The Importance and Role of Training in Creating/Sustaining the Best Possible Forces

[Ski]

Superb thread, really making me think.

Training is really the tip of the pyramid - the force structure, resourcing, personnel policies and equipping capabilities all determine how well, how often and complex training can be. Seeing 5 HBCT's at Bliss and 4+ at Hood scare me - where are they going to find ranges for all these units....?

Also very interesting to hear that voice of experience known as Ken White chime in as per SOP.

[Ken White]

And that's all they are, opinions...

Interesting you mention Bliss (where I think that along with Dona Ana and White Sands the Combined Arms Center should be) and Hood -- which I think can support the range requirements. Though admittedly the range training, firing and qualifications processes all need refinement. Hopefully, for small arms the Army will stop insisting on the helmet and go routinely to hot ranges, that would speed things up a great deal...

So would moving Tanks and other tracks without ground guides. Never ceases to amaze me that we can and do manage that in combat but cannot do so in training. Sort of makes "Train as you will fight" suspect...

'Safety' is vastly overdone in training, the excessive and poorly thought out training safety guidelines are a significant training distractor. Risk avoidance, like Scotch, is an acquired taste...

I say all that about Bliss and Hood because the move to Benning is going to create major problems in regard to ranges and training areas (benefit of a political rather than a practical decision) and barring a major war, I'll be surprised if anyone can fire a tank main gun east of the Mississippi in the next twenty to forty years due to 'environmental' constraints -- activism, actually...

[Hacksaw]

As the title indicates, I'm not a TRADOC apologist. Stove pipes abound and despite the efforts of several professionals they tend to remain in place regardless of how many times they reorganize the deck chairs. That said, much has been done in the past three years to address issues described throughout the thread....
1. Initial Entry Training has moved out of the classroom and into the field. Warrior Tasks are trained in conditions that replicate (as best they can) the operational environment. Whether to standard? That is a leader issue, but it is the TRADOC commander's explicit top priority. From time eternal everyone has lamented the Soldier that comes out of BCT as "not good enough" - but he's alot better today than in 2004.
2. All new 2LTs and WO1 (loggies, JAG, MC as well) go through the Basic Officer Leader Course (I believe 6 weeks) that is conducted almost entirely in the field. It is only after this that they go to branch specific training. Again, are they competent combat leaders as they exit - probably not, but the product is a heck of a lot better.
3. All NCO courses are less than 8 weeks (possibly two exceptions), Tasks formerly in ANCOC are now in BNCOC, ANCOC is mostly old 1SG Course, 1SG course is dead. Again, nearly all the "filler" is done upfront using dL. Mostly MOS specific field craft. Perfect - nah but better
4. CCC (formerly known as OAC) is in the midst of the same type of change (refrained from using transformation).

To be clear is all this good enough - nope and more can and should be done from a generating base perspective.

As for unit training, units are assembling and deploying on short time lines and I won't second guess commanders who are trying to prioritize what they train and do not. I do agree in the strongest terms that units/Soldiers rise (or not) to the level of their leader's expectations.

Live well and row

[Ken White]

even with Google, it's hard to track down. Lot of guys in green right now aren't aware of all that (including my kid the know it all -- though he did tell me some of the bit about OSUT). An ORF like me is way outa the loop...

Still, I know we do better now than we've ever done, far better that in my day and even better than in 2004 as you say. Thanks again.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Ken,
I don't know. I'm not sure that CGSC/ILE is too long. It was a little different for us as functional area guys now go to the satellite campus before going or following their base line schools for their new area (ex. I did the 3+ month Basic Strategic Arts Program up at Carlisle - then did the 16 week Satellite Campus at Belvoir. Both courses had allot to offer, and I saw the POIs, instruction and discussion as complimentary, not as superfluous, or conflicting. We were told what the full ILE course POI looked like, and I think if the quality of instruction is as good (or close) as what we had at Belvoir, both the attendees and the folks they will go out and lead, or the staffs they will be part of, will benefit from the time they spent there.

Sam is probably a good guy to weigh in here (as is Marc - BTW - anybody seen him in awhile?), but more happens in the PME then just the teaching and inculcation of new knowledge I think - it is also presents the individual a chance to sort through their recent experiences and place them in the proper context - this for me is where I really learn what I just did - it gives me a chance to think about it, and apply it to the other things I'm learning. For me, its where that stuff stands a chance of becoming tacit knowledge, that I can draw on as a kind of intuition.

I also think that while the POIs are relevant, and need to be updated and pitched by good folks, the best learning for me comes in the discussion - which might start with something in the POI - but might wind up in a seeming unrelated place. There is also the benefit of the guest lecture series - etc.

As was also pointed out to me, for many - ILE may be the last time the Army invest in them on that scale - a relatively small portion will go to the SSCs (Senior Service Colleges) - which having had a chance to talk to some folks about those - I think they offer an educational experience that also benefits the individual and the Army.

I've know a few SAMS type folks, and have always been impressed with their contributions - the argument could be made I guess that those who'd attend would be so inclined anyway to "self-learn", but the ones I've asked have attributed their contributions to the opportunity afforded them - another good program we need to sustain.

One of the interesting things about DoD 3000.5, and also mentioned in the Army Campaign Plan for Stability Operations (that one is an FOUO doc released in August 2007), is the mention that military personnel will be expected to perform those duties/jobs (at least temporarily) - that while being better suited to a civilian from an OGA or from the HN, must be filled by us - until conditions (meaning security presumably - but could also mean OGA/HN capability or capacity) permit otherwise. Interesting how both documents really reflect the reality of ground truth - both now, historically (post hostilities in WWII) and at least likely actions following MCO in the future, if not before or during depending on when we put our foot in) vs. the way we'd really have liked to wage a war going into 2000.

Again, policy effects training - which makes sense seeing as how you "go" to war ideally to achieve some identified political purpose that could not (or was not as favorably decided through) be achieved through other means.

This trickles right on down the line in different ways and in different measures, and hopefully never impacts the basic things we need to do in order to meet the primary mission of defending the Constitution and the state from the Huns - but does get back to why you have a military - and what types of policies will require (or stand a chance of requiring) military power to achieve. At that point I think is where we get (or should get) rational we need for basing agreements, long term contracts, how many C-17s and TSVs we buy, etc. (with a healthy dose of domestic politics for good measure) - but our foreign policy often seems "jumpy", inconsitent, and sometimes vague about what is really important to us - which should drive all the DOTLMPF train - maybe that is the nature of who we are -but it makes focus not so easy.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

However, three thoughts occur. I have three good friends, all retired COLs. the Tanker went to Leavenworth and later taught there. He agrees with you on all counts but even he admits that the length is nice to have as opposed to totally necessary. The FA guy went to the AFSC at Norlfolk, shorter and he later served on two Joint staffs and commanded twice as a LTC, one FA Bn and one more exotic outfit. He was quite comfortable with the AFSC as opposed to CGSC. The Infantry Aviator OTOH didjn't go to any comparable course and contends he never missed 'em. Different strokes...

In any event, that's above my pay grade; you Field grades can sort that out...

Second thought is that in seven years as a Civilian Instructor and Branch Chief at the Armor School, I noted that a surprising number of the Advanced course Classes adopted "Wasted Days and Wasted Nights" as the Class song. Sort of funny but that was actually the case, honest.

At the same time, the AOBC classes generally felt short changed on time. When Shy Meyer as CoS, Army tried to change TRADOC's approach, he didn't succeed in getting the OBCs to nine months to a year but he did get them all increased by a month or more. His attempts to get the Advanced Courses chopped to two to twelve week courses tailored specifically to the individuals next assignment flopped totally. Most cited the rationale you cite, the extended learning environment, for their resistance to his ideas. Unfortunately, the TRADOC Manpower audit process that determines School staffing on Instructor (to student) Contact Hours would have had a significant bearing on that proposal in the form of manpower cuts and thus made those arguments at least a little suspect...

Lastly, back then, when we at the Schools developed a new POI, we had to simultaneously develop a Mobilization POI for the course (or a replacement or similar course) to be taught in the event necessary. Those POIs were invariably more intense, covered more tasks and were much shorter in duration than the peacetime versions. I always wondered about the logic of that.

You also said:

"This trickles right on down the line in different ways and in different measures, and hopefully never impacts the basic things we need to do in order to meet the primary mission of defending the Constitution and the state from the Huns - but does get back to why you have a military - and what types of policies will require (or stand a chance of requiring) military power to achieve. At that point I think is where we get (or should get) rational we need for basing agreements, long term contracts, how many C-17s and TSVs we buy, etc. (with a healthy dose of domestic politics for good measure) - but our foreign policy often seems "jumpy", inconsitent, and sometimes vague about what is really important to us - which should drive all the DOTLMPF train - maybe that is the nature of who we are -but it makes focus not so easy.

Boy, ain't that the truth...

[Rob Thornton]

Interesting & Good points, they get me thinking. When I went through the Armor Captains Career Course back in 2000 (as a token Infantryman – but one whose wife is from Louisville, and it’d also been recommended to me as a way to get my map out of my cargo pocket), there was some complaining by some guys about why we spent so much time doing BN and BDE level operations vs. focusing in on being a CO CDR – which we all thought was the end all & be all (it was certainly a whole lot more fun and rewarding!). However, the truth was that out of the time between being a CPT and a MAJ – I only spent about 2 of those 6 years in command. I spent three of the remaining four on some kind of staff, and the last one as an advisor, which was also more like being staff then being a CDR, and one in which the analytical skills I’d developed helped me help those I advised and worked with. The multiple experiences were mutually reinforcing.

I’ve also ran into folks who attended CAS3 and thought it was a waste of their time. Now I agree that it went overboard on “tools” such as the DEC MAT (or decision matrix), however, it did show how to (or how not to) present information largely devoid of context to somebody who had to make a decision, and only had a short attention span for a number of reasons. It also illustrated the limitations of trying to do so, which taught me to always add some kind of short info paper, or where possible craft a good letter or email to accompany something if I could not be there myself. One other thing CAS3 did was introduce (or reintroduce) me to non-Infantry/non-Combat Arms peers for the first time in a non- work/I need this now environment – it broadened my appreciation for them, as well as understanding their capabilities and limitations in regard to staff work (as well as my own) – this also helped down the road as my post command jobs brought me closer to those folks in different capacities.

I think there are naturals – like the Aviator you mentioned – some guys and gals are just well suited – they will never know if what they missed could have enhanced them, because by the standard they are already exceptional – like some guy who already throws a 90 mph fastball, his attendance to a clinic might only get him a mph or two more – it might make him great, but he was already really good. However, I think there are allot of guys who attending the clinic would turn an average, or less then average pitcher into a good one. They might not understand why it was important, or even believe it helped until they could look back and see how it worked out. To take it back down to where the rubber meets the road – my PLs always wanted to work platoon ops (and I probably did too as a PL), but the truth was the quality of their platoons had as much or more to do with squad proficiency and below on battle drills and individual and leader tasks then solely on how well they did a platoon attack – it was building blocks. Its why we have focuses as well – my focus was on squads, my boss the BN CDR was on platoons, and the BCT CDR was on companies – both for resourcing and tracking. Once I cracked the code on running squad LFX and STX lanes the proficiency of my platoons shot way up, the same with the BN’s focus on platoons, and ultimately the BCTs focus on companies – makes sense given the decentralized nature of today’s conditions (METT-TC)

I think its pretty tough when thinking about leader development (particularly today when guys split off into different tracks at the 04 level) in today’s conditions to decide when to cut one thing and not another – it goes back to risk, but also to clarity of purpose. I also wonder about how the needs of the Army (and Joint and Inter-Agency community) might affect what we consider today’s truth. If for example we expand faster then we can fill certain positions – where do we get more 04s/05s and 06s to fill critical roles – probably from the same place we always do, out of hide – which could mean faster (or slower) promotions in certain grades, greater retention incentives, wider “Return to Active Duty” programs. Stop loss/stop move type initiatives, or that all these support areas we’ve identified as needing quality people might suddenly become less important then the Operations side – which is the core of what we do. All of these have some type of effect on the force and often put people (but not always) who are less ideally qualified then what we’ve previously identified as the having met the standard qualifications to do that job (could be educational or experience/assignment type qualifications).

Again it gets back to anticipating / forecasting needs and we do that better when we understand (better understand) what we are likely to be asked to do.

Best, Rob

[Eden]

Rob, we already have what you are asking for. There is a very precise system for determining exactly what we should train, how long it will take to train soldiers and units in those tasks, how we can evaluate their expertise, the resources it will require to execute the training, what should be taught in schools and in the field, how long courses should be, how many course should be run, etc ad nauseum. It is a logical system that begins with the publication of the National Security Strategy and ends with the publication of unit taining schedules - briefed in detail at the QTB, submitted in writing 7 weeks prior, approved six weeks prior, posted four weeks out, changes allowed no later than 72 hours before execution. There are provisions for exceptions, waivers, requests for changes, and the like. The manuals and instructions associated with it can be found in training rooms across the Army.

The problem is that to make any significant change to your training program, especially if you are in a schoolhouse, takes about two years, minimum. Commanders, obviously, are not going to wait that long, so changes are made that cannot be resourced - because you are bypassing the system that provides those resources. So, you rob resources from elsewhere. In the end, either other training is shortchanged or maintenance is deferred. It is a vicious cycle that leaves post roads full of potholes, ranges oversubscribed, and us still training recruits in "React to Nuclear Explosion" but not "React to an IED".

In other words, it is extremely difficult to significantly improve training quantity or quality, Army-wide, under the current system. It was designed when the mission was "Enter the continent of Europe..." or "Delay the 3rd Guards Shock Army..." and served its purpose well for four or five decades. Now it is a creaking bureaucratic collossus that, like its evil twin in Alexandria, is the greatest obstacle to improving the quality of our Army today.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Eden,
Pretty much concur. The problem I think comes with the clarity which provides the linkages to make it all flow, as well as issues that come with trying to turn the super-tanker (some good things about it, some bad).

Given the nature of what I think you pretty accurately describe - it may be the best we can do. However, if it is possible to change it (or desirable) then I think it might have to begin with clarity of purpose - the NSS I think sets the tone - all the other documents get their bearing off of it (as it should be). Could it be more succinct? I'm not sure - even if I wish it were - it is after all the "National" Security Strategy, and sometimes being more concise means being more constrained. So the essential tasks in the NSS state:

- Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity
- Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends
-Work with others to defuse regional attacks
-Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies and our friends with WMD
-Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade
-Expand the Circle of Development by opening the societies and building the infrastructure of democracy
-Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century
-Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization

might be broad enough to encompass everything we might find ourselves doing, or required to do, but I'm not sure they do (or can) provide focus (they are not prioritized - nor does it say which ones might be more vital then others) - it kind of reminds me of writing your OER support form at the end of the rating period (I say sort of )

As they get translated along with other policy documents and speeches, etc. there are allot of disconnects that leave the pot holes you mentioned (or in some cases they might be broken bridges). Here is where leaders have to make decisions abut where to put the available resources (people, time, $$, land, etc.) Sometimes we get it right, sometimes not so much, and sometimes we get it wrong. There might be an element of risk at work here as well - it might be aversion or it might be mitigation - depends on how you look at it I guess. Could we do better - I guess that is the question on my mind at the moment, and if so how?

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

that might be an intersting subject to spend some more time thinknig about - how what is decided on as policy from folks inside the beltway equates to purpose, and direction in terms of education, training and health out at the tactical level - the various linkages and breaks in contact, etc. You could also study how the advice from folks on the outside of the beltway gets interpreted to become policy - then compare what guys and gals wind up having to do vs. what they might have been trained to do. You always hear about the sausage grinders - and wonder how that happens. It takes you back to the relation between tactics and strategy - you go in looking one way and come out looking ... different maybe.
Best, Rob

[Ken White]

but I do think he gives the "very precise system" far more credit than it possibly deserves. In my observation it has never been that precise and every step he mentions:

Rob, we already have what you are asking for. There is a very precise system for determining exactly what we should train, how long it will take to train soldiers and units in those tasks, how we can evaluate their expertise, the resources it will require to execute the training, what should be taught in schools and in the field, how long courses should be, how many course should be run, etc ad nauseum...

has human fallibility problems. Take the issue of selecting what should be taught in schools versus what is to be taught in the field. I know from sad experience that a portion of that distribution is based on 'Go' rates (those with low rates are 'better taught in the unit...' Heh.) and instructor contact hours required (more is better). I have been on too many POI task selection boards and watched the input from Commanders in the field with respect to what is to be taught where get scant if any attention.

In other words, it is extremely difficult to significantly improve training quantity or quality, Army-wide, under the current system. It was designed when the mission was "Enter the continent of Europe..." or "Delay the 3rd Guards Shock Army..." and served its purpose well for four or five decades. Now it is a creaking bureaucratic collossus that, like its evil twin in Alexandria, is the greatest obstacle to improving the quality of our Army today.

Absolutely correct. The system tries, it really does -- and most people mean well and make it work in spite of the impediments. We just need to remove the impediments and get serious about training. Unfair statement; most of us ARE serious about it -- however, we need to give the problem more thought and do a better job of getting the basics down for new entrants of whatever rank.

[Ken White]

A few thoughts on them.

The Clinic metaphor is a good one and a "clinic" is needed for the average bear-- no question. I totally agree with the focus you and your Bn placed on the various echelons in todays world -- but would also submit that if the PLs were better trained, THEY could focus on th Squads while the Company Commander focused on them...

Looking down one echelon is far better than looking down two, precludes micro management, keeps the Co Cdr out of the PLs hair and the Bn Cdr (and Staff...) out of the Co Cdrs hair.

Yes, sorting out the mixes and tracks is difficult. I think, to an extent, we have made that so by having too many Officers (as a percentage of the force) and that many of them are in unnecessary positions. Most Staffs, in my experience are over large (and the higher one goes the overlarger they are...) and I'm still trying to figure out why the Artillery need Officers for FOs -- I know why they did in WW I and even in WW II -- I do not know why that's necessary today. Other than to populate the Branch...

I know we do that for mobilization backup and other purposes, I simply question the efficiency and the dilution of leadership and the forays into strange jobs that add little value to either the Army or the Officer.

All small stuff. There are are two big things where I'd throw in a cynical old fogey whose seen it all (or most of it, anyway) caution:

One is forecasting -- we are unlikely to ever get that right and I'm unsure why we try to such an inordinate extent (other than that Congress and the MBA model expect us to do that, factors of which I'm well aware). The point being; yeah, we sort of have to do it but we should not hang our flop hats on the accuracy of those forecasts. Be very prepared for the unforeseen is what I think I'm saying...

The second is in putting too much stock in a top down approach. I think that's dangerous. Using the NSS is sensible and totally logical way to drive our train(s). Unfortunately, the US Government is not a totally logical beast and it can change complexions, appetites and colors -- much less directions -- on a two to four to eight year basis (and even more often, all on a plitical whim or two). The Army cannot adapt well to that speed of change, it needs to focus on its core missions, concentrate on doing the basics better than everyone else in the world and just be prepared.

Hewing to the 'guidance' or predilections of the government of the day is fraught with danger. Equally bad is attempting (as in the Weinberger or Powell 'Doctrines') to shape that guidance and those desires. The Army just needs to be prepared to do its job as a full spectrum armed force in the service of the nation and it must be prepared for political irrationality and abnormal missions in strange places that fly in the face of the 'strategy' du jour or even common sense.

And it should and must do that TOTALLY apolitically (in thought and word and deed).

[Rob Thornton]

Ken,
Good points - I will (and have) certainly profess that today's PLs are far sharper then I was as a PL - I think war has done that - on a number of levels some of which we've talked about here on this thread.

Part of it is in resources though - trying to do an independent PLT LFX is tricky to resource - not just in terms of CL V, but in terms of OCs, ammo handlers, RTO operators to keep in touch with RNG CNTRL, Road Guards, sychronization, etc. - when I did do it, I did not get as good of throughput - when I did SQD LFXs/STXs I was able to leverage more leadership and we got more training. Another thing I did often was a rifle squad LFX + the platoon weapons squad, and/or a vehicle in support (sometimes even hand held 60s (the mortar variety) - sort of a twofer that was easy to pull off and let me work SBF tasks in conjunction with squad battle drills. It depends on what we were after, and the 1SG along with the rest of my company leadership came together to discuss it.

Now I did allow the PLs and PSGs to take a portion of the white space available to ID, Plan and resource their own training plan - which usually gave them a 5 day period every QTR - I may have only had 5-10 days myself for stuff I felt was important - but I felt it very important that they had a chance to go out and learn resourcing and training in a way they could not when somebody else plans it - it was part of their leader development, and it built an element of autonomy and confidence into their decision making.


I'm not an artilleryman, but I was an 0861 my first 3 years in the FMF - there were no officers on my NGF spot team, however we did have a USN LT as the NGLO. As for FOs in the company - mine was a good one I got allot of leverage out of - in addition to heading up my ADHOC FS platoon (the mortars, the FSE and the Sniper section) he also served as my Intel Analyst. I think the principal value he may have gotten out of it - aside from the opportunity to be a leader - was understanding of how combined arms works from the rifle company perspective before going on to command a battery. For a LT with the last name Cody he might one day need a good understanding of more then just the Artillery Branch

I agree with you on the value of forecasting - its something we do, but if you pin your hopes on it you're likely to be disappointed. A rule of thumb I tried to follow was don't create training that is so contingent on a particular range or condition that you won't be able to execute it in some modified form if something changes. Its a rule that served me well.

I also agree on the issue of "top down" approach. I think at the BCT level and below things need to be generally nested in the METL or mission requirements for pretty easy reasons - its the bread and butter. But I think that folks also need to understand there are ripples with policy decisions - we've talked about those before - partly I write to work through problems with SWC members that I'm thinking about - and where possible I try to inform or get others to think - we've got a big audience.

I think you've summed it up well here:

Hewing to the 'guidance' or predilections of the government of the day is fraught with danger. Equally bad is attempting (as in the Weinberger or Powell 'Doctrines') to shape that guidance and those desires. The Army just needs to be prepared to do its job as a full spectrum armed force in the service of the nation and it must be prepared for political irrationality and abnormal missions in strange places that fly in the face of the 'strategy' du jour or even common sense

I don't think we should shape policy goals - but I do think we have a responsibility to inform about consequences and effects - particularly if a belief exists that a military COA to achieve a political end is feasible based on faulty assumptions for whatever reasons; or if the military analysis on what the consequences of doing something (or not doing something) are incongruent with the civilian side. Being prepared to do our job may require keeping those who appropriate and allocate resources in the loop about how things play out on the ground, or are likely to play out on the ground based on our best judgment - which is what GEN (R) Shinseki was asked by Congress to give ref. his estimates on the size of the force required to secure and stabilize post invasion Iraq. It is a curved and grey line at times I think.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

Oh, the FOs are almost all great guys -- I never ran into a bad one; just think it's overkill for the job. We may move away from that, may not -- but in the interim, I understand the new Combined Arms or Maneuver Captains course at Benning post 2012 will also include Fires guys; that's good.

I don't think we should shape policy goals - but I do think we have a responsibility to inform about consequences and effects - particularly if a belief exists that a military COA to achieve a political end is feasible based on faulty assumptions for whatever reasons; or if the military analysis on what the consequences of doing something (or not doing something) are incongruent with the civilian side. Being prepared to do our job may require keeping those who appropriate and allocate resources in the loop about how things play out on the ground, or are likely to play out on the ground based on our best judgment - which is what GEN (R) Shinseki was asked by Congress to give ref. his estimates on the size of the force required to secure and stabilize post invasion Iraq. It is a curved and grey line at times I think.
Best, Rob

Emphatically agree. We have an obligation to inform as accurately as possible and take it to the mat. That means that it is incumbent upon both the administration of the day AND Congress to listen and assess. It also means we have to be absolutely honest and not play games with either of those two --a, ummm, minor shortfall on our part on occasion -- to keep credibility.

I think we need to do a better job of educating the American public about the Armed Forces, what we do, who we are and why we do some of the things we do. The loss of a lot of 'veterans' in our society has had an adverse impact (as has been discussed here and elsewhere).

Back on track, while I know Congress in particular causes some of those games and we're sort of forced to play, I personally believe that we're smart enough to outflank and out think Congress and we should do that rather than get annoyed at them and tend to blow them off (which we tend to do too often to the incompetents in media as well. Yeah, I know... ). I also know that doing that is extremely tricky and it would be easy to slip into something akin to politicking.

Not only a curved and gray line, I think it's a snake that can pop up and bite if it's stepped on...

Guess that's why the gen-gens get the big bucks. Hmm. Given the sometimes awesome scope of responsibility versus the comparatively low pay, maybe I should say "very slightly bigger bucks."

[patmc]

We may move away from that, may not -- but in the interim, I understand the new Combined Arms or Maneuver Captains course at Benning post 2012 will also include Fires guys; that's good.

FA and ADA established the Fires Center of Excellence, or whatever it is called this week, at Fort Sill. Is this going away? Most of the FA Captains I know want the Maneuver Course, but are shot down because FACCC is not being filled. Fires officers can attend MCCC, just rare these days. My previous two FA BN CDRs attended both FA and IN or AR CCC. The BDE CDRS did as well. Those days are gone, but the attitude is still out there that MCCC is the better choice.