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Thread: The Importance and Role of Training in Creating/Sustaining the Best Possible Forces

  1. #21
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    Default Indigenous recon

    Now, almost five years after we invaded Iraq conventional officers are now considering the obvious, which is clearly one of many examples of why we need Special Forces. The Marines, unlike the Army, embraced these types of activities early in the fight. Now the question is should conventional forces be controlling indigenous recon elements, especially those operating in civilian garb? If you are the only players in town, then by all means, but if you have specialized forces that are more capable of training, equiping, advising, and controlling these type of operations (which can go terribly wrong when poorly planned, especially the risk of blue on blue if if you have a bunch of nervous E2's controlled by a LT in the battlespace), why would you? Pardon my bitterness, but after seeing some clown operations downrange I have my doubts. You can't compare our Army to the Brits. Our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts.

  2. #22
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Global Scout View Post
    Now, almost five years after we invaded Iraq conventional officers are now considering the obvious, which is clearly one of many examples of why we need Special Forces. The Marines, unlike the Army, embraced these types of activities early in the fight. Now the question is should conventional forces be controlling indigenous recon elements, especially those operating in civilian garb? If you are the only players in town, then by all means, but if you have specialized forces that are more capable of training, equiping, advising, and controlling these type of operations (which can go terribly wrong when poorly planned, especially the risk of blue on blue if if you have a bunch of nervous E2's controlled by a LT in the battlespace), why would you? Pardon my bitterness, but after seeing some clown operations downrange I have my doubts. You can't compare our Army to the Brits. Our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts.
    While being aware of OPSEC and the sensitivity of this subject, I think I can say quite a few problems go away if the Indig are un-armed, and if there is a particularly broad and lateral interpretation of constitutes reconnaissance as opposed to so called intelligence activity.

    The capture of two UK SRSR operators is pretty indicative of the sort of problems Global Scout is talking about. - as it is of having more than one home team playing on the field!
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 01-22-2008 at 06:58 AM. Reason: Clarity and syntax
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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  3. #23
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    In many cases its not "any" U.S. folks (conventional or SOF) who control the indigenous CTR plainclothes types - in our case the IA controlled their own - we advised. We advised on targeting, on operations, on intel, etc. The IA controlled their own. Took us awhile to help the partner unit understand that as well, but eventually they did - and we all got along.

    We came up with good ways to help the two forces deconflict (OPSEC) and prevent fratricide, but I'd say we kept as close (or closer) relationship with our CF partner as the resident ODA that was at MAREZ, and we lived with our folks out in town so we provided a persistent 2 way link.

    Were there incidents of potential frat - yes, but not exactly for the reasons you bring up - they were because of training issues in the BCT and TF staff as well as deficiencies in the IA DIV, BDE, BN, and deficiencies in the IP, and deficiencies in the MiTTs(i.e. training writ large) - and because in complex operations Murphy is going to have a say - ex. the locations (to include the grid, side od the street, type of structure, and story of house were provided to a night battle captain for the overwatches the IA were putting in - the word did not get out to all the CF traveling on TAMPA that evening, and the MPs initiated contact with one of the IA overwatches (the gunner said he saw an Iraqi in the window with a weapon by his side - which he probably did). The IA overwatch called his operations center, and they sent a runner downstairs to get me, and I came up on the CF net to deconflict - luckily nobody got hurt. This is a case of fog and friction as well as poor training -on a number of levels - and it happens not just between U.S. and HN forces, but between allies who speak the same language, and have interoperability on a number of levels. when you have multiple folks operating in the same space, each thinking they rightfully own it, there are going to be issues - I could go on and on about some of the SNAFUs - but looking back, there were no show stoppers (the show did go on) and over a relatively short period of time, both forces began to really understand how to work with each other well.

    We did try to work with the local ODA to get more CTR training for the scouts - but they had a host of priorities - some from much higher up - then strictly ID. They also did not have the other resources needed. An argument could be made that says well we need more SF to do ID, or you could make the argument that we did pretty well by the IA, and after awhile, they found they too had a knack for such things and could be creative themselves - in fact pretty soon their success rivaled the CF partner.

    I also think that while we were not as well trained going into it, we've made some undeniable progress. While I did see some SNAFUs by our folks (generally I've seen SNAFUs by almost everyone - including the occasional dumb enemy), what I most saw was a very professional Army that had adapted to the conditions and the mission at hand. No - they were not COIN gurus (meaning guys running around spouting theory, but were instead guys and gals articlute in executing COIN on the ground), or unconventional adaptees - nor do I think they should have been. They were soldiers who'd by and large adapted to their environment (within reason) and were carrying out the mission in a professional manner. For all the things that go on in a large battlespace such as a city, there are going to be somethings things that defy explanation -#### does happen - to everybody - in a complex and inter-active environment - the issue imo is how you handle it, and that is a training issue.

    Best, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 01-22-2008 at 07:05 PM.

  4. #24
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Exactly. We agree on the problem

    but see different solutions...

    Quote Originally Posted by Global Scout View Post
    Now, almost five years after we invaded Iraq conventional officers are now considering the obvious, which is clearly one of many examples of why we need Special Forces. The Marines, unlike the Army, embraced these types of activities early in the fight...
    Yes and no, some Army units defied the Sanchez 'wisdom' and did that. The bigger issue is why did not the initial Army units into Iraq know what to do in the situation in which they found themselves?

    Simply because they hadn't trained for it. BCTP in those days; you won the war with a final attack, turned off the lights and the computers and left the room. Armies do what they're trained for; the US Army found itself in a situation it had not trained for and it floundered -- that's a lick on 20 plus years of very senior leadership and the then commanders in Iraq...

    There will never be enough Special Forces to do a wholesale attack and occupation.

    I'd also submit that if both SF and the rest of the Army would start talking to each other instead of acting like a pair of females who wore the same dress to a party, they both might learn something...

    (and yes, I know SOCOM is part of the problem)

    Maybe there's hope, I heard 3d Gp and the 82d pulled off a good op not long ago...

    "...Now the question is should conventional forces be controlling indigenous recon elements, especially those operating in civilian garb? If you are the only players in town, then by all means, but if you have specialized forces that are more capable of training, equiping, advising, and controlling these type of operations (which can go terribly wrong when poorly planned, especially the risk of blue on blue if if you have a bunch of nervous E2's controlled by a LT in the battlespace), why would you? Pardon my bitterness, but after seeing some clown operations downrange I have my doubts."
    Sort of sums up the problem, doesn't it? What if those specialized forces are not available in the quantities required due to either sheer numbers or diversion to other missions?

    Why is that E2 nervous? Why are you not prepared to trust his LT? Because neither has been adequately trained and we know that.

    The issue is not who does what, it's what forces we have and how well they're trained. On that score, even SOF can screw the pooch on occasion, foul ups are not confined to the big Army. There was this suburban full of interesting gear my son's rifle platoon from the 82d found in the street back on OIF2...

    I've seen a lot of clown operations on both sides of the SOF / conventional fence. Combat'll do that. One of the worst firefights I saw in VN was between two Mike Force Companies...

    I'll also mention that a recurring theme from both Afghanistan and Iraq in addition to the major point I cite below is that there is a lack of unity of command...

    "...You can't compare our Army to the Brits. Our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts.[/QUOTE]

    I agree that our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts. That's the real point here, is it not?

    Given the absolute fact that the US Army recognized as far back as 1986 that these types of conflict would be the future norm, whose fault is that?

    However, you can compare our Army to the Brits, I do it all the time. There's one massive difference -- the Brits train well on the basics; we ignore the basics. Every after action report I've seen, every CALL bulletin, everyone I've talked to (and that includes some SOF folks... ) who's been in any of the three current theaters says the same thing -- we do not do the basics well.

    The point is, as you so amply illustrate, we don't train well enough.
    Last edited by Ken White; 01-22-2008 at 05:10 PM. Reason: Typo

  5. #25
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    Default Pause for thought

    I've been reading this thread as it has evolved and have no military experience. Sometimes the abbreviations elude me, but that aside it has been a great read. Nice to know the US military do see somethings the Commonwealth / British armies do well and can learn from. Perhaps we can get our Indian members to add their views, not only from their international experience, but the low intensity wars they have had and still have.

    davidbfpo

  6. #26
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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    I've been reading this thread as it has evolved and have no military experience. Sometimes the abbreviations elude me, but that aside it has been a great read. Nice to know the US military do see somethings the Commonwealth / British armies do well and can learn from. Perhaps we can get our Indian members to add their views, not only from their international experience, but the low intensity wars they have had and still have.

    davidbfpo
    The Three Letter Acronym (TLA) soup is hilarious. What you need to do is write down all the BCT, TFF, LCS, SWC, DOS, BN, etc... on a card with a grid 5x5.. When you hit five across, on the diagonal, up-down shout bingo and take a drink of Scotch. It makes TLA's a lot more fun to read without a translator.

    We have a few different countries represented but they aren't posting as much. It is interesting to read the different accounts of actions. I'd be interested in hearing more about Sri Lanka, and any of the Malaysian conflicts.
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  7. #27
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    However, you can compare our Army to the Brits, I do it all the time. There's one massive difference -- the Brits train well on the basics; we ignore the basics. Every after action report I've seen, every CALL bulletin, everyone I've talked to (and that includes some SOF folks... ) who's been in any of the three current theaters says the same thing -- we do not do the basics well.

    The point is, as you so amply illustrate, we don't train well enough.
    Wow Ken! That's very forthright. Politeness prevents me from agreeing, but I have to say I am constantly amazed at some of the things that certain armies choose not to train to do. I am currently doing some real boot-lace level research on this, so opinions as to this matter would be very welcome.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  8. #28
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Our problem with the basics is not that we don't

    recognize them and know they need to be trained, it's a combination of philosophy, cost and human fallibility.

    Most of our initial entry training, officer and enlisted is based on WW II models (which in turn was predicated on WW I models). Those techniques worked marginally for a large mass Army of draftees and by the end of WW II, were generally fair. However, given the fact that the US Army has been at peace since 1945 (I know parts of it have not been but the institution has been..) and given the general softening of society, the mothers of America are not willing to accept a significant number of injuries to their kids in training. Thus those items that can be injurious are softened or eliminated.

    The broader problem is that the Army has not adapted to the fact that Joe Entrant, 2007 version, is far more mentally capable (and less emotionally and physically capable but not terribly so) of absorbing more and better training. We train a mile wide and an inch deep; many of the basics are taught but only superficially and they are not drilled in (a critical point). Initial entry training for combat arms enlisted folks should be around 32 weeks -- it's only a little over half that in many cases; Officer accession training should be about a year, it's less than half that. So the philosophy is bad.

    In fairness, the Marines do better.

    The Army believes it cannot afford to train an individual for more than his or her next job. This is obviously fallacious because at any institutional level, the trainees or students will almost invariably perform the duties of at least one more rank step and most likely two before they get additional training -- this is just dumb; by refusing to spend the money up front, we make subsequent training more expensive, shortchange those trained -- and we get people killed unnecessarily due to that. The Tillman case comes to mind. So the cost factor is very real and very false logic.

    Then there's human fallibility. It's a big problem but I'll cite just two examples. Immediate action on an M16/M4 is simple but calls for drilling and muscle memory or it doesn't become the reflex action it should be. This may have changed but 30 years ago, the solution was not to drill it in but to extend the time allotted to perform the action to save training time (and go easy on the Drill Sergeants). Hopefully, they are no longer teaching any use of the forward assist assembly and I don't know what that time is today but if it's more than five seconds...

    The second item is that those tasks which garner low pass rates in training are not trained in the schools and training centers in many cases, they are flagged out for "in unit training." Not because they're too difficult in all cases for the institution to train but because the low pass rate makes the school or center look bad. There's more but those are two examples.

    Then there's the fact that units don't have time in too many cases to properly train because of the same three factors -- but that's another thread.

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    There will never be enough Special Forces to do a wholesale attack and occupation.
    I'd also submit that if both SF and the rest of the Army would start talking to each other instead of acting like a pair of females who wore the same dress to a party, they both might learn something...
    (and yes, I know SOCOM is part of the problem)
    Maybe there's hope, I heard 3d Gp and the 82d pulled off a good op not long ago
    Ken, all very good points. I must admit I was on the male version of the rag yesterday when I wrote my response. I have no issue with any unit doing what needs to be done. The problem is the Army has lost the art of training, though TRADOC fans would probably argue with me on that point, I would counter argue we pretend to train to standard. The numerous posts throughout this great site had support to my argument, whether it is a unit in pre-mission training or worse a MiTT element getting ready to deploy.

    thank you for recognizing that SOCOM is part of the problem for SF, but the reality is they are not "the" problem. As for 3d Gp and the 82d working together, that happens plenty of times at the Co and below level, where there are no political agendas, only a desire to win. Too bad most of the times you do it, you have to hide the cooperation from higher.

    Why is that E2 nervous? Why are you not prepared to trust his LT? Because neither has been adequately trained and we know that.

    The issue is not who does what, it's what forces we have and how well they're trained. On that score, even SOF can screw the pooch on occasion, foul ups are not confined to the big Army. There was this suburban full of interesting gear my son's rifle platoon from the 82d found in the street back on OIF2...
    Please tell your son to return my stuff! (only joking)

  10. #30
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Talking Some of my best friends are in SOCOM...

    Quote Originally Posted by Global Scout View Post
    . . .
    thank you for recognizing that SOCOM is part of the problem for SF, but the reality is they are not "the" problem.
    True and under some Commanders, they've been helpful at removing the bars. That will continue to vary. The big Army mindset on the part of some senior folks therein is also part of the problem. It's complex and not easily solved but it needs to be, I think...

    ... As for 3d Gp and the 82d working together, that happens plenty of times at the Co and below level, where there are no political agendas, only a desire to win. Too bad most of the times you do it, you have to hide the cooperation from higher.
    True, yet I think this one was a top down effort in both chains; not there so can't say for sure. In any event, the guys on the ground do generally work it out; if we could fix the budget and spaces problem we could get rid of some of the feuding.

    Please tell your son to return my stuff! (only joking)
    I didn't know you were in the Navy! Quelle horreur...

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    It is interesting how, when these threads hit about #30, that you can't tell what the original subject was. Not to be rude, but to return to Rob's original question "Could we be training our infantry better and in a wider variety of tasks?", I would like to give my two cents worth.

    The answer is that of course we could do better and, yes, there are 'special' tasks like FID, long-range reconnaissance, raids, direct action, etc., that garden-variety conventional untis could do if afforded the training time. Slim's point, as Rob clarified midway down the thread, was that he believed regular infantry could be used for deep raids, airborne drops, the primitive airmobile operations of the times, and other tasks that most believed could only be done by 'special' forces. Today's army faces a variety of tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan that were either outside the purview of 'regular' infantry training or were considered the province of SOF.

    Defining these tasks and constructing a training program for them is something most competent mid-grade officers could do. I believe a random selection of officers and NCOs, plucked from any infantry battalion, could train a group of men to do virtually anything - advise a foreign battalion, run a PRT, interdict rat lines, screen a border, etc - that you need to do in COIN ops to an acceptable standard. They won't be able to do it as well as SF, because SF have the luxury of screening their personnel, possess language and other skills well beyond what you'll find in random conventional forces, and generally have years of operational experience conducting 'special' ops.

    So the obvious (and facile) answer is, of course, more and better training is good and will produce more capable units.

    The problem is, how do you afford your soldiers more and better training in our current Army? We would need to drop many of the useless things we force soldiers to do nowadays - mandatory training about equal opportunity, health, alcohol abuse, fire prevention, and the like - and better resource things like shoot houses, combat ranges, leadership courses, cultural awareness, and other small-unit training assets. Unfortunately, even these no-brainers will only free up a small sliver of time, and that is the hardest constraint we face.

    I am a firm believer that US units can only do a handful of things well. If you concentrate your training on small-arms combat skills and squad/platoon maneuver, your ability to function smoothly as part of larger units will suffer. If you concentrate on the softer skills of unconventional warfare, your combat skills will degrade. The only way for units to acquire a wider range of skills is to keep them together for years and not disassemble them - as we do - after every combat tour. Yes, more and better training will produce more capable units, but our system of individual replacements ensures a hard ceiling beyond which only the most extraordinary commanders will be able to go.

    Finally, some would argue that our current combat experience is in fact producing the kind of units Rob was hoping for. Iraq and Afghanistan are seen as the ultimate training ranges. I would argue that prolonged exposure to the combat zones is narrowing our expertise, because in combat you don't train, you rehearse. It is a subtle but important distinction that leads directly to the opposite effect that Rob was seeking. History, I believe, supports my thesis that nothing is more destructive to an Army's overall competency than small wars

  12. #32
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Always a good plan...

    "It is interesting how, when these threads hit about #30, that you can't tell what the original subject was. Not to be rude..."
    One does have to pay attention, no question. Still, total adherence to orthodoxy is sort of stultifying...

    Though it it does appear somewhat endemic today.
    "...Today's army faces a variety of tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan that were either outside the purview of 'regular' infantry training or were considered the province of SOF."
    True and the Asymmetric Warfare Group deserves many kudos for helping units to train themselves in migrating some of those nominal SOF skills to ordinary units. Skills that in peacetime have migrated to SOF and not been trained in the rest of the Army but skills which any competent Infantryman in WW II, Korea or Viet Nam had and then some...
    "...So the obvious (and facile) answer is, of course, more and better training is good and will produce more capable units."
    Sometimes an answer may be obvious and only be facile in the eye of some beholders. Regardless, you then say:
    "I am a firm believer that US units can only do a handful of things well. If you concentrate your training on small-arms combat skills and squad/platoon maneuver, your ability to function smoothly as part of larger units will suffer. If you concentrate on the softer skills of unconventional warfare, your combat skills will degrade. The only way for units to acquire a wider range of skills is to keep them together for years and not disassemble them - as we do - after every combat tour. Yes, more and better training will produce more capable units, but our system of individual replacements ensures a hard ceiling beyond which only the most extraordinary commanders will be able to go."
    I strongly disagree on the first opinion, I've seen too many units over too many years that can do it all. I have seen a number of commanders who were not willing to trust units to do more than a few things. I've seen even more leaders who were afraid to take the risk to train their units to do more...

    I do agree that the current system of 'personnel management' is inimical to that ability.

    I would add that if your position on only handful of things were accurate, it would be an even more damaging indictment of our training process than my rather scathing comments on the subject. I'd also ask whose fault that shortfall in capability is...
    "...I would argue that prolonged exposure to the combat zones is narrowing our expertise, because in combat you don't train, you rehearse. It is a subtle but important distinction that leads directly to the opposite effect that Rob was seeking. History, I believe, supports my thesis that nothing is more destructive to an Army's overall competency than small wars."
    You CAN train in combat and good leaders do that. All day, every day -- if one does not derive training value from every action, one is not taking care of one's troops. Period. Good units force that to happen.

    I disagree with your thesis and would suggest that history supports it only in part -- and that only because an Army allowed that to be true.

    In the current situation, the reversion to MCO roles is difficult due to the rapid rotation from CONUS to the theaters and concern for morale and families but the concentrated training needed to effect a successful reversion is not a lengthy effort (unless we determine to cram 12 weeks training in to 26 as we are prone to do -- partly due to some of those training distractors you mention).

    While I am firmly convinced that our institutional training should focus on major combat operations, the big war if you will, adapting downward to do COIN or a small war of another nature is -- or should be -- but a temporary refocus; the primary focus can be easily restored with minimal training. One does not 'do' a COIN fight, one engages in COIN operations and one adapts to the modified skills needed (it is easier to do that than to train for COIN and adapt to MCO). I'd also suggest that the deterioration of some MCO skills is offset by the gaining of other skills and that adds to the overall competence of the individual and may better prepare him for the shock of major combat -- and make no mistake, it is and will be a shock...

    The ability to downshift from MCO to COIN is present today and has been done in the past. That however is is most true and most easily done when the initial training is thorough and concentrates on instilling the basics -- which we do not do...

    Which your stated concerns amply illustrate.

  13. #33
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    As Eden points out, there is a whole lot of what GEN Marshall in his days at the Infantry School called "bunk". I have long sought to find a copy (preferably auf Englisch) of GEN Felix Steiner's Training System - the one that emphasized genuinely realistic tactical training at all times, use of live-fire whenever possible, emphasis on weapons-handling and rigorous but sensible PT, and almost no Drill! (I love that part).

    But apart from some items like marching 2 miles in 20 minutes with full kit, little drill, lots of weapons training and live-fire training, lots of sports, and advanced training, and an emphasis on the WWI "Pepperpot" tactics of the Stormtroops, I haven't find too much more in the way of specifics (though I can't say that I fancy getting up at 06:00 for an hour's worth of PT regardless of what training regimen is being used).

    If the US Army were ever to draw-down enough from Iraq and elsewhere in the future to allow for something like this, an 18-month Unit training cycle might be a useful way to go, broken into three 6-month blocks. Field exercises conducted during the first 5 months of each block would normally be conducted with some sort of MILES-type laser simulation equipment, along with plenty of blank ammo and pyrotechnics - sound and smoke are necessary too. The last month of each 6-month block would normally be dedicated to live-fire training and exercises. The first 6-month block would emphasize (but not exclusively) individual and small-unit training; the second block would likewise emphasize minor-unit training; and finally, the third block would emphasize major-unit level training. Formation-level training would have to be accomodated throughout, but with emphasis progressively increasing over the course of the 18-month training cycle.

    Strip the ceremonial stuff to the barest of bare bones; rethink and rework the administrative system to reduce it to the minimum possible (this is a really big issue, especially for officers, and a really tough one to deal with); and of course - as Eden strongly pressed for - scrap the individual-based personnel system and replace it with a true Regimental- or Brigade-based personnel system. That would be the toughest thing of all to pull off, but it would be self-defeating to increase training time and resources only to lose most of those benefits to the rotating-door individual assignment process of the personnel system.

    And all of this would best be served with initial-level training for soldiers lasting not less than six months, with high standards rigorously enforced in weapons handling and marksmanship, physical fitness, tactics and battlecraft, fieldcraft, and being trained to assume leadership two levels above one's own. Advanced training, such as 3 weeks for basic machine gunner to 6 weeks for basic reconnaissance patrolman, would follow after the soldier's first 18 months in his Unit. Battle fitness standards would include such as a 10-mile Battle March with full kit within 2 hours followed immediately by a 300-400m Assault Course, and then directly on to a live shoot (the "Shoot to Live" Program") starting at 400m and requiring everyone to achieve the minimum of Marksman (as the USMC does). Swim tests, Chins, Dips, Sit-Ups, Squat-Jumps, and the like, would also be tested. All of this would be tested every 90 Days. As "burnout" really is a problem at times for highly-trained units, every Sunday and Holiday - without exception - really would be a "day off".

    Junior NCOs, with at least 6 years' service in the Army and a basic NCO course lasting at least 3-4 months (preferably six), and advanced NCO courses would follow after their first 18 months as an NCO in their Unit, such as 4 weeks for advanced machine gunner to 5 weeks for advanced reconnaissance patrolman. Senior NCOs, with at least 9 year's service in the Army and warrant officer's and sergeant-major's courses, plus additional specialized courses, would provide for the core professional development of the NCO Corps.

    Officers would receive a full year's basic officer training, and after their first 18 months in their Unit, would be eligible for advanced training such as basic machine gunning to basic reconnaissance patrolman (although this would already have been taught to them in their officer course). Officers are often exempt from such basic courses in advanced training, as they must cover agood deal of its matter in officer training anyway; but this may be a disservice to them and to their soldiers, especially after their first time in a Platoon may have distracted them somewhat from some of the finer points of Heavy Weapons and the like as they concentrate on learning the basics of their craft.

    After their first 36 months in their Unit, they attend the advanced course for their advanced specialty, and at some point (as Captains) duly take command of a Heavy Weapons or Combat Support Platoon in their advanced specialty (from Machine-Gunning to Reconnaissance). And on up the ladder to Battalion Staff, Company 2i/c, Company Command and Majority - and then off to CGSC, etc.

    Long post, I know, and this is a very rough outline, which deliberately ignores some realities about resources, force structure, career progression, and a few other things. But I'm trying to set up an "ideal" here to describe some fundamental characteristics and requirements of and for the training necessary for a truly competent "Full-Spectrum" Unit.
    Last edited by Norfolk; 01-24-2008 at 04:24 AM.

  14. #34
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default From the top...

    Why an 18 month cycle? The US Army operated for many years on an annual cycle and got all you suggest into that 12 months with time left over. What you suggest for six months was done in a quarter with the fourth quarter for major multi divisional combined arms exercises which actually occurred at various times due to conflicting schedules of participants; wouldn't be smart to have everyone on the same cycles...

    That system culminated in a graded test. We don't do those any more as our dipwad Congress decided that such tests scores were subjective and this encouraged favoritism, probably racism and elitism and who knows what else, not the American way. They told the Marines to quit scoring also -- the Marines wisely ignored them. A recurring complaint was that cycle produced peaks and valleys so we introduced the ARTEP -- which produces peaks and valleys.

    We don't do nearly as much ceremonial stuff as most armies. No way we're going to go to a Regimental system (which has its pluses and minuses), knock too many civilians in the DC area out of work. I know, I know -- but that's reality.

    Agree on your individual training prescription; some of that is being done now, just not enough. Squat jumps went out before I retired in '77 -- you are OLD...

    Best combat oriented physical training is a good obstacle course, run 2-3 times a week (even for Tankers ), other days of the week, PT should be branch specific.

    Your NCO courses are too long; we already shoehorn two hours into eight, don't encourage that! That'll just encourage the inclusion of training distractors in the POI. Short and intensive and mostly in a field environment is a much better combat trainer than long and leisurely which encourages in-garrison training and lectures...

    The only thing one has to do to train for full spectrum is train to thoroughly train all the MCO tasks at the entry level and let the units do the COIN and other lesser included stuff for various different types of operations when and if it's needed, it's just not that hard.

    I noticed a blurb over at Abu Muq that said the CGSC was still teaching MCO and that the COIN level content was low. Good (LINK). He apparently disagrees, I don't.

  15. #35
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default Individual Standards

    I have to say, I have reigned back my thinking recently to where it seems apparent to me, that basic training should focus largely on individual skills. - Which would be a modified Scout/Sniper skills set, plus First Aid, CQB/Battle Shooting, platoon weapons, basic Comms skils.

    Most of those skills are not hard to achieve. The application of those skills within a squad/section or fire team are, likewise, not hard to put across. It seems to me that the training of commanders and NCOs is far more critical.

    BTW, I see the basic fitness standard as running 3,200m (2 miles) in running kit with a 22kg ruck in >16 minutes for basic and >15:30 for NCO/officers as a minimum, as well as being able to climb a 7m rope using arms only. I actually had two NCOs at the Defence Medical Centre test this and they thought it reasonable, as did some SIs (though not all) from the NCO School at Brecon. Not definitive but it's a start.

    If you can get hits on 0.5 x 1m target exposed for 5 seconds at 100m, from the standing position, then that seems good enough for me. Prone at 300m.
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  16. #36
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default The size of the plate, the learning curve, the # of requirements in addressing risk

    A good chunk of exchanges in the last 4 or 5 posts. CAVGUY brought up a good point in a meeting we were both at yesterday – the training plate is really only so big, and attempts to just keep piling stuff on top of it means it does not really get absorbed, it gets finger drilled (could mean it gets done –but not to anyone’s real benefit), or everything loses its importance. So what does belong in the PME? What should be emphasized up front? I think you have to begin by looking at what we are expected to do, that no one else is – wage land war – conduct ground combat operations (I’m a ground guy, and as Joint as I am – people construct cities on land). The next step is to look at the wide ranging conditions and missions associated with that (incidentally there is a piece in today’s paper quoting Rep Skelton on pushing DoD to review service roles and missions).

    This I think is where things start to get greyer – what a state requires its military to do – there are the enduring things – provide security for the state (don’t let the Huns into the gates), and there are the important, but “more” temporal interests – that while remaining vital – such as stability in a particualr region where we require ourselves and others to have access to secure strategic resources to fuel economies – are not “quite” the same as meeting an opposite's uniformed army upon which the outcome may likely decide the course of a declared war.

    In 2005 DoD issued Directive 3000.5 that put stability operations on par with other types of operations. This also coincides with Army doctrine that now reflects “full spectrum” as description of what we do. For those unfamiliar with 3000.5 I think its purpose was to lay out a number of tasks that are to be accomplished (many are still in the process or may not have fulfilled the spirit of the directive) that would help us address our current shortfalls for the wars we are in, and what many say are more the norm then the exception (I hate to attempt to tell the future – it always surprises me some - warning BAITED AMBUSH here out in front of the FLOT and in a FFA ). As far as I know there has been no report card on how we’ve done in implementing it. Why would that be? I have a theory – to direct a service or agency to become the executor raises the question of resources (time, people, focus and yes money – but more of the other 3 I think since money still only gets you some of the second, none of the first and the 3rd…) – so what falls off the plate? Who takes responsibility for saying – you no longer have to do this at all, do it well, or do it not so well – and what do the latter 2 mean when others start to apportion blame?

    I think some of it comes back to the golden mean – you don’t make too many radical departures from the golden mean in what is inherently a conservative organization (we conserve/preserve the security of our state).

    So I think this leads to a learning curve where we depart from the very basic and enduring responsibilities. What Ken has said and I agree with, is that maybe our perception of the need for a learning curve is at least parlty in our head (what I mean is the time required to address new and relative unfamiliar conditions -METT-TC) - and that we can do much better with the Army of 2008 then the one of 1917 and 1941. We do need to scrape some of the empty carbs, and over kill off the plate to make room for the things that matter, but to do so we are going to have to get comfortable with excepting risk, and the best way to mitigate that is to make a better investment in people – which ties us into a number of other threads like the ones on leadership and retention.

    I think there is linkage between what our civilian leadership want us to do based on their short term perception, and the enduring roles that don’t always forward in their objectives because they don’t (all) understand what it takes to build and sustain a military and its competencies. There we have to temper their expectations.

    I wrote all this because I’m thinking about the level where senior leaders who must interact with policy must articulate the risk to policy objectives (near and far) by pursuing a particular course of action that ripples across the Strategic to the Tactical.

    Increasing the amount of time available to train officers and NCOs outside of their units has a proportionate effect on a number of areas. Other agencies don’t even have the luxury we do with regard to sending their folks to levels of education and training – their bench is not big enough. If DoS fills a ILE/CGSC seat with a butt, nobody backfills that guy or gal (however I think the CAC recently said he’d work with agencies willing to do so by backfilling the seat with a uniformed guy/gal of like specialty – good for them/good for us). We have that luxury – no BN CMD slot generally goes unfilled (for very long) when a LTC(P) goes to AWC (Army War College). OPTEMPO in the current war has made that harder to do, but we’re still managing to get guys education – and in many cases we’ve figured out ways to get them some advanced civil schooling (ACS) both as a benefit to the individual, the Army, and the nation. I’d also say that time away from a platoon or company to attend additional training is not always a good thing – the experience of leading, commanding and yes even doing staff work – is invaluable to leader development –given our broad requirements – to include those outline in the GN Act – you get barely enough of the first two – but given we spend a great deal of time on staff supporting other CDRs and units – the last is also critical.

    I’m not trying to take senior leaders off the hook in making room for more and better training that will better prepare us for the variety of conditions we face in meeting our responsibilities to the men and women we lead. However, identifying the risks so that everybody goes in pretty much with eyes wide open is critical to making things work in a manner that won’t haunt us down the road – we don’t want to be playing Jenga and not know it. I believe we can and should do better – there is room to be doing things smarter – but I also believe things are not as simple as identifying which things to make longer, or do away with – goes back to understanding the complex nature of war and the men and women we send to wage it in the ends/ways/means equation.

    Best, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 01-24-2008 at 01:57 PM.

  17. #37
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Agree on your individual training prescription; some of that is being done now, just not enough. Squat jumps went out before I retired in '77 -- you are OLD...
    OLD!? I'm thunderstruck Ken. In fact I think that I'm experiencing chest pain and shortness of breath now - and my arthritis is preventing me from getting to my Nitro pills quick enough. I mean, I didn't even include Squat-Thrusts (Donkey-Kicks) here!

    As per usual, I shall defer to your superior wisdom on these matters; although I kind of thought that trying to include the bulk of the content of the Ranger Course into a Basic NCO Course might require a course of rather more than 3 months or so. I just didn't want the aspiring Corporals to emerge fat and lazy from their first 14 or 15 weeks of NCO training - so I put them on the 9-week Ranger Diet!
    Last edited by Norfolk; 01-24-2008 at 03:47 PM.

  18. #38
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default Creating, Managing and Sustaining a Training Base

    A few other thoughts come to mind with regard to establishing, sustaining and changing a training base – the first is on self imposed requirements – who do we want teaching at our schools and courses, who do we want writing our doctrine, who do we want running our service academies? Why do we want folks with operational experience doing that, say turning it over completely to contractors – who regardless of their experience, might not either have the same vested interest, or the more recent ground truth? What does that do to the equation of managing the force?

    How about considering something like forecasting requirements? It could be for CL V (ammunition) – a STRAC table is supposed to provide a unit an idea of what related training it does, and how often – but it also determines how much ammunition is to be ordered, how much space is required on the installation to hold it, how much the producer of that ammunition can expect to have to make the following year – etc.

    The same can be said about levels of training – we were having a discussion the other day about levels of training for advisors. A sharp SNCO here said that what we might be wise to do is establish different levels of capability based on the amount of training or experiences an advisor had – and that by doing so we’d be capable of knowing what that guy could do. I thought it was a great idea – and its one we do in other areas. Another reason I thought it was great is I could see its utility to managing the training base and for planners trying to decide if a COA was feasible.

    If we create requirements for example that certain types of units have the x- amount of capacity for various levels of proficiency in a skill set(s) (we already do this by MTO&E) then that establishes the training base requirements that must sustained in order to meet those needs – i.e. if you create the need for more snipers for example, then your capacity to train those new sniper requirements needs to grow in order to meet it (you could resource it internally, or you could outsource it). My point is that with an increased investment in training, there is an increased investment somewhere along the training and sustaining base – and also along the rest of the DOTMLPF – more of something in this case equates to more of something else as well – this is also true when we move things around – the consequences for moving the Armor School to Benning with its 400 tanks – more AHA space, more competition for ranges, more motor pools and maintenance bays, etc. If we want more training on tanks for example – its more of something else, risk associated with not doing so, or some substitute that while more efficient might not be more effective – we’re back to tough choices.

    Anyway – as we go down the path – its worthwhile to consider the ripples.

    Best, Rob

  19. #39
    i pwnd ur ooda loop selil's Avatar
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    Default

    Rob,

    If you find the plate to small the time to finite look at the training from a new perspective. What you "train" may not be what you "teach". There is a lot of excess in most education and training programs (they are not the same by the way). You can rapidly evaluate and chip away at the excess by finding points of commonality, and where repetition is done only for time management. Physical fitness requires a defined number of minutes activity. Martial arts require a fixed number of repetitions. Increase the intensity of the martial arts training and decrease other physical fitness training. I'm sure similar examples exist both as simplistic and at higher levels. I'm not as aware of military training as maybe I should be, but the utilization of building block educations systems often are done in stove pipes. When they should be done in reversed hierarchies (upside down pyramids). What ever the most basic skill is taught first. Then multiple skills are taught on top of that base. The original not being addressed other than in utilization. So on, and upwards until you can apply it across multiple careers, or specialties. This educational philosophy isn't well loved by the military from what I understand as everybody wants to start out with breathe (breath control), and then work their way up to tactics. You should only have to teach the most basic skill once, and the reinforce rarely but use often.
    Last edited by selil; 01-24-2008 at 05:40 PM. Reason: i r a college graduate spalling wull
    Sam Liles
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  20. #40
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Some great thoughts, Rob.

    Sam's post is also great and he's correct in that the Army has a tendency to adhere to "crawl, walk, run" at all costs without considering the fact that some can walk when they get there and some can even run (and that is particularly true at levels above entry -- how many in your Advanced course had already commanded companies...).

    Addressing your comments in order of your two latest posts:

    Yes, the training plates (plural) are only so big. The question to me is what is allocated to which plate. I suggest, for Officers, that the Basic courses are far too short and the Advanced courses (and CGSC) are far too long *. The same applies to NCOES which is largely seen a as a joke by most NCOs (that may have changed recently, I know they're trying to change it); initial entry training is too short and the levels of NCOES are all too long (and too garrison oriented). So the total plate allocation doesn't need to increase, nor do we need to pile much else on -- rather, we need to take some esoterica off -- we just need to tune the allocation between the plates.

    * Shy Meyer tried to fix thatin the late 70s, the bureaucracy won.

    Stability operations may or may not need to be on a par with other operations (whatever that means) the fact remains that the Army's primary mission is land warfare and keeping said Huns away from the gate. If the Army can do that, it is more than capable of adapting to other minor missions. As you say, predicting the future is a virtual impossibility and we should not waste time and effort trying to do so.

    You say -- and I totally agree -- that we need to get comfortable accepting risk. That is a profound and important statement and our failure in ever increasing amounts over the last 30 plus years to be willing to do that is a large part of the problem. We have become a comfortable bureaucracy and we like it. That needs to change.

    You correctly illustrate the conflicting demands of time in the unit versus time spent away in education or training -- and that is a knotty problem. I think there is no one answer or 'typical' set of answers. People vary; all do not absorb knowledge or skills at the same rate and thus each individual's path must vary. That is very difficult to accommodate but we should at least try; good leaders and commanders do that for their people -- but the institution does not try. It should.

    Allied to that though is another time impact -- length of tours. If I had a nickel for every senior Officer I've heard say "...just about the time I learned what the job entailed and became effective, I moved..." I'd send you a whopping check to take the entire Kansas chapter of SWJ to KC for steaks and buckets of beer...

    That needs a hard look. I've often said DOPMA is dangerous and I really believe that. A lot of congressionally imposed stuff to achieve "fairness" in promotions is antithetical to best military practice.

    That brings up an aside of our penchant for adopting civilian education, training and management practices which should be totally stopped...

    You say:
    "I believe we can and should do better – there is room to be doing things smarter – but I also believe things are not as simple as identifying which things to make longer, or do away with – goes back to understanding the complex nature of war and the men and women we send to wage it in the ends/ways/means equation."
    Couldn't agree more.

    Going on to your next post, you suggest using contractors for training -- I agree that their use could and probably should be expanded but with the caveat that the majority need to be old retired heads and in uniform, ala Junior ROTC instructors.

    Doctrine writers should be serving folks, period -- do not let a civilian, even one who's retired, anywhere near that. The folks that write it need to be the folks who are going to execute it, period.

    You also said:
    "The same can be said about levels of training – we were having a discussion the other day about levels of training for advisors. A sharp SNCO here said that what we might be wise to do is establish different levels of capability based on the amount of training or experiences an advisor had – and that by doing so we’d be capable of knowing what that guy could do. I thought it was a great idea – and its one we do in other areas. Another reason I thought it was great is I could see its utility to managing the training base and for planners trying to decide if a COA was feasible."
    I thought that's what we did?

    and:
    "we’re back to tough choices."
    Always been true and we have a bad tendency not to make those because we don't think it through and tend to take the easiest solutions. We like to avoid risk...

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