he was considering.

Finally Slim tells a story about an encounter he had as a cadet. He was pouring over Jomini's "Principles" as describe by the Field Service Regulations when along came the SGM:

"Don't bother your head about all them thing's me lad, there is only one principle of war and that is this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him the most, when he ain't lookin!"

Sound familiar - funny how other leaders in other wars from other countries often divine some of the bare bone truths - Slim's SGM's quote sounds allot like "get there first with the most" - what teacher experience is.

I like that, and also like his thoughts just prior to telling that story:

Until the very horror of mass destruction forces men to find more sensible ways to of settling national disputes, war will remain, and while it remains it will continually change. Yet, because it fought between men rather then between weapons, victory will still go, when armaments are relatively equal, to the side which is better trained and has higher morale - advantages- which are obtained neither easily, quickly, nor without the sacrifice of more then money in peace. War remains an art, and like all arts, whatever its variation, will have its enduring principles.

I like this for a number of reasons - Slim gets to the challenges of preparing for the unknown, and the hard choices that accompany those challenges. He also opens up the consideration of comparing different types of advantages - it might not just be in weaponry or technology! He also outlines why people are important - because men go to war to achieve political purposes as defined by other men -but once we begin waging war -the rational for achieving victory is apt to change.

Now I know that is a kind of round-about way to address the topic - but it gets to the value and rational for investing more resources into training the men (and women) who go forward to wage war.

Best, Rob