The Importance and Role of Training in Creating/Sustaining the Best Possible Forces

[Ken White]

"It is interesting how, when these threads hit about #30, that you can't tell what the original subject was. Not to be rude..."

One does have to pay attention, no question. Still, total adherence to orthodoxy is sort of stultifying...

Though it it does appear somewhat endemic today.

"...Today's army faces a variety of tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan that were either outside the purview of 'regular' infantry training or were considered the province of SOF."

True and the Asymmetric Warfare Group deserves many kudos for helping units to train themselves in migrating some of those nominal SOF skills to ordinary units. Skills that in peacetime have migrated to SOF and not been trained in the rest of the Army but skills which any competent Infantryman in WW II, Korea or Viet Nam had and then some...

"...So the obvious (and facile) answer is, of course, more and better training is good and will produce more capable units."

Sometimes an answer may be obvious and only be facile in the eye of some beholders. Regardless, you then say:

"I am a firm believer that US units can only do a handful of things well. If you concentrate your training on small-arms combat skills and squad/platoon maneuver, your ability to function smoothly as part of larger units will suffer. If you concentrate on the softer skills of unconventional warfare, your combat skills will degrade. The only way for units to acquire a wider range of skills is to keep them together for years and not disassemble them - as we do - after every combat tour. Yes, more and better training will produce more capable units, but our system of individual replacements ensures a hard ceiling beyond which only the most extraordinary commanders will be able to go."

I strongly disagree on the first opinion, I've seen too many units over too many years that can do it all. I have seen a number of commanders who were not willing to trust units to do more than a few things. I've seen even more leaders who were afraid to take the risk to train their units to do more...

I do agree that the current system of 'personnel management' is inimical to that ability.

I would add that if your position on only handful of things were accurate, it would be an even more damaging indictment of our training process than my rather scathing comments on the subject. I'd also ask whose fault that shortfall in capability is...

"...I would argue that prolonged exposure to the combat zones is narrowing our expertise, because in combat you don't train, you rehearse. It is a subtle but important distinction that leads directly to the opposite effect that Rob was seeking. History, I believe, supports my thesis that nothing is more destructive to an Army's overall competency than small wars."

You CAN train in combat and good leaders do that. All day, every day -- if one does not derive training value from every action, one is not taking care of one's troops. Period. Good units force that to happen.

I disagree with your thesis and would suggest that history supports it only in part -- and that only because an Army allowed that to be true.

In the current situation, the reversion to MCO roles is difficult due to the rapid rotation from CONUS to the theaters and concern for morale and families but the concentrated training needed to effect a successful reversion is not a lengthy effort (unless we determine to cram 12 weeks training in to 26 as we are prone to do -- partly due to some of those training distractors you mention).

While I am firmly convinced that our institutional training should focus on major combat operations, the big war if you will, adapting downward to do COIN or a small war of another nature is -- or should be -- but a temporary refocus; the primary focus can be easily restored with minimal training. One does not 'do' a COIN fight, one engages in COIN operations and one adapts to the modified skills needed (it is easier to do that than to train for COIN and adapt to MCO). I'd also suggest that the deterioration of some MCO skills is offset by the gaining of other skills and that adds to the overall competence of the individual and may better prepare him for the shock of major combat -- and make no mistake, it is and will be a shock...

The ability to downshift from MCO to COIN is present today and has been done in the past. That however is is most true and most easily done when the initial training is thorough and concentrates on instilling the basics -- which we do not do...

Which your stated concerns amply illustrate.

[Norfolk]

As Eden points out, there is a whole lot of what GEN Marshall in his days at the Infantry School called "bunk". I have long sought to find a copy (preferably auf Englisch) of GEN Felix Steiner's Training System - the one that emphasized genuinely realistic tactical training at all times, use of live-fire whenever possible, emphasis on weapons-handling and rigorous but sensible PT, and almost no Drill! (I love that part).

But apart from some items like marching 2 miles in 20 minutes with full kit, little drill, lots of weapons training and live-fire training, lots of sports, and advanced training, and an emphasis on the WWI "Pepperpot" tactics of the Stormtroops, I haven't find too much more in the way of specifics (though I can't say that I fancy getting up at 06:00 for an hour's worth of PT regardless of what training regimen is being used).

If the US Army were ever to draw-down enough from Iraq and elsewhere in the future to allow for something like this, an 18-month Unit training cycle might be a useful way to go, broken into three 6-month blocks. Field exercises conducted during the first 5 months of each block would normally be conducted with some sort of MILES-type laser simulation equipment, along with plenty of blank ammo and pyrotechnics - sound and smoke are necessary too. The last month of each 6-month block would normally be dedicated to live-fire training and exercises. The first 6-month block would emphasize (but not exclusively) individual and small-unit training; the second block would likewise emphasize minor-unit training; and finally, the third block would emphasize major-unit level training. Formation-level training would have to be accomodated throughout, but with emphasis progressively increasing over the course of the 18-month training cycle.

Strip the ceremonial stuff to the barest of bare bones; rethink and rework the administrative system to reduce it to the minimum possible (this is a really big issue, especially for officers, and a really tough one to deal with); and of course - as Eden strongly pressed for - scrap the individual-based personnel system and replace it with a true Regimental- or Brigade-based personnel system. That would be the toughest thing of all to pull off, but it would be self-defeating to increase training time and resources only to lose most of those benefits to the rotating-door individual assignment process of the personnel system.

And all of this would best be served with initial-level training for soldiers lasting not less than six months, with high standards rigorously enforced in weapons handling and marksmanship, physical fitness, tactics and battlecraft, fieldcraft, and being trained to assume leadership two levels above one's own. Advanced training, such as 3 weeks for basic machine gunner to 6 weeks for basic reconnaissance patrolman, would follow after the soldier's first 18 months in his Unit. Battle fitness standards would include such as a 10-mile Battle March with full kit within 2 hours followed immediately by a 300-400m Assault Course, and then directly on to a live shoot (the "Shoot to Live" Program") starting at 400m and requiring everyone to achieve the minimum of Marksman (as the USMC does). Swim tests, Chins, Dips, Sit-Ups, Squat-Jumps, and the like, would also be tested. All of this would be tested every 90 Days. As "burnout" really is a problem at times for highly-trained units, every Sunday and Holiday - without exception - really would be a "day off".

Junior NCOs, with at least 6 years' service in the Army and a basic NCO course lasting at least 3-4 months (preferably six), and advanced NCO courses would follow after their first 18 months as an NCO in their Unit, such as 4 weeks for advanced machine gunner to 5 weeks for advanced reconnaissance patrolman. Senior NCOs, with at least 9 year's service in the Army and warrant officer's and sergeant-major's courses, plus additional specialized courses, would provide for the core professional development of the NCO Corps.

Officers would receive a full year's basic officer training, and after their first 18 months in their Unit, would be eligible for advanced training such as basic machine gunning to basic reconnaissance patrolman (although this would already have been taught to them in their officer course). Officers are often exempt from such basic courses in advanced training, as they must cover agood deal of its matter in officer training anyway; but this may be a disservice to them and to their soldiers, especially after their first time in a Platoon may have distracted them somewhat from some of the finer points of Heavy Weapons and the like as they concentrate on learning the basics of their craft.

After their first 36 months in their Unit, they attend the advanced course for their advanced specialty, and at some point (as Captains) duly take command of a Heavy Weapons or Combat Support Platoon in their advanced specialty (from Machine-Gunning to Reconnaissance). And on up the ladder to Battalion Staff, Company 2i/c, Company Command and Majority - and then off to CGSC, etc.

Long post, I know, and this is a very rough outline, which deliberately ignores some realities about resources, force structure, career progression, and a few other things. But I'm trying to set up an "ideal" here to describe some fundamental characteristics and requirements of and for the training necessary for a truly competent "Full-Spectrum" Unit.

[Ken White]

Why an 18 month cycle? The US Army operated for many years on an annual cycle and got all you suggest into that 12 months with time left over. What you suggest for six months was done in a quarter with the fourth quarter for major multi divisional combined arms exercises which actually occurred at various times due to conflicting schedules of participants; wouldn't be smart to have everyone on the same cycles...

That system culminated in a graded test. We don't do those any more as our dipwad Congress decided that such tests scores were subjective and this encouraged favoritism, probably racism and elitism and who knows what else, not the American way. They told the Marines to quit scoring also -- the Marines wisely ignored them. A recurring complaint was that cycle produced peaks and valleys so we introduced the ARTEP -- which produces peaks and valleys.

We don't do nearly as much ceremonial stuff as most armies. No way we're going to go to a Regimental system (which has its pluses and minuses), knock too many civilians in the DC area out of work. I know, I know -- but that's reality.

Agree on your individual training prescription; some of that is being done now, just not enough. Squat jumps went out before I retired in '77 -- you are OLD...

Best combat oriented physical training is a good obstacle course, run 2-3 times a week (even for Tankers ), other days of the week, PT should be branch specific.

Your NCO courses are too long; we already shoehorn two hours into eight, don't encourage that! That'll just encourage the inclusion of training distractors in the POI. Short and intensive and mostly in a field environment is a much better combat trainer than long and leisurely which encourages in-garrison training and lectures...

The only thing one has to do to train for full spectrum is train to thoroughly train all the MCO tasks at the entry level and let the units do the COIN and other lesser included stuff for various different types of operations when and if it's needed, it's just not that hard.

I noticed a blurb over at Abu Muq that said the CGSC was still teaching MCO and that the COIN level content was low. Good (LINK). He apparently disagrees, I don't.

[William F. Owen]

I have to say, I have reigned back my thinking recently to where it seems apparent to me, that basic training should focus largely on individual skills. - Which would be a modified Scout/Sniper skills set, plus First Aid, CQB/Battle Shooting, platoon weapons, basic Comms skils.

Most of those skills are not hard to achieve. The application of those skills within a squad/section or fire team are, likewise, not hard to put across. It seems to me that the training of commanders and NCOs is far more critical.

BTW, I see the basic fitness standard as running 3,200m (2 miles) in running kit with a 22kg ruck in >16 minutes for basic and >15:30 for NCO/officers as a minimum, as well as being able to climb a 7m rope using arms only. I actually had two NCOs at the Defence Medical Centre test this and they thought it reasonable, as did some SIs (though not all) from the NCO School at Brecon. Not definitive but it's a start.

If you can get hits on 0.5 x 1m target exposed for 5 seconds at 100m, from the standing position, then that seems good enough for me. Prone at 300m.

[Rob Thornton]

A good chunk of exchanges in the last 4 or 5 posts. CAVGUY brought up a good point in a meeting we were both at yesterday – the training plate is really only so big, and attempts to just keep piling stuff on top of it means it does not really get absorbed, it gets finger drilled (could mean it gets done –but not to anyone’s real benefit), or everything loses its importance. So what does belong in the PME? What should be emphasized up front? I think you have to begin by looking at what we are expected to do, that no one else is – wage land war – conduct ground combat operations (I’m a ground guy, and as Joint as I am – people construct cities on land). The next step is to look at the wide ranging conditions and missions associated with that (incidentally there is a piece in today’s paper quoting Rep Skelton on pushing DoD to review service roles and missions).

This I think is where things start to get greyer – what a state requires its military to do – there are the enduring things – provide security for the state (don’t let the Huns into the gates), and there are the important, but “more” temporal interests – that while remaining vital – such as stability in a particualr region where we require ourselves and others to have access to secure strategic resources to fuel economies – are not “quite” the same as meeting an opposite's uniformed army upon which the outcome may likely decide the course of a declared war.

In 2005 DoD issued Directive 3000.5 that put stability operations on par with other types of operations. This also coincides with Army doctrine that now reflects “full spectrum” as description of what we do. For those unfamiliar with 3000.5 I think its purpose was to lay out a number of tasks that are to be accomplished (many are still in the process or may not have fulfilled the spirit of the directive) that would help us address our current shortfalls for the wars we are in, and what many say are more the norm then the exception (I hate to attempt to tell the future – it always surprises me some - warning BAITED AMBUSH here out in front of the FLOT and in a FFA ). As far as I know there has been no report card on how we’ve done in implementing it. Why would that be? I have a theory – to direct a service or agency to become the executor raises the question of resources (time, people, focus and yes money – but more of the other 3 I think since money still only gets you some of the second, none of the first and the 3rd…) – so what falls off the plate? Who takes responsibility for saying – you no longer have to do this at all, do it well, or do it not so well – and what do the latter 2 mean when others start to apportion blame?

I think some of it comes back to the golden mean – you don’t make too many radical departures from the golden mean in what is inherently a conservative organization (we conserve/preserve the security of our state).

So I think this leads to a learning curve where we depart from the very basic and enduring responsibilities. What Ken has said and I agree with, is that maybe our perception of the need for a learning curve is at least parlty in our head (what I mean is the time required to address new and relative unfamiliar conditions -METT-TC) - and that we can do much better with the Army of 2008 then the one of 1917 and 1941. We do need to scrape some of the empty carbs, and over kill off the plate to make room for the things that matter, but to do so we are going to have to get comfortable with excepting risk, and the best way to mitigate that is to make a better investment in people – which ties us into a number of other threads like the ones on leadership and retention.

I think there is linkage between what our civilian leadership want us to do based on their short term perception, and the enduring roles that don’t always forward in their objectives because they don’t (all) understand what it takes to build and sustain a military and its competencies. There we have to temper their expectations.

I wrote all this because I’m thinking about the level where senior leaders who must interact with policy must articulate the risk to policy objectives (near and far) by pursuing a particular course of action that ripples across the Strategic to the Tactical.

Increasing the amount of time available to train officers and NCOs outside of their units has a proportionate effect on a number of areas. Other agencies don’t even have the luxury we do with regard to sending their folks to levels of education and training – their bench is not big enough. If DoS fills a ILE/CGSC seat with a butt, nobody backfills that guy or gal (however I think the CAC recently said he’d work with agencies willing to do so by backfilling the seat with a uniformed guy/gal of like specialty – good for them/good for us). We have that luxury – no BN CMD slot generally goes unfilled (for very long) when a LTC(P) goes to AWC (Army War College). OPTEMPO in the current war has made that harder to do, but we’re still managing to get guys education – and in many cases we’ve figured out ways to get them some advanced civil schooling (ACS) both as a benefit to the individual, the Army, and the nation. I’d also say that time away from a platoon or company to attend additional training is not always a good thing – the experience of leading, commanding and yes even doing staff work – is invaluable to leader development –given our broad requirements – to include those outline in the GN Act – you get barely enough of the first two – but given we spend a great deal of time on staff supporting other CDRs and units – the last is also critical.

I’m not trying to take senior leaders off the hook in making room for more and better training that will better prepare us for the variety of conditions we face in meeting our responsibilities to the men and women we lead. However, identifying the risks so that everybody goes in pretty much with eyes wide open is critical to making things work in a manner that won’t haunt us down the road – we don’t want to be playing Jenga and not know it. I believe we can and should do better – there is room to be doing things smarter – but I also believe things are not as simple as identifying which things to make longer, or do away with – goes back to understanding the complex nature of war and the men and women we send to wage it in the ends/ways/means equation.

Best, Rob

[Norfolk]

Agree on your individual training prescription; some of that is being done now, just not enough. Squat jumps went out before I retired in '77 -- you are OLD...

OLD!? I'm thunderstruck Ken. In fact I think that I'm experiencing chest pain and shortness of breath now - and my arthritis is preventing me from getting to my Nitro pills quick enough. I mean, I didn't even include Squat-Thrusts (Donkey-Kicks) here!

As per usual, I shall defer to your superior wisdom on these matters; although I kind of thought that trying to include the bulk of the content of the Ranger Course into a Basic NCO Course might require a course of rather more than 3 months or so. I just didn't want the aspiring Corporals to emerge fat and lazy from their first 14 or 15 weeks of NCO training - so I put them on the 9-week Ranger Diet!

[Rob Thornton]

A few other thoughts come to mind with regard to establishing, sustaining and changing a training base – the first is on self imposed requirements – who do we want teaching at our schools and courses, who do we want writing our doctrine, who do we want running our service academies? Why do we want folks with operational experience doing that, say turning it over completely to contractors – who regardless of their experience, might not either have the same vested interest, or the more recent ground truth? What does that do to the equation of managing the force?

How about considering something like forecasting requirements? It could be for CL V (ammunition) – a STRAC table is supposed to provide a unit an idea of what related training it does, and how often – but it also determines how much ammunition is to be ordered, how much space is required on the installation to hold it, how much the producer of that ammunition can expect to have to make the following year – etc.

The same can be said about levels of training – we were having a discussion the other day about levels of training for advisors. A sharp SNCO here said that what we might be wise to do is establish different levels of capability based on the amount of training or experiences an advisor had – and that by doing so we’d be capable of knowing what that guy could do. I thought it was a great idea – and its one we do in other areas. Another reason I thought it was great is I could see its utility to managing the training base and for planners trying to decide if a COA was feasible.

If we create requirements for example that certain types of units have the x- amount of capacity for various levels of proficiency in a skill set(s) (we already do this by MTO&E) then that establishes the training base requirements that must sustained in order to meet those needs – i.e. if you create the need for more snipers for example, then your capacity to train those new sniper requirements needs to grow in order to meet it (you could resource it internally, or you could outsource it). My point is that with an increased investment in training, there is an increased investment somewhere along the training and sustaining base – and also along the rest of the DOTMLPF – more of something in this case equates to more of something else as well – this is also true when we move things around – the consequences for moving the Armor School to Benning with its 400 tanks – more AHA space, more competition for ranges, more motor pools and maintenance bays, etc. If we want more training on tanks for example – its more of something else, risk associated with not doing so, or some substitute that while more efficient might not be more effective – we’re back to tough choices.

Anyway – as we go down the path – its worthwhile to consider the ripples.

Best, Rob

[selil]

Rob,

If you find the plate to small the time to finite look at the training from a new perspective. What you "train" may not be what you "teach". There is a lot of excess in most education and training programs (they are not the same by the way). You can rapidly evaluate and chip away at the excess by finding points of commonality, and where repetition is done only for time management. Physical fitness requires a defined number of minutes activity. Martial arts require a fixed number of repetitions. Increase the intensity of the martial arts training and decrease other physical fitness training. I'm sure similar examples exist both as simplistic and at higher levels. I'm not as aware of military training as maybe I should be, but the utilization of building block educations systems often are done in stove pipes. When they should be done in reversed hierarchies (upside down pyramids). What ever the most basic skill is taught first. Then multiple skills are taught on top of that base. The original not being addressed other than in utilization. So on, and upwards until you can apply it across multiple careers, or specialties. This educational philosophy isn't well loved by the military from what I understand as everybody wants to start out with breathe (breath control), and then work their way up to tactics. You should only have to teach the most basic skill once, and the reinforce rarely but use often.

[Ken White]

Sam's post is also great and he's correct in that the Army has a tendency to adhere to "crawl, walk, run" at all costs without considering the fact that some can walk when they get there and some can even run (and that is particularly true at levels above entry -- how many in your Advanced course had already commanded companies...).

Addressing your comments in order of your two latest posts:

Yes, the training plates (plural) are only so big. The question to me is what is allocated to which plate. I suggest, for Officers, that the Basic courses are far too short and the Advanced courses (and CGSC) are far too long *. The same applies to NCOES which is largely seen a as a joke by most NCOs (that may have changed recently, I know they're trying to change it); initial entry training is too short and the levels of NCOES are all too long (and too garrison oriented). So the total plate allocation doesn't need to increase, nor do we need to pile much else on -- rather, we need to take some esoterica off -- we just need to tune the allocation between the plates.

* Shy Meyer tried to fix thatin the late 70s, the bureaucracy won.

Stability operations may or may not need to be on a par with other operations (whatever that means) the fact remains that the Army's primary mission is land warfare and keeping said Huns away from the gate. If the Army can do that, it is more than capable of adapting to other minor missions. As you say, predicting the future is a virtual impossibility and we should not waste time and effort trying to do so.

You say -- and I totally agree -- that we need to get comfortable accepting risk. That is a profound and important statement and our failure in ever increasing amounts over the last 30 plus years to be willing to do that is a large part of the problem. We have become a comfortable bureaucracy and we like it. That needs to change.

You correctly illustrate the conflicting demands of time in the unit versus time spent away in education or training -- and that is a knotty problem. I think there is no one answer or 'typical' set of answers. People vary; all do not absorb knowledge or skills at the same rate and thus each individual's path must vary. That is very difficult to accommodate but we should at least try; good leaders and commanders do that for their people -- but the institution does not try. It should.

Allied to that though is another time impact -- length of tours. If I had a nickel for every senior Officer I've heard say "...just about the time I learned what the job entailed and became effective, I moved..." I'd send you a whopping check to take the entire Kansas chapter of SWJ to KC for steaks and buckets of beer...

That needs a hard look. I've often said DOPMA is dangerous and I really believe that. A lot of congressionally imposed stuff to achieve "fairness" in promotions is antithetical to best military practice.

That brings up an aside of our penchant for adopting civilian education, training and management practices which should be totally stopped...

You say:

"I believe we can and should do better – there is room to be doing things smarter – but I also believe things are not as simple as identifying which things to make longer, or do away with – goes back to understanding the complex nature of war and the men and women we send to wage it in the ends/ways/means equation."

Couldn't agree more.

Going on to your next post, you suggest using contractors for training -- I agree that their use could and probably should be expanded but with the caveat that the majority need to be old retired heads and in uniform, ala Junior ROTC instructors.

Doctrine writers should be serving folks, period -- do not let a civilian, even one who's retired, anywhere near that. The folks that write it need to be the folks who are going to execute it, period.

You also said:

"The same can be said about levels of training – we were having a discussion the other day about levels of training for advisors. A sharp SNCO here said that what we might be wise to do is establish different levels of capability based on the amount of training or experiences an advisor had – and that by doing so we’d be capable of knowing what that guy could do. I thought it was a great idea – and its one we do in other areas. Another reason I thought it was great is I could see its utility to managing the training base and for planners trying to decide if a COA was feasible."

I thought that's what we did?

and:

"we’re back to tough choices."

Always been true and we have a bad tendency not to make those because we don't think it through and tend to take the easiest solutions. We like to avoid risk...