"I think a case could be made that Divisions and Corps also had specialized units for reconnaissance and or enabling type functions - CORPS LRS-D and DIV Pathfinders come to mind..."
Yes, the Corps had and have LRS Companies but there are two constraints on their missions and one big impediment. The constraints are risk aversion on the part of Corps staffs and commanders -- that varies, of course but it is real sometimes. Another that is almost universally true is infiltration and exfiltration. Because they're 'Big Army' the 160th SOAR doesn't even want to talk to them; the USAF SOC types are much the same and conventional Army Aviation units aren't trained or equipped to get the LRS Dets where they need to go. That needs to be addressed.
"...Having an actual person on the ground to assess the situation and feed back information in a manner that "paints the picture" so leaders can make critical decisions on is invaluable. Again, some have a more natural aptitude to not only be able to go forward and thrive, but to show discipline and restraint while being able to pick up on what is really important beyond a staff's standard PIR that sounded right back before anyone began movement."
That is, believe it or not, the impediment. For real and in training, I've seen people out miles, literally, in front of major units, rendering good reports -- which are ignored or disputed. I have seen MI types directly refute reports because they have no confirmation from their sources and methods; I have seen Commanders flatly state "Those kids can't see that, it isn't happening." or words to that effect. I think a big part of that is training related -- and about which more in a second.
"(I saw a few red-headed Macedonian descendants but they did not share much in common physically with me - lucky for them I suppose)."
Heh. The standard answer in the ME for the Red Hair or blue Eyes is "Al Iskander was here..."
"As such the BN came up with a good plan to get more Arabs in the reconnaissance business (see that article in VOL 8 of the SWJ on building indigenous forces with regards to METT-TC) - this I think is part of what Slim was advocating about the need for "locals" to conduct reconnaissance - there are few places where we are likely to fight where an Anglo is going to pass for local."
Too true and we, moving into a new AO with folks that haven't done this before are way too slow in picking up locals for Scouts; we're also too slow, sloppy and inadequate in the HumInt business (before Jedburgh attacks, that's addressed at command attitudes and the quantity of HumInt people, not the quality).

Back to the failure to use our recon assets -- or to put enough stock in what those who are used report, my contention is it's a training issue. We do not train them well; not nearly as well as the Brits do (they don't do a lot of things any better or sometimes as well as we do but they do a far better job on, among other things, recon and intel gathering, far better). Since people know the scouts and recon folks aren't all that well trained, the information they provide thus is automatically suspect.

That tumble down 'trust' -- or lack of it -- aspect plagues us in all spheres. Lieutenants aren't trusted because we all know they are not adequately trained and are still learning. It's pervasive and insdious and our lack of ability to trust subordinate due to perceived shortfall potential or lack of judgment leads to micromanagement, failure to delegate and over centralization. From being one of the most innovative Armies around we have descended into being one of the most hidebound. Fortunately, both Afghanistan and Iraq are changing that; commanders are being forced to delegate to the point of acute discomfort on the part of the commanders -- and it all works out...